Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Jagdish And Ors. vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr. on 29 July, 1997
Equivalent citations: II(1998)DMC619, 1997(1)WLC437
JUDGMENT S.C. Mittal, J.
1. This petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code is directed against the order dated 21.12.1994 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh in Criminal Original Case No. 223/94 under Sections 406 and 498A, IPC whereby the application submitted by the petitioners on 7.10.1994 challenging the jurisdiction of the Court was dismissed and ordered to hear the arguments for charge.
2. The SHO, Suratgarh submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioners in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh for offences under Sections 406 and 498A, Indian Penal Code after completing the investigation on a report by Smt. Narayani daughter of Khayali Ram and wife of petitioner No. 1 Jagdish on 22.3.1994 in which she stated that she was married to petitioner No. 1 Jagdish on 7.2.1991 at Manak Khedi according to Hindu rites. Gold and silver ornaments were given to her by her father in the marriage which she entrusted to her mother-in-law petitioner No. 2 Smt. Chavli and her brother-in-law petitioner No. 3 Rameshwar Lal. Her father also gave as a present Rs. 31,000/- to Jagdish in Tika ceremony. It was further stated that the petitioners were not satisfied with the presents and started treating her with cruelty. She was beaten by the petitioners. The petitioners asked her to bring Rs. 1 lac from her father and threatened to kill her. She wrote a letter to her father. Her brother and maternal uncle came there and took her to her parents house. It was alleged that had she not been taken by her brother to her parents the petitioner would have killed her. Panchayat was held several times but the dispute could not be settled. The petitioners bluntly said that she could live with them only when she brought Rs. 1 lac from her parents. The petitioners also refused to return her 'Stri Dhan'. The offences under Sections 406, and 498A, Indian Penal Code were registered to Police Station, Suratgarh and charge-sheet was submitted as stated above.
3. The petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the Court of learned Addi- tional Chief Judicial Magistrate to try the case but the application filed by the petitioners was rejected.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Counsel for the complainant.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the learned Trial Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case because according to the First Information Report she was subjected to cruelty by the petitioners at Binjbayala which does not fall within the jurisdiction of Additional Chief Magis- trate, Suratgarh. It has also been alleged that she entrusted her 'Stridhan' to Rameshwar Lal and Chavli at Binjbayala. Therefore the petitioners are liable to account for it also at Binjbayala. No offence was committed under Section 498A, Indian Penal Code at Manak Khedi i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of the Additional Chief Magistrate, Suratgarh. It is further contended that the offences under Sections 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code are distinct offences not covered under Section 220, Criminal Procedure Code. Both the above offences do not form part of the same transaction. Therefore, the learned Trial Court's view is erroneous that the offences are triable by it by virtue of Section 220, Criminal Procedure Code. No offence is made out against the petitioners No. 2 and 4 because specific allegations of cruelty have not been levelled against them. It is further argued that there is no prima facie material on the record to show dishonest misappropriation of 'Stridhan'. It is, therefore, submitted that the Court of Addi- tional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh has no territorial jurisdiction to try the matter before at the learned Counsel for the complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor have supported the impugned order. Their contention is that there are specific allegations against the petitioners for subjecting Narayani to cruelty and also misappropriation of 'Stridhan'. She was compelled to go to her parents on account of the cruelty and the circumstances created by the petitioners. She is being subjected to mental cruelty by the petitioners by coercing her to bring Rs. one lac otherwise she could not live with her husband.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions. I have also perused the allegations in the FIR and the documents under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code. The offence of subjecting a woman to cruelty by husband or relative of husband has been defined under Section 498, Indian Penal Code for the purpose of this offence under Section 498A, "cruelty" means wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause injury or danger to her life, limb or health. If a woman is put to harassment with a view to coerce her or her relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable security or on account of failure to meet such demand then such harassment is also covered under the definition of cruelty' given in the explanation of Section 498A, Indian Penal Code.
7. If repeated demand for dowry is meted and harassment is made out to a woman which may be physical or mental is an act of cruelty. It is not necessary that the husband or his relatives must be present at the time when the wife is subject to cruelty. If their act, conduct, omission or commission is of such a nature which results in mental and physical harassment it will amount to an act of cruelty to a woman and it is immaterial that the woman is living at that relevant time at her matrimonial home or at her parents house. The offence under Section 498A is a continuing offence and if the act of cruelty continues even while, the woman is living at her parents house, the offence is triable by both the Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction the act of continuing offence of cruelty has been committed at matrimo- nial home or the parents house.
8. In the instant case prima facie it has been shown that Narayani was subjected to cruelty at her matrimonial home Binjbayala and she was compelled to leave the matrimonial home due to the threats given by the petitioners. It has been further stated that when she was living at her parents house the petitioners insisted on their demand for Rs. one lac failing which she will have to remain at her parents house. This prima facie at this stage shows that the petitioners continued to cause harass- ment to Narayani with a view to coerce her to satisfy their unlawful demand i.e. to compel her to live at her parents house. Therefore, prima facie it appears that she has been subjected to cruelty at Manak Khedi within the definition of 'cruelty' given in. the explanation of Section 498A, Indian Penal Code. On taking into consideration the FIR and the papers under investigation i.e. the statements of witnesses, it appears that act of maltreatment and humiliation by the petitioners continued even while Narayani was residing with her parents. Therefore, I am of the view that Clause (c) of Section 178, Criminal Procedure Code is clearly attracted and the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh has also territorial jurisdic- tion to try the case against the petitioners under Section 498A, Indian Penal Code which is a continuing offence.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon several judgments reported in 1994 (2) All India Hindu Law Reporter 589 (Pb. & Hry.), Punjab and Haryana High Court; Balwinder Kumar Shartna v. State of Haryana, 1996 (1) All India Hindu Law Reporter 303 (Pb. & Hry.), Punjab & Haryana High Court; Karambir v. State of Haryana, 1996(1) All India Hindu Law Reporter 109,(Pb.&Hry.), Punjab & Haryana High Court; Satinder Kumar v. Asha Rani, 1994 (2) All India Hindu Law Reporter 552 (Pb. & Hry.), Punjab & Haryana High Court; Kulwant Singh v. Kanta Rani, (1993) 2 Cur. Cri. R. 930, Allahabad; Sunil Kumar v. State of U.P., 1993 (1) All India Hindu Law Reporter 631 (Pb. & Hry.), Punjab and Haryana; Jatinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1995 (2) All Hindu Law Reporter 602 (Pb. & Hry.); Tarsem v. Amrit Kaur. All the above cases do not render any help to the petitioners. In all the above cases the facts were different and the provisions under Section 178(2) was not considered on the facts of the cases.
10. In the instant case, Narayani was maltreated for dowry and she was subjected to cruelty at Binjbayala matrimonial home. She was threatened to be killed if she did not bring Rs. one lac from her parents and it became unsafe for her to live at her matrimonial home. She was compelled to leave her matrimonial home and to reside with her parents at Manak Khedi. The petitioners insisted on the unlawful demand of dowry and did not call her back unless she brought Rs. one lac from her parents and thereby causing harassment and maltreatment to coerce her and the parents to concede their unlawful demand for dowry. The petitioners refused to return 'Stridhan 'articles also committing an act of dishonest misappropriation with a view to again coerce Narayani and her parents to satisfy their unlawful demand. The above series of acts are so connected together as to form the part of the same transaction. The offences alleged in the instant case under Sections 498A and 406, Indian Penal Code are undoubtedly distinct offences but appears to have been committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction and therefore the petitioners can be charged and tried for both the offences by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh. 'Stridhan' was entrusted at Binjbayala but on demand it was required to be returned or accounted by the petitioners to Narayani complainant at Manak Khedi where she was residing with the parents. In view of the above situation, the learned Trial Court has territorial jurisdiction to try the offence of Section 406, Indian Penal Code and all other offences committed by the petitioners in one series of acts forming the same transaction. I have already held that the acts of maltreatment and harassment i.e. the cruelty at Binjbayala and Manak Khedi is a continuing offence of Section 498A and dishonestly retaining the 'Stridhan' required to be returned at Manak Khedi i.e. offence under Section 406 forms part of the same transaction. In my opinion the provisions of Sections 178(c), 181(4) and 220, Criminal Procedure Code are clearly attracted to confer territorial jurisdiction to the learned Trial Court to try the above stated offences against the petitioners.
11. There is one more important aspect of the case that when complainant wife was maltreated and subjected to cruelty so much so that she ferred for her life due to the threats given by the petitioners, the consequences of all the above acts of the petitioners ensued at Manak Khedi that she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home and to reside with her parents at Manak Khedi. She was not being called back to force her and parents to fulfil the unlawful demand of dowry. Section 179, Criminal Procedure Code says that where an act is an offence by reason of any thing which has been been done and all the consequences which have ensued, the offence may be enquired by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. I am of the view that Section 179, Criminal Procedure Code is also attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh has clearly territorial jurisdiction to try the offences.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further argued that there are vague allegations against the petitioner No. 4 about committing act of cruelty. There are no specific allegations regarding the entrustment of 'Stridhan' to petitioner No. 1 Jagdish and Smt. Indra petitioner No. 4. This case is at the stage of hearing the arguments for charge. I do not deem it just and proper to discuss and scrutinise the statements of the witnesses under Section 161, Criminal Procedure Code and other material on record while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code because the petitioners will have full opportunity to make their submissions in this regard before the learned Trial Court. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh has territorial jurisdiction to try the offences against the petitioner in view of the provisions contained in Sections 187(c), 179,181(4) and 220, Criminal Procedure Code.
13. Consequently, the impugned order dated 21.12.1994 is upheld and the petition is hereby dismissed.