Patna High Court
Bijay Sahu @ Bijay Sah vs The State Of Bihar on 29 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.62 of 2004
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1. Bijay Sahu @ Bijay Sah S/O Nokhe Sahu R/O Vill.- Kapasiya, P.S.- Arer,
Dist.- Madhubani
2. Ram Sahu @ Ram Sah, son of Nokhe Sahu, R/O Vill.- Kapasiya, P.S.-
Arer, District - Madhubani (abated vide Court's order dated 0311.2025.)
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar
2. Nathuni Pasi S/O Jailal Pasi R/O Vill.- Kapasiya, P.S.- Arer, Dist.-
Madhubani
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, Adv.
Mr. Purushottam Kumar, Adv.
Ms. Somali Acharya, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Ms. Anita Kumari, APP
For Resp. No. 2 : Mr. Shakti Suman, Adv.
Mr. Rajesh Ranjan -1, Adv.
Ms. Maria Nazir, Adv.
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CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. G. ANUPAMA
CHAKRAVARTHY
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 29-04-2026
1. This appeal is arising out of the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 14.01.2004 passed in
T.R. No. 185/03 arising out of CR No. 375/99 on the file of
Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
Madhubani, whereby, the appellants were convicted for the
offence punishable under Sections 3(1)(v) and 3(1)(x) SC/ST
Act and under Sections 323 and 427 of the IPC and were
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for
the offence punishable Sections 3(1)(v) and 3(1)(x) SC/ST Act
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026
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and rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offences
punishable under Sections 323 and 427 of the IPC.
2. Heard, Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, the Learned
Advocated assisted by Ms. Somali Acharya, the Learned
Advocate for the appellant, Ms Maria Nazir, the Learned
Advocate for the informant and Ms. Anita Kumari Singh, the
Learned APP for the State.
3. The case of the complainant /Nathuni Pasi in brief is
that Khesara Nos. 250 and 251 situated in village- Kapasiya
are Gair Majarua lands wherein the complainant and his uncle
have 5 dhurs of land in their name over which there was an
ancestral house. The Government had issued Basgit Parcha in
favour of the complainant, as they are landless poor persons.
The accused persons (including appellant) are influential
persons and they forcibly dismantled the house and
dispossessed the complainant and constructed a wall thereon.
4. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant
approached the local police, but the police did not register the
case, for which, the complainant was constrained to prefer a
private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Madhubani.
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026
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5. The contents of the complaint disclose that alleged
incident took place on 17.04.1999 in the morning hours, but
the complaint petition was preferred before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Madhubani on 19.04.1999 i.e. after two days of
the occurrence.
6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madhubani after
examining the complainant and some of the witnesses took
cognizance of the offence against the accused persons including
the appellant on 18.09.2000 for the offences punishable under
Sections 144, 323, 427 of the IPC and under Section 3(1)(iv),
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989, and
issued summons to the accused. Thereafter the case was
transmitted to the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST Prevention of
Atrocities Act, Madhubani on 17.04.2001.
7. During the course of trial, the Special Court framed
charges against one Nokhe Sah, Ram Sah and Bijay Sah for
the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 427 of the IPC
as well as under Section 3(1)(iv), 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Prevention
of Atrocities Act, 1989. The charges were read over and
explained to the accused persons and they pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026
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8. Further, the record reveals that on 16.01.2002, the
trial court had abated the criminal proceedings against Nokhe
Sah, in view of his death.
9. During the course of trial, the prosecution has
examined six witnesses and following exhibits were marked:
P.W.1 Arun Kumar Jha Co-villager
P.W.2 Ramawtar Mahto Bhagina of
complainant)
P.W.3 Suresh Mahto son of complainant
P.W.4 Nathuni Mahto complainant)
P.W.5 Laxmi Mahto Typist
P.W.6 Umesh Thakur Advocate Clerk
Ext.1 Complaint petition
Ext. 2 Basgit Parcha in the name of
Nathuni Pasi
Ext. 3 Photocopy of Basgit Parcha in
the name of Lakhan Pasi
Ext. 4 Rent receipt no. 604117
Ext. 5 Rent receipt no. 604116
10. On behalf of the defense, three witnesses were
examined and two exhibits were brought on record. They are
as follows :
D.W.1 Rambujhawan Sah
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026
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D.W.2 Sukhdeo Chaudhary
D.W.3 Subhash Chandra
Mishra
Ext. A Rent receipt
Ext. A1 to A/5 Rent receipt 30 years old
in torn condition.
11. On consideration of entire material on record, the
trial court convicted the appellants for the offence punishable
under Sections 323 and 427 IPC and under Section 3(1)(iv),
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 and
sentenced them in the manner as stated supra.
12. It also appears that the present appeal was filed by
two appellants, namely, Ram Sahu @ Ram Sah and Bijay Sahu
@ Bijay Sah. However, during the pendency of the present
appeal, appellant no. 1/ Ram Sahu @ Ram Sah died on
15.01.2023. In this regard a death certificate was brought on record by the appellants through I.A. No. 1/2024 and this Court vide order dated 20.09.2025 abated the appeal as also the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court against Ram Sahu @ Ram Sah.
13. The point for determination in this appeal are as Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 6/42 follows-
(i) Whether the trial court is right in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 427 IPC and Section 3(1)(iv), 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 ?
(ii) Whether the prosecution/complainant was able to prove the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 427 IPC and Section 3(1)(iv), 3(1)
(x) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 beyond reasonable doubt ?
14. In order to decide the points, it is just necessary to re-appreciate the evidence on record.
15. P.W. 1/ Arun Kumar Jha, a co-villager, testified that approximately two years prior to his deposition, at 7:00 A.M., he was proceeding toward Kapasiya from his house, he witnessed a quarrel near the residence of Nathuni Pasi. He further testified that Nokhe Sah, Vijay Sah, and Ram Sah were dismantling Nathuni Pasi's house. When Nathuni resisted, they assaulted him with fists. Subsequently, Nokhe Sah constructed a brick boundary wall and uttered abusive and derogatory words.
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 7/42
16. In a significant identification error, P.W. 1 identified a person in court as appellant (Bijay Sah) who was, in fact, accused (Ram Sah). He further testified that when he reached the place of occurrence, about 10 to 11 persons were present and the quarrel continued for 10 minutes, however, he did not attempt to intervene. According to his evidence there was a land dispute and that the three accused assaulted Nathuni Pasi with fists and slaps, four or five times but Nathuni Pasi did not become unconscious.
17. He stated that a three-layer brick wall was constructed in his presence and that the appellant, Ram Sah and Nokhe Sah dismantled a hut and that Bijay Sah and Yogendra Sah ( co-sharer of Nathuni Pasi) were also present there. He specifically admitted that he came to court to testify, at the request of Nathuni Pasi's son, Suresh Mahto
18. The evidence of P.W. 2, Ramawtar Mahto, disclose that the incident took place on April 7, 1999, at approximately 7:00 A.M. Upon hearing an uproar, he went to the house of Nathuni Pasi, where he saw Nokhe Sah, Ram Sah, and Vijay Sah dismantling the structure. When Nathuni Pasi attempted to resist, the accused threatened to burn the house of the " sala"
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 8/42 by setting it on fire. He categorically deposed that Nathuni Pasi was assaulted with fists and slaps and that the accused demolished a 10-foot wall though they did not actually set it on fire. He further testified that the land in question belonged to Nathuni Pasi and that the accused persons had no legal claim over it.
19. In his cross-examination, P.W. 2 admitted that Nathuni Pasi is his maternal uncle and that his house is adjacent to the place of occurrence. He stated that the dismantled structure was a thatched hut; however, he could not specify its length or width. He further stated that that the dismantling of house took half an hour and he was present at the scene for approximately twenty minutes during the initial stage. Thereupon a wall was constructed on the land. According to him, three persons dug foundation trench that was 10 feet long and one and a half cubits deep. He further testified that laborers took about half an hour to dig the foundation, after which a mason constructed a wall 5 feet high and 10 feet long. The construction continued till 4:00 P.M.
20. P.W. 2 further claimed that he remained at the place of occurrence from 7:00 A.M. till 4:00 P.M. Finally, he testified Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 9/42 that 50 to 60 people gathered by the time, he reached the scene, however, no one attempted to rescue Nathuni Pasi from the accused persons.
21. It is specifically admitted by P.W.2 at para -9 of his cross-examination that Nathuni's house is still existing on the same plot. He further admitted that Nathuni had obtained 5 ¼ dhurs of land from Govt. through Basgit Govt. parcha.
22. The evidence of P.W.3, Suresh Mahto, disclose that the incident took place on April 7, 1999, at approximately 7:00 A.M. The accused persons, namely, Ram Sah, Bijay Sah, and Nokhe Sah dismantled the house of Nathuni Pasi while uttering derogatory words that, "You would not stay here, sala Pasi." When Nathuni tried to resist, accused threatened him, saying, "Sala, we will burn you along with this." He further testified that they assaulted Nathuni with fists and slaps, and that the house in question belonged to Nathuni Pasi.
23. In his cross-examination, P.W.3 admitted that Nathuni Pasi is his father and testified that he had not previously deposed in this case. He stated that the place of occurrence is a Gair Majarua land and that 5 ¼ dhurs of land had been allotted to his father through a government parcha. Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 10/42 His evidence further reveals that no house remained on the land after the occurrence. The parcha land is adjacent to the site where Nathuni sells toddy and where a small house measuring about 1 ½ dhurs exists.
24. P.W.3 could not confirm whether the hut used for the toddy shop was part of the same plot, he later stated that the toddy shop was built on the same land. P.W.3 admitted that the disputed land, which was received by his father through Parcha, situated just one step from his house. His evidence specifically disclose that two thatched houses existed in the name of his father in the plot. According to him, three accused arrived together and assaulted his father with 30 to 35 fists and slaps on his back, arms, and other parts of the body. Consequently, Nathuni Pasi lost consciousness and three accused began dismantled the house. At paragraph No. 12, P.W.3 specifically testified that his father regained consciousness after ten minutes and he took his father to home. The accused then rapidly built a wall after dismantling the house. According to him, the foundation work commenced at 8:00 A.M., and took aproximately one hour to complete. The wall construction got completed by 3:00 P.M. The resulting Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 11/42 structure was approximately 20 arms long, 10 arms broad, and 2 ½ man-lengths high, constructed using mud paste. P.W.3 did not identify who prepared or provided the mud paste. Finally, he testified that they did not go to the police station, after the assault, but instead of it instituted a case in Court. He further testaified that his father had filed two similar cases against these accused persons in the same Court, and that while his younger brother managed the litigation ( pairvi), his father never visited the Court.
25. P.W. 4, Nathuni Pasi, the complainant, testified that the incident occurred at 7:00 A.M. He stated that the accused persons/Nokhe Sah, Ram Sah, and Bijay Sah, abused him at his residence, assaulted him, and dismantled his house. During the incident, they uttered the derogatory caste based slur, "Harijan sala, we will not allow you to stay here." He further affirmed that the plot was allotted to him by the Government through a parcha and that the accused had no legal interest in the land.
26. In his cross-examination, P.W. 4 testified that the occurrence took place on saturday, the accused initially abused him and subsequently assaulted him with 15 to 20 Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 12/42 slaps on his face, back, and stomach. He further stated that only children were present in the courtyard during the assault, and no other adults were nearby. He further specified that the accused fled after the assault and he did not inform anyone in the village about the incident.
27. According to his testimony, P.W.s 1 to 3 arrived about five minutes after the physical assault had ended. P.W. 4 stated that he filed a case in Madhubani at 10:00 A.M. on the same day. He further testified that he initially went to the police station to submit a written application at 8:00 A.M., but as no action was taken, he proceeded to the Court at about 10:00 A.M. and filed a private complaint. His evidence further reveal that there were two houses on the property; out of which, one was dismantled, while the other, where he sells toddy remained standing. He alleged that the accused erected a wall on the disputed land with the help of four to five unidentified labourers. He described the foundation as one cubit deep, 10 cubits long, and 5 cubits wide, with the wall reaching a length of 15 cubits. The construction on the land continued until 3:00 P.M., P.W. 4 admitted he was not present during the construction process, as he had gone elsewhere. He Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 13/42 further admitted that 2 ½ dhurs of land had been allotted to his uncle and 2 dhurs of land had been allotted to him, however, he could not identify the Khata or Khesara numbers of the disputed plot.
28. The evidence of P.W.5/Laxmi Mahto disclose that he had typed the complaint petition of Nathuni Pasi and had put his name on the complaint petition as the typist. The complaint petition was marked as Exhibit- 1.
29. In the cross-examination, P.W.5 testified that he was not personally aware about the contents of the complaint petition.
30. P.W.6, namely, Umesh Thakur, testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting and signature of Shashikant Jha, the Revenue Clerk of Kapasiya Panchayat. He identified the writings and signature of Shashikant Jha on two land revenue receipts. Out of which, one was in the name of Nathuni Pasi and other was in the name of Lakhan Pasi, which were marked as Exhibit 4 and 4/1 respectively.
31. On perusal of the docket orders of the trial court, it is evident that Exhibits 2 and 3, which are Basgit Parchas in the name of Nathuni Pasi and Lakhan Pasi were marked Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 14/42 through P.W.5/the typist. However, the evidence on record does not disclose that these documents were marked through P.W.5.
32. As stated supra, on behalf of the defence, three witnesses were examined. D.W.1/Rambujhawan Sah testified that he knew both the complainant as well as the accused persons. According to him, the house of Nokhe Sah was situated nearby his house. The disputed land belonged to Nokhe Sah and had remained in the possession of Nokhe Sah and his ancestors since time immemorial. Nathuni Pasi used to run a toddy shop in a thatched hut which belonged to Nokhe Sah and that Nathuni Pasi had taken the house on rent from Nokhe Sah. He further testified that he did not witness any physical altercation as alleged in the complaint petition and also testified that Nokhe Sah had neither dismantled the thatched house nor the disputed hut/house.
33. In his cross-examination, he testified that the population of his village is two to three thousand and he cannot specify about the Khata or Khesara number of disputed land and that he had not seen any document relating to the disputed land. He further testified that Nokhe Sah is related to Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 15/42 him as grandfather.
34. D.W.2/ Sukhdeo Chaudhary, is an Advocate's Clerk. His evidence disclose that he had mentioned in the list of documents about a receipt dated 26.04.1943 standing in the name of Munni Sah.
35. D.W.3, namely, Subhash Chandra Mishra testified that after examining to the land revenue receipt, he found that it was written in the handwriting of one Shyam Ram, which was marked as Exhibit- A. He further testified that Ram Sah had submitted five land receipts which were marked as Exhibits A1 to A5. He further testified that he filed the case in the presence of writer. The documents were written/scribed in his presence and he had seen the documents for the first time.
36. The Learned counsel for the appellant urged that there are numerous discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses. It is contended that the trial court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record while convicting the appellant.
37. Firstly, the Learned counsel argued that the essential ingredients of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act are not attracted in the present case and the complainant failed to Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 16/42 establish that the alleged incident occurred within 'public view.' Furthermore, it is contended that the dispute is purely civil in nature and rendering the provisions of the SC/ST Act is not at all applicable. In support of the said contention, the Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which shall be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs of this judgment.
38. Additionally, the Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the requisite ingredients of the offence punishable under Sections 423 and 427 of the IPC. Consequently, it was submitted that the trial court's judgment warrants interference and prayed to set aside the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed by the trial Court.
39. On the other hand, the Learned APP for the State and the Learned counsel appearing for the informant contended that the appellant abused the complainant by taking his caste name and, therefore, the offence under SC/ST Act is duly proved and, accordingly prayed to confirm the judgment of the trial Court.
40. On appreciation of entire evidence available on Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 17/42 record, it is evident that P.W.1 identified a person, who was not the accused by name. He identified one person as Bijay Sah but the said person was Ram Kumar Sah.
41. On perusal of complaint petition, it is evident that name of P.W.1 was not mentioned in the list of witnesses. P.W.1 also admitted in his evidence that there was a civil dispute between Nathuni Pasi, Ram Sah and the appellant/Bijay Sah and that the complainant's son brought him to the Court to depose in their favour.
42. There are inconsistencies from the evidence of prosecution witnesses. P.W.1 testified that there were about 10 to 11 persons present at the time of occurrence. P.W. 2 testified that there were about 50 to 60 persons present at the place of occurrence. P.W.3 did not testify as to the number of persons present at the place of occurrence. P.W.4 the complainant himself, stated that there were no adults at the time of occurrence, except the children who were playing nearby.
43. Further, the evidence of P.W.2 at para no. 6 of his cross-examination disclose that the labourers dugged the pit for foundation of the wall and he remained at the place of Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 18/42 occurrence till the completion of wall i.e. from 7.00 A.M. to 4.00 P.M.
44. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W.3, who is the son of the complainant disclose (at para no. 12) that there were no labourers. The foundation was dug at about 8.00 A.M. and that the construction ended by 3.00 P.M. Further, the evidence of P.W.4 disclose (at para no. 5) that four to five persons had built the wall though he could not identify the labourers engaged in the said construction.
45. Further inconsistencies from the evidence of P.W.s 1, 2 and 3 are that P.W.1 had not witnessed the dismantling of the house and had only gone to the place where the quarrel was taking place. It is specifically testified by him that the accused persons had not used any abusive language. P.W.2 also stated that no abusive language was used and admitted that the complainant was his maternal uncle. He also admitted that a house still existed on the disputed land. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W.3 disclose that there was no house on the land where the occurrence took place as mentioned at para no. 5. However, there were two parchas in the name of his father (para no. 8) on which, there was a house of his Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 19/42 father as well as a house of his paternal uncle.
46. The complaint is notably silent regarding the existence of two houses on the 5¼ dhurs of disputed land. Furthermore, while the complaint describes the plot as Gair Majarua land. The Learned counsel for the appellant contends that such land is categorized either as Aam or Khas, and the said lands cannot be allotted to the individuals. He argued that the disputed land is not Gair Majarua at all. The complaint disclose that P.W. 4 and his uncle were granted Basgit Parchas as landless persons, it also alleges that the accused persons had threatened to remove the 'Pasi' from the locality and that the accused were armed with weapons and demolished the complainant's house. But they only used fists and slaps when the complainant resisted. The evidence on record confirms the appellant's alleged involvement was limited only to minor physical assault by fists and slaps during the resistance of dismantling of the structure.
47. The evidence of P.W.3 further disclose that he witnessed the entire incident and that his father i.e. P.W.4 fell unconscious during the assault and he took his father to his house.
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 20/42
48. The learned counsel for the appellant specifically contends that if at all P.W. 4 had fallen unconscious, he could not have witnessed the dismantling of the house thereafter. Similarly, if P.W. 3 had escorted P.W. 4 to his residence, then, P.W. 3 himself could not have personally witnessed the subsequent construction of the wall, which allegedly began with the digging of the foundation at about 8:00 A.M. and concluded by 3:00 P.M.
49. The evidence of P.W. 3 is patently self-contradictory. At paragraph 11 of his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused persons had left the site immediately after dismantling the house; however, at paragraph 12, he testified that the accused remained there to construct a wall. The conduct of the witnesses appears suspicious in as much as the witnesses did not report the matter to the police and instead directly instituted a complaint case before the Court. The evidence of P.W. 3 further disclose that his father had already filed two similar cases against the accused. Further, the evidence of P.W. 3 at paragraph 7 disclose that his own house is situated just 'one step' away from the disputed land thereby establishing that he is an interested interested witness having a Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 21/42 direct stake in the disputed property."
50. Another major discrepancy in this case is that the complainant himself stated that none of the persons were present at the time of assault and other witnesses had reached the place of occurrence about five minutes after the assault.
51. It is surprising to note that P.W.3, the son of the complainant (P.W.4), purportedly remained a silent spectator, while his father was being assaulted by the accused persons. Ordinarily, natural human conduct would suggest that a son would immediately intervene to rescue his father from such an assault. The trial Court failed to appreciate that such passivity appears to be highly improbable and contrary to human conduct. Furthermore, the testimony of P.W.4 creates a fundamental contradiction regarding the presence of witnesses. P.W.4 also testified that no adults were present at the time of the occurrence, and that only children were present in the courtyard, which directly contradicts the claim of P.W.3 that he witnessed the event. Additionally, P.W.4 alleged a prolonged assault, involving 15 to 20 blows on his face, back, and stomach; however, there is a conspicuous lack of medical evidence or independent corroboration to support an assault of Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 22/42 such nature and duration.
52. The other factor, which is noticed by this court is that the judgment passed by the trial court lacks adequate reasoning for convicting the appellants. Neither the oral evidence of the witnesses nor the documentary evidence were discussed by the trial court while convicting the appellant.
53. It is pertinent to mention that in case of Noor Hasan Ansari and Ors. Vs State of Bihar in Cr.APP(SJ) No. 68 of 2004, this Court dealt with the followings criteria for marking a document:-
"In order to have a documents marked by the Court as an Exhibit, a party must satisfy the Court that there is sufficient material in order for the Court to arrive at a prima facie view that:-
(a) The "contents" of the document are proved (i.e. the document exists).
(b) The signature or handwriting on the document, if any, are proved (i.e. the document is genuine).
(c) In some cases, the witness who seeks to tender the document in evidence has personal knowledge of the document (i.e. that the witness is in a position to prove the accuracy or truth of the contents of the document);
(d) The document is not inherently or ab initio inadmissible on some other legal ground (e.g. Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 23/42 irrelevance, privilege, non-registration) and
(e) The document has been appropriately stamped, if so required by law.
16. (i). In order to prove contents of a document, the witness through whom the document is sought to be tendered must produce the document in court. The Evidence Act provides, in essence, that the "contents" of documents must ordinarily be proved by "primary" evidence.
(ii). As the second step in getting a document marked, the witness who introduces the document must identify the signature or handwriting on the document, if there is any. The mere production of a document is not sufficient for the document to be marked as an exhibit.
(iii). Thirdly, in order to lay a foundation for marking a document, if the document contains any statement(s) of fact, and the party propounding the document relies on the truth or accuracy of those statements, then the witness. who tenders the document must demonstrate personal knowledge and the familiarity of the document.
(iv). Fourthly, in some cases, irrespective of a party's ability to satisfy the criteria set out above, a law might prohibit some documents from being considered admissible in evidence. Such documents cannot be marked in evidence. Once a document is marked, it becomes the part of the Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 24/42 record but has to be considered by the Court about its admissibility and relevancy of the such document. Marking of document alone will not give any right to read the contents of the documents or about the admissibility of the documents."
17. Furthermore, Rule 58 of the Criminal Rules Of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990 envisages about marking of exhibits which reads as follows:-
"58 Marking of exhibits:-
(1) Exhibits admitted in evidence shall be marked as follows:-
(i) if filed by the prosecution with the capital letter 'P' followed by a numeral, P1, P2,P3 and the like;
(ii) if filed by defence with the capital letter 'D' followed by a numeral, D1, D2, D3 and the like;
(iii) in case of Court exhibits with the capital letter 'C' followed by a numeral C1, C2, C3 and the like; (2) All the exhibits filed by the several accused shall be marked consecutively.
All material objects shall be marked in Arabic numbers in continuous series as M.O. 1, M.O.2 and M.O.3 and the like, whether exhibited by the prosecution or the defence or the Court."
54. This court is unable to understand as to why the trial court has not followed the procedure for marking the exhibits Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 25/42 as per Rule 58 of Criminal Rules of practice. Admittedly, the Exhibit 1 was got marked through P.W.1, who is a typist. Further Exhibits 2 and 3 were marked through oral prayer of Public Prosecutor and not through a witness. Exhibit 4 and 4/1 were marked through P.W.6, who is an Advocate Clerk.
55. At this juncture, it is relevant to rely on the judgments of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukhi Yadav v. The State of Bihar reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Pat 5721 wherein their Lordships have held as follows:-
"9. We fail to appreciate as to which law permits such a thing and how a Judge of standing of Additional Sessions Judge could do such a thing. First thing we must notice that P.W.9 is an Assistant to an Advocate Clerk, who has nothing to do with the case, yet the Court permits him to step in as a prosecution witness. Moreover we have coined such witness as "Sankat Mochan witness". What more scandalized us is the trial court, which permits a person, who was nobody, to pick up the entire case diary from paragraphs 1 to 121 and prove it and make it a part of evidence. The court then proceeds further to mark it as Ext. 3 and then the court sits down to read entire case-diary in order to appreciate evidence. Nothing can be more scandalous. No such Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 26/42 step is permissible in law. The trial court forgot the true import of section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.'), which clearly states that any criminal Court may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such enquiry or trial. What the trial court has done is using it as evidence, making it as evidence and appreciating it as evidence, which is wholly impermissible in law. The diary can never be proved in a Court, for it cannot be used as evidence. No part of diary can be proved because if any one is proving it for the purposes of making it an evidence, such act is prohibited by law. The law contemplates a reference to the diary only for the purposes of refreshing memory or contradicting the statements of witnesses in the Court with the statements made during the course of investigation. Only when it is used for refreshing memory, the procedure as envisaged under section 145 of the Evidence Act is to apply but that does not mean that diary can become evidence. Law prohibits such thing. We have found in cases after cases that in the State of Bihar, the Sessions Courts do not know or understand this distinction in law and in cases after cases the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. are proved as evidences or other materials in the case- diary are proved as evidence and marked as exhibits. This is a practice that should end, the sooner the better. The other thing is Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 27/42 that as to who is permitted to prove a document. It appears that in this State every Tom, Dick and Harry, the expression we have formed now "Sankat Mochan Witness", could come and prove any official document. In this case, an Assistant to Clerk of an Advocate, who has nothing to do in the case, has been permitted by the trial court to prove the entire case-diary and mark it as exhibit. This practice is deprecated and it must come to an end. A person, who is author of a document or in absence of author, which absence has to be explained, a person familiar with the handwriting of the author can only prove the document. The procedure adopted by the trial court is unknown to law. No sooner this practice ends than better it would be."
56. The above citation squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Their Lordships have held that a person who is author of the document, or in absence of the author, (whose absence has to be explained), a person familiar with the hand- writing of author can prove the documents. Their Lordships have further held that the procedures adopted by the trial Court are unknown to law, and such practices have to be ended.
57. As discussed supra, the contents of documents in Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 28/42 Exhibits 1 to 4/1 cannot be looked into by the trial court as the contents were not proved by party having knowledge over it.
58. The Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Karuppudayar vs. State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in 2025 SCCOnLine SC 215, wherein their Lordships have distinguished the expression of "public view" and "in any place within the public view" in para no. 10 and 11, which reads as under-
"10. The term "any place within public view"
initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 29/42 lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p.
736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below: "Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."]. The Court held as under:
It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building. but some members of the public are there (not Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 30/42 merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.
59. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Keshav Mahato Alias Keshav Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar reported in 2026 Live Law SC 62, wherein their Lordships have held in para no. 10 and 16, which reads as under-
"10. We shall fist proceed to examine whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act respectively are disclosed on a plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet. The sections read as under:-
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 31/42 "3. Punishments for offences atrocities.-- [(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-- xxx
(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
(s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;"
16. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) it would be necessary that the accused abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had been hurled as an abuse."
60. It is pertinent to mention here that the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was amended by Amendment Act 01 of 2016. However, the present case was registered under the provision of Act 33 of 1989. The offences for which, the appellant has been convicted are punishable under Section 3(1)(iv) and 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. In the above said citations of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the relevant provision has been discussed under Section 3(r) of the Act, which is punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.
61. Both the above citations are squarely applicable to Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 32/42 the facts and circumstances of the present case. The evidence on record do not disclose that P.W.4 was insulted or intimidated with the intent to humiliate him as a "Harizan" in any place within the "public view". Therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 3(1)(iv) and 3(1)
(x) of SC/ST Act warrants interference by this Court.
62. Further, the Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment in the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710, wherein their Lordships have held in para 12 and 13 and again para no. 16 and 18, which reads as follows:-
"12 The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as "1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view".
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 33/42 is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out".
63. Further in the case of Ramavatar vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2022) 13 SCC 635, wherein, their Lordships have held in para no. 17, 20.1 and 20.2, which reads as under-
"17. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 34/42 that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a "special statute" would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC.
20.1. Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is to deter caste- based insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre-existing civil dispute between the parties. The case of the appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the deprecated incident was the aforestated civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case.
20.2. Secondly, the offence in question, for which the appellant has been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to us that although the appellant may not belong to the same caste as the complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward section of the Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 35/42 society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quarters only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the appellant and the complainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the socio- economic status of the appellant, we are of the opinion that the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed".
64. In the case of D. Venkateshwar Rao and Others v. P. Bakthavatchalam reported in 2023 11 SCC 182, their Lordships have held in para nos. 2, 5, 6, 9 and 10, which reads as under:-
"2. That the private respondent herein has filed a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai for alleged offence under Sections 3(2)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 alleging inter alia original accused have conspired and that the petitioners herein unlawfully encroached the pathway adjacent to his house and started to construct temple. It was alleged that the said temple was built up on the complainant's water pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB cable and thereby caused obstructions to him to enjoy his property. Therefore, it was alleged that even after order passed by the High Court, the accused Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 36/42 persons did not stop the illegal construction and thereby committed atrocities on the peaceful living of his family.
5. We have heard Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants original accused and the respondent appearing in person. We have also gone through the complaint and considered the allegations in the complaint made against the accused. Having considered the allegations in the complaint and the material on record, it appears that initiation of the criminal proceedings by the respondent against the appellants original accused for the offence under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is nothing but an abuse of process of law and the court and also provision of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
6. It appears that a private dispute was going on between the parties with respect to the illegal construction. As per the allegations in the complaint, the original complainant had purchased the vacant land and constructed the building. It is alleged that adjacent to his house and on the common pathway, the accused have unlawfully encroached upon the pathway and started constructing the temple and thereby have put up illegal construction on his water pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB cable. In the entire complaint, there are no allegations that the complainant is obstructed and/or interfered with enjoyment of his right on his property deliberately and wilfully knowing that the complainant belongs to SC/ST.
10. From the material on record, we are satisfied that no case for the offences under Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 37/42 Sections 3(2)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is made out, even prima facie. None of the ingredients of Sections 3(2)(v) and (va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are made out and/or satisfied. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion and view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, therefore, is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants deserves to be quashed and set aside.
65. In the case of Ghulam Musafa vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2023) 18 SCC 265, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in para no. 34, 37, which reads as follows:-
"34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramawatar v. State of M.P.27, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a "special statute" would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: (SCC pp. 641-42, paras 16-17) "16. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 38/42 SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities.
17. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 39/42 goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a "special statute"
would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC.
35. We have bestowed anxious consideration to the precedents cited by the learned counsel for the respondents and are of the view that the same are inapposite to the factual scenario herein. Suffice it would be to state that while the propositions laid down therein are not disputed, they do not prejudice the version of the present appellant. Tapan Kumar Singh and Naresh indicate that the FIR need not be a detailed one, as it is only to initiate the investigative process and the police should ordinarily be allowed to investigate. This is the general rule, but not a fetter on this Court or the High Court in an appropriate case".
66. All the above citations squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
67. It is admitted by all the witnesses i.e. P.W.s 1 to 4 that there was land/civil dispute between the parties and pursuant to it, the present case was filed and criminal proceedings were initiated against the appellant by way of private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madhubani.
68. Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. envisages that in case of commission of cognizable offence, a report has to be filed Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 40/42 before the Station House Officer having jurisdiction over the matter and in case, the Officer-in-Charge refuses to register the case, the remedy available to the informant is to send a report to the Superintendent of Police through speed post or by personal approach.
69. It is specifically testified by P.Ws. 3 and 4 that the incident took place at about 7.00 A.M., thereafter, P.W.4 approached the police station at about 8.00 A.M., and as the police allegedly refused to register a case, they proceeded to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madhubani at 10.00 A.M. and preferred a private complaint. However, the record reveal that the alleged incident occurred on 17.04.1999 and the complaint copy was presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madhubani on 19.04.1999 i.e., after two days of incident. As to why, the complainant remained silent for two days, if he was aggrieved by the acts of Officer-in-Charge of concerned police station, is not at all explained either by way of oral evidence or by making the content in the complaint petition.
70. Section 3(1)(v) of SC/ST Act is attracted, if at all any person wrongfully occupies or cultivates the land owned Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 41/42 by, or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or gets the land allotted to him transferred. In the present case, the complainant miserably failed to prove that the disputed land belonged to him. The documents i.e., Exhibits 2 and 3, which are Parchas, were marked on the oral request of the Public Prosecutor. As stated above, mere marking of documents does not suffice to prove their contentions unless the contents are duly proved in accordance with Law. Furthermore, Exhibits A, A/1 to A/5 were preferred by the defence to prove that they are in possession of the said land and had been paying rents receipts to the Government for holding the land. The trial Court has miserably failed to appreciate Exhibits A, A/1 to A/5 with that of the documents of Exhibits 2 and 3 for determining whether the disputed land belonged to the complainant. In the absence of materials on record, the trial Court ought not to have convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Section 3(1)(iv) and 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. Further there is no evidence on record, so far the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 427 of IPC is concerned. The trial Court has also erred in convicting Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.62 of 2004 dt.29-04-2026 42/42 the appellant under these sections also. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court warrants interference by this Court.
71. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.01.2004 passed by the Learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Madhubani in T.R. No. 185/03 /CR No. 375/99, is hereby set aside.
72. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled against them.
73. The appeal is allowed.
74. Since, the appellant was released on bail vide order dated 04.02.2004, he is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds.
75. Let the records of this appeal be returned to the concerned trial court forthwith.
(G. Anupama Chakravarthy, J) sunilkumar/-
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