Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ranjeet Singh And Anr vs State Of H.P on 27 March, 2025
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 206 of 2012 Reserved on: 11.03.2025 Date of Decision: 27.03.2025 Ranjeet Singh and anr. ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition is directed against the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, vide which the appeal filed by the appellants (accused before learned Trial Court) was dismissed and judgment of conviction dated 05.07.2007 and order of sentence dated 06.07.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. (learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) Trial Court) were upheld. Originally revision was filed by Ranjeet Singh and Mahinder Singh but Ranjeet Singh died during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the present petitioner and the co-accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act. It was asserted that the informant Suman Lata (PW1) was present in her home on 12.04.2006 at about 12 pm. Her dog was roaming in the courtyard of her house. Accused Ranjeet Singh was walking on the road. The dog barked at him. Ranjeet Singh complained to the informant that her dog was barking at him. The informant replied that the dog would not bite the accused. The accused Ranjeet Singh went to his home and brought a gun owned by the petitioner-Mahinder Singh. He shot the dog. The incident was witnessed by Neha Devi (PW2) and Sant Ram (PW3). The matter was reported to the police and FIR (Ext. PW1/A) was registered at the police station. Mohammad Arshad (PW7) conducted the 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/A). He seized the gun vide memo (Ext. PW4/B). He prepared a sketch of the gun (Ext. PW7/C) and put it in a cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with seal 'A'. Seal Impression (Ext.PW7/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. An application (Ext.PW7/D) was filed for conducting the post- mortem examination of the dog. Dr. Sanjay Thakur (PW5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the dog and found that it had died due to injury caused by a high-velocity blunt object. He issued a report (Ext. PW5/A). Accused Mahinder produced his gun license (Ext. PW7/D) which was seized vide memo (Ext. PW4/A). The gun was sent to FSL, Junga for analysis. Rajesh Kumar (PW8) examined the gun and issued a report (Ext. PX) showing that the gun was fired. The statements of the remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court charged accused-Ranjeet Singh with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 429 of IPC and Section 25(1-B) (a) of the Arms Act and Accused Mahinder Singh with the commission of an offence 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act, to which, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 08 witnesses to prove its case. Suman Lata (PW1) is the informant. Neha (PW2) and Sant Ram (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Harish Chand (PW4) is the witness to the recovery of the gun license. Dr. Sanjay Thakur (PW5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the dog. Vinod Kumar (PW6) did not support the prosecution case. Mohammad Arshad (PW7) conducted the investigation. Rajesh Kumar (PW8) is the Forensic Expert, who examined the gun and issued the report.
5. The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They stated that they were falsely implicated and they were innocent. The statement of Surjeet Singh (DW1) was recorded in defence.
6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of Neha, the informant and Sant Ram were consistent that accused Ranjeet had brought the gun and shot the dog. Accused Mahinder had failed to keep the gun properly, which is a 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) violation of the conditions of the license. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted accused Ranjeet Singh for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 429 of IPC and Section 25-(1-B) (a) of the Arms Act and Mahinder Singh of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act. Learned Trial Court sentenced accused Mahinder Singh to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹ 500/- and in default to further undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court Kangra at Dharamshala who concurred with the findings recorded by learned Trial Court that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were consistent regarding the accused Ranjeet shooting the dog with the gun of his brother Mahinder. The testimony of Surjeet Singh (DW1) only established the enmity which was not sufficient to discredit the prosecution case. Accused Mahinder Singh failed to keep the gun securely and violated the conditions of the license issued to him; hence, the appeal was dismissed.
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8. Being aggrieved from the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused have filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. Neha Devi (PW-2) stated that she was catching hold of the dog when accused Ranjeet fired at the dog, however, she had not sustained any injury. The defence evidence proved the enmity between the informant and the accused. The statement of the Veterinary Officer (PW-5) did not establish that the death was caused by a gunshot. Rajesh Kumar (PW8) admitted that the gun was damaged and could not be used to fire on the date of examination. This made the prosecution case inherently improbable, therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
10. Mr. Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. Assuming the prosecution case to be true, 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) there is no evidence that any condition of the license required the gun to be kept under lock and key. The mere use of the gun by Ranjeet Singh does not amount to a violation of the license. In any case, the evidence led by the prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that a gun was used to kill the dog, therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the license was issued in the name of the petitioner and he was responsible for keeping the gun in safe custody. His brother had taken the gun and used it to shoot at the dog, this established the violation of the condition of the gun license. Hence, he prayed that the petition be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it was observed:
"13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:
"12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC."10
Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 )
15. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
16. Learned Courts below held petitioner Mahinder Singh guilty of the violation of Section 30 of the Arms Act. Section 30 reads as under: -
30. Punishment for contravention of licence or rule.―Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder, for which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.
17. It is apparent from the bare perusal of this Section that the accused must have contravened any condition of a license or any provision of the Act. Learned Trial Court or the learned Appellate Court have not referred to any condition in the license, any provision of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder, which required the holder of a gun to keep it under the lock and key. They simply proceeded on the assumption that since the gun was used by Ranjeet Singh, therefore, there was a violation of the condition of the license or the provisions of the Act/Rules. This is not correct. It was laid down in Cheddi Singh Vs State, 1977 14 AllCriC 331; 1977 0 Supreme(All) 23 that where the holder had 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) gone to attend the call of nature and the gun was used by another person, the holder could not be convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act:
"4...The evidence of Ganesh thus also shows that the case taken up by the defence could not be discarded by the two courts below inasmuch as according to the witnesses produced by the prosecution itself, Cheddi Singh was present at the time when the gun was recovered from the house of Sigdar Singh. As Chhedi Singh had gone to attend the call of nature, his temporary absence from the house of Sigdar Singh could not either be sufficient for convicting Chhedi Singh under Section 30 nor could Sigdar Singh be held guilty under Section 25 of the Arms Act. Accordingly, the conviction of the applicants appears to be illegal."
18. It was held in Kanhaiya Lal Son of Gaya Prasad Vs State of Uttar Pradesh, 1994 0 AllCriC 220; 1994 2 AWC 979; 1994 0 CrLJ 2307; 1994 0 JIC 194; 1994 0 Supreme(All) 51; 1994 0 UPCriR 151; that in absence of any evidence that holder had deliberately or impliedly allowed another to handle the gun, the offence punishable under Section 30 of Arms Act is not made out. It was observed:
"(19 ) AS such in the absence of any evidence to this effect that the applicant, Kanhaiya Lal, a licensee of the gun, had allowed Vijay Kumar to handle the gun to his knowledge. The gun was lying inside the house. Obviously, it was loaded in the night. It was early hours in 12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) the morning when Kanhaiya Lal got ready to go on his duty. According to the evidence on record Vijai Kumar himself took up the gun and just on account of fun either jokingly or accidentally it was fired. The first information report version was that it was accidentally fired. The witnesses also stated that the fire was accidental. (20) THE negligence was certainly on the part of Vijay Kumar, a boy of 12 years, having taken out the gun from the house and it accidentally went off where the children were playing.
(21) THERE is nothing on record to suggest that Kanhaiya Lal had either deliberately or impliedly allowed Vijay Kumar to handle the gun which was loaded. It was clear on the record that the gun was usually loaded in the house during the night. In normal course during the night in the villages, the guns are kept loaded for personal safety. It appears to be a case of childish act on the part of Vijai Kumar who took out the gun and negligently fired the same by way of accidentally hitting the children playing nearby.
(22) SO far as the guilt of Kanhaiya Lal is concerned, there is nothing to suggest how he had asked Vijay Kumar to bring the gun. Naturally, the gun was kept inside the house of Kanhaiya Lal loaded. It was the mischief of the boy, Vijay Kumar to take out the gun mishandling the same and getting it accidentally fired. In such a circumstance it could not be said that Kanhaiya Lal had committed an act of breach of the conditions of the licence.
( 23 ) THE learned counsel for the applicants referred the case of Chhedi Singh v. State, reported in 1977 All Cri C 331. In that case licence holder of a gun had kept the same in another person's house and went to attend the call of nature. The gun was recovered in the meantime. The authority while dealing with this matter and the nature of the offence under S. 30 of the Arms Act held that a person simply leaving the gun in another house did not commit 13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) any offence under S. 30 of the Arms Act. In this particular case also the applicant, Kanhaiya Lal had left the gun in his own house. This was not a breach of any condition of the licence. The gun was loaded obviously during the night. That also is not a breach of the licence, Kanhaiya Lal had not asked Vijay Kumar to bring the gun which was loaded. Therefore, it could not be said that Kanhaiya Lal had committed any breach of the licence punishable under S. 30 of the Arms Act.
(24 ) IT was a mischievous act on the part of Vijay Kumar, who was just a boy of twelve years of age. He took out the gun as is evident from the evidence adduced for fun and play. In this process, the gun went off and injuries were caused to the children playing nearby.
(25) AFTER examining the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record there is nothing to suggest that Kanhaiya Lal had committed any act of omission or commission in breach of the conditions of licence. It was a case of accidental fire on account of the fact that the boy, Vijay Kumar took out the gun just for play. Therefore, in these circumstances, the applicant Kanhaiya Lal could not be held guilty under S. 30 of the Arms Act. The findings of the lower Courts holding Kanhaiya Lal guilty under S. 30 of the Arms Act as against the weight of evidence is not justified on record.
19. It was held in Tarlochan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 473 that where there is no evidence that the accused had delivered the possession of the gun, he cannot be held liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 30 of Arms Act. It was observed:
"20. Once the appellant stands exonerated from offence under Section 120-B IPC by the High Court and Section 29 of the Arms Act by us on the ground that the prosecution 14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) failed to establish that the firearm was parted by him knowingly and willingly and that it was taken away without his knowledge by the co-accused and used in the commission of an offence, there appears to be no justification to convict and punish the appellant even under Section 30 of the Arms Act. Section 30 of the Arms Act reads as under: --
"Section 30-Punishment for contravention of licence or rule. -
Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder, for which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to [six months], or with a fine which may extend to [two thousand] rupees, or with both."
21. Since there is no evidence to establish any willful violation by the appellant of any of the conditions of the Act or conditions of a licence or any provision of the Act or any rule, he is liable to be exonerated from the offence of Section 30 as well."
20. In the present case, no evidence was led to prove that the petitioner had allowed his brother to use the gun to shoot the dog. Thus, the petitioner could not have been convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act.
21. Even otherwise the prosecution case was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Rajesh Kumar (PW8) conducted the examination of the gun. He issued the report (Ext.PX) in which, it was mentioned that the nipple was found 15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) missing. He admitted in cross-examination that it was not possible to fire the gun due to the damage to the nipple. Thus, the testimony of this witness shows that the gun was incapable of firing at the time of the examination.
22. Mohammad Arshad (PW7) also admitted in his cross-examination that the gun did not have a nipple at the time of its seizure and it could not have been fired in the absence of the nipple. This statement also shows that the gun was incapable of firing on 12.04.2006 when it was seized. The incident had also occurred on 12.04.2006 and in the absence of any evidence that the gun was damaged at the time of the incident, the absence of the nipple would benefit the accused.
23. Both the learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that the nipple could have been damaged at the time of the fire. They ignored the fundamental principle of criminal law that the benefit of every doubt in the prosecution case has to be given to the accused and not to the prosecution. When the nipple was broken at the time of examination, it has to be taken that the gun could not have been fired unless there is positive evidence that the nipple was damaged at the time of the fire. No witness 16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) has deposed that the nipple was damaged at the time of the fire, therefore, learned Courts below could not have concluded that the gun was capable of firing and the nipple was damaged at the time of the fire.
24. Dr. Sanjay Thakur (PW5) conducted the post- mortem examination of the dog. He found that the animal had died due to traumatic shock and hypovolemic shock caused by extensive loss of blood owing to extensive injury caused probably by a high-velocity blunt object. In his opinion, the death could have been caused with the fire of a SBML. He admitted in his cross-examination that no pallets were found in the dead body of the dog.
25. His report does not read that there were any exit wounds; hence, the absence of the pallets from the dead body makes the prosecution case suspect regarding the use of a firearm. Further, he has not mentioned any charring or blackening of the body or even the entry wounds thus his testimony was not sufficient to hold that the dog had died due to the gunfire.
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26. Learned Courts below ignored these vital documents and relied upon the ocular version of the witnesses.
27. The testimonies of these witnesses contradict the prosecution's version that a gun was used to shoot the dog. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held liable for handing over the gun for unlawful purposes.
28. No other point was urged.
29. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court is ordered to be set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act. The fine be refunded after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case no further appeal is preferred and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety each in the like 18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7807 ) amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
31. A copy of this judgment along with the records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) 25 March, 2025 th Judge (Saurav pathania)