Madhya Pradesh High Court
Premnarayan Arya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 June, 2018
1
CRR No.2847/2018
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRR No.2847/2018
(Premnarayan Arya vs. State of M.P.)
Gwalior, Dated : 27.06.2018
None for the applicant.
None for the respondent/State.
An information has been sent by the Secretary, the High Court Bar Association, Gwalior to the Principal Registrar, High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench Gwalior to the effect that the President, Vice President and some other members of the Bar were attacked by some miscreants as a result of which, the lawyers are abstaining from work.
Shri Premnarayan Arya, who is an Advocate by profession is present in person.
It is submitted by Shri Arya that he may be heard and he is ready to answer any query which may be raised by this Court. A copy of the charge sheet has already been filed along with this revision, therefore, case diary is not required.
This criminal revision under Section 397, 401 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant against the order dated 6.6.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.3 (Electricity Act), Gwalior in S.T.No.137/2018 by which a charge under Section 306 of IPC has been framed.
The necessary facts for the disposal of the present revision in short are that initially the deceased had lodged a report against the applicant for an offence under Section 376 of IPC. The applicant was thereafter granted bail. Thereafter the deceased committed suicide on 1.2.2018 by consuming some poisonous substance. A suicide note, left by the deceased was also recovered. In the suicide note, it 2 CRR No.2847/2018 was mentioned that the applicant is her cousin brother [son of her mother's sister (Mausi)]. It is mentioned that because of the said relationship, the applicant used to visit her house and had asked her to develop friendship but because she was only 20 years of age, therefore, she could not understand his intention. However, the applicant took the parents of the deceased in confidence, and on 17.10.1999 he persuaded them that the deceased may be sent to Gwalior for doing Law and accordingly, she came to Gwalior on 17.10.1999. Thereafter he left the deceased in the house of grandmother. On one day, the applicant took the deceased to his house and offered a tea and after consuming the tea, the deceased became semi unconscious and thereafter the applicant without her consent committed rape on her. After the said incident, the deceased was threatened by the applicant that in case if she narrates the incident to anybody, then she would be defamed by the applicant and nobody would believe the allegations of the deceased and under this threat, he continued to have physical relations with her. On three to four occasions, she became pregnant also but the applicant got her aborted. In order to show his bonafides, the applicant also married her in a temple but she was never accepted/projected as wife. Since the deceased was being used by the applicant, therefore, she went in depression as she was afraid that her family may get defamed in the society. In the meanwhile, the applicant married another lady. However, she also left him after four years of marriage. Initially the applicant used to drive the auto but after sometime he passed LL.B. and LL.M. The deceased thereafter narrated the entire incident 3 CRR No.2847/2018 to her mother and her mother called the applicant to her house on various occasions but the applicant instead of going to the house of the mother of the deceased insisted that her mother should come to Gwalior and accordingly a room was booked by the applicant at Gwalior on 6.10.2017 in the name of the deceased and her mother. The copy of the receipt was also annexed with the suicide note. The applicant had a discussion with her mother and in order to maintain the family pride the mother of the deceased also agreed to keep quite and accepted the suggestion given by the applicant that this episode should not be narrated to anybody, and he would continuously help the deceased financially. Thereafter her mother went back to Delhi. On 27.10.2017, the applicant came to her house at about 8:00 PM and threatened the deceased may do whatever she wants but he would not spare her. Neither he would allow her to marry and even if she gets married, then she will have to give birth to the children of the applicant. It was also mentioned in the suicide note that still she is afraid of the applicant and, therefore, she committed suicide under the hope and belief that on one day, she would get justice.
The contents of the suicide note have been corroborated by the statement of the witnesses which have been recorded by the police during investigation.
It is contended by the applicant that he had never threatened the deceased and the allegations that he had threatened the deceased that neither he would spare her nor he would allow her to marry and in case if she gets married, even then she will have to give birth to the children of the applicant. It is submitted that the allegations 4 CRR No.2847/2018 made in the suicide note are false. However, during the arguments, it was rightly conceded by the applicant that the defence which has been taken by the applicant cannot be considered at this stage because it is a disputed question of fact that whether the applicant had ever threatened or not. When a specific question was put to the applicant that in case if the allegations are accepted in toto, then whether it would amount to abetment of suicide or not, then he kept mum and did not answer.
Heard the applicant.
Before considering the allegations which have been made against the applicant, it would be essential to consider the scope of interference at the stage of framing of charge. If the allegations made against the accused creates a strong suspicion that he might have committed an offence, then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court cannot conduct a roving and detailed enquiry into the allegations. Strong suspicion against the accused is sufficient to frame the charge and although the suspicion cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial but at the stage of framing of charge it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The Supreme Court in the case of Soma Chakravarty vs. State (Th. CBI) reported in 2007 AIR SCW 3683 has held as under:-
"20. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material 5 CRR No.2847/2018 on record the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial."
The Supreme Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in 2010 CRI. L.J. 1427 has held as under:-
"10. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused" clearly show that the Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the Court, after the trial starts. At the 6 CRR No.2847/2018 stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him."
The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2018 has held as under:-
".....Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. .... "7 CRR No.2847/2018
This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused."
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in AIR 1979 SC 366 has held as under:-
"(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities 8 CRR No.2847/2018 appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
The Supreme Court in the case of Niranjan Singh vs. K.S. Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya reported in AIR 1990 SC 1869 has held as under:-
"Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed? It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (AIR 1977 SC 2018) this Court observed that at the initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or 9 CRR No.2847/2018 rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (AIR 1979 SC 366) this Court after considering the scope of Section 227 observed that the words 'no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value establish the ingredients constituting the said offence."
The Supreme Court in the case of Shoraj Singh Ahlawat and others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in AIR 2013 SC 52 has held as under :
''11. A plain reading of the above would show that the Court trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons to be recorded by it and only if it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code provides for framing of a charge if, upon consideration of the police report and the documents sent therewith and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which can be adequately punished by him.10 CRR No.2847/2018
The ambit of Section 239 CrPC and the approach to be adopted by the Court while exercising the powers vested in it under the said provision fell for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2008) 2 SCC
561. That too was a case in which a complaint under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. was filed against the husband and parents-in-law of the complainant-wife. The Magistrate had in that case discharged the accused under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C, holding that the charge was groundless. The complainant questioned that order before the Revisional Court which directed the trial Court to frame charges against the accused persons.
The High Court having affirmed that order, the matter was brought up to this Court. This Court partly allowed the appeal qua the parents-in-law while dismissing the same qua the husband. This Court explained the legal position and the approach to be adopted by the Court at the stage of framing of charges or directing discharge in the following words:
"11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive 11 CRR No.2847/2018 opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence."
(emphasis supplied)
12. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court from earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy 1997 Cri.LJ 1125, State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996 Cri.LJ 2448 and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni 2000 Cri.LJ 3504. In Som Nath's case (supra) the legal position was summed up as under:
"if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."
(emphasis supplied)
13. So also in Mohanlal's case (supra) this Court referred to several previous decisions and held that the judicial opinion regarding the approach to be adopted for framing of charge is that such charges should be framed if the Court prima facie finds that 12 CRR No.2847/2018 there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the material produced was sufficient to convict the accused. The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal's case (supra) is in this regard apposite:
"8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."
14. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi(2005) 1 SCC 568, this Court was considering whether the trial Court can at the time of framing of charges consider material filed by the accused. The question was answered in the negative by this Court in the following words:
"18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced...Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal 13 CRR No.2847/2018 jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression 'hearing the submissions of the accused' cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the state of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police...
xx xx xx xx
23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material..."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Even in Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364, 14 CRR No.2847/2018 reliance whereupon was placed by counsel for the appellants the tests to be applied at the stage of discharge of the accused person unde Section 239 of the Cr.P.C., were found to be no different. Far from readily encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a strong suspicion in regard to the commission of the offence would be sufficient to justify framing of charges. The Court observed:
"...While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law...
16. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another (1979) 3 SCC 4, where this Court was examining a similar question in the context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legal position was summed up as under:
"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge :
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out:
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge 15 CRR No.2847/2018 and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouth- piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial."
The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander & Anr. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under:-
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where 16 CRR No.2847/2018 it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
18. x x x x x x x
19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) "4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of 17 CRR No.2847/2018 the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If 'the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing', as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, 'the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-- ... (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused', as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the 18 CRR No.2847/2018 trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
20 to 26 x x x x x x x
27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the 19 CRR No.2847/2018 principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed 20 CRR No.2847/2018 by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge.
Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected 21 CRR No.2847/2018 by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.
(Ref. State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 :
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2000 SCC (Cri) 615 : AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala [(2009) 14 SCC 466 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1412]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma v. State of U.P. [(2009) 7 SCC 234 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 356]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna v. Peddi Ravindra Babu [(2009) 11 SCC 203 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1297]; Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar [(1987) 1 SCC 288 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 82]; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 : AIR 1991 SC 1260]; Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 275]; M. 8 MCRC.6606/2015 Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 571] and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat [(2001) 7 SCC 659 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1361 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 1201]).
27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration 23 CRR No.2847/2018 as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court.
Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.
28. x x x x x x x
29. In the light of the above principles, now if we examine the findings recorded by the High Court, then it is evident that what weighed with the High Court was that firstly it was an abuse of the process of court and, secondly, it was a case of civil nature and that the facts, as stated, would not constitute an offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC. Interestingly and as is evident from the findings recorded by the High Court reproduced supra that "this aspect of the matter will get unravelled only after a full-fledged trial", once the High Court itself was of the opinion that clear facts and correctness of the allegations made can be examined only upon full trial, where was the need for the Court to quash the charge under Section 306 at that stage. Framing of charge is a kind of tentative view that the trial court forms in terms of Section 228 which is subject to final culmination of the proceedings.
30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression "there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence". This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste.
24 CRR No.2847/2018A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word "presume" while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence";
"to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming". In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence."
The next question is that whether allegations made against the applicant prima facie make out a case, warranting framing of charge or not?
Section 306 of I.P.C. reads as under :
"306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. "Abetment" is defined under Section 107 of IPC which reads as under:-
"107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing, who--
First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or 25 CRR No.2847/2018 Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.--A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
The Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Chheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan reported in (2010) 12 SCC 190 has held as under:-
"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the 26 CRR No.2847/2018 legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."
The Supreme Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605 while dealing with the term "instigation" held as under :
"16. ... instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of 'instigation', though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes 'instigation' must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an 'instigation' may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.
17. Thus, to constitute 'instigation', a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by 'goading' or 'urging forward'. The dictionary meaning of the word 'goad' is 'a thing that stimulates someone into action;27 CRR No.2847/2018
provoke to action or reaction' ... to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts...."
The Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttaranchal reported in (2012) 9 SCC 734 held as under:
"17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide:
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh ((1991) 3 SCC 1), Surender v. State of Haryana ((2006) 12 SCC 375, Kishori Lal v. State of M.P.( (2007) 10 SCC 797) and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree ((2009) 1 SCC 554)
18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case there has been instigation which forced the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. More so, while dealing with an application for quashing of the proceedings, a court cannot form a firm opinion, rather a 28 CRR No.2847/2018 tentative view that would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 CrPC."
The Supreme Court in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 371 has held as under:
"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."
Further, in para 12 of the judgment, it is held as under:
"The word "instigate" denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation."
The Supreme Court in the case of Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of A.P. reported in (2010) I SCC 750 needs mentioned here. In which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that:-
"abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing - Without a positive act on part of accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained - In order to convict a person under section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit offence - It also requires 29 CRR No.2847/2018 an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide - Also, reiterated, if it appears to Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to society to which victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstances individual in a given society to commit suicide, conscience of Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that accused charged of abetting suicide should be found guilty- Herein, deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord circumstances of case, none of the ingredients of offence under Section 306 made out - Hence, appellant's conviction, held unsustainable".
In the case of State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal, reported in 1994 (1) SCC 73, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"This Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly 30 CRR No.2847/2018 circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that that accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty"
The Supreme Court in the case of M. Mohan Vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in AIR 2011 SC 1238 has held as under :-
"Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."
The Supreme Court in the case of Kishori Lal vs. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 10 SCC 797 has held in para 6 as under:-
"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) 31 CRR No.2847/2018 intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section
107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. "Abetted" in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence."
In the case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 1 SCC 707, the Supreme Court has held as under:-
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their 32 CRR No.2847/2018 being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.
13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
14. The expression 'abetment' has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause 'thirdly' of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.
15. In view of the aforesaid situation and position, we have examined the provision of clause thirdly which provides that a person would be held to 33 CRR No.2847/2018 have abetted the doing of a thing when he intentionally does or omits to do anything in order to aid the commission of that thing. The Act further gives an idea as to who would be intentionally aiding by any act of doing of that thing when in Explanation 2 it is provided as follows:
"Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
16. Therefore, the issue that arises for our consideration is whether any of the aforesaid clauses namely firstly alongwith explanation 1 or more particularly thirdly with Explanation 2 to Section 107 is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case so as to bring the present case within the purview of Section 306 IPC."
The Supreme Court in the case of Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010) 8 SCC 628 has held as under :
12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note.34 CRR No.2847/2018
13. It is absurd to even think that a superior officer like the appellant would intend to bring about suicide of his driver and, therefore, abet the offence.
In fact, there is no nexus between the so-called suicide (if at all it is one for which also there is no material on record) and any of the alleged acts on the part of the appellant. There is no proximity either. In the prosecution under Section 306 IPC, much more material is required. The courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross-examination by the appellant-accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant- accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience. The person like the appellant in the present case who is serving in a responsible post would certainly suffer great prejudice, were he to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature. In the similar circumstances, as reported in Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. (2005) 2 SCC 659, this Court had quashed the proceedings initiated against the accused.
The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapur Vs. Ramesh Chandra reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under:-
"33. The High Court has also noticed that perusal of the suicide note brings to fore the fact that the petitioner-accused is not only named but his illegal occupation of the house of the deceased is stated to be one of the primary reasons for Komal Kapoor in 35 CRR No.2847/2018 committing the suicide. The statement of the son of the deceased is also on the same line. Then the High Court proceeds further to notice that even if it is assumed at this stage that the suicide note and statement were correct, the action of the petitioner-accused in forcibly occupying the portion of the house of the deceased and the deceased taking the extreme step would not bring his act within the definition of abetment, as there is no material or evidence placed by the prosecution on record. This finding could hardly be recorded without travelling into the merits of the case and appreciating the evidence. The Court could pronounce whether the offence falls within the ambit and scope of Section 306 IPC or not. These documents clearly show that the accused persons had brought in existence the circumstances which, as claimed by the prosecution, led to the extreme step of suicide being taken by the deceased. It cannot be equated to inflictment of cruelty as discussed by the High Court in its judgment. Once Sections 107 and 306 IPC are read together, then the Court has to merely examine as to whether apparently the person could be termed as causing abetment of a thing. An abetter under Section 108 is a person who abets an offence. It includes both the person who abets either the commission of an offence or the commission of an act which would be an offence. In terms of Section 107 IPC, Explanation (1) to Section 107 has been worded very widely. We may refer to the judgment of this Court in Goura Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. wherein this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 473-74, para 8) "8. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is 36 CRR No.2847/2018 a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word 'instigate' literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do anything. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. 'Act abetted' in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence. In the instant case, the abetted persons have been convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 304. So in the case of A-1 it is Section 304 read with Section 109 IPC, that is attracted."
34. A wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact and such person voluntarily causing or procuring or attempting to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to instigate the doing of that thing. According to the record, the accused had made a wrong statement that he had paid a sum of Rs 24,00,000 for purchase 37 CRR No.2847/2018 of the property C-224, Tagore Garden, Delhi and the property belonged to him. Whether it was a misrepresentation of the accused and was an attempt to harass the deceased and her family which ultimately led to her suicide is a question to be examined by the Court. The allegations as made in the aforestated documents clearly reflect that blank documents were got signed, but the purpose, the consideration and complete facts relating to the transaction were not disclosed to the deceased or the family. This would, at least at this stage, not be a case for examining the correctness or otherwise of these statements as these allegations cannot be said to be ex facie perverse, untenable or malicious. It would have been more appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court, if it would have left the matter to be determined by the Court upon complete trial. May be the accused would be entitled to get some benefits, but this is not the stage. These are matters, though of some civil nature, but are so intricately connected with criminal nature and have elements of criminality that they cannot fall in the kind of cases which have been stated by us above. There, the case has to be entirely of a civil nature involving no element of criminality.
35. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ((2009) 16 SCC 605 to contend that the offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC is completely made out against the accused. It is not the stage for us to consider or evaluate or marshal the records for the purposes of determining whether the offence under these provisions has been committed or 38 CRR No.2847/2018 not. It is a tentative view that the Court forms on the basis of record and documents annexed therewith. No doubt that the word "instigate" used in Section 107 IPC has been explained by this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh ((2001) 9 SCC 618) to say that where the accused had, by his acts or omissions or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may have to be inferred. In other words, instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. All cases may not be of direct evidence in regard to instigation having a direct nexus to the suicide. There could be cases where the circumstances created by the accused are such that a person feels totally frustrated and finds it difficult to continue existence." Therefore, it is clear that a person can be said to have instigated another person, when he actively suggests or stimulates him by means of language, direct or indirect. Instigate means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act.
If the entire allegations are accepted, then it is clear that the deceased was sexually exploited by the applicant for 18 long years and even he threatened the deceased that he would not spare her and would not allow her to get married and in case if she gets married, then the children would be of the applicant only which clearly means that a threat was extended by the applicant that even if the deceased gets married to somebody else but still the applicant would force her to continue with physical relations.
39 CRR No.2847/2018Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the applicant had created such a situation before the deceased, where she lost all hopes of her life and she was left with no other option but to commit suicide. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the charge under Section 306 of IPC is prima facie made out. Accordingly, the order dated 6.6.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.3 (Electricity Act), Gwalior in S.T.No.137/2018 is hereby affirmed.
Before parting with this order, this Court feels it appropriate to mention that the Trial Court, should not get prejudiced by any of the observation made by this Court in this order, as the submissions made by the applicant have been considered in the light of limited scope of interference at the stage of framing charge. The Trial Court is requested to decide the trial, strictly in accordance with the evidence which would come on record.
The revision fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G.S. Ahluwalia) Judge (alok) Digitally signed by ALOK KUMAR Date: 2018.06.29 16:07:53 +05'30'