Allahabad High Court
Food Corporation Of India, Gorakhpur vs Mahabir Prasad Bhartiya on 15 December, 1987
Equivalent citations: AIR1988ALL160, AIR 1988 ALLAHABAD 160, (1988) ALL WC 594 (1988) 1 CURCC 1107, (1988) 1 CURCC 1107
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J.
1. This is defendant's First Appeal against the decree dated 31-10-1979, passed by the Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, in a suit filed buy the plaintiff-respondent for a declaration that the impugned order No.D/6(4)/Sugar-G.K.P./1597 dated 3-7-1973, passed by the defendant-appellant was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiff
2. The facts need not detain us as they are more or less admitted. The plaintiff respondent's case was that he was a Transport-Contractor of Sugar and has been undertaking transport and other contracts for supply of labourers and handling foodgrains. On 14-5-1973, the defendant-appellant ordered the" plaintiff-respondent to transport sugar from six mills situate in U.P. to 7 different districts, and the payment was to be made in accordance with the rates stipulated in the order. One of the important conditions was that the plaintiff shall be held responsible for theft or loss in transit. The contract was ad hoc and was given in emergency, liable to be terminated by a short notice, and was valid for one month only from the date of issue of the letter. In pursuance of the order the plaintiff preferred the work of transport of sugar from said mills to 7 districts in U.P. and submitted a bill in May, 1973. In fact 1248. bags of suges were transported from Nawabganj Sugar Mill to Ferozabad. Out of it 936 bags of sugar were drenched by the act of God. The aforesaid sugar was handed over to the driver of the truck No. W.B.K. 6602, but the same did not reach the destination. It transpired later that 100 bags of sugar were not delivered by the truck driver. Consequently an F.I.R. was lodged on 3-6-1973 at P.S. Babupurwa Distt. Kanpur and the driver, cleaner, etc. were taken into custody by the police of Kanpur. The impugned order was passed by the plaintiff (defendant ?) indicating that the twice the levy price of 100 bags of sugar and other incidental expenses would be recovered from the plaintiff who never agreed to pay twice the value of the goods lost. In view of the aforesaid illegal order dated 14-5-1973, the plaintiff's bill for Rs. 31,059.67 in respect of this contract and a bill of Rs. 4,000/- in respect of handling contract have been withheld. The plaintiff repeatedly requested the defendant not to implement the order dated 3-7-1973 but he paid no attention hence, the necessity for the suit.
3. The defendant-appellant contested the suit denying the plaint allegations and alleged that the impugned order was perfectly correct as the aforesaid sugar bags have been lost in transit by the plaintiff, the contractor, and he was liable to pay twice the price of the sugar that there was no cause of action for the suit, that the suit was barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short the Act). The plaintiff was not entitled to any relief.
4. The suit was decreed and the impugned order dated 3-7-1973 was held to be illegal and void, and not binding on the plaintiff respondent. The present appeal has been tiled against the decree of the Court below.
5. Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant urged that suit, as framed, was not maintainable and was barred by Section 34 of the Act that there was no cause of action for the suit and the suit could not have been legally decreed for the relief of declaration. The order dated 3-7-1973 directing the recovery of twice the levy price of the sugar from the plaintiff was justified, as that was based on the difference between market price prevalent on the date of the order and the actual price of the sugar. Reliance was placed on Protap Chandra Koyal v. Kali Charan Acharya, AIR 1963 Cal 468, Union of India v. Commercial Metal Corporation, AIR 1982 Delhi 267.
6. Sri S.M. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, urged that in case the proviso to Section 34 was read along ' with the main provisions of the Act, the suit was maintainable, inasmuch as no further relief was required by the plaintiff than the relief claimed by him. He further urged that Section 34 of the Act was not exhaustive and there may be cases where declaration may be granted by the court even though the case may not be covered by Section 34, that there was sufficient cause of action after passing the order dated 3-7-1973 demanding double price of the 100 bags of sugar, that the suit was correctly decreed for the relief claimed. There was no justification nor any basis in support of the order dated 3-7-1973 requiring twice the levy of actual price of sugar lost in transit, and hence the order requiring double price was illegal. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant were sought to be distinguished.
7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, the points for determination are as to whether the suit was barred by Section 34, in any case whether Section 34 was exhaustive, whether there was any cause of action, whether the suit could have been decreed for the relief claimed. The point whether the order demanding double price of the sugar bags was justified in view of the damages, sustained by the plaintiff, would be considered separately.
8. The first three questions emanate from the interpretation of Section 34 of the Act. It is convenient to set out the statutory provisions of Section 34.
"34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right :-- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such a suit ask for any further relief :
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff being able to claim any further relief than a mere declaration of title omits to do so."
9. For a correct interpretation, we may read Section 34 of the Act along with Order 7, Rule 7, Order 2, Rule 2, Sections 9 and 99 of the Civil P.C. 1908 (for short Code). Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code provides that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or any other appropriate relief to be given by Court.
10. Order 2, Rule 2, on the other hand, provides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. A plaintiff may, however, relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any court. In case the plaintiff omits to claim any ralief in the suit, he shall not otherwise file a separate suit in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished, Where the plaintiff was entitled to both the reliefs in respect of the same cause of action, he may sue for all, or any of such reliefs, Section 9 enacts that the Civil Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Section 99 lays down inter alia that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded, for any defect in the cause of action or any error, defect, or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.
11. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877 (old) was the fore-runner of the present Section 34 of the Act and it was based on English concept of equity. In English concept of equity a decree for declaration for poor (sic) and simple was innovations and obtained authoritative sanction by Section 50 (fifty) of Chancery Procedure Act, 1852 which provided that --
"No suit shall be open to objection on the ground that a mere declaratory decree or order is sought thereby, and it shall be lawful for the court to make binding declaration of rights without granting consequential relief."
12. There were significant features which enabled this section to receive a far more ;
generous interpretations. In an English case in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay, (1915) 2 KB 536, the pattern of the development of action was specified even to the extent that declaration can be granted even when no consequential relief was sought or even where no cause of action for the suit existed. The actual words are quoted below :--
'Theoretically, the majority of the Court of Appeal took a decisive step forward by laying down that a declaration might be granted not only where consequential relief was neither granted nor claimed, but even where the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant. But its significance is qualified by remarking that only in very exceptional circumstances could it issue in the absence of a cause of action."
13. In Modern Equity by Harold Graville Hanbury (Seventh Edition), the utility of the declaratory relief has been stated (on page 589) in these words : --
"When all necessary limitations are borne in mind, growing utility of the declaration is unquestionable. Though it may be escaping from the idea that actions must primarily be "coercive.....A declaration is a valuable means of testing the question of the existence of a firm contract, arid of restoring contentment to the mind of one technically wronged, but not to such an intense degree as to warrant, the grant of an injunction."
(See Hohler v. Aston, (1920) Ch 420, Behrens v. Richards, (1905) 2 Ch 614.)
14. Similar concept was, however, enacted in British India under Section 15 of the Civil P.C. 1859 which was repealed by the CivilP.C., 1877. This provision of Section 15of the Code, 1859 was, however, enacted separately under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887. This provision of Section 42 of the 1877 Act was somewhat different. In other words it was made in one way comprehensive and in other way limited. In view of the provisions of Section 15 of the Civil P.C., 1859 or Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887, the Courts in this country had power to pass purely a declaratory decree. We are, however, concerned with Section 34 of the present Specific Relief Act, 1963, which was fore-runner of the Act 1887. It is in slightly changed language, inasmuch as the illustrations appended to Section 42 of the old Act were dropped.
15. A bare reading of Section 34 makes it manifest that any person could file a suit for declaration in case he is entitled to any legal character of any right as to any property, and the Court may, in its discretion, grant such declaration. In fact, the words 'legal character' have been mentioned under Section 41 of the Evidence Act, which makes a final judgment, in respect of any legal character of a person, whether such legal character is taken away or conferred upon him, conclusive, not only against the parties, but also against all the , world. This is, usually called 'judgment-in-rem'. Under the present section the words 'legal character' is not a common phrase in jurisprudence and it is seldom used in statutes except under Section 42 of the old Act. The words 'legal character' indicate the legal-status'. A declaration that the defendant is not the son of plaintiff or his adopted son, or the plaintiff is the legitimate child of the deceased person or that he is the son of A and not the son of B, or that a lady plaintiff either is or is not the wife of the defendant and similar declarations as to whether the plaintiff is a member of an agricultural tribe and as to whether the plaintiff is or is not a member of any specified class, would be covered within the meaning of declaration of 'legal-character'. The clause 'declaration as to right to possession' simply means a declaration in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that he is lawfully entitled to possession and he may also claim relief of injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. A plaintiff in possession of a property claiming to be the owner, may sue for a declaration that the decree obtained by the defendant against the plaintiff was collusive and not binding on the plaintiff. Such suit can be filed against any person denying or interested in denying his title to such character or right, and the court may in. its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. The court may however pass a declaratory decree thereon. But in case the plaintiff is able to claim some further relief, the court shall not grant such declaration. There is distinction between the 'further-relief, and 'the other-relief". The further relief, means the relief emanating from the first relief claimed based on the same cause of action, whereas the other relief, may be a separate relief not flowing from the first relief, and it may be totally independent relief. If in a particular case the plaintiff has not claimed any relief as to any legal character or to any right as to property, but his claim is otherwise, in that case the relief claimed would be beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Act. It has, therefore, been held in a string of decisions that the provisions of Section 42 of the old Act or of Section 34 of the Act, 1963 are not exhaustive, in case any relief is claimed otherwise than, a declaration as to any legal character of any right, to any property, in that event general provisions of Order 7, Rule 7 and Section 9 of the Code would apply. In other words, in case the relief falls out side the purview of Section 42 of the old Act, 1887 or Section 34 of the present Act, in that case the courts have power to grant such a decree under the general provisions of the Civil P.C. in continuity of the requirement of the Section.
16. In the present case, the relief claimed by the plaintiff does not appear to be in respect of declaration as to any property, inasmuch as the plaintiff-respondent has just obtained a contract that he would with the help of his own contractors or hired contractors, transport the sugar bags of the defendant-appellant from one place to another, as desired by the defendant. One hundred bags of sugar could not reach the destination, thereafter the impugned order was passed, which was the basis for the cause of action to the suit, giving rise to the present appeal. We are of the opinion that the relief claimed in the suit is not "declaration of a legal character or any right as to any property. In fact it is a relief which is not strictly covered by the provisions of Section 34 of the Act. As Section 34 of the Act was not exhaustive the relief can still be granted by the court, in view of Section 9 read with Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code. In case the relief was sought for declaration of any particular compromise or order or a particular decree passed under some pre-emption suit, that was not a case covered by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (old). It was held in Pratap Singh v. Bhabute Singh, (1913) 40 Ind. App. 182 (P.C.) by their Lord ships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, that Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887 would not apply to the case and that it was not a question of exercise of discretion by the Court under the section. The plaintiff in that suit was held to be entitled to the relief under the provisions of Section 9 or Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code. Similarly in the instant case also the plaintiff-respondent claimed the relief as follows (vide copy of the plaint paper No. 4(Ka) page 6 of the Paper Book at page-16) --
"(1) The relief sought is that by decree of the declaration in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant, it be declared that the impugned order No. F-6-4/sugar/BKP-1597 dated 3-7-1973 passed by the defendant is illegal, void, without jurisdiction and inoperative, and not binding on the plaintiff.
(2) Cost of the suit be awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.
(3) Any other relief be awarded in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant, which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper."
17. The reliefs claimed, in fact, appears to be similar to the relief claimed in the suit, leading to the appeal before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pratap Singh v. Bhabute Singh (surpa) and it was also similar to the relief claimed in Vema Reddy Rama Raghav Reddy v. Konduni Seshu Reddy , AIR 1967 SC 436. In the plaint the relief claimed that the order dated 3-7-1973 was not binding on the plaintiff indicates that the relief refers to the present relief. The principle and import of Section 34 is that it refers to the declaration which serves to define rights, present or future, without a present relief. If the decree has the effect of giving present relief also in that event the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief for declaration in view of the general provisions of C.P.C. (i.e. Section 9 read with Order 7, Rule 7 of the Code) as Section 34 of the Act was not exhaustive. See Ram Raghav Reddy v. Sheshu Reddy, 1966 (Supply) SCR 720 : AIR 1967 SC 436. Firsher v. Secretary of State for India, (1899) 26 Ind App 16 (PC), Supreme General Films v. H. H. Maharaja Baijnath, (AIR 1975 SC 1810).
18. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. As the defendant-appellant has passed the order dated 3-7-1973 (Ext. A-9) (at page' 126 of the paper book) to the effect that twice the value of 100 bags of sugar plus incidental expenses would be recovered from the defendants-appellants and that order was the basis of the cause of action for the present suit. On that order being passed the appropriate relief to be claimed by the plaintiff would have been that the order could have been declared illegal, void without jurisdiction or not binding on the plaintiff as nothing more was done by the defendant-respondent, inasmuch as no amount was curtailed either from the security money deposited by the plaintiff-respondent, hence at that stage when the suit was filed, the only appropriate relief that could have been claimed by the plaintiff was to get a declaration from the Civil Court that the said order was illegal, void and not binding on the plaintiff. We are however, of the view, in the alternative that the plaintiff has claimed the appropriate relief and the proviso to Section 34 was not applicable as no further relief could have been claimed under the facts and circumstances of the case. Just a few words appear imperative about the interpretation of the proviso appended to a section.
19. The interpretation to the proviso to Section 34 was the sheet-anchor of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant. It was argued with vehemence that the plaintiff must have claimed further relief in the form of an injunction etc., directing the defendant not to recover the price of 100 bags of sugar. But the main Section 34 of the Act does not indicate any such condition. The nature of the Proviso, whenever it may be added by the legislature according to simple principle of construction, is to qualify the main provision of Section or in some cases it may create an exception. In case the Proviso was not enacted that matter would be deemed to be covered under the provisions of the main section. It would be convenient to make a reference to the 'Craies on Statute Law' VII Edition page 218 to the following effect : --
"the effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso according to the ordinary rule of construction is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it, and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it could be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect. (See Duncan v. Dixon, (1890) 44 Ch D 211) Toranto Corporation v. Att. General of Canada, (1946) AC 32.) In Mullins v. Treasurer of Surrey, (1880) 5 QBD 170 at page 173 it was held as follows : --
'The natural presumption is that, but for the proviso the enacting part of the section would have included the subject-matter of, the proviso."
20. Adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant assuming that the case is covered by Section 34 of the Act, about the further relief, which ought to have been claimed in view of the proviso but was not claimed, we are of the opinion that considering the nature of the order dated 3-6-1973, which was the basis for cause of action of the suit, the plaintiff has claimed the appropriate relief. In Lais Ram Aver Singh v. Smt. Yumman Ningol Khangemban, AIR 1986 Gauh 66 where the plaintiff's suit was for the declaration of his title to her wife's share in the property and also for a permanent injunction, but did not claim for possession, it was argued that the suit was barred by the Proviso to Section 34, as the plaintiff must have claimed relief for possession separately, which was "further relief" in that case. But it was held, after the discussion, that even though the possession was not claimed, the suit was not barred by Section 34 of the Act, as the relief for possession being claimed by the plaintiff was not covered by the expression "further relief" as given in the Proviso to Section 34.
21. In Dipak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1987 SC 1422, where the plaintiff-appellant had filed a suit for permanent injunction for a declaration that he continued to be in service and that he was also entitled to all the benefits flowing from the declaration, it was urged that plaintiff did not claim either relief for damages, etc. or three years' salary hence the suit was not maintainable. But their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed three years' salary even though the same was not claimed by the plaintiff-respondents. It was mainfest, accordingly, from the facts of that case that even though further relief which could have been claimed by the plaintiff, was not claimed, nevertheless suit was held to be maintainable and three years' salary as damages was awarded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Considering this dictum laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion in the alternative, as stated earlier, that the suit could not be deemed to be barred by Section 34. Similarly the plaintiff-
respondent has got a cause of action, in respect of which the suit was filed and it was maintainable.
22. Adverting to the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, Pratap Chandra Koyal v. Kali Charan Acharya (AIR 1963 Cal 468) (supra) was a case where in the first suit on the basis of agreement conveyance the only relief claimed was for specific performance of the contract and it was decreed. Whereas subsequently the suit was filed for compensation for breach of contract, hence subsequent suit was held to be barred by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code. The main relief in the second suit for compensation for breach of contract was 'further relief emanating from the first relief' which could have been claimed in the earlier suit. The present appeal is based on different facts, hence that case is not relevant.
23. Now coming to the second limb of the arguments as to whether the order demanding double price of 100 bags of the sugar was justified in view of the damages sustained by the plaintiff. Ext. A-6 is admittedly the order by which the plaintiff was given the work to transport the sugar bags from some of the Sugar Factories in the State to different districts. It was also indicated that the said contract was ad hoc, issued under some special circumstances terminable at any time. That contract contained a condition that the plaintiff-respondent would be held liable for theft/transit loss, if any. There is no manner of doubt that the loss of 100 bags would be recoverable from the plaintiff-respondent, who had undertaken to carry the sugar bags to the destination. But the objection of the plaintiff-respondent was that the order dt. 3-7-1973 was passed arbitrarily demanding twice the value of the sugar bags including the incidental expenses to be recovered from the plaintiff's pending bill. Apparently the price of 100 bags of sugar was recoverable from the plaintiff, but not, at the rate of twice the value, including incidental charges. The reasonable amount of loss could be certainly compensated. The loss could be recovered from the pending bills of the plaintiff-respondent, but the loss could not be fixed arbitrarily twice the actual loss. After perusing the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, particularly the statements of A.R.M. Abbasi, D.W.1, page 31, who says, (on page 35), that the twice price was ordered to be recovered from the plaintiff according to the Rules of Sugar Corporation, that he did not know the officer, who framed these Rules, nor he knows any such rules, and that he made the statements that there were rules about the price of sugar on the direction of the Head Office, that this was the order of the Regional Manager we are satisfied that there was no evidence which could justify the order dated 3-7-1973 (page 126) that in case of loss of sugar bags, the price to be recovered shall be twice the vaiue including the incidental charges.
24. Union of India v. Commercial Metal Corporation (AIR 1982 Delhi 267) (supra) was the next case, the case relied upon by the appellant, was a case dealing with the fact as to what must have been the amount of damages in case of non-delivery. We have no quarrel with, the principles of ascertainment of the amount of damages. In the instant case, the damages could be ascertained by the defendant-appellant or the reasonable price of 100 bags, of sugar would be recoverable from the plaintiff-respondent. But there was no basis for order dated 3-7-1973 indicating that twice the price of 100 bags of sugar would be recovered from the pending bills of the plaintiff. It shall, however, be still open to the defendant-appellant, to recover the reasonable amount or the price of sugar bags lost in transit and to deduct the said amount from the pending bills of the plaintiff, but the passing of the order capriciously, was not justified. The case of Union of India v. Commerical Metal Corporation (supra), dealing with the price of ascertainment of the amount of damages could not be said to be pertinent to the controversy before us.
25. Applying the posteriori and priori methods of reasoning, we are of the opinion that there was no justification for the order-dated 3-7-1973, directing the twice value of 100 bags of sugar including incidental expenses to be recovered from the pending bills of the plaintiff-respondent. It is, however, made clear that the reasonable price of the proposed hundred bags would certainly be recovered by the defendant-appellant from the plaintiff-respondent.
26. In the premises as indicated before, we do not find any merit in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, however, we refrain from making any order as to costs.
27. At the time of delivery of the judgment an oral prayer was made for a certificate for appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of the provisions of Article 134A of the Constitution of India. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the opinion in the present appeal neither any substantial question of law of general importance is involved nor there is involved any question as to the interpretation of Constitution, which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the said oral prayer is refused.