Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Chandra Veer vs Govt. Of Nctd on 8 January, 2026
Item No. 34 (Court-IV) O.A. No.57/2020
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No.57/ 2020
Reserved on: 05.01.2026
Pronounced on: 08.01.2026
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S Khati, Member (A)
Chandra Veer, Age-26
Age 26 years, Sub: Appointment
Group: C, S/o Sh. Satendera, R/o. VPO
VPO-Gothra,
Tehsil
Tehsil-Khekhra, District-Baghpat,
Baghpat, UP
UP-2501011.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Sachin Chauhan
Chauhan)
Versus
1. Govt. of NCTD, Through the Chief Secretary,
Govt. of NCTD, Naya Sachivalaya, Delhi.
2. The Commissioner of Police, Police
Headquarters, I.P. Estate, M.S.O. Building, New
Delhi.
3. The Dy. Commissioner of Police, Recruitment,
New Police Lines, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi
Delhi-
110009.
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Amit Sinha)
Page 1 of 26
SURAJ BISHT
2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30'
Item No. 34 (Court-IV)
(Court O.A. No.57/2020
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J):
(J):-
In the present Original Application, filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant has prayed for the following relief(s):
(1) To set aside the show cause notice dated 3.7.2018 whereby the candidature of applicant to the post of Const. (Exe) is put under notice and order dated 21.12.2018 whereby the candidature of applicant to the post Constable (Exe) has been cancelled and further direct the responde respondent that candidature of applicant to the post of Constable (Exe) be restored and applicant be given appointment to the post of Constable (Exe) in Delhi Police with all consequential benefits including seniority & promotion and pay & allowances.
Or/and
(ii) Any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit and proper may also be awarded to the applicant."
applicant.
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant has not only placed a challenge to the impugned order but also the order passed by the competent authority based on the recommendation of the Sc Screening Committee.
He emphasized that the rejection of the candidature of the applicant is arbitrary and without application of mind. He submitted that the respondent need to consider er the guidelines laid down by tthe Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. UOI UOI, SLP No. 20525/2011, decided on 21.07.2016, before cancelling the candidature of the applicantt on the ground of suitability. R Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced below:-
"22. The employer is given 'discretion' to terminate or otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant ha has already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that Page 2 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 all the facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration while adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services services in question. In case the employer come to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed would not have affected adversely fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has been suppressed is material fact and would have rendered an incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer employer would be justified in not appointing or if appointed to terminate services of such incumbent on due consideration of various aspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully the employer has the right to consider fitness and while doing so effect oof conviction and background facts of case, nature of offence etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been made, employer may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline toto appoint a person who is unfit or dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion that conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the fitness for employment incumbent may be appointed or continued in service.
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26.. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.
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28. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sesensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by concerned authorities considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects.
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30. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:
(4) In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acqacquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted : -
(C) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, Page 3 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 the employer may consider all rrelevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.
(5) In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
(6) In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.
2.1 He further submitted that the relevant vant facts of the applicant's case, in terms of the aforesaid directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which needs need to be considered by the Screening Committee, are as follows:
a. Onn perusal of FIR it would be clear that even the name of the applicant is not in existence in the FIR.
b. Ass per impugned order of cancellation of candidature, there is no specific allegation against the applicant.
c. Even as per impugned order of cancellation, the allegation even against the friend of the applicant was of verbal abuse. There is no specific allegation against the applicant.
d. The he applicant is placing his reliance on the settlement deed which was placed even before the competent authority and the first clause of the same clearly reads as under:
under:-
"Whereas due to some some confusion, misunderstandings and temperamental differences arose between the parties results in the present FIR No No- 350/2017 u/s 354/506/34 I.P.C., P.S. Timarpur, Delhi which was registered against the First party on the eh complaint of Second Party."
Page 4 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 e. Once
nce the FIR is quashed that too on the basis of settlement deed which has a clause that the name the applicant has taken in FIR due to misunderstanding and confusion clearly makes out tha that the applicant suitability cannot cannot be judged on the basis of a soli solitary incident in which even the allegation are not being made against the applicant.
f. The he initial allegation were against group of boys but the applicant was arrested and for that reason only, the applicant is facing the impediment, other than the presen present alleged incident the name of the applicant does not fall in any other criminal incident allegation from which it could be construed that the applicant is of bullying nature or not suitable for appointment in constable (Exe) in Delhi Police.
g. The
he finding
finding of Committee that the applicant is bullying type and propensity to indulge in crime without fear of law is not based upon facts but only, a decision based on suspicion and surmises that without too applying its mind on the facts of the case.
h. The applicant cant was falsely implicated due to misunderstanding in FIR No-350/2017 No 350/2017 and the said FIR was quashed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in WP (Crl) No-1279/18 No 1279/18 dated 27.4.2018. It is a matter of record that no specific allegation was alleged against the applicant in in aforesaid FIR. The applicant was the victim of circumstances and falsely implicated implicated due to misunderstanding. T The applicant was preparing for govt. competition examination at the Page 5 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 time of registration of FIR and conclusion of trial would take long time and present FIR would act as an impediment in employment;
and for the sake of future, the aforesaid matter has been settled with complainant as otherwise the applicant was falsely implicated due to misunderstanding in aforesaid incident.
i. The he respondent while rejecting the candidature of applicant has considered consider the wrong facts i.e. statement of applicant has been recorded under section 164 cr. P.C. on the contrary the applicant never gave statement u/s 164 Cr.PC thus making the impugned orders as bad in law.
j. The he background of the applicant is rural and the present employment is of utmost importance to the applicant and his family.
k. The applicant belongs to a respectable family having deep roots in the society and applicant father is also serving wit with the respondents for the past 28 years. The applicant cleared the selection process on merit and other than the present incident there is no other impediment in way of applicant for getting the present employment. The present employment is lowest in the hhierarchy of the police department that is to the post of constable in Delhi police.
2.2 Learned counsel counsel for the applicant drew our attention to the settlement deed dated 12.03.2018 between the complainant and the applicant herein.
herein He submitted that the Hon'ble High Court vide order Page 6 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 dated 27.04.2018 (Annexure A7) quashed the FIR filed against the applicant. For the sake of better appreciation, the order dated 27.04.2018 is reproduced herein below:
"By the present petition, petitioners seek quash quashing of FIR No.350/2017 under Sections 354/506/34 IPC registered at PS Timarpur, Delhi on the complaint of respondent No.2 and the proceedings pursuant thereto on the ground that the parties have settled the matter.
Learned proxy counsel for learned Additi Additional Standing Counsel for the State on instructions from Investigating Officer submits that in the above noted FIR the two petitioners are the only accused and the above-noted respondent No. 2 the complainant/victim.
Respondent No. 2 is present in Court and is identi identified by the learned counsel and the Investigating Officer. She states that she has settled the matter with the petitioners vide Settlement Deed dated 12th March, 2018 as the petitioners have apologised and assured that they will not misbehave in future. In terms of the settlement she does not wish to pursue the above-noted above noted FIR and the proceedings pursuant thereto.
The petitioners who are present in Court and are identified by the learned counsel affirm the statement of respondent No.2 and undertake to abide by the terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties vide abide Settlement Deed Dated 12th March, 2018, copy whereof is annexed as Annexure -BB to the present petition and have also apologised to the respondent No.2 for their act. Petitioners also assu assure that they will not indulge in any misbehaviour in future and to show remorse petitioners undertake to deposit costs also.
In view of the fact that the parties have amicably resolved their differences of their own free will, volition and without any coe coercion and no useful purpose will be served in continuance of the proceedings, it would be in the interest of justice to quash the abovementioned FIR and the proceedings pursuant thereto. There is no legal impediment in quashing the FIR in question.
Consequently, uently, FIR No.350/2017 under Sections 354/506/34 IPC registered at PS Timarpur, Delhi and proceedings pursuant thereto are hereby quashed subject to the petitioner depositing cost of ₹10,000/- each with the Juvenile Justice Fund maintained by the Registra Registrar General of this Court within three weeks.
Parties have signed this order sheet in acknowledgment of their statements made before this Court.
Petition is disposed of. Order dasti."
2.3 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondents in their order er dated 21.12.2018 recorded the wrong facts that 'statement of applicant u/s 164 Cr.P.C. has been recorded' on the contrary statement Page 7 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 of applicant u/s 164 Cr.P.C. has never been recorded, the present fact shows the absolute non-application non application of mind on beha behalf of authority and enough ground to vitiate the finding of Screening Committee on which basis the present impugned impugned order dated 21.12.2018 has been passed.
2.4 Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant remained in judicial custody from 05.08.2017 till 19.08.2017 but was released on bail on 11.08.2017 after recording the statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on on 10.08.2017. He further submitted that the allegations levelled against the applicant have been cross cross-examined and, in the remotest sense, the applicant has been acquitted; therefore, no inference of conduct of the applicant being bullying in nature can be drawn against the applicant herein.
2.5 Learned counsel for the applicant re relied upon the various judgments passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, which are as follows:
i). Judgment in W.P.(C) No.11979/2015 titled Manoj Kumar vs. UOI & Ors.
ii). Judgment in W.P.(C) No.2068/2010 titled GNCTD vs. Robin Singh.
2.6 He further relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi W.P.(C) No.4051/2012 dated 27.04.2012 titled Commissioner of Police vs. Anil Kumar, Kumar, which read reads as under:
"7.
7. We do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. First of all, the respondent Anil Kumar had clearly disclosed the factum of registration of the criminal case in both his Page 8 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 application form as well as in the attestatio attestation form. Secondly, the said respondent had also been acquitted by the trial court insofar as the offences under Section 452/506 IPC are concerned and as regards the offence under Section 354 IPC the same had already been compounded with the permission of the the court in terms of the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The effect of all this would be that the respondent stood acquitted of all charges against him.
8. Once the respondent Anil Kumar has been acquitted by the trial court, it was not open to the petitioner petitioner to rely on the very same allegations and conclude that his candidature be cancelled for his "involvement" in the criminal case. It was open to the petitioner to have made other inquiries with regard to antecedents and character of the respondent Anil Kumar umar and if any information with regard to his unsuitability came to the knowledge of the petitioner then his candidature could have been cancelled. But that is not the case here. The petitioner had solely relied on the very same allegations which found me mention in the FIR which had culminated in the acquittal of the respondent Anil Kumar. That is not permissible.
9. The order of the Tribunal be complied with within four weeks from today.
10. The writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
costs."
2.7 Learned counsel counsel for the applicant submitted that the Screening Committee has not applied the mind objectively in terms of the decision rendered in Avtar Singh (supra).
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned co counsel for the respondents relied upon the averments rments made in the counter affidavit.
He produced on record the decision making process. Learned counsel further clarified that the statement of victim was recorded us 164 Cr.
PC and it was inadvertently written that the statement of applicant was recorded.. However, the case of the applicant was considered in detail and the action taken by the respondents is legal.
3.1. Since the statement of the victim has been recorded under Section 164, the same is not reproduced.
r 3.2. Learned counsel counsel for the respondents urged that the statement so recorded reflects the seriousness of the crime involved in the matter Page 9 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 and cannot be dealt with in light of the decisions relied upon by the applicant.. He further highlighted that objective consideration has been done in the present present matter. He also relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 8751/2021, dated 29.01.2025, titled Anita vs. Commissioner of Police & Anr Anr., which reads as follows:
"9. Undoubtedly, the petitioner did not have, in her favour, an honourable acquittal or even an acquittal on benefit of doubt, in the criminal proceedings which were instituted against her by FIR 99/2013. The petitioner was acquitted only on the basis of a compromise executed between her and the complainant.
complainant. Mr. Chhibber sought to submit that the Tribunal has not taken into account a subsequent order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate on 20 March 2015.
10. We have perused the said order. The order concludes thus:
"25. Prosecution has been successful in proving the charges against accused Sonu u/s 3 read with section 6 of Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the issue No. 2 is decided in affirmation.
26. From the above elucidation ucidation of evidence, Issue No. 1 and 2 have been decided in affirmation. Hence it is found justified to convict accused Smt. Sonu under section 120B IPC and Section 3/6 of Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means)Act, 1992 for punishable offence and for action under Sec 419 and 420 IPC and Sec 320 (8) cr.p.c. for accused Sonu and Km. Anita.
Order
27. Accordingly, accused Smt. Sonu D/o Sh. Ram Pratap wife of Sh. Sandip Kumar caste Ahir Rio Pali, PS Mahendergarh, Distt Mahendergarh is convicted ted for offence u/s 120B IPC and Section 3/6 of Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 1992 and accused Smt. Sonu and Km. Anita D/o Sh. Satyavir Singh, caste Ahir. R/o Rasoolpur, PS Buhana Distt Jhunjhnu are acquitted for charges under der section 419, 420 IPC and in accordance with provisions contained in Section 320(8) cr.p.c.."
11. It is clear from a reading of the aforesaid paragraphs that in fact, on merits, the learned CJM found the allegation of impersonation in the examination toto have been proved. In paragraph 26 of the judgment of the learned CJM, the petitioner Anita was acquitted of the charges under Sections 419 and 420 under Section 320(8)² of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 19733.
12. Acquittal under Section 320(8) 320(8) is on the basis of compounding of the offence by compromise. As such, this order, too, underscores the fact that the acquittal of the petitioner was only because she chose to compromise Page 10 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 the case with the complainants. By no standards could it be treated as an acquittal on merits.
13. The Supreme Court has, in State of M.P. v Bhupendra Yadav, held thus:
"24. The yardstick to be applied in cases where the appointment sought relates to a Law Enforcement Agency, ought to be much more stringent than those applied pplied to a routine vacancy. One must be mindful of the fact that once appointed to such a post, a responsibility would be cast on the respondent of maintaining law and order in the society, enforcing the law, dealing with arms and ammunitions, apprehendingg suspected criminals and protecting the life and property of the public at large. Therefore, the standard rectitude to be applied to any person seeking appointment in a Law Enforcement Agency must always be higher and more rigourous for the simple reason that possession of a higher moral conduct is one of the basic requirements for appointment to a post as sensitive as that in the police service." of In matters of appointment to disciplined forces such as the armed forces and the police, greater latitude has to be granted to the establishment regarding the candidates whom they would seek to induct. If the decision not to appoint a candidate is based on relevant considerations, the Court must forbear from interfering, lest an undisciplined candidate is indu inducted into a discipline force.
14. Mr. Chhibber has sought to place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kumar v State of UP and a Division Bench of this Court in GNCTD v Robin Singh.
15. Insofar as Robin Singh is concerned, the decis decision not to appoint Robin Singh to the Police in that case was solely on the basis of concealment, by him, of his involvement in the criminal case while applying for appointment. In the present case, there is no such allegation against the petitioner. The respondent respondent has chosen not to appoint the petitioner given her antecedents and the criminal case against her, which was compromised with the opposite party. As such, the decision in Robin Singh has no application.
16. Ravinder Kumar, too, involves the same issue as is apparent from the opening paragraph of the judgment. The opening paragraph of the said judgment reads thus:
"The vexed question is back again. Is it a hard hard-and-fast and a cut-
and-dried dried rule that, in all circumstances, non non-disclosure of a criminal nal case (in which the candidate is acquitted) in the verification form is fatal for the candidate's employment? We think not and it ought not to be so too. Fortunately, we have a judicial chorus supporting our view. Each case will turn on the special factss and circumstances. We have endeavoured to analyse the applicable precedents and have followed those line of cases, which have a striking similarity to the facts at hand."
17. Mr. Chhibber also sought to place reliance on the judgment of a Coordinate Bench Bench of this Court in Pawan Singh v Commissioner of Police. In that case, the concerned officials had been acquitted of the criminal charge against them, albeit on benefit of doubt. The present case is, Page 11 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 therefore, clearly distinguishable, as there is no hono honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt in favour of the petitioner.
18. The reasons which prompted the respondent not to appoint the petitioner as Constable in Delhi Police are germane and in our view, would not brook judicial interference. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Tribunal to the extent it has dismissed the OA filed by the petitioner.
19. This Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed with no orders as to costs."
3.3 Learned counsel counsel for the respondents emphasized that in the present case quashing of FIR is based on the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.(CRL) No. 1279/2018, which reads as follows:
Respondent No. 2 is present in Court and is identified by the learned counsel and the Investigating Investigating Officer. She states that she has settled the matter with the petitioners vide Settlement Deed dated 12th March, 2018 as the petitioners have apologised and assured that they will not misbehave in future. In terms of the settlement she does not wis wish to pursue the above-noted above noted FIR and the proceedings pursuant thereto.
3.4 Learned counsel for the respondents further relies upon the following case laws:
(i) Shankarsan Dash Vs. UOI (1991 3 SCC 47
(ii) UOI v. Kali Dass Batish, Batish, 2006 1 SCC 779
(iii) Delhi Admn. V. Sushil Kumar,, 1996 11 SCC 605
(iv) Commr. Of Police v. Mehar Singh, Singh, 2013 7 SCC 685
(v) State of M.P. v. Parvez Khan, Khan, 2015 2 SCC 591
(vi) State v. Raj Kumar 2021 8 SCC 347
(vii) UOI v. Methu Meda 2022 1 SCC 1
(viii). Satish Chandra Yadav v. UOI, UOI 2023 7 SCC 536
(ix) Virendra Jatav v. State of M.P. M.P. 2022 SCC OnLine MP 763 Page 12 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020
4. In rejoinder to the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the respondents, learned counsel counsel for the applicant also relied upon the following case laws:
i) Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No.5675/2017 dated 10.12.2019 titled Sandeep Singh vs. Govt. of NCTD & Anr.
ii) Judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No.860/2023 dated 11.04.2023 titled Mahesh Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors.
iii) Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7935/2023 titled Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
iv) Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition Nos.20525/2011, 4757/2014 and 24320/2024 dated 21.07.2016 titled Avtar Singh vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
v) Judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Co ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in O.A. No.426/2019 No.426/2019 dated 08.07.2025 titled Vidur vs. Commissioner of Police and Anr.
vi) Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2325/2009 titled Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors.
vii) Judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Co ordinate Be Bench of this Tribunal in O.A. No.4375/2015 dated 20.12.2024 titled Amit vs. Commissioner of Police and Anr.
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5. Heard counsel for the respective parties and perused the pleadings available on record.
6. ANALYSIS :
6.1 We are of the considered opinion that the mere quashing of the FIR in the criminal case involving the applicant does not, by itself, confer upon him an automatic right to be declared fit for appointment to the post in question.. The respondents have exercised their discretion judiciously, after taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of allegations and the requirements of the post in question.
6.2 In the he judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra), which has been strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court iin paragraph 38.4.3 of the said judgment, has categorically held as under:
"38.4.3 -If If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate riate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
6.3. In State of M.P. v. Bhupendra Yadav (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1181), a criminal case was registered in the year 2015 against the respondent therein for offences under Sections 341 and 354(D) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 11(D) and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The allegations were that the respondent, along with other co co-accused, had Page 14 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 wrongfully restrained the complainant, a minor, and attempted to outrage her modesty. It was further alleged that despite the complainant repeatedly spurning spurning his advances, the respondent persistently stalked her, threw a letter and flowers at her, and insisted that she speak to him. During the trial, the complainant turned hostile.
A compromise was arrived at between the parties, pursuant to which the charge under Section 341 IPC was compounded. Since the remaining offences were non-compoundable, non compoundable, the trial continued;
however, owing to the prosecutrix and other witnesses turning hostile, the Trial Court acquitted the respondent of the charges under Section 354(D) (D) IPC and Sections 11(D)/12 of the POCSO Act. Subsequently, in 2016, the respondent was selected for the post of Constable after clearing the examination conducted by the State Government. In the verification form, he truthfully disclosed his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case. Nevertheless, upon consideration of his antecedents, the Superintendent of Police declared him unfit for recruitment. Upholding the decision of the State Government, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate to be declared fit for appointment to a disciplined force. It was held that the competent authority had judiciously exercised its discretion after considering all relevant factors relating to the antecedents of the respondent. The Court further held that even a single criminal case, in which the candidate ndidate is ultimately acquitted, apparently oon the basis of benefit of Page 15 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 doubt, can render him unsuitable for appointment to the post of Constable. Accordingly, Accordingly, the decision of the State Government was found to be neither arbitrary nor vitiated by mala fides, and the interference by the High Court was held to be unwarranted.
6.4 In paragraph 25 of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Manish anish Saini v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Another,, W.P.(C) No. 11856/2022, decided on 04.11.2024, it was observed as under:
"The litmus test that seems to emerge from a reading of the above authorities is the basis of the acquittal of the candidate in the criminal case. In the case of candidates seeking entry into police services, or other services dealing with law and order and security, one cannot really distinguish between offences on the basis of 'severity'. All offences involving moral turpitude, ccriminal acts, or intimidation must fall under the same umbrella."
6.5 In Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India and Others Others, Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019, decided on 26.09.2022, the Hon'ble Supreme Court obser observed as under:
67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employment opportunity is a scarce commodity in the present times being circumscribed within a limited vacancies yet by itself may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the ccredentials of a candidate may raise any question regarding his suitability, irrespective of eligibility. However, at the same time, this Court observed that there should not be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in a government service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of each case. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the judges is that every individual deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move ahead in life for se self-improvement.
To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, may not always constitute justice. It would all depend on the fact situation of the given case.
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68. The only reason to refer to and look into the various decisions rendered by this Court as above over a period of time is that the principles of law laid therein governing the subject are bit inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench decision in the case of Avtar Singh (supra) different courts have enunciated different principles.
69. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to shortlist the broad principles of law which should be made applicable to the litigations of the present nature. The principles are as follows:
a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the publi public employer concerned, through its designated officials officials-more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society's secu security. [See Raj Kumar (supra)]
b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in acriminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.
c) The suppression of material information and making a false statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution, conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can be terminated from service.
d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders'conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided.
e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority concerned whose action is being challenged, acted mala fide.
f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the Authorit Authority? g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the Authority concerned was fair and reasonable?
reasonable?"
6.6 There can be no dispute that, in arriving at a just and proper decision, the Screening Committee is required to examine and apply the provisions of Standing Order No. 398/2010, which is relevant for taking an appropriate decision in the present case. The said Standing Order reads as follows:Page 17 of 26
SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 "STANDING ORDER NO. 398/2010 POLICY FOR DECIDING CASES OF CAN- DIDATES PROVISIONALLY SELECTED IN DELHI POLICE INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL CASES (FACING TRIAL OR ACQUITTED).
During the recruitments made in Delhi Police, several cases come to light where candidates conceal the fact of their involvement in criminal cases in the applica- tion Form/Attestation Form in the hope that it may not come to light and disclo disclo- sure by them at the beginning of the recruitment process itself may debar them from participating in the various recruitment tests. Also the appointment if he/she has been acquitted but not honourably.
In order to formulate a comprehensive policy, the following rules shall be appli- cable for all the recruitments conducted by Delhi Police:-
1). xxx xxxxxx 2). xxx xxxxxx
3). If a candidate had disclosed his/her involvement and/or arrest in criminal cases, complaint case, preventive proceedings etc. and the case is pending inves- tigation or pending trial, the candidature will be kept in abeyance till the final de de- cision of the case. After the court' judgment, if the candidate is acquitted or dis dis-
charged, the case will be referred to the Screening Committee of the PHQ com- prising of Special Commissioner of Police/Administration, Joint Commissioner of Police/Headquarters and Joint Commissioner of Police/Vigilance to assess his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police.
4) If a candidate had disclosed his/her ininvolvement in criminal case, complaint case, preventive proceedings etc. both in the application form as well as in the at at- testation form but was acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her case will be referred to the Screening Committee of PHQ to asses assess his/her suitability for ap- pointment in Delhi Police.
5). xxx xxxxxx
6). Such candidates against whom chargecharge-sheet in any criminal case has been filed in the court and the charges fall in the category of serious offences or moral turpitude, though lat later acquitted or acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person, he/she will generally not be considered suitable for government service. However, all such cases will be judged by tthe Screening Committee of PHQ to assess their suitsuit- ability for the government job. The details of criminal cases which involve moral turpitude may kindly be perused at Annexure 'A'.
7) Such cases in which a candidate had faced trial in any criminal case which does not fall in the category of moral turpitude and is subsequently acquitted by the court and he/she discloses about the same in both application form as well as attestation form will be judged by the Screening Committee to decide about his/her suitability tability for the government job.
Page 18 of 26SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020
8) xxx xxxxxx
9). If any candidate is discharged by extending the benefit of Probation of Offend- ers Act, 1958 this will also not be viewed adversely by the department for his/her suitability for government service."
Annexure nexure A to the above policy which refers to offences involving moral turpitude is extracted below:
"1. Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120 120-B, Indian Penal Code)
2. Offences against the State (Sections 121 - 130, Indian Penal Code)
3. Offences relating to Army, rmy, Navy and Air Force (Sections 131 131-
134, Indian Penal Code)
4. Offence against Public Tranquility (Section 153 153-A & 153-B, Indian Penal Code).
5. False evidence and offences against Public Justice (Sections 193-216A, Indian Penal Code)
6. Offences relating ting to coin and government stamps (Section 231 231- 263A, Indian Penal Code).
7. Offences relating to Religion (Section 295 295-297, Indian Penal Code)
8. Offences affecting Human Body (Sections 302 302-304, 304B, 305- 308, 311-317, 325-333, 333, 335, 347, 348, 354, 363 363-373, 376-376-A, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D, 377, In- dian Penal Code)
9. Offences against Property (Section 379 379-462, Indian Penal Code)
10. Offences relating to Documents and Property Marks (Section 465-489, Indian Penal Code)
11. Offences relating to Marriage and Dowry Prohibition Act (Section 498-A, A, Indian Penal Code).
Code)."
6.7 We may also usefully refer to paragraphs 26 to 30 of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police v. Raj Kumar, Kumar, Civil Appeal No. 4960 of 2021 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 13285 of 2014), decided on 25.08.2021, wherein it was held as under:
Page 19 of 26SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 "26.
26. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guess the suitability of a candidate for any public office or post. Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the m materials), or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny on why a candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts' decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive power of determining suitability of an individual for appointmen appointment. This was emphasized by this court, in M.V. Thimmaiah v. Union Public Service Commission(2008) 2 SCC 119 held as follows:
"21. Now, comes the question with regard to the selection of the candidates. Normally, the recommendations of the Selection Committeeee cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the recommendations of the Selection Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion has been given to the Selection Committee only and courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the selection of the candidates nor is the business of the court to examine each candidate and record its opinion...
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
30. We fail to understand how the Tribunal can sit as an Appellate Authority to call for the personal records and constitute Selection Committee to undertake this exercise. This power is not given to the Tribunal and it should be clearly understood that th the assessment of the Selection Committee is not subject to appeal either before the Tribunal or by the courts. One has to give credit to the Selection Committee for making their assessment and it is not subject to appeal. Taking the overall view of ACRs of the candidates, one may be held to be very good and another may be held to be good. If this type of interference is permitted then it would virtually amount that the Tribunals and the High Courts have started sitting as Selection Committee or act as an App Appellate Authority over the selection."
27. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v Dr. B.S. Mahajan(1990) 1 SCC 305 this court held that "12. ... it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinise ththe relative merits of the candi- dates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. ... in the present case ththe University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selec selec- tion so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so-calledcalled comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction."
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28. Again, in Union Public Service Commission v. M. Sathiya Priya(2018) 15 SCC 796 it was reiterated that "The question as to how the categories are assessed in light of the relevant records and as to what norms apply in making the assessment, is exclusively to be determined by the Selection Committee. Since the jurisdiction tto make selection as per law is vested in the Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee members have got expertise in the matter, it is not open for the courts generally to interfere in such matters except in cases where the process of assessment iss vitiated either on the ground of bias, mala fides or arbitrariness. It is not the function of the court to hear the matters before it treating them as appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committee and to scrutinise the relative merit of the candidates.
dates. The question as to whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted expert body i.e. the Selection Committee."
29. Public service - like any other, pre pre-supposes that the state employer has an element of latitude or choice on who should enter its service. Norms, based on principles, govern essential aspects such as qualification, experience, age, number of attempts permitted to a candidate, etc. These, broadly constitute eligibility conditions required of each candidate or applicant aspiring to enter public service. Judicial review, under the Constitution, is permissible to ensure that those norms are fair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in a non-discriminatory discriminatory manner. However, suitability is entirely different;
ifferent; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, is greatest, as long as the process of decision making is neither illegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides.
30. The High Court's approach, evident from its observations about the youth and age of the he candidates, appears to hint at the general acceptability of behaviour which involves petty crime or misdemeanour. The impugned order indicates a broad view, that such misdemeanour should not be taken seriously, given the age of the youth and the rural setting.
etting. This court is of opinion that such generalizations, leading to condonation of the offender's conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided. Certain types of offences, like molestation of women, or trespass and beating up, assault, ault, causing hurt or grievous hurt, (with or without use of weapons), of victims, in rural settings, can also be indicative of caste or hierarchy-based based behaviour. Each case is to be scrutinized by the concerned public employer, through its designated officials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society's security. "
6.8 It has been vehemently contended on behalf of the applicant that, even if the allegations contained in the FIR are taken at their face value, no offence under Section 354 IPC is made out, even remotely.Page 21 of 26
SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the nature of the allegations is, at best, best, akin to acts of "bullying" and does not satisfy the essential ingredients of the said offence.
6.9 Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:
"Assault of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will there by outrage her modesty, 1 [shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine."
One cannot ignore the essential ingredients of Section 354 IPC:
(i) Actus Reus (The Act): Assaulting or using cri criminal force on a woman.
(ii) Mens Rea (The Intent): The action must be done with the intention to outrage her modesty, or with knowledge that it is likely to do so.
(iii) Definition of Modesty: Implies a woman's sense of chastity and self-respect, respect, often linked to her private acts or body."
6.10 The Indian Penal Code does not specifically define the term "bullying." However, acts which may be described as bullying bullying--
whether ther physical, verbal, or cyber in nature nature--are addressed under various provisions of the IPC, depending upon the nature and consequences of the conduct. Such acts may, inter alia, attract Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide), where they lead to self self-harm; Sections 503 to 507 IPC (criminal intimidation, insult, or annoyance) in cases involving threats or provocation; Section 354D IPC (stalking); and Section 509 IPC (word, gesture, or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman). In cases of cyber bullying, relevant provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 may also be attracted.
Additionally, the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights Page 22 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 (NCPCR) has issued guidelines aimed at the prevention of bullying.
The NCPCR has defined "bullying"
"bullying" as follows:
"Bullying can be defined as an act of aggressive physical or social behaviour, intentionally and repeatedly meted out by an individual or a group towards another person(s), which causes harm or discomfort. It often involves an imbalance of of power between the perpetrator and the victim, wherein the victim is unable to stop it from happening. Bullying is typically repetitive in nature and may have immediate, medium, and long long-
term physical, mental, and psychological impacts on both the bully aand the bullied."
6.11 In Ruffley v. The Board of Management of Saint Anne's School ([2017] IESC 33), a landmark decision in Irish employment law, the Supreme Court clarified the concept of "inappropriate behaviour" in the context of bullying. The Court hel held that such behaviour must be inappropriate at a human level and not merely legally wrong. It emphasized that the test focuses on propriety in human relations rather than strict legality. The Court further observed that a key component of the definition of bullying is that the conduct must be "outrageous, unacceptable, and exceeding all bounds tolerated by decent society," thereby limiting claims to conduct that is clearly intolerable in social and moral terms.
6.12 In Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, the defendant, in what he seems to have regarded as a practical joke, informed the plaintiff that her husband had been seriously injured in an accident and was lying at The Elms, Leytonstone, with both legs broken, and instructed her to fetch tch him immediately with pillows. All this was false. The statement caused the plaintiff a violent shock to her nervous system, resulting in vomiting, other serious and permanent physical effects, Page 23 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 and temporary mental incapacity, necessitating medical atte attention and causing significant distress and expense. Justice Wright J observed:
"The The defendant has, as I assume for the moment, wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff -- that is to say, to infringe her legal right to personall safety, and has in fact thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition without more appears to me to state a good cause of action, there being no justification alleged for the act. This wilful injuria is in law malicious, although no malicious purpose pose to cause the harm which was caused nor any motive of spite is imputed to the defendant.
It remains to consider whether the assumptions involved in the proposition are made out. One question is whether the defendant's act was so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant, regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind. I think that it was. It is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave effects under the circumstances upon any but an exceptionally indifferent person, and therefore an intention to produce such an effect must be imputed, and it is no answer in law to say that more harm was done than was anticipated, for that is commonly the case with all wrongs. The other question is whether the effect was, to use the ordinary phrase, too remote to be in laww regarded as a consequence for which the defendant is answerable."
Hence, applying the above propositions, the applicant cannot take shelter either in the settlement or in the allegations of "bullying."
The argument advanced by the learned counsel for th the applicant--that bullying does not, ipso facto, constitute an offence under Section 354 IPC--cannot cannot be accepted. It is well-settled well settled that bullying, whether physical, verbal, or psychological, can leave long long-term effects on both the victim and the perpetrator.
perpetrator. Recruitment into a disciplined force operates on the principle of zero tolerance, given the critical responsibility entrusted to such personnel. Appointment to a disciplined force entails a "duty of care," a legal obligation which Page 24 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 demands that standards of conduct, integrity, and suitability be maintained at the highest level.
6.13 From above, the following undisputed facts emerge:
(i) FIR was registered for the said offense under Section 354 IPC.
(ii) The applicant remained in custody for more than 24 hours, i.e., from 5.8.2024 to 11.08.2024.
(iii) The Statement of Complianant was recorded under Section 164 CR PC.
(iv) A settlement was reached, resulting in the quashing of the FIR.
(v) The Section 354 IPC falls within the ambit of moral turpitude
of clause 8 to Annexure A
(vi) There
ere is no malafide or biased approach adopted by the respondents.
(vii) There is no procedural lapse on the part of the screening committee.
(viii) The Screening Committee looked into all the aspects on case by case basis.
7. CONCLUSION :
7.1. In view of the above analysis, analysis, we do not find any merit in the present Original Application.
A Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Page 25 of 26 SURAJ BISHT 2026.01.12 13:04:03+05'30' Item No. 34 (Court-IV) (Court O.A. No.57/2020 7.2. Pending M.A.s,
M.A.s if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.
(Dr. Anand S Khati) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/sb/as/
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