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[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Rohit Rajpal And Anr vs Ankita Suri And Ors. on 9 January, 2017

Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.


 IN THE COURT OF SH. AJAY PANDEY, ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE­
   05, ROOM NO. 605, SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS, NEW
                          DELHI
In the matter of
Suit No.9439/16

Rohit Rajpal & Anr                                              .............Plaintiffs
                                       Versus

Ankita Suri & Ors                                             ..............Defendants

Present:           Plaintiff no. 1 with Sh.Rajeshwar Kumar Gupta, Advocate.
                   Sh. Rajeev Kumar, Advocate for defendnat no. 1 and 2.
                   None for defendant no.3.

         ORDER

1.   By   this   order   application   under   order   VII   rule   11 read with section 11 CPC filed by defendant no. 1 and 2 is being decided.

 

2.   Arguments on application heard.

 

3.   It is stated in the application that the plaint is barred under the law of limitation as well as in view of section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.

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Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

4.   Learned   Counsel   for   defendant   no.   1   and   2   also submits  that  the  suit is not maintainable under section 26 of Specific Relief Act.

 

5.   Learned   Counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   submits   that neither of the grounds raised by the defendant in his application under   order   VII   rule   11   CPC   is   applicable   in   the   facts   and circumstances of the present case nor the ratio of the judgment relied upon by him is applicable in the present suit.

 

6.   This   is   a   case   for   rectification   of   document   being registered sale deed dated 24.08.2011 under section 26 of the Specific Relief Act to rectify the same to be read as a mortgage deed.

7.   It is submitted by counsel for the plaintiff that the sale deed was got executed by the defendant no. 1 and 2 under undue influence from the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 against the loan advanced to the plaintiffs as well as defendant no. 3.

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Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

 

8.   Both the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 are brothers.

 

9.   It is stated in the plaint that in July­ August 2011, plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 for their urgent needs approached their relative Sh. Varun Sethi, who is the husband of defendant no. 2 for lending some money. Sh. Varun Sethi agreed to lend the money subject to the condition that plaintiffs and defendant no.   3   would   mortgage   their   property   being   entire   First   and Second   Floor   of   the   House   bearing   no.   NIL   -   36   C,   Malviya Nagar, New Delhi measuring 100 sq yards as the security but in place of a mortgage deed they would execute a sale deed which would be revoked/cancelled lateron, or a transfer deed would be executed to convey back the title of the said property in the name   of   the   plaintiffs   and   defendant   no.   3   on   repayment   of alleged loan of 27 lacs.. 

 

10.  It is further stated that plaintiffs and defendant no.

3, who were in dire need of money agreed to the condition of defendant no. 1 and 2 and accordingly executed the impugned Suit No.9439/16 Page 3 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

sale deed dated 24.08.2011 registered with the concerned Sub Registrar on 30.08.2011.

 

11.  It is further stated that because the transaction was not   of   sale   therefore   the   possession   of   the   property   was   not delivered to defendant no. 1 and 2 though it was mentioned in the   impugned   sale   deed   that   actual   physical,   peaceful   and vacant   possession   had   been   handed   over   to   the   vendees   by vendors. 

 

12.  It   is   further   stated   that   on   03.12.2015,   plaintiffs were informed by the security guard of the building that some court personnel had visited the premises.

 

13.  In the end of Fabruary, 2016, plaintiffs also received an   anonymous  Whatsapp  message  containing   the   copy   of   the order dated 26.02.2016 in execution no. 52/2015. Thereafter, the plaintiffs got to know that defendant no. 1 and 2 filed civil suit   being   CS   no.   695/2013   (New   No.   CS   26/14)   titled   as Kritika Suri & Anr vs Rajesh Rajpal for recovery of possession of Suit No.9439/16 Page 4 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

the property from defendant no. 3 and a consent decree was passed   against   him   on   24.04.2014.  In   execution   of   the   said decree,   the   court   had   issued   warrants   of   possession   against defendant no. 3.

 

14.  It is stated that the property in question was jointly held   and   owned   by   plaintiffs   alongwith   their   elder   brother, defendant no. 3 and the same was never sold to defendant no. 1 and 2 and defendant no. 1 and 2 got executed the sale deed dated   24.08.2011   under   undue   influence,   coercion   and compulsion to secure the loan for which they were in a position to dominate the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3. Under the undue influence,   coercion   and   compulsion,   these   defendants   also received   the   chain   of   title   documents   from   the   plaintiffs   and defendant no. 3.

 

15.  It   is   further   stated   that   the   Learned   Court   of   Sh.

Rakesh Kumar, ADJ South while dismissing the objections and the  review  application  of the plaintiffs, filed in  the  execution petition,   was   of   the   view   that   in   case   the   plaintiffs   and   the Suit No.9439/16 Page 5 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

defendant no. 3 had borrowed the said loan of Rs 27 Lakhs, a mortgage   deed,   ought   to   have   been   executed   and   not   a   sale deed. The said Learned Court further observed that the consent decree of possession has also been passed against defendant no.

3.  

16.  It is further stated that plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 were the joint owners of undivided property but the plaintiffs were not made party to the said suit deliberately  and it appears that   the   suit   was   filed   collusively   and   to   debar   the   plaintiffs from their valuable rights, title and interest in the suit property.

 

17.  It is further stated that under these circumstances, plaintiffs sought legal advice. It was advised to them that a suit for rectification under section 26 Specific Relief Act, 1963 needs to be filed. Plaintiffs got certified copies of the plaint, written statement and other documents in suit no. 695/14, from which it was revealed that defendant no. 1, 2 executed a registered lease deed dated 24.05.2013 in favour of defendant no.3. It is stated that execution of this lease deed was concealed from the Suit No.9439/16 Page 6 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

plaintiffs by defendant no. 1 and 2 as well as by defendant no.

3. It is further stated that defendant no. 3 alone had no right or authority to execute and register the lease deed from defendant no. 1 and 2. It is further stated that plaintiffs also came to know that the cheques issued by defendant no. 3 to defendant no. 1 and 2 were dishonoured and a case was filed against defendant no.   3   in   the   court   of   Learned   MM,   Karkardoma   Courts.   The plaintiffs appeared in the said court before the Learned MM, NI Act (East) Karkardoma Courts on 20.08.2015 but defendant no. 3 did not disclose to plaintiff no. 1 that the said cheque was issued pursuant to some lease deed. It is stated that defendant no.   3   informed   the   plaintiff  no. 1  that   the  said  case  is  for  a dishonoured cheque of interest of the loan.

 

18.  It is further stated that the plaintiffs are left with no option but to file the present suit for rectification of the sale deed dated 24.08.2011.

 

19.  In para 18 of the plaint, plaintiffs have taken various grounds. In the first 7 grounds of para 18, plaintiffs have given Suit No.9439/16 Page 7 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

details of the other registered sale deeds of the property in the same   area   which   are   purportedly   registered   for   a   higher consideration   amount   than   this   impugned   sale   deed.   In   8 th ground,   plaintiff   has   stated   that   the   defendant   no.   1   and   2 committed   fraud   upon   the   plaintiffs   and   the   consent   of   the plaintiffs was not free but influenced by defendant no. 1 and 2 as   plaintiffs   were   in   dire   need   of   money   and   the   defendant dictated/dominated their terms. In ground 9 it is stated that the suit   filed   by   defendant   no.   1   and   2   was   in   collusion   with defendant no. 3. In ground 10 it is stated that the consideration of the sale deed is at very lower side and is forbidden by law and   it   would   defeat   the   provisions   of   circle   rates   fixed   by Government of NCT of Delhi and Stamp Duty applicable  and payable in Delhi. In ground 11 it is stated that the case of the defendant   no.   1   and   2   is   within   the   definition   of   fraud   and defendant no. 3 also got in collusion with them to deceive the plaintiffs and to receive unlawful gain against the plaintiffs.

 

20.  Pleadings  in   the  plaint  and  arguments  of  counsels for the parties considered.

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Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

21.  Counsel for the plaintiffs submits that a clear cause of action is disclosed in the plaint. He further submits that the suit is within limitation as the plaintiffs got to know about the fraud   committed   by   the   defendants   in   February   2016   after receiving a Whatsapp message containing the copy of the order dated 26.02.2016 in execution no. 52/2015. He further submits that there was no occasion with the plaintiffs to know about the proceedings of civil suit no. 695/14 because the plaintiffs were not made a party to the said suit.

 

22.  Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that in view of the nature of transaction as well as the consideration money in the sale deed, the plaint primafacie reflects that there was an undue influence exercised by defendant no. 1 and 2 against the plaintiffs   while   executing   the   impugned   sale   deed   dated 24.08.2011.

  

23.  Counsel for the plaintiffs further submits that now the burden to prove that there was no undue influence lies upon Suit No.9439/16 Page 9 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

the   defendants.   He   submits   that   the   same   can   be   discharged only   by   way   of   a   trial.   He   submits   that   plaintiffs   have   every chance to succeed in their case in view of the facts disclosed in the plaint.

 

24.  In support of his submission learned counsel for the plaintiffs has drawn the attention of the court to section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which provides as follows:­   

  16.   "Undue   Influence"

defined:­   1   A   contract   is   said   to   be induced by "undue influence" where the relations   subsisting   between   the   parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and   uses   that   position   to   obtain   an unfair advantage over the other. (2)   In  particular   and  without  prejudice to   the   generality   of   the   foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another­
  (a)   where   he   holds   a   real   or apparent   authority   over   the   other,   or where he is in a fiduciary relation to the other; or
  (b) where he makes a contract with Suit No.9439/16 Page 10 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

a   person   whose   mental   capacity   is temporarily   or   permanently   affected   by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.

  (3) Where a person who is in a position to   dominate   the   will   of   another,   enters into   a   contract   within   him   and   the transaction appears on the face of it or on   the   evidence   adduced,   to   be unconscionable,   then   burden   of   proving that such a contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.

25.  Learned Sh. Gupta has specifically emphasized upon the illustration (c) of the section which reads as:­   "A,   being   in   debt   to   B   the money­lender   of   his   village,   contracts   a fresh loan on terms which appear to be unconscionable. It lies on B to prove that the   contract was not induced by undue influence" 

He submits that the defendant no. 1 and 2 were in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiffs as plaintiffs were receiving and   they   were   lending   money   to   the   plaintiffs.   He   further Suit No.9439/16 Page 11 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.
submits   that   the   terms   of   the   alleged   sale   deed   are   un­ concianable as the consideration amount mentioned therein is less than the half, which the property of same description, in same locality could have fetched.     
 

26.  It   is   rightly   submitted   by   learned   counsel   for defendant no. 1 and 2 that no presumption of exercise of undue influence can be drawn in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Nor there is any apparent influence brought out in the pleadings. 

 

27.  Illustration  (c) relied  upon  by the  learned counsel for plaintiffs is not applicable. In illustration (c) of Section 16 of Indian   Contract   Act,   debtor   was   already   indebted   from   the money lander and therefore the money lander was already in position of dominance above the debtor. 

 

28.  In the present case there is nothing in the pleadings to suggest that the plaintiffs were under some compulsions or influence   to   approach the  defendant  no. 1 and 2 for  lending Suit No.9439/16 Page 12 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

some   money.   In   the   plaint,   plaintiffs   have   stated   that   they themselves approached the uncle of defendant no. 2 for lending of money in the month of July­August 2011. Even the alleged dire need of money to the plaintiffs could not be inferred from the pleadings as it do not appear from the pleadings that the money was immediately disbursed to the plaintiffs. Rather the money was given to the plaintiffs on 24.08.2011 as against they approaching for the same in July­August 2011. There was no urgency to receive money from defendants only. Plaintiffs could have   mortgaged   their   freehold   property   with   any   bank   and financial institution and could have easily received the loan, if any.

29.  There is nothing in the plaint to suggest that there is some  previous contract between the parties or some  previous transactions,   which   could   have   influenced   the   will   of   the plaintiffs to execute the impugned document.

 

30.  Hence, the transaction in favour of defendant no. 1 and 2 can not be termed as un­concionable merely because the Suit No.9439/16 Page 13 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

consideration amount secured in the sale deed is allegedly less than   the   other   independent   transactions   between   the   third parties.   During   the   course   of   arguments   learned   Counsel   for plaintiffs failed  to point out that  the consideration  amount is below circle rates.

 

31.  The facts stated in the plaint, do not in itself suggest that the transaction of execution of sale deed was actuated by undue influence exercised by defendant no. 1 and 2 over the plaintiffs and defendant no.3.

 

32.  Even   otherwise   if   for   the   sake   of   arguments   it   is presumed that this ground is available to plaintiffs, it is rightly submitted  by   counsel  for  defendant  no. 1 and 2 that  on  this ground also the plaintiff could have sought the rectification or declaration   of   the   alleged   sale   deed   within   the   period   of limitation. 

    

33.  There   is   nothing   in   the   plaint   as   to   when   the plaintiffs come out of the alleged undue influence exercised by Suit No.9439/16 Page 14 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

defendant no. 1 and 2, which could suggest when the period of limitation of filing the present suit could have begun.

 

34.  Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides as under:­ Section   3:   Bar   of   limitation.­   (1)   Subject   to   the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred,  and  application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence."

35.    Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   in  Manindra   Land   and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee AIR 1964 S.C. 1336 has held that Section 3 is peremptory and it is the duty of the Court to not to proceed with a suit, appeal or application if it   is   made   beyond   the   prescribed   period   of   limitation, irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been set up in defence or not. The section is mandatory and has to be obeyed in full. The Court has no choice in the matter. If any of the   provisions   contained   in   Sections   4   to   24   inclusive,   are inapplicable, the mandatory provision of Section 3 is attracted with the result that the Court is bound to dismiss a suit which, on the face of it, appears to be barred by time. 

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Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

36.  In the case in hand, as per the facts stated in the plaint. The alleged sale deed was executed on 24.08.2011. As per Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a suit to declare the forgery   of   an   instrument   issued   or   registered   is,   three   years, from the date of issue or registration. 

 

37.   As per Article 58 of Limitation Act, 1963 any other relief of declaration can be sought within three years when the right to sue occurs. As per para 20 of the plaint, the   cause of action for filing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs firstly arose when   the   sale   deed   dated   24.08.2011   was   executed   and registered with a clear understanding between the plaintiffs and defendant no. 3 that it was a security document. 

 

38.  If the limitation period is counted from the said date the same expired after three years w.e.f 24.08.2014. 

 

39.  The  present  suit has been  filed on 02.12.2016 i.e. after about two years of the expiry of period of limitation. 

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Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

40.   It   therefore   appears   to   be   rightly   submitted   by learned counsel for defendant no. 1 and 2 that the suit is barred by the law of limitation.

 

41.  Next   contention   of   the   counsel   for   defendant   for rejection of suit is that the same is barred by Section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. 

42.  In reply to these submissions of the counsel for the defendant no. 1 and 2 that suit is also hit by section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that there are a number of documents in the form of sale   deed   of   different   parties   in   the   same   area   which   the plaintiffs are relying in order to prove their suit. Learned Sh. Gupta therefore submits that plaintiff is not intending to lead only   oral   evidence   against   the   registered   sale   deed   dated 24.08.2011.

43.  He  submits that  plaintiff is intending to prove  the documents of the similarly situated properties to reflect that the Suit No.9439/16 Page 17 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

sale deed dated 24.08.2011 could not have been executed on the consideration as mentioned in the same. 

44.  Court   is   in   agreement   with   the   submission   of   Sh.

Rajeev that the documents referred to by learned Sh. Gupta are independent   documents.   Section   91   and   92   of   the   Indian Evidence Act provide as follows:­   "Section 91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of   property   reduced   to   form   of documents:­ When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any   matter   is   required   by   law   to   be reduced   to   the   form   of   a   document,   no evidence   shall   be   given   in   proof   of   the terms   of   such   contract,   grant   of   other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself , or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.

  Section   92.   Exclusion   of evidence   of   oral   agreement:­   When   the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition   of   property,   or   any   matter Suit No.9439/16 Page 18 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

required by law to be reduced to the form of   a   document,   have   been   proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying,   adding   to,   or   subtracting   from, its terms."  

45.  Section   91   excludes   all   evidence   except   the document   itself   if   the   terms   of   a   contract   or   the   grant   of   a property are reduced in the form of document.

 

46.  Section   92   further   bars   any   oral   agreement   or statement   in   variance   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of   the document refereed in Section 91. As per the section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act, the contents and terms and conditions of the  contract  between  the parties can be  proved by document itself. As per section 92, plaintiff can not lead any oral evidence contrary to, varying, adding or subtracting from the said terms and conditions.  Both the sections of Evidence Act are in reality doctrine   of   substantive   law  as held  by  Honble   High  Court  of Suit No.9439/16 Page 19 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

Delhi in  "RFA no (OS) 88­89 of 2006 titled as Shilendra Nath Endlay and Anr vs Kuldip Gandotra".

 

47.  Honble   High   court   of   Delhi   in   the   above   cited judgment held :­   ".... As regards the contention raised on behalf of the Appellants, that it was   orally   agreed   between   the   parties that the Respondent would be responsible for   getting   the   said   flat   converted   into freehold, is concerned the said assertion is   devoid   of   merit.   It   is   a   well   settled principle of interpretation that Evidence Act   forbids   proving   the   contents   of   a writing other than by the writing itself. This   doctrine   described   by   the   Supreme Court as " best evidence rule" is in reality a   doctrine   of   substantive   law,   namely, that   in   case   of   a   written   contract   all proceedings   and   contemporaneous   oral expressions  of   the  things   are   merged   in writing   and   displaced   by   it.   In   other words,   when   persons   express   their agreement in writing, it is for the express purpose   of   getting   rid   of   any indefiniteness   and   to   put   their   ideas   in such   shape   that   there   can   be   no Suit No.9439/16 Page 20 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

misunderstanding, which so often occurs when   reliance   is   placed   upon   oral statements.   Written   contracts   presume deliberation   on   the   part   of   the contracting parties and it is natural they should   be   treated   with   careful consideration by the courts and with the disinclination to disturb the conditions of matters as embodied in them by the act of   the   parties.   The   Supreme   Court   in Roop Kumar (supra) has observed:

  It   is   likewise   a   general   and most inflexible rule that wherever written instrument   are  appointed, either  by  the requirement of law, or by the contract of the   parties,   to   be   the   repositories   and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded   from   being   used   either   as   a substitute   for   such   instruments,   or   to contradict or alter them. This is a matter both   of   principle   and   policy.   It   is   of principle because such instruments are in their own nature and would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon  which  men's right  depended, were liable to be impeached by loose collateral evidence.   (See   Starkie   on   Evidence   p.
648)   Thus,   it   is   seen   that   the provisions of the Evidence Act come into Suit No.9439/16 Page 21 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

operation   for   the   purpose   of   excluding evidence   of   any   oral   agreement   or statement   for   the   purpose   of contradiction,   varying,   adding   or subtracting   from   its   terms,   after   the document has been produced to prove its terms." 

48.  The   plaintiff in  the  present   case  emphasized upon some oral understanding between the parties that the sale deed was not to be acted upon. The said terms and condition can not be read into the document nor the oral evidence of the same is permitted   under   section   91   and   92   of   Indian   Evidence   Act, because even a mortgage deed for the property is required to be compulsorily   registrable.   Hence,   it   is   rightly   submitted   by counsel for the defendant no. 1 and 2 that the suit is also hit by section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and the plaintiffs are barred by law to lead any evidence qua their pleadings in variance of the registered document executed by them.

 

49.  Further   in   view   of   section   58   (c)   of   Transfer   of Property Act no transaction of sale of a property can be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition of mortgage is embedded Suit No.9439/16 Page 22 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

in the document which effects or purports to effect the same. 

 

50.  In   "Raj   Kishore   (D)   By   LRs   vs   Prem   Singh   &   Ors (2011) 2 CTC 229", plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the sale deed executed by him in favour of defendant no. 1 was void and ineffective and he continued to be the owner in   possession   of   the   land.   It   was   stated   that   the   plaintiff purportedly   executed   and   registered   a   sale   deed   of   land   in favour   of   defendant   no.  1  for  a  sum of   Rs  6000/­  only.  The plaintiff's case was that transfer was only by way of security for the payment of Rs 6000/­, which was taken as a loan. Further case of the plaintiff was that on return of the loan amount the land   in   question   was   supposed   to   be   transferred   back   to plaintiff. An agreement to that effect was also executed between the parties to the transaction on the date of execution of the sale deed itself. Plaintiff's further case was that the possession of the land in question continued with him and defendant no. 2 as agreed between the parties.

 

51.  Hon'ble   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   in   second Suit No.9439/16 Page 23 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

appeal took a view that because the sale deed was accompanied by   an   agreement   for   re­conveyance   of   the   property   sold   , transaction between the parties would amount to a mortgage, subject to the condition that mortgagee must get the property re­conveyed within the period stipulated for that purpose.

 

52.  Hon'ble   Supreme   Court   disagreeing   with   the   view taken   by   the   Hon'ble   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   quoted section 58 (c) of Transfer of Property Act and held :­   We   have   heard   learned counsel for the parties at length. As seen above, the High Court has, while dealing with   the   substantial   question   of   law framed by it for determination, held that whenever conveyance of any property is accompanied   by   a   document   for   re­ conveyance of the same to the seller the transaction   would   amount   to   a mortgage. The proposition of law is not in our opinion correctly stated. Although the High Court has not elaborated as to what kind of mortgage an agreement for re­conveyance   would   bring   about,   it   is obvious that the High Court meant to say that   the   transaction   would   constitute   a mortgage   by   conditional   sale.   Mortgage Suit No.9439/16 Page 24 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

by conditional sale is described by section 58 as under :­   58(c)   Mortgage   by conditional sale: ­ Where, the mortgagor ostensibly   sells   the   mortgaged   property on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage­money on a certain date the   sale   shall   become   absolute,   or   on condition   that   on   such   payment   being made  the sale shall  become void, or on condition   that   on   such   payment   being made   the   buyer   shall   transfer   the property   to   seller,   the   transaction   is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the   mortgagee   a   mortgagee   by conditional sale:

  Provided   that   no   such transaction   shall   be   deemed   to   be   a mortgage,   unless   the   condition   is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.   A bare reading of the above would   show   that   for   a   transaction   to constitute mortgage by conditional sale it is   necessary   that   the   condition   is embodied in the document that purports to   effect   the   sale.   That   requirement   is stipulated by the Proviso which admits of no exceptions.
  The High Court, it is manifest Suit No.9439/16 Page 25 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.
from   the   judgment   under   Appeal, overlooked   the   Proviso   according   to which   the   condition   regarding   payment of the mortgage money as a condition for transfer of the property to the seller must be embodied in the Sale Deed itself. That is   not   so   in   the   instant   case.   The   Sale Deed   executed   by   the   Plaintiff   in   the instant   case   does   not   embody   any condition   like   the   one   referred   to   in Clause (c) of Section 58, extracted above. The broad statement of law made by the High  Court  to the effect  that every sale accompanied   by   an   agreement   for   re­ conveyance of the property will constitute a   mortgage   by   conditional   sale   is   not, therefore,  correct.  That  is  also  the  view taken by this court in K. Simrathmull v Nanjalingiah,   Gowder   AIR   1963   SC 1182, where the plaintiff had borrowed a certain amount from the defendant and in   lieu   thereof   executed   a   deed   of conveyance of certain land together with the house standing thereon in favour of the   defendant.   Another   deed   of   re­ conveyance   was   executed   by   the defendant on the same date by which the defendant­purchaser   of   the   property agreed   to   re­convey   the   house   provided the exercise of the right of demanding re­ Suit No.9439/16 Page 26 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.
conveyance took place  wihtin two years and rent payable by the plaintiff is not in arrears for more than six months at any time.   On   the   breach   of   the   second condition stipulated by the agreement for re­conveyance   the   defendant­purchaser refused to re­convey. In a suit for specific performance   the   plaintiff   sought   to invoke   the   equitable   jurisdiction   of   the court   to   give   him   relief   against   the forfeiture clause. This court held that the sale deed and the deed of conveyance and rent   were   no   doubt   part   of   the   same transaction   yet   the   transaction   did   not constitute a mortgage by conditional sale. This court observed:
  The sale deed, the deed of re­ conveyance­Ext.   A­1   and   the   rent   note Ext.   B­1   were   undoubtedly   parts   of   the same   transaction.   The   plea   of   the plaintiffs   that   the   sale   deed   Ext.   A­1 constituted a transaction of mortgage by conditional sale is inadmissible, because the   Sale   Deed   and  the  covenant  for   re­ conveyance   are   contained   in   separate documents.
  The   findings   of   the   High Court   as   to   the   legal   effect   of   the transaction   of   sale   followed   by   an agreement to re­transfer of the property Suit No.9439/16 Page 27 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.
is not , therefore, legally sound. 
 

53.  In   the   case   in   hand,   no   condition   of   mortgage   is embedded   in   the   alleged   sale   deed   dated   24.08.2011.   The document   rather   mentions   the   handing   over   of   possession   in favour of defendant no. 1 and 2. Subsequently, registered lease deeds   were   executed   by   defendant   no.   1   and   2   in   favour defendant no.3.  Hence, the suit of the plaintiff appears   to be hit by Section 58 (c) of Transfer of Property Act also.

 

54.  It   appears   to   be   rightly   submitted   by   counsel   for defendant no. 1 and 2 that in order to avoid enjoyment of the fruit of litigation in favour of defendant no. 1 and 2 in CS No. 695/14,   plaintiff   has   filed   the   present   suit.   The   execution petition for recovery of possession of the property no. NIL­ 36C Malivya Nagar, Delhi is already pending in the court of Learned ADJ­03.   The   objection   of   the   plaintiffs   in   the   said   execution petition are also dismissed. The review application against the dismissal of the objections is also dismissed. The said dismissal has   become   final.   During   the     course   of   arguments   learned counsel     for   defendant   no.   1   and   2   has   placed   on   record Suit No.9439/16 Page 28 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

certified copies of summons served upon the defendant no. 3 in the   said   case  "Kritika   Suri   and   Anr   vs   Rajesh   Rajpa"  dated 16.11.2013.

 

55.  This   service   report   prima   facie   reflects   that   the summons were served upon the plaintiff no. 2. Therefore, prima facie it appears that the plaintiff no. 2 was aware of the filing of the   said   suit   no.   695/14.   Even   if   the   fact   of   service   upon plaintiff no. 2 is ignored, the court is of the opinion that the defendant no. 1 and 2 cannot be restrained from reaping the fruit of the litigation in CS 695/14 when there is no prayer for setting aside the decree in the said suit and when objections of plaintiffs have been already dismissed.

 

56.  In  "T.Arivandandam   vs   T.   V.   Satyapal     1977   AIR 2421, 1978 SCR (1) 742", Hon'ble Supreme Court Of India has given following observations:­     "We   have   not   the   slightest hesitation   in   condemning   the   petitioner for gross abuse of the process of the court Suit No.9439/16 Page 29 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   it   is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif's Court Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law   in   receiving   plaints.   The   learned Munsif   must   remember   that   if   on   a meaningful­not­formal­reading   of   the plaint   it   is   manifestly   vexatious,   and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power   under   order   VII   rule   11   CPC taking   care   to   see   that   the   ground mentioned   therein   is   fulfilled.   And,   if clever, drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first   hearing   by   examining   the   party searchingly   under   order   X   CPC.   An activist   Judge   is   the   answer   to irresponsible   law   suits.   The   trial   court should insist  imperatively  on examining the   party   at   the   first   hearing   so   that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code (Ch. XI) is also   resourceful   enough   to   meet   such men,   and   must   be   triggered   against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his   cost   realised   what   George   Bernard Shaw   remarked   on   the   assassination   of Suit No.9439/16 Page 30 of 32 Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

Mahatma Gandhi "It is dangerous to be too good" 

 

57.  The   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   in   total suggest that continuance of the present suit would only harass the defendant no. 1 and 2 in a fruitless litigation. In view of the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in  "T.Arivandandam vs T. V. Satyapal  1977 AIR 2421, 1978 SCR (1) 742", this court is of the opinion that such attempts of plaintiffs need to be nipped in the bud.

 

58.   The   present   suit   appears   to   be   barred   by   law   of limitation as well as by section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The same is also hit by order VII rule 11 (d) CPC.

 

59.   The suit is accordingly rejected under order VII rule 11(d) CPC.

 

60.  Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

Suit No.9439/16 Page 31 of 32

Rohit Rajpal and Anr vs Ankita Suri and Ors.

  

61.  File be consigned to record room.

Announced in the open                                      (AJAY PANDEY)
Court on 09.01.2017                              ADJ­05 (SOUTH DISTRICT)
(Order contains 32 pages)                          SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI




Suit No.9439/16                                                     Page 32 of 32