Tripura High Court
Sri Parshuram @ Pashuram Reang vs The State Of Tripura on 29 May, 2018
Author: Arindam Lodh
Bench: Arindam Lodh
Page 1 of 15
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL. PET NO.22 OF 2O18
Sri Parshuram @ Pashuram Reang
S/O Late Dantarai Reang of Village Devipur,
P.S. Santir Bazar, Dist. South Tripura,
now undergoing imprisonment at Kendriya Sanshodhanagar
Bishalgarh, P.O & P.S. Bishalgarh Dist. Sepahijala.
----Petitioner(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. S Bhattacharjee, Legal Aid Counsel.
Ms. Juthika Naukham, Advocate.
Ms. Archana Reang, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Choudhury, Public Prosecutor.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTCE MR. AJAY RASTOGI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Reserved on : 29.05.2018.
Pronounced on : 07.06.2018.
Whether fit for reporting : YES.
JUDGEMENT
(Lodh ,J) This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 has been projected to quash the order to suffer multiple sentences of life imprisonment consecutively.
The solitary issue to be decided here is:
When multiple sentences of life imprisonment are awarded, whether the same would run consecutively or concurrently ?Page 2 of 15
2. Briefly stated, the appellant Sri Parshuram @ Pashuram Reang, was convicted in ST 37(ST/B) of 1999 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 364-A of IPC and also directed to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. He was also convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo R.I for (5)five years by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Sri S.C. Das, as he then was) Belonia, South Tripura on 03.01.2000. The appellant had preferred an appeal which was numbered as Crl Appl. (J) 48 of 2008 and was acquitted on 24.08.2012. While the appellant was undergoing imprisonment again he was tried in case No. ST 48 (ST/B) of 1999 for committing offence under Section 364-A, 302, 201 of IPC. Thereafter, by a judgment of conviction he was convicted on 03.06.2000 by the said Court mentioned above. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default to suffer S.I for 3(three) years under Section 364-A of IPC; under Section 302 of IPC the petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default to suffer S.I for 3(three) years. The petitioner was further sentenced to suffer. R.I for 7(seven) years under Section 201 of the IPC and lastly, for committing the offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act he was sentenced to suffer R.I for 3(three) years. It was directed that the life imprisonment under Section 364, 302 of IPC shall run consecutively and imprisonment under Section 201 and 27 of the Arms Act shall run concurrently with the sentences of life imprisonment. It was also directed that the sentences shall run after the period of imprisonment of ST 37(ST/B) of 1999 is expired.
3. The appellant was again tried in the case No. ST 3 (ST/B) of 2000 for committing offence under Section 364-A of IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and whereunder he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment Page 3 of 15 for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default to suffer S.I for 3(three) years under Section 364-A of IPC and under Section 27 of the Arms Act he was sentenced to suffer R.I. for 3(three) years and directed that the sentences shall not run concurrently again by the said learned Court mentioned above. Learned Trial Court further directed that the sentences shall start after the suffering of sentence passed in ST 37 (ST/B) of 1999 and ST 48 (ST/B) 1999 are expired.
The appellant was further prosecuted in another case bearing No. ST 18 (ST/B) of 2002 under Section 364-A read with Section 34 of I.P.C and under Section 27 of Arms Act tried by the same Court as stated above.
4. Vide judgment dated 05.12.2002 the appellant was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer further imprisonment for one year under Section 364-A read with 34 of IPC.
By this petition, the appellant has sought for conversion of sentences passed in ST 48 (ST/B) of 1999, ST 3(ST/B) of 2000 and ST 18(ST/B) of 2002 to run concurrently instead of consecutively with the first sentence passed in ST 37(ST/B) of 1999, the sentence which the appellant has been suffering at present.
5. Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, at the very outset, has drawn our attention to the chart given in para-10 of the petition. The statement made in para-10 along with the chapter has noted hereunder, for convenience:-
" 10........ it is most humbly submitted that the petitioner tried by the Ld. Additional sessions Judge Belonia, South Tripura for separate offences assigning out of different transaction/incidents as would be evident from the below mention chart:-Page 4 of 15
Sl.No Case No Judgment & Order of Sentence Appeal date
1. ST 37(ST/B) 1999 03.01.2000 Under Section . 364 A Acquitted by of IPC. To suffer Hon'ble High imprisonment for life Court on under sec.27 Arms Act 24.08.12 on Crl.
R.I. 3 years Appl(J) 48 of 2008
2. ST 48(ST/B) 1999 03.06.2000 Under Sec. 302 of I.P.C to suffer R.I for life and fine of Rs. 10,000/-
I.d. to suffer SI for 3 year, under sec, 364A to suffer imprisonment for life under Sec 201 IPC. To suffer R.I for 7 years under Sec. 27 Arms Act to suffer R.I for 3 years. The life imprisonment to run consecutively and lesser punishments to run concurrently after suffering in ST 37(ST/B) 1999 are over.
3. ST 3(ST/B) 2000 27.07.2000 Under Sec. 364A to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- id to SI for 3 years and under sec.27 Arms Act to suffer RI for 3 years both to run concurrently after suffering are over in S.I 1 and 2 sufferings are over in S.I 1 and 2
4. ST 18(ST/B) 2002 05.12.2002 Under sec. 364A of I.P.C to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- i.e. R.I. for 1 year.
6. Showing the chart, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel submits that the sentences imposed at serial No. 2, 3 & 4 would run concurrently with the sentence passed in serial No.1 i.e. ST.37(ST/B) 1999, wherein the learned Trial Court vide its judgment dated Page 5 of 15 03.01.2000 passed an order of sentence under Section 364-A of IPC to suffer imprisonment of life under Section 27 of the Arms Act with rigorous imprisonment for 3(three) years from which he was acquitted by this High Court vide judgment and order dated 24.08.2012 in Crl.Appl (J) 48 of 2008. He has further contented that except the case of ST 37( ST/B) 1999 in which the appellant was acquitted, he has not preferred any other appeal against the conviction and sentence passed in ST. 48(ST/B) of 1999, ST 3(ST/B) of 2000 and ST 18(S.T/B) of 2002.
7. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel further submits that the order to undergo sentence consecutively is patently illegal and beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court in view of the provisions under Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C., and it needs to be interfered with by invoking the inherent power vested upon this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. However, he has clarified that the present petition is not meant for interference with the judgment and conviction against the accused appellant. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court passed in Ranjit Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigar and anrs. reported in (1991) STPL 5572 SC.
8. We have meticulously and consciously read over Section 427 of the Cr.P.C in the light of the submission advanced by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel to bring the sentences in consonance with Section 427(1) and the object of enacting sub Section 2 of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. is as under:-
" Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.-(1) when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on Page 6 of 15 a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:
Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.
2. When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence."
9. In the decision of Ranjit Singh (Supra) the Apex Court has examined the meaning, purpose and object of enacting sub Section 2 of Section 427 Cr.P.C in para 8 which is quoted below:-
" Sub-section (1) of Section 427, Cr.P.C. provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, sub- section (1) of Section 427, Cr.P.C. deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for a life. In such a situation, the first sentence being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made. Sub-section (1) says that in such situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being know , ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Courts directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases covered by sub-section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender "already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life " who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse (AIR 1961 SC 6000 )and reiterated in Maru Ram (AIR 1980 SC 2147) that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the Court on a subsequent conviction the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no Page 7 of 15 question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as sentence to serve, the remainder of life in prison unless committed or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in subsection (2) of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub-section (1) thereof is that without the Court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the Court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on subsection (1) if there be no express direction of the Court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in sub-section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the Courts directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section (2) is, therefore, clear"
10. At this juncture, I deem it fit to take note of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. which speaks of sentences in cases of conviction and sentence of several offences at one trial. We are not unmindful to the fact that Section 31 of the Cr.P.C relates to the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life for several offences which are declared at one trial and is distinct to Section 427 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with multiple conviction and sentence for imprisonment for life declared in multiple trials. As such, we have preferred to confine ourselves within the interpretation of this provision of the code whether the punishment shall run concurrently or consecutively.
11. Interpreting Section 31(1) of Cr.P.C. a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in O.M. Cherian Vs. State of Kerala & Ors., Page 8 of 15 reported in (2015) 2 SCC 501 declared that if two life sentences are imposed on a convict, the Court must necessarily direct these sentences to run concurrently. The Court Said-
" 13. Section 31(1) CrPC enjoins a further direction by the court to specify the order in which one particular sentence shall commence after the expiration of the other. Difficulties arise when the courts impose sentence of imprisonment for life and also sentences of imprisonment for fixed term. In such cases, if the court does not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently, then the sentences will run consecutively by operation of Section 31(1) CrPC. There is no question of the convict first undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life and thereafter undergoing the rest of the sentences of imprisonment for fixed term and any such direction would be unworkable. Since sentence of imprisonment of life means jail till the end of normal life of the convict, the sentence of imprisonment of fixed term has to necessarily run concurrently with life imprisonment. In such case, it will be in order if the Sessions Judges exercise their discretion in issuing direction for concurrent running of sentences. Likewise if two life sentences are imposed on the convict, necessarily, the court has to direct those sentences to run concurrently."
12. To the same effect as to the decision of two Judges Bench in Duryodhan Rout Vs. State of Orrisa reported in (2015) 2 SCC 783 in which the Apex Court took the view that since life imprisonment means imprisonment of full span of life there was no question of awarding consecutive sentences in case of conviction of several offences at one trial.
Relying upon the proviso to sub Section 2 of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. the Apex Court held that when a person is convicted for several offences including one for which life sentences can be awarded, the proviso to Section 31(2) Cr.P.C shall forbid running of such sentences consecutively.
13. Thus, it appears from the above two pronouncements that the logic behind life sentences not running consecutively lies in the fact that imprisonment for life implies imprisonment till the end of the Page 9 of 15 normal life of the convict. If that proposition is sound the logic underlying the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court in O.M. Cherian (supra) and Duryodhan Rout (supra) cases would also be equally sound. What that needs to be examined is whether imprisonment for life thus indeed imply imprisonment till the end of the normal life of the convict as observed in O.M. Cherian(supra) and Duryodhan Rout (supra)? That question in our considered opinion, is no longer res integra, the same having been examined and answered in the affirmative by a long line of decisions handed down by the Apex Court.
14. Thus, Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. also finds support in regard to the legal principles settled by the Apex court that sentence of life imprisonment declared for committing multiple offences at one trial or any multiple trials shall run concurrently instead of consecutively.
15. In the case in hand, what we find that orders of sentence of "imprisonment for life" for each of the murders was directed to run consecutively.
16. We find four numbers of sessions trials were being conducted by the same Trial Court in four separate cases for committing several offences which were also registered under different case numbers. In all the 4(four) cases the Trial Court has imposed life sentence which would run consecutively after expiry of one life sentence.
17. We have tried to find out the meaning of the word "imprisonment" which has not been defined either in the code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code but as per the General Page 10 of 15 Clauses Act of 1897 under Section 3(27) " imprisonment" shall mean imprisonment of either description as defined in the Indian Penal Code" the definition of imprisonment under the General Clauses Act would, therefore, in case of life imprisonment mean imprisonment for life/imprisonment for the remainder of the convict life.
18. In State of Punjab Vs. Joginder Singh, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 661, Apex Court held that in the sentence "imprisonment for life" convict has to pass the remainder of the life under imprisonment unless of course it is granted remission by the competent executive authority in exercise of the power vested under Section 432 and 433 Cr.P.C.
19. In Maru Ram Vs. Union of India reported in (1981) 1 SCC 107, the Apex Court following Gopal Vinayak Godse Vs State of Maharashtra (A.I.R 1961 SC 600) held that imprisonment for life lasts until last breath of the prisoner and whatever the length of remission earned, prisoner could claim release only if remaining sentence is remitted by the Government.
20. In Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India & ors. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 498, the Apex Court had yet another occasion to examine the meaning and appropriate expression of " imprisonment of life" when we read in the light of Section 45 of the IPC, the said expression would ordinarily mean the full and complete span of life. The following passage in this regard is apposite :
" 12.-......... the expression " imprisonment of life" must be read in the context of Section 45, of IPC, under that provision the word 'life' denote the life of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context. We have seen that the punishment are set out Page 11 of 15 in Section 53 imprisonment for life being one of them. Read in the light of Section 45 it would ordinarily mean imprisonment for the full or complete span of life."
21. Hence, imprisonment of life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code only means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict. The right to claim remission, commutation, reprieve etc., as provided under Article 72 or Article 161 of the Constitution of India will always be available being constitutional remedies untouchable by the Court.
22. A recent Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. Sriharan reported in (2016) 7 SCC 1 also had an occasion to review the case law of the subject. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in Sambha Ji Krishan Ji Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1974) 1 SCC 196, State of M.P Vrs. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470, Maru Ram (Supra) and Ranjit Singh (supra) the Apex Court observed:-
" It is quite apparent that this Court by stating as above has affirmed the legal position that the life imprisonment only mean the entirety of the life unless it is curtailed by remission vitality granted under the Code of Criminal Procedure by the appropriate Government or under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution by the executive head viz the President or Governor of the State respectively. "
23. The legal decision is, thus, fairly well settled that imprisonment of life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority.
24. Another Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in Muthuramalingam & ors. Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2016) 8 SCC, 313 has held:- Page 12 of 15
" 18-....... the legal position is, thus, fairly well settled that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless of course the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the competent authority. That being so, the provisions of Section 31 under CrPC must be so interpreted as to be consistent with the basic tenets that life sentence requires the prisoner to spend the rest of his life in prison. Any direction that requires the offender to undergo imprisonment for life twice over would be anomaly and irrational for it will disregard the fact that human life and other living being had but one life to live. So understood Section 31(1) would permit consecutive running of sentence only if such sentence do not happen to be life sentence i.e. in our opinion, the only way one can avoid an obvious impossibility of a prisoner serving 2(two) consecutive life sentence.
25. The Apex Court in Duryodhan Rout (supra) case observed as under:-
" 26... This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Modh. Munna v. Union of India. The Court held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. There is no provision either in the Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without there being a formal remission by the appropriate Government.
27...... In Swamy Shraddananda (2) V. State of Karnataka, this Court while substituting the sentence of death to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be released from prison till the rest of his life. A similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana. In the said case this Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has no indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years' or 20 years' imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C".
26. Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. B. Choudhury on behalf of the State of Tripura has drawn our attention to the provisions of Section 219 and 223(C) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Page 13 of 15
We have perused both the Sections 219 and 223. Section 219 says that "three offenses of same kind within a year may be charged together" and Section 223 relates to "all person may be charged jointly". We find no relevance for the application of this provisions in relation to the appeal at our hand, on further query as to whether there is any contrary view taken by the Supreme Court when Mr. Choudhury, learned P.P., has left the burden upon us to arrive at an appropriate decision on the question involved in this petition.
27. In the present petition, conviction and sentence to suffer imprisonment for life have been declared for commission of multiple offences and tried in multiple trials. From the charge, we referred to at paragraph 5 of this judgment, it reveals that four separate cases have been registered bearing case nos. S.T.37(ST/B) of 1999 under Section 364 A of the IPC etc.; S.T. 48(ST/B) of 1999 under Section 302 of the IPC etc.; S.T. 3(ST/B) of 2000 under Section 364 A of the IPC etc. and S.T. 18(ST/B) of 2002 under Section 364 A of the IPC. Four separate cases were registered for commission of the said offences. After commitment, four separate sessions trial were conducted. Four separate judgments were pronounced on four different dates in respect of the above stated sessions trials. In all the four sessions trials, the Sessions Judge had already sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life with a further direction that all the life sentences passed separately in the said four sessions trials shall run consecutively. The Sessions Judge while directing the life sentences to run consecutively had failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested upon him by the court and he misinterpreted and misconstrued the provisions of Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C to the effect that the life span of a person can be only one. There is no bar to declare sentence to suffer imprisonment for life in Page 14 of 15 connection with the multiple cases, but the court must be mindful that all the subsequent life sentences must run concurrently and not consecutively, which is the clear mandate of Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. in the light of the discussion and observation, we made in the preceding paragraphs. As such, the subsequent sentences in S.T. 48 (ST/B) of 1999; S.T. 3 (ST/B) of 2000 and S.T. 18 (ST/B) of 2002 shall run concurrently instead of consecutively.
28. The order to suffer life sentence consecutively in four separate trials against four separate sessions cases means a person to suffer imprisonment for life after expiry of one life sentence, he is to suffer another punishment of life sentence and so on when the legal position is that the life imprisonment only means the entirety of the life which he is to complete in one span of life, otherwise, the very object of enacting Section 427(2) Cr.P.C would be frustrated.
29. For the reasons stated above, we are inclined to interfere with the direction to suffer sentences of imprisonment for life consecutively in the cases as aforestated passed by learned Sessions judge and accordingly, the same is modified to the extent that the orders and sentence to suffer life imprisonment in the 4(four) cases viz., ST37(ST/B) 1999, ST48(ST/B) of 1999, ST3(ST/B) of 2000 and ST18(ST/B) of 1999 has to run concurrently instead of consecutively. It is made clear that life imprisonment means end of one's life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which, in turn, is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and further substantive check in 433-A of the code.
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30. At last, it would be injustice, if we do not appreciate Sri Sankar Bhattacharjee, learned counsel and his two learned junior colleagues, Advocates Ms. Juthika Naukaham and Ms. Archana Reang for their strenuous efforts to assist this Court as legal aid counsels.
31. The judgment passed by the Sessions judge stands modified and the sentence to run concurrently to the extent as directed above. The petition stands disposed with the aforesaid observation and direction.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE suhanjit