Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Kusumlata Swatantra vs Gnctd on 3 November, 2025
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Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022
Court No. 2
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench, New Delhi
O.A. No. 1964/2022
This the 03RDday of November, 2025
Hon'ble Mr. R N Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Ms. Kusumlata Swatantra,
Aged-56 Years,
D/o Sh. Dharamdev
Working as Central Administrator
(Contract Basis)
In Govt. of NCT of Delhi
R/o B-1246, Shastri Nagar,
Near Haryana General Store,
New Delhi 110052
...Applicant
(By Advocate(s): Mr. Sourabh Ahuja)
Versus
1. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through its Chief Secretary,
3rd, Delhi Secretariat,
I.P. Estate, Near ITO,
New Delhi-110002
2. The District Magistrate North,
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Near Swami Sardhanand College,
Alipur, Delhi-110036
3. The Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Model Town, Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Near NDPL Office,
Under Azadpur Flyover,
Delhi-110033
...Respondents
(By Advocate(s): Mr. Amit Anand)
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Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022
Court No. 2
ORDER (ORAL)
Hon'ble Mr. R N Singh, Member (J) Earlier this O.A. was dismissed by this Tribunal vide order dated 27.09.2023. The said order of the Tribunal was challenged by the original applicant before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. No. 13029/2023, wherein the Hon'ble High Court vide order / judgment dated 09.10.2023, has set aside the Tribunal's aforesaid order and restored and revived the O.A. on the board of this Tribunal. Thus the O.A. was listed for fresh adjudication.
2. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and also perused the pleadings available on record.
3. Undisputed facts are that in the year 2019 the respondents through the Office of the District Magistrate, North, Govt. of NCT of Delhi invited application(s) for the post of "Central Administrator" in one stop center, established in Babu Jagjivan Ram Memorial Hospital, Jahangirpuri, New Delhi. The applicant also applied in response to such advertisement. Pursuant to the selection process, the Selection Committee selected the applicant. The recommendation of the selection committee was accepted by the Competent Authority vide their order dated 09.12.2019 and thus the applicant was appointed to the said post w.e.f. 09.12.2019, on contract basis. Such contractual appointment 3 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 of the applicant was extended for one year w.e.f. 10.12.2020 to 09.12.2021 and later on 11.12.2021 to 09.06.2022. The contract was lastly extended on 11.06.2022 to 16.08.2022, with the approval of the competent authority. Vide impugned notice dated 08.07.2022, the applicant was informed that the competent authority has not extended her contract beyond 16.08.2022 and thus the said notice, with direction to attend the duties upto 16.08.2022. Vide the impugned notice it was also informed that the applicant shall be at liberty to reapply and appear for the recruitment process.
4. The respondents initiated recruitment for the same post again on contract basis, through impugned notice Annexure- A/2 dated 08.07.2022. Aggrieved by non-extension of her contractual employment vide the impugned notice dated 08.07.2022 and also the action of the respondents vide their impugned notice, initiating fresh recruitment again on contract basis for the same post on which the applicant had earlier been selected and been continuously working as such, vide orders for extension of the contract from time to time, the applicant has approached this Tribunal by way of the present O.A. seeking the following reliefs:-
"8. (i) That the Hon'ble Tribunal may graciously be pleased to pass an order of quashing the impugned order. dated 08.07.2022 (Annexure A/1) and fresh advertisement for one post of Central Administrator (Annexure A/2) and consequently, pass an order directing the respondents to allowing the applicant to work in· the department to the post of 4 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 Central Administrator at one stop centre, Babu Jagjivan Ram Memorial Hospital, Jahangirpuri, New Delhi till post is. filled up by regular employee and the service of the applicant cannot be replaced by another contract employee.
(ii) Any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal deem fit and proper may also be granted to the applicant along with the costs of litigation."
5. After hearing, this Tribunal vide interim order dated 08.08.2022, directed the respondents to continue the applicant's service on contract basis, if they are in need of service of such employee on contract basis. The respondents were further directed not to declare the final result of the post in question pursuant to the selection process initiated vide the impugned advertisement notice dated 08.07.2022.
6. Counter reply was filed by the respondents, seeking dismissal of the O.A. with cost. The applicant filed rejoinder reiterating the claim and the grounds in support thereof.
7. When the matter was earlier taken up for final hearing, the learned counsel for the parties admitted that the engagement of the applicant has been identical to that of the applicants in O.A. No. 3817/2022 with O.A. No. 123/2023 and the said two O.As have been dismissed by this Tribunal vide a common order dated 20.09.2023. A copy of the common order dated 20.09.2023, passed by this Tribunal was brought on record by the learned counsel for the respondents. In this background, the present O.A. was dismissed by the Tribunal vide its order dated 27.09.2023, as noted above. The order 5 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 dated 27.09.2023, was challenged by the original applicant before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the Hon'ble High Court vide its order / judgment dated 09.10.2023, set aside the Tribunal's order and restored the O.A. to the board of the Tribunal.
8. Subsequent thereto, additional submissions by way of an affidavit with certain additional documents were filed by the respondents and in response thereto a response affidavit with certain documents had been filed by the original applicant. Written submissions have been filed on behalf of the respective parties.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the impugned notice not extending the services of the applicant is non-application of mind, inasmuch as despite admittedly, the respondents are in need of employing somebody on contract on the post of Central Administrator, the post on which the applicant has been selected and had been working on contract only. The respondents have not continued the applicant's engagement beyond 16.08.2022, however, on the same date vide impugned public notice i.e. on 08.07.2022, they have initiated selection process for the same post again on contract basis only. 9.1. Learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the applicant has performed not only to the entire satisfaction of the Competent Authority amongst the respondents, but, she 6 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 has also been commended for the same. He submits that applicant alongwith three others was nominated by the competent authority amongst the respondents vide order dated 21.05.2025 (Annexure-A/11) as Master Trainers of one stop centers (OSCs) for the National Workshop, which was held on 27.05.2025 at Vigyaan Bhawan, New Delhi. He further submits that though the respondents had issued show cause notices to the applicant later seeking her explanations before issuance of the impugned order, however, the applicant had submitted her submission and taking note of her explanation and material on record, the respondents have given her warning in January, 2021, however, on the same date they have extended the contractual term of the applicant for further period. Even, thereafter the contractual employment of the applicant was further extended twice. 9.2. Learned counsel for the applicant has also invited our attention to the copy of the Visitors Book, wherein various dignitaries /visitors have commended the conduct and performance of the applicant from time to time. 9.3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that admittedly, the competent authority for appointment of the applicant is District Magistrate and in the case of the applicant the District Magistrate (North) has commended the 7 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 efforts of the applicant while holding the position on contract basis in the month of October, 2022.
9.4. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that no reason has been given by the respondents in the impugned order / notice for non extension of applicant's contractual employment, however, by way of the counter reply and additional submissions etc., it has been pleaded by the respondents that the contractual employment was not extended in case of the applicant, keeping in view the various complaints received against her and also keeping in view her performance not being found upto mark.
9.5. He submits that the impugned notice cannot sustain in law with the help of the reasons being relied by the respondents. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on law laid down by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1297/1977 titled as Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, decided on 02.12.1977, particularly para 8 thereof. 9.6. Learned counsel for the applicant has further submitted that though the applicant has been working on contract basis, however, the applicant cannot be disengaged from such employment by way of stigmatic order. He clarified that though the impugned order appears to be an order simplicitor however, an order without disclosing any reason. Admittedly, 8 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 the respondents have pleaded in their pleadings filed in opposition to the claim of the applicant in this O.A. after looking into the complaints received against her that the applicant was found guilty of misconducts and therefore such orders are in violation of law settled on the subject. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the judgment dated 11.02.2025 of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 1212/2025 titled as Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors Vs. Ravinder, particularly para 16 thereof. In this regard, he has also placed reliance on order / judgment dated 01.05.2023, of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 10385/2021, titled as Nina Lath Gupta Vs. Union of India, Through Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Anr. particularly page 9 para 12(c) thereof.
9.7. Learned counsel for the applicant has also argued that it is settled law that even if stigma is not apparent from the impugned order of termination / disengagement, however the Courts and Tribunals can lift the veil to find out as to whether the reason therefor is some misconduct or not. In support, he refers to the judgment dated 24.01.1984 of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 3040/1982 titled as Anuj Jaiswal Vs. Government of India and Another, particularly para 12 and 13.
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Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 9.8. Mr. Saurabh Ahuja, learned counsel for the applicant clarifies that the case of the applicant is on a mere strong footing, inasmuch as, in present case even lifting of the veil is not required, as the respondents have themselves pleaded in their pleadings, that the contractual appointment of the applicant was not extended, keeping in view the complaints received against her and they being satisfied of the allegations leveled against the applicant in such complaints as to be true. 9.9. The last argument on behalf of the applicant is that from the action of the respondents not extending the contractual employment of the applicant vide the impugned order and initiating a process of selection for appointment of freshers vide the impugned public notice on the same date, it is apparent that the respondents intended to select and appoint a fresher or outsider in preference to the applicant. The learned counsel for the applicant submits that such action of the respondents is not sustainable in view of the judgment dated 03.11.2014 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 1741/2014 titled as Narinder Singh Ahuja and Others Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and Ors.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Anand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed the claim of the applicant.
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Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2
11. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the present O.A. is not maintainable in view of the findings of the Tribunal in a common order dated 20.09.2023, in O.A. No. 3817/2022 alongwith O.A. No. 123/2023, wherein the Tribunal has considered the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana and Ors Vs. Piara Singh & Ors., 1992 (4) SCC 118 and the Tribunal has categorically held that Sub- Divisional Magistrate, under whose supervision and guidance this Center functions had appeared in Court and had expressed strong reservation with respect to the behavior and conduct of the applicant. He submits that the Tribunal on various grounds including jurisdiction, was not inclined to show any indulgence in favour of the applicant while reiterating that the applicant has no ground less to say any right to seek continued engagement in one stop center, which have been created for a specific purpose and that purpose being very sensitive in nature. While holding so, the Tribunal has further held that the respondents cannot and should not be restrained from engaging appropriate and qualified persons for such Centers and the applicant does not enjoy either the right or the luxury to seek such restrain.
11.1. Mr. Anand, has further argued that the Hon'ble High Court of Chatisgarh at Bilaspur vide its order dated 28.09.2021 in W.P.(S) No. 4215/2020, titled as Ashish 11 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 Kumar Tiwari Vs. State of Chattisgarh and Ors., while dealing with termination of the contractual employee/ petitioners in the said writ petition, which was passed without conducting any enquiry has held that the contractual employee does not have any indefeasible right seeking for continuation of the contract even after the conclusion of the contract period.
11.2. Mr. Anand has further argued that as there is sufficient material on record that even before passing of the impugned order, complaints were received against the applicant, which were looked into, however, taking a sympathetic view, the applicant was though continued further, however, a warning was issued to her. 11.3. He has argued that from the impugned order itself it is evident that the liberty was accorded to the applicant to apply afresh, if the applicant so desires in response to the impugned public notice.
11.4. Learned counsel for the respondents has further argued that though the common order /judgment dated 20.09.2023, in O.A. No. 3817/2022 alongwith O.A. No. 123/2023, was challenged by the applicants' in such O.A.s before the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble High Court has set aside the order / judgment of the Tribunal, however, the ratio decidendi as stated in para 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the 12 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 common order / judgment of the Tribunal was not set aside and/ or interfered in any manner by the Hon'ble High Court and the Writ Petition was only partly allowed. 11.5. He has further added that so far the commendation given by the District Magistrate and being referred and relied by the applicant in her favour, is concerned, the same was not only specifically given in favour of the applicant, but the same was in respect of the team and about the team efforts.
12. In rejoinder, Mr. Ahuja, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the commendation given by the District Magistrate relates to the team, however, undisputedly the team consisted of the applicant also. He has further invited our attention to page 2 of the additional submissions, which is a letter dated 13.10.2021, (Annexure-A/7-colly.), and he submits that the WHO has found the One stop Center being headed by the applicant and also another as best performing center.
13. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
14. There is no dispute that no reason has been given in the impugned order vide which the engagement of the applicant has been restricted only upto 16.08.2022 and vide the said order, the respondents have also given liberty to the applicant 13 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 to apply afresh if she desires in response to the impugned public notice issued for fresh selection again on contract basis. Such action of the respondents is found to be in violation of the law that one set of contractual employees should not be replaced by another set of contractual employees. Reliance is placed on the law laid down by the Apex Court in Piara Singh, (supra).
14.1. The impugned order also indicates non-application of mind, inasmuch as, on one hand the respondents are giving liberty to the applicant to apply afresh in response to the impugned public notice for the same post to which the applicant was selected in the year 2019 and has been continuing with the help of the order of extensions issued by the respondents from time to time and on the other hand restricting the applicant's engagement to 16.08.2022. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Narinder Singh Ahuja and Others, (supra) while dealing with the non- extension of contractual employment has held in para 15 of the judgment, as under:-
"15. In the opinion of this Court, since the respondents nowhere dispute that there is need for the performance of the work that the petitioners were discharging all along and there is also no dispute that the project and funding (for the project) would continue till 2017, the decision to discontinue the petitioners' engagement is based only on the policy to outsource the contractual employment to a third party. The petitioners are not insisting on regularization, given the nature of the employment or engagement, which is project based. However apart from the decision to "outsource" engagement of contract employment to a third agency, there is no rationale to 14 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 discontinue the petitioners' contracts. The justification that the employees engaged through the contractor are paid lower wages is arbitrary, because the "outsourced" or outsourcing agency would have to be paid its service charges. The lower wages paid, therefore, is, in effect, because of the charges/fees paid to the contractor/outsourced agency. The facts of this case clearly reveal that even though the work is to be performed by contractual employees, the reason for discontinuance of the petitioners' employment is not their replacement with regular appointees, but instead, with another set of contractual employees. The state/respondents cannot, in the circumstances of this case, say that discontinuance of such employment cannot be gone into by the Court because the petitioners were aware that their contracts ended.
16. For the above reasons, this court is of opinion that the CAT erred in law, in holding that the petitioners could not complain against the discontinuance of their contractual employment. Accordingly, a direction is issued to the respondents to continue the petitioners in contractual employment on annual renewal basis, till the currency of the RNTCP scheme/project in 2017. An appropriate consequential order shall be issued by the respondents within eight weeks from today." 14.2. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the issue also arises as to whether the respondents can sustain the impugned order not extending the contractual employment of the applicant on the basis of their averments / assertions made in the counter reply and/ or the additional affidavit filed. Such issue is no more res integra, in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), para 8, of which reads as under:-
"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds. its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:15
Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."
14.3. So far the contention of the respondents that the impugned order not extending the contractual employment of the applicant is based on the allegations/ complaints received against the applicant and the same were found to have some merit, if this would have been the case of the respondents, we fail to understand justification available to the respondents in giving liberty to the applicant to apply afresh for the same post in response to the impugned public notice issued by the respondents.
14.4. Moreover, if the impugned non-continuation of the contractual employment of the applicant is based on the alleged misconduct, admittedly the enquiry / investigation, if any, has been conducted by the respondents, the same has been unilateral and behind the back of the applicant without affording any opportunity to the applicant for her defence. Such action of the respondents is not sustainable in law in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Nina Lath Gupta (supra), para 27 and para 29, of which read as under:-
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Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 "27. Therefore, what emerges from the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments is that if an order is founded on allegations, the order is stigmatic and punitive and services of an employee cannot be dispensed with without affording him an opportunity of defending the accusations/allegations made against him in a full-fledged inquiry. Since this case relates to a tenure appointment, it will be pertinent to look at the law with respect to stigmatic orders in the context of tenure appointments. In Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 526, Petitioner was Director, AIIMS, who had been appointed for a period of 5 years or till he attained the age of 62 years, whichever was earlier, the Supreme Court examined the meaning and connotation of the term 'tenure' and observed that tenure is a term during which an office is held. It is a condition of holding office and once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment begins when he joins and comes to an end on completion of the tenure, unless curtailed on 'justifiable' grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of office on completion of his tenure and thus, the question of prematurely retiring him does not arise. In A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd (supra), Respondent was appointed as General Manager (Finance) for a period of 3 years and prior to the said period coming to an end, his services were terminated. Respondent approached the High Court in a writ petition seeking quashing of the order and the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition after coming to a conclusion that the termination order was innocuous and not penal in nature and termination being in accordance with the contract of service, after giving three months' salary in lieu of the notice, required no interference. The Division Bench, allowing the appeal held that though the order on the face of it appeared to be innocuous, however, if the attendant circumstances were examined, more particularly, the stand in the counter affidavit, the conclusion was irresistible that the order was penal in nature and since penalty was imposed without affording opportunity to meet the charge, the order was unsustainable. This order of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and the contention of the Appellant was that the reasons indicated in the order were the motive for termination and not the foundation, requiring an inquiry, prior to termination. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench, to the extent that the order of termination was vitiated and ruled as follows:-
"3. The legal position is fairly well settled that an order of termination of a temporary employee or a probationer or even a tenure employee, simpliciter without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by the court. But the court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior to the issuance of order of termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same order. If the court comes to a conclusion that the order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order would not be interfered with, but if the court comes to a 17 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 conclusion that the so-called inefficiency was the real foundation for passing of order of termination, then obviously such an order would be held to be penal in nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate procedure has not been followed. The decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr K. Ram Kumar also stipulate that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing an order of termination, it will be open for the employer to indicate how and what was the motive for passing the order of termination, and it is in that sense in the counter-affidavit it can be indicated that the unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the employer acted in accordance with the terms of employment and it never wanted to punish the employee. But on examining the assertions made in paras 13 and 14 of the counter-affidavit, in the present case it would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand, the appellant-employer really terminated the services in accordance with the terms of the employment and not by way of imposing the penalty in question. 4. In fact, the letter of the Commissioner for Handlooms and Director of Handlooms and Textiles dated 19-5-1993 was the foundation for the employer to terminate the services and as such the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that the order of termination is based upon a misconduct, though on the face of it, it is innocuous in nature. We therefore do not find any infirmity with the said conclusion of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court requiring our interference."
28. In the aforesaid case, the letter of the Commissioner for Handlooms and Director of Handlooms and Textiles was the foundation for the termination order and hence found to be stigmatic. It is thus trite that in a tenure employment, if the termination order of the employee is an order simplicitor and casts no stigma, it warrants no interference by the Court, however, if the attendant circumstances lead to a conclusion that termination is founded on allegations, then being penal in nature, the order would be untenable in law, if issued without affording an opportunity to the employee to defend the accusations.
29. Another judgment, which needs a mention and is close on facts, is in the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and Others, (2020) 12 SCC 426, wherein the Supreme Court observed that the termination order was issued in the backdrop of Internal Complaints Committee Report and going by the terms and tenor of the order, it was incomprehensible to construe such an order to be an order simplicitor when the report of the Inquiry Committee was the foundation. The Supreme Court also reiterated the position of law that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the termination order and may be in any document referred to therein, which reference will inevitably effect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the 18 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 order must be construed as an ex facie stigmatic order of termination."
In this regard we get support from the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in the case of Ravinder (supra), also para 16 of which reads as under:-
"16. The above enunciation of law applies on all fours to the present case. In fact the order of termination in the present case is far more stigmatic than the order which was under
challenge in Virender. As such, it could not have been issued without holding a formal disciplinary proceeding. A mere show cause notice and reply thereto, would not suffice."
We may refer the judgment of Apex Court in Anoop Jaiswal (supra), also in this regard, para 12 and 13 of which read as under:-
"12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the Court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the Court holds that the order though in the form is merely a determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to the rights conferred by law upon the employee.
13. In the instant case, the period of probation had not yet been over. The impugned order of discharge was passed in the middle of the probationary period. An explanation was called for from the appellant regarding the alleged act of indiscipline, namely, arriving late at the Gymnasium and acting as one of the ring leaders on the occasion and his explanation was obtained. Similar explanations were called for from other probationers and enquiries were made behind the back of the appellant. Only the case of the appellant was dealt with severely in the lend. The cases of other probationers who were also considered to be ring leaders were not seriously taken note of. of discharge may be non- committal, it cannot stand alone. Though the nothing in the file of the Government may be irrelevant, the cause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read alongwith the order for the purpose of determining its true character. If on reading the two together the Court reaches the conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of dis-charge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a 19 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution."
14.5. So far the findings of this Tribunal in para 13, 16, 17 and 18 in O.A. No. 123/2023 (supra), of the common order dated 20.09.2023 are concerned, we are of the considered view that even if it is assumed that such findings of the Tribunal was not set aside by the Hon'ble High Court in the relevant Writ Petition, however, the fact remains that once we are confronted at one hand with the finding of this Tribunal and at other with the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court in Nina Lath Gupta (supra), Ravinder (supra) and the law laid down the Apex Court in Anuj Jaiswal (supra), the law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court and Supreme Court in such cases will bind us and not what we have held in O.A. No. 123/2023 (supra) and that too while holding that the Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction and such judgement of the Tribunal has been set aside by the Hon'ble High Court.
14.6. So far judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Chattisgarh at Bilaspur in Ashish Kumar Tiwari (supra) is concerned, the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court is of learned Single Bench. Furthermore, before the Hon'ble High Court as evident from para 4 of the judgment, the issue was as to whether the petitioner was given a fair and reasonable opportunity of defence. Here, admitted case of the parties is that no opportunity was given to the applicant to defend 20 Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2 against the allegations made against her and the findings stated to have been written by the respondents as being claimed in the counter reply.
15. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Narinder Singh Ahuja (supra), the contractual employee may not have right for indefinite extension of their contractual employment, however, they are having right to be allowed to continue on contract basis in preference to junior contract employees. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Court being binding, we have no reasons to take a contradictory view.
16. We are informed that in view of the interim order passed in the matter, the applicant is still holding the position of Centeral Administrator in One Stop Center under the respondents.
17. In view of the aforesaid, the O.A. is allowed with the following orders:-
1. The impugned order dated 08.07.2022, not extending the applicant's contractual employment beyond 16.08.2022 is set aside.
2. The respondents are directed not to replace the contractual employment of the applicant in preference to any fresher or junior.21
Item No. Sl. 2 O.A. No. 1964/2022 Court No. 2
3. The applicant shall be entitled for consequential benefits, i.e. pay as admissible in accordance with the relevant Rules / Contract.
4. The aforesaid directions shall be complied by the respondents as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four weeks after receipt of a certified copy of this order.
18. However, the respondents shall be at liberty to take action, if any, pursuant to complaints received against the applicant, however, in accordance with principle of natural justice and Rules on the subject.
19. In the facts and circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R N Singh) Member (A) Member (J) /SG/