Karnataka High Court
Sunil Kumar vs State By on 7 December, 2021
Author: M. Nagaprasanna
Bench: M. Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 7TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.6016/2018
BETWEEN
1. SUNIL KUMAR
S/O PATALAPPA
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
R/AT SADENAHALLI
HESSARGHATTA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 203.
2. MUNEGOWDA
S/O KEMPANNA
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
R/AT MAZARA HOSAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
3. K N RAJU
S/O NIRVANI
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
KIADB QUARTERS
BASHETTIHALLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
4. MANJUNATH
S/O CHIKKA BYRAIAH
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
WORKING AS MACHINE
OPERATOR AT RITTAL FACTORY
# 264, BEHIND GOVERMENT
2
SCHOOL, PALANAJOGAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLPUR TALUK - 560 203.
5. SHIVAKUMAR
S/O HARISHGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
KASUVANAHALLLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
6. SHAFIR AHMED
S/O BHASHEER AHMED
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
KALLUPETE,
DODDABALLAPUR - 560 203.
7. MADHU
S/O MARISIDDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
S M GOLLAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR - 560 203.
8. RAGHAVENDRA
S/O NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
BHUVANESHWARINAGARA
DODDABALLAPUR TOWN - 560 203
9. M SATHISH
S/O MAHADEVAPPA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
KASBAGH
DODDABALLAPUR TOWN - 560 203.
3
10 . MALLESH
S/O SHIVAPPA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
WORKING AT RITTAL FACTORY
JAKKUR, YELAHANKA HOBLI
BENGALURU - 560 064.
11 . ARUN KUMAR
S/O SHIVANNA
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
R/AT KASUVANAHALLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
12 . KEMPARAJU
S/O BYATHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
R/AT T. AGRAHARA
THARAHUNUSE POST
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 203.
13 . SRI. MALLESH
C/O CHIKKATHAYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT KASAVANAHALLI
VEERAPURA POST
DODDABALLAPPUR TALUK - 560 203.
14 . KEMPARAJU
S/O MUNIKEMPANNA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT SADENAHALLI
THARAHUNUSE POST
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 203.
15 . SHASHIKUMAR
S/O KEMPANNA
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
R/AT T. AGRAHARA
THARAHUNUSE POST
4
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 064.
16 . RAMANJINAPPA
S/O CHIKKANNA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
R/AT T. AGRAHARA,
THARAHUNUSE POST
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 064.
17 . AFFROZ
S/O ABDUL JAFFAR
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
R/AT NEAR TANUJA BAR
BASHETTIHALLI,
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
18 . HARISH
S/O RAJU
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
BASHETTYHALLI POST
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
19 . MANJUNATH
S/O BYREGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS
R/AT BASHETTIHALLI, KASABA HOBLI,
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
20 . MUNIVENKATAPPA
S/O LATE YELLAPPA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI,
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
21 . SRINIVAS
S/O SHANMUGAM
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
5
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
22 . BABU
S/O LATE KANNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
23 . ANAND
S/O RAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/AT BASHETTIHALLI, KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
24 . MANJUNATH
S/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
WORKING AS DRIVER
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
25 . GANGARAJU
S/O LATE MANI
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
26 . SURESH
S/O MANI
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/AT AREHALLIGUDDADAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
DODDABALLAPUR TALUK - 560 203.
... PETITIONERS
[BY SRI.SUBRAMANYA H.V., ADVOCATE
(PHYSICAL HEARING)]
6
AND
1. STATE BY
DODDABALLAPUR
RURAL POLICE STATION
(REPRESENTED BY STATE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING) - 560 001.
2. SRI H B LAKSHMAN GOWDA
S/O BORAIAH
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
KSRTC BUS DRIVER
TOKEN NO.3871
R/AT HONNAHALLI GRAMA
HEBBUR HOBLI
TUMKUR TALUK - 561 034.
... RESPONDENTS
[BY SRI.R.D.RENUKARADHYA, HCGP FOR R1
(PHYSICAL HEARING);
SRI.N.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R2
(PHYSICAL HEARING)]
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C
PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET FILED IN
CR.NO.300/2011 OF DODDABALLAPURA RURAL POLICE
STATION PENDING IN S.C.NO.10027/2015 FOR THE
OFFENCE P/U/S 143, 147, 148, 435 AND 353 R/W 149 OF
IPC AND SECTION 3(e) AND 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF
DAMAGE TO PUBLIC PROPERTY ACT, PENDING ON THE
FILE OF IV ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, DODDABALLAPURA FOR
THE REASONS STATED ABOVE.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
Petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 18, 20 to 26, 29 to 31 are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in Crime No.300/2011 pending in S.C. No.10227/2015 before the IV Additional District And Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Doddaballapura for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 435, 353 and 149 of the IPC read with Sections 3(e) and 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
2. Heard Sri. Subramanya H.V., learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri. R.D. Renukaradhya, learned HCGP appearing for respondent No.1, Sri. N.B. Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
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3. Brief facts as projected by the prosecution, are as follows:
One Sri. H.B. Lakshmana Gowda - respondent No.2 in the present petition was driving a KSRTC bus bearing Reg.No.KA-40-F-261 near Apparel Park at Bashettihalli Industrial Area, Doddaballapur Road. By the act of the said driver and an allegation that he had killed one Pillapa due to the collusion with the KSRTC bus, the petitioners along with others generated a mob, damaged the KSRTC bus bearing Reg.No.KA-1-FA-723 and has also damaged the bus by hurling stones to the bus and also burning them. Therefore, it was a mob attack on the KSRTC bus for an act of the driver of the bus, which had killed one Pillappa.
4. Based upon the said incident of such mob attack, the police Inspector by name one Sri. V.S. Shabarish registers a suo-motu complaint against several accused, which includes the petitioners. The 9 complaint becomes an FIR in Crime No.299/2011 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 332, 435, 504 read with Section 149 of the IPC. For the sake of convenience, the same would be referred to as 'First FIR'.
5. In the said FIR, the police have filed a charge sheet as well on 24.04.2012 in Crime No.299/2011. This is the charge sheet that is filed by the police against the accused for the aforesaid offences in terms of the first FIR that was registered. The charge sheet also narrates offences punishable of the very same provisions of law that are found in the FIR.
6. After registration of the first FIR, the driver of a bus registers another complaint before the police i.e., on the very same day 23.10.2011. The complainant was the driver of the bus that was parked which was also burnt in the incident. FIR is registered on the same day, for the same incident, albeit burning of a different 10 bus, by the mob at about 10.15 p.m. The timing of the incident is the same as that of the first FIR. For the sake of convenience, the same would be referred to as the Second FIR. The FIR is registered for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 435, 353 read with Section 149 of IPC.
7. The police after investigation have filed a charge sheet on 10.04.2012 for the same offences that are alleged in the FIR and the very same offences that are found in the first FIR and first charge sheet. Therefore, the case at hand is a case, where the incident of a mob attack on the busses of the KSRTC have lead to filing of two FIRS against the petitioners and the petitioners are accused in both the cases for the very same offences that have occurred on the very same day and between the very same period of time.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the proceedings in Crime 11 No.299/2011 in S.C.No.10027/2015 has progressed and the trial is on verge of conclusion. The FIR is registered in Crime No.300/2011 on the same day which is in S.C.No.10028/2015 is what is questioned before this Court on "doctrine of sameness", as the only factor that is different in both the complaints is the complainant' one is a suo-motu case is registered by the Police Inspector and the other is by a driver of the bus, which was burnt by the mob.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel representing respondent No.2 - complainant would contend that though the timing of the incident is the same, but the incidents are different, as the bus which was not even involved in the accident is also burnt by the mob and the KSRTC has suffered huge loss due the acts of the petitioners and would submit that it is a matter of trial that the petitioners have to come out clean in both these cases.
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10. Learned HCGP would also toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2- complainant, but would submit that the allegations, incident are all the same.
11. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
12. The afore-narrated facts not being in dispute need not be reiterated. The incident of mob attack on the buses of KSRTC is on a particular act of driver of the KSRTC, resulting in a death of a particular person in the limits of the village. This lead to fury among the people, who gathered and attacked the buses of KSRTC. This act of the mob attack resulted in an FIR being registered by the police, suo-motu for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 332, 435, 504 read with Section 149 of the IPC. This was the First 13 FIR. The police have investigated into the matter and filed the charge sheet and the trial is on the verge of conclusion in the said Crime No.299/2011. The driver of the another bus which was burnt also files a complaint on the very same day for the very same incident albeit a bus that was parked in the area. For the very same offences, the police have investigated and examined the very same documents and witnesses and have also filed the charge sheet in that case as well. It is that case that is called in question in the present petition and an interim order of stay is in operation.
13. Therefore, the trial in this case, if permitted to continue, would without doubt become an abuse of the process of the law, as the petitioners being accused are already been prosecuted for the very same offences, on the very same incident being registered by the police and the trial is on the verge of conclusion. Therefore, the Second FIR and the charge sheet that is filed would 14 undoubtedly be hit by the "doctrine of sameness" as held by the Apex Court in plethora of cases, which are all referred to by this Court in Criminal Petition No.3171/2018 disposed on 20.09.2021, wherein this Court has held as follows:
"11. Before embarking upon the journey of considering the facts obtaining in the case at hand, I deem it appropriate to notice the flow of law as laid down by the Apex Court with regard to registration of second complaint on the very same incident. The Apex Court right from the judgment in the case of T.T. ANTONY (supra) has held as follows:
"15. On these contentions, four points arise for determination:
(i) whether registration of a fresh case, Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station on the basis of the letter of the DGP dated 2-7-1997 which is in the nature of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC, is valid and it can form the basis of a fresh investigation;
(ii) whether the appellants in Appeals Nos.
689 and 4066 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) 15 Nos. 1522 and 8840 of 2000] and the respondent in Appeals Nos. 690-91 of 2001 [arising out of SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 2724-25 of 2000] have otherwise made out a case for quashing of proceedings in Crime No. 268 of 1997, Kuthuparamba Police Station;
(iii) what is the effect of the report of Shri K. Padmanabhan Commission of Inquiry; and
(iv) whether the facts and the circumstances of the case justify a fresh investigation by CBI.
... ... ...
...
18. An information given under sub-
section (1) of Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first information report (FIR) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nickname suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house 16 diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the first information report -- FIR postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other informations made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H -- the real offender -- who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused.
27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 17 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
35. For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 CrPC on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the 18 investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crimes Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under Section 173(8) CrPC before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."
(emphasis supplied)] Again the Apex Court in the case of Babubhai (supra) holds as follows:-
"23. If the two FIRs are read together, it becomes clear that the incident started in the morning as per both the FIRs CR No. I- 154 of 2008, lodged by Mr M.N. Pandya, Sub- Inspector of Police, stated that he reached the place of occurrence after receiving the information from the police station and found that the mob had already dispersed. The case of the prosecution is that when the police reached the place of occurrence of the first incident, the mob had already dispersed, could not be correct for the reason that some of the witnesses have stated that the clash was going on when the police arrived and police resorted to force to disperse the mob. In fact, it was the police 19 who summoned the ambulances which took the injured persons to hospitals."
(emphasis supplied) In the case of SURENDER KAUSHIK (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
"24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident.The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] , the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different version of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible."
(emphasis supplied) In the case of ANJU CHAUDHARY (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
20
"14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-in- charge of a police station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence. However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the investigating agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as 21 far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, re- examination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.) (emphasis supplied) In the case of P. SREEKUMAR (supra) the Apex Court holds as follows:-
"30. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that the second FIR filed by the appellant against Respondent 3 though related to the same incident for which the first FIR was filed by 22 Respondent 2 against the appellant- Respondent 3 and three bank officials, yet the second FIR being in the nature of a counter-complaint against Respondent 3 was legally maintainable and could be entertained for being tried on its merits.
31. In other words, there is no prohibition in law to file the second FIR and once it is filed, such FIR is capable of being taken note of and tried on merits in accordance with law.
32. It is for the reasons that firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would have been somewhat different. Such was not the case here; second, it was filed by the appellant as a counter-complaint against Respondent 3; third, the first FIR was against five persons based on one set of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in the first FIR; and lastly, the High Court while quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not examine the issue arising in the case in the light of law laid down by this Court in the two aforementioned decisions of this Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] and Surender Kaushik [Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 953] and simply referred the three decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this Court has laid down general principle of law relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code."
(emphasis supplied) 23 In the case of ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI (supra), the Apex Court holds as follows:
"37. In the present case, all the FIRs or complaints which have been lodged in diverse jurisdictions arise out of one and the same incident -- the broadcast by the petitioner on 21-4-2020 on R. Bharat. The broadcast is the foundation of the allegation that offences have been committed under the provisions of Sections 153, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298, 500, 504 and 506 IPC. During the course of the hearing, this Court has had the occasion, with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel, to peruse the several complaints that were filed in relation to the incident dated 21-4-2020. They are worded in identical terms and leave no manner of doubt that an identity of cause of action underlies the allegations levelled against the petitioner on the basis of the programme which was broadcast on 21-4-2020. Moreover, the language, content and sequencing of paragraphs and their numbering is identical. It was in this backdrop that Mr Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted (in our view correctly) that this Court may proceed to quash all the other FIRs and complaints lodged in diverse jurisdictions in the States, leaving open, however, the investigation in respect of FIR No. 238 of 2020 dated 22-4-2020 transferred from Police Station Sadar, District Nagpur City to N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai.
... ... ...
...
39. A litany of our decisions -- to refer to them individually would be a parade of the familiar -- has firmly established that any reasonable restriction on fundamental rights must comport with the 24 proportionality standard, of which one component is that the measure adopted must be the least restrictive measure to effectively achieve the legitimate State aim. Subjecting an individual to numerous proceedings arising in different jurisdictions on the basis of the same cause of action cannot be accepted as the least restrictive and effective method of achieving the legitimate State aim in prosecuting crime. The manner in which the petitioner has been subjected to numerous FIRs in several States, besides the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of identical allegations arising out of the same television show would leave no manner of doubt that the intervention of this Court is necessary to protect the rights of the petitioner as a citizen and as a journalist to fair treatment (guaranteed by Article 14) and the liberty to conduct an independent portrayal of views. In such a situation to require the petitioner to approach the respective High Courts having jurisdiction for quashing would result into a multiplicity of proceedings and unnecessary harassment to the petitioner, who is a journalist."
(emphasis supplied) The law in this regard as laid down in the aforesaid cases is followed in the latest judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA (supra) wherein, it is held as follows:
"6. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 25 211] takes us to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of material improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the same complainant against the same accused with regard to the same incident, it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt from Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], which further clarifies the holding in T.T. Antony [T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]: (Upkar Singh case [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211], SCC pp. 297-98, para
17) "17. ... In our opinion, this Court in that case only held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code."
(emphasis supplied in the original) It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] that bears directly and strongly upon the present case.
(emphasis supplied) If the law that is laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments is considered, what would unmistakably emerge is, registration 26 of second FIR on the same incident would be hit by the "doctrine of sameness" and will have to be annihilated as it would amount to improving the facts and the case in the subsequent complaint on the same incident. On the bedrock of the principles laid down in the afore-extracted judgments of the Apex Court, the case at hand will have to be considered."
14. Therefore following the judgments of the Apex Court, which are relied on by this Court in the aforesaid judgment, the subject criminal petition deserves to succeed.
15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER i. Criminal Petition is allowed.
ii. Proceedings in Crime No.300/2011 pending in S.C. No.10227/2015 before the IV Additional District And Sessions Judge, 27 Bengaluru Rural District, Doddaballapura, stands quashed insofar as the petitioners are concerned.
Sd/-
JUDGE SJK