Bombay High Court
The Maharashtra State Co-Operative ... vs The Maharashtra State Co-Operative ... on 27 March, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1994(2)BOMCR585A, [1992(65)FLR66]
JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J.
1. The Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers' Marketing Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as "Cotton Federation"), has come up in appeal before the Bench of this Court, complaining about the decision of the Single Judge rendered on 18-12-1991, in Writ Petition No. 2749 of 90.
2. The writ petition assailed the order passed by the Industrial Court on 14-9-1990, which upheld the plea of the Union about unfair labour practice in respect of the specified items as indicated therein.
3. The facts leading to the appeal may be recounted.
4. A benevolent legislation to relieve the toiling farmers in the black cotton soil of India, was made when the Maharashtra Raw Cotton (Procurement, Processing and Marketing) Act, 1971 was passed. It conferred on the State, governmental monopoly to deal in cotton. The Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation (hereinafter referred to as "the Marketing Federation") was to be the sole agent of the State. Attractions of specialisation were detected in this field of activity as well. The result was the creation of a specialised corporation, the Cotton Federation.
5. Many workers, doing manual and clerical work were there on the pay-roll initially of the Marketing Federation and latterly on the Cotton Federation, from 1971-72 onwards. The scheme of enactment, the permanency envisioned in relation to its functioning, and the details of actual work pattern, according to the Union, would not tolerate continuance of employment of workers on a casual basis. Engagement at one time and disbandment at some time later, according to the Union, was totally unjust and unfair. A reference raising that dispute came before the Industrial Court, G.K. Patankar, under Reference No. 2131/73. Shri Patankar passed the award on 31-3-1974. The decision therein was that all employees who had completed 240 days of continuous service should be treated as permanent.
6. There was, however, continuing controversy between the Marketing Federation and the workers. Patankar Award was not applicable to the seasonal employees, according to the Marketing Federation. This contention did not meet with approval with the Industrial Court. The controversy was carried to this Court. It was decided upon by this Court in Shripati Pandurang Khade & others v. Zonal Manager, Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd & others, (by the judgment rendered on 9/10-4-1987 by V.V. Vaze, J.). The learned Judge also repelled the plea of the Federation. The Federation did not relent in its efforts to have its stand vindicated. It was, however, disappointed ultimately. Appeal No. 37 of 1988 filed by it was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 11-10-1988, Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation v. Shripati Pandurang Khade & others, 1989 Mh. L.J. 264.
7. All would have thought that the controversy had been set at rest by the Apex Award. It was, however, not to be. The Cotton Ferderation, persisted in pleading that the Patankar Award applicable only to such of the seasonal employees who had completed 240 days as on 31-8-1974, the date of the Award.
8. This contention did not, again, appeal to the Industrial Court before which it was raised. The Award passed on 14-9-1990 in Complaint (ULPA) No. 316 of 90 rendered a finding adverse to the Cotton Federation, as already adverted to above. The challenge before the learned Single Judge had been unsuccessful; the matter is thus before us.
9. Counsel covered many points - factual and legal, with a view to justify the stand of the Cotton Federation. At the end of the day, we have found it impossible to uphold the arguments or to accommodate the plea of the appellant Cotton Federation.
10. True, cotton cultivation has its peculiarities. It is not a perennial crop, yielding throughout the year. The cultivational activity, quite often not capturing attention or recognition, may be there. The plants start presenting a pleasing smile only later. The beautiful blooms are picked, with understandable enthusiasm. Allied activities soon follow. Ginning is indispensable. That is urgently attended to. Collection at the various centres, transportation to places of storage, and other connected actualities with the variety of dealings, take place in quick succession, with hectic pace. The Cotton Federation takes the stand that the season commences with the cool climate of October and gets exhausted in the exhausting heat of April. According to it, the worker's interests are legitimately taken care of, but consistent with the seasonal character of the crop. Much more is not needed, nor deserved by the workers, according to it. Patankar Award is, of course, there. That applies only to the workers who had been parties to that Award. The later extension in a subsequent Reference, should not also be automatically applied to the workers covered by the present complaint, according to the counsel. There was a blind adoption of the earlier decision, without critical and objective examination of the facts of the complaints, complained counsel. A blinkered vision vitiated the decision of the Industrial Court, and of the learned Judge, it is asserted.
11. Patankar Award, according to us, should not be viewed either in isolation or on a narrow plane as applicable to a limited situation or a limited group of workers. The issue was a basic one, and of general character. Pleadings of the parties, the evidence adduced, the reasoning adopted and the ultimate conclusion come to, to our mind, do not cast the slightest doubt about general character of the adjudication on a sensitive dispute relating to seasonal employees. The Union pegged its demand at a higher level than was reasonable. That, however, is the style of Trade Unionism. They leave something to be sliced off in the course of prolonged bargaining process. The demand that all persons who had completed 78 days in the year should be made permanent, has to be understood in that background. The Industrial Court has, however, to see both sides, and weigh rival contentions. It was only natural that Patankar passed the Award, not upholding the demand of the Union in its extreme aspiration nor caressing the stance of the Cotton Federation in its fullness. A golden mean, ideal in the circumstances, was reached by it. A continuous service of 240 days was made the criterian for being treated as a permanent employee.
12. The narrow contention of the Cotton Federation overlooks the grand scheme underlying the Industrial Jurisprudence. Essentially, what is cherished in that area, is not armistice, but truce. Apart from the contending factors, there is an ubiquitous onlooker, the public-deeply interested in containing the fire of ire and extinguishing the fire by the wonderful work mechanism of the Industrial Court. Section 18 of the enactment, eloquently proclaims this larger perspective. That section relates to the persons on whom an Award is binding. Sub-clause (d) of section 18 is particularly significant. Thereunder, the award shall be binding "Where party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is composed of workmen all persons who are employed in the establishment... to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently become employees in that establishment..." .
13. Those who step into the shoes of the earlier employer, have to take on, along with profits and privileges, already in the palms, the obligations and liabilities as well . Stepping into the shoes does not mean shaking off the cross which on occasions one may have to carry. In a similar situation, this Court, through Mohta, J., had held that, and with respect, we fully agree with that the Cotton Federation is a successors-in-interest of the old Federation (Vide M.S. Co-operative Marketing Federation Employees Union v. State of Mah. & other), (1989)I C.I.R. 21. Viewed from the limited angle of the statutory effect, we, therefore, have no hesitation to concur with the decision taken by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the Patankar Award would be equally applicable to all the employees, irrespective of the fact that they became employees on the days subsequent to 31-8-1974, the date of the Patankar Award.
14. In a sense, it was the precise controversy of permanency of seasonal employees that was raised earlier in ULPA No. 125/87 and connected cases. The discussions of the Industrial Court in that case, very elaborate and detailed, and touching on all relevant aspects, would clearly make out the substantial similarity of the controversy involved therein and the controversy in the current case. Matters come to a sharper focus, from the judgment of Vaze, J., and the ultimate upholding of that judgment by the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with copious extracts of the decision of the Industrial Court, or the reasoning of Vaze, J., and the declarations of the Supreme Court. Much in that direction has been already done by the learned Single Judge. We agree with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, on every important point of that decision. Reiteration and the reaffirmation of that reasoning, with a repetition of the details, would be a supreme superfluity and avoidable prolixity of this judgment. We agree with the finding of the learned Single Judge and hold that Patankar Award was rightly held to be applicable to the employees involved in the present complaint as well.
15. On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted that the general notion of the seasonal work has been substituted by a statutory definition under section 2(g) of the Act. 'Season' has been defined therein as the period from 1st of July to 30th of June. It is not necessary to explore the significance of this expression of `season' by a statutory definition making inroad into general understanding of the term "season" as we have, even otherwise, repelled the appellants' contention.
16. On behalf of the workmen, it was rightly contended that even prior to 1972, Cotton used to be grown, picked up and processed and that such activities were common experiences shared by all in the Deccan delta blessed with black cotton soil. This aspect has an effect on the understanding of the demand of the labour for permanency, the consideration of the same in the Patankar Award, and the understanding of such a repeated demand in the complaint in ULPA 128/87 etc. which ultimately ended in the Supreme Court decision on 11-10-1988. Having regard to the background facts and circumstances, it is difficult to dissect Patankar Award and to view it as applicable only to a few of the workmen who were involved in the Reference before him. The question of permanency was a serious problem relating to the workmen in the industry. The question was referred to and had been considered by Patankar. The principle is not of an ephemeral relevance but enduring influence. We are thus of the view that the workmen involved in the present case, facing the same problem and advancing the same arguments in relation to the seasonal workmen, were rightly entitled to the application of the principle enunciated by Patankar Award. That was how matters were understood in the earlier proceedings, which culminated in the decision of the Supreme Court on 11-10-1988.
17. It is contended that the Act in question came into effect on 4-12-1971, and that the reference to Patankar Tribunal was made on 30-5-1973, and consequently, it could be inferred that the demands of the workmen had been made prior to 30-5-1973. Season would have come to an end in April, and consequently no employee could have completed 240 days in that situation-contended the counsel for the appellant. We shall not conjecture on the matters when a definite pronouncement is available in the Award of Patankar. It is difficult to imagine that Patankar Award would have dealt with a situation, which according to counsel for the appellant, was a factual impossibility. Equally unsustainable is the ambitious contention that if Patankar Award meant a wider coverage, it would have expressly stated that the award is applicable to all employees including permanent, temporary and seasonal. The terms of the Award are clear. We are in full agreement with the understanding of the terms thereof as made in the earlier proceedings as also in the current one. We are unable to detect any error whatever in the interpretation placed on Patankar Award, repeatedly. in the aforesaid proceedings.
18. One argument which was stressed at some length to get the order upset by this Court, was based on Bhuibhar Agreement (Annexure II (b) dated 18-1-1984). The recommendation of the Bhuibhar Agreement was noted by the learned Single Judge. No doubt that agreement had recommended that the seasonal employees would be entitled to work for six months in a year. That recommendation, however, is not destructive of the rights which the seasonal employees had, under the Patankar Award. The fact that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute for arbitration by Bhuibhar Commitee, and that the agreement of 18-1-1984 would have the effect of modifying the Patankar Award was rejected by the learned Single Judge, holding that the workers would not be treated as having given up their legitimate claim for permanency which they had already acquired under the Patankar Award. It has been repeatedly laid down that clear and cogent materials should exist for entering a finding of waiver or abandonment of an existing right. This is particularly so in the case of an under privileged strata of society like the workmen in the present case. We do not find any error in the approach, reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Single Judge on this aspect either.
19. There is also much significance in the fact that subsequent to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shripati Khade's case (cited supra), some workers had been made permanent in different places in the State of Maharashtra by the Cotton Federation. A letter dated 5th August, 1980 referred to in paragraph 15 of the judgment, is indicative of a vindictive attitude on the part of the Cotton Federation. A suggestion for effecting an artificial break in the service of the employee so as to disable him from completing 240 days, was rightly found by the learned Single Judge to be a reprehensible practice. The view taken by the learned Single Judge about the Cotton Federation indulging in unfair labour practice in not implementing the Patankar Award, does not, in the circumstances, call for any interference at the appellate forum.
20. We assume that a feeling of conviction in the correctness of its contention prompted the Cotton Federation to pursue the matter in the present case, despite earlier failure. The learned Judge indicated his anger against what was felt to be a totally unjustified and adament attitude on the part of the Cotton Federation, by award of cost of Rs. 10,000/-. We have come to the conclusion that there is no merit in the contention of the appellant. We would, therefore, affirm the finding of the learned Judge and dismiss the appeal. Even so, we do not wish to add to the burden of costs of the Cotton Federation. The appeal, thus, would stand dismissed, but without any order as to costs.