Jharkhand High Court
Dr. Manoranjan Biswas vs Mecon Limited on 7 October, 2025
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2025:JHHC:30922
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
WP(S) No.1813 of 2021
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Dr. Manoranjan Biswas, son of Nibaran Chandra Biswas,
resident of CGM (HR) MECON Limited, Quarter No. E-11,
MECON Colony, PO Doranda, PS Doranda, District Ranchi
... Petitioner(s).
Versus
1.MECON Limited, a Government of India Enterprises through its
Chairman and Managing Director, Vivekanand Path, PO and PS
Doranda, District Ranchi
2.Chairman and Managing Director, MECON Limited, a
Government of India Enterprises, Vivekanand Path, PO
Doranda, PS Doranda, District Ranchi ... Respondent(s).
CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.
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For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Amitabh, Advocate .........
17 /07.10.2025: Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner in this writ petition has prayed to quash the punishment order dated 28.10.2020 contained in letter no. 11.73.3/C1850 by which the petitioner has been punished and his basic pay was reduced by one stage from Rs. 75,190/- to Rs. 73,000/- per month in the time scale of pay i.e. Rs. 51,300 - Rs. 73,000/- with immediate effect for the period of six months. Further it was ordered that during the aforesaid period the petitioner will earn his increments and on expiry of this period the reduction will not have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.
3. Further the petitioner also prays to quash the appellate order dated 04.03.2021 as contained in Memo No. 11/78/4(4)/71 by which the appeal was also dismissed.
4. After hearing the parties, I find that the issue lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner was employee of the respondent- MECON Limited, Ranchi. A departmental charge memo was issued against the petitioner alleging misconduct.
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5. It is the case of the employer that the petitioner had entered in service by wrongful means as he did not possess the total post qualification work experience which was supposed to be 24 years. As per the allegation the petitioner did not possess the said qualification but had managed to obtain the service. Further there is an allegation that gross irregularities were committed in the matter of promotion of the petitioner as he has got himself wrongfully considered for promotion in Level of E-8 in the year 2016 in contravention of the eligibility requirement of minimum 4 years in E-7 grade. Further it has been alleged that the petitioner has obtained wrong performance ratings from his previous employer to his benefits. The charge against the petitioner was in fact relates to dishonesty in connection to the privileges extended under the rules of company [Clause 5.2.1 (xi)] in connection with the companies affairs giving false information regarding his particulars for the purpose of employment by concealing facts [Clause 5.2.1 (xii)] and breach of the Conduct Rules of 4.1.1(a)(d) read with Clause 5.2.1. (xix) and his act is prejudicial to the goodwill of the company [Clause 5.2.1 (xxxix)]. The memorandum of charge has been brought on record at page no. 80.
6. Admittedly a departmental proceeding was initiated after appointing an Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his report. The report has also been brought on record by the petitioner which is at Annexure-4. Admittedly, the Inquiry Officer did not find any material in support of the charge framed against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer in his report has mentioned that there is absence of cogent and clinching evidence and the petitioner cannot be held to be guilty of dishonesty in connection with privileges extended under the rules of the Company or of giving false information regarding his particulars for the purpose of employment or concealing any facts about his previous employment or his act is prejudicial to the goodwill or interest of the company. Ultimately, it was held that the charges have not been established.
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7. Thereafter the inquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner seeking response. Though he was not supposed to give reply as he was exonerated, yet he submitted his reply. Vide letter dated 26.06.2020 contained in memo no. 11.73.3/C1850 the disciplinary authority in paragraph no. 5 agreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer, but referred the matter to Central Vigilance Commission for their second stage advice. The Central Vigilance Commission advised imposition of a major penalty against this petitioner, which is apparent from letter dated 09.10.2020. The said advise was communicated to the petitioner and his response was sought for, which he complied with by giving a reply dated 20.10.2020. Thereafter the impugned order of punishment dated 28.10.2020 was passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
8. The procedure which has been adopted by the Disciplinary Authority is unknown to law. When the Inquiry Officer has exonerated the delinquent employee, propriety demanded that a notice/show cause outlining the point of difference should have been communicated to the petitioner. It is well settled that Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the finding of the Inquiry Officer. He can arrive at a different conclusion differing with the inquiry report, but if he is not accepting the exoneration report of the Inquiry Officer, he has to give his independent reasons as to why he has differed with the findings. He thereafter has to communicate the said point of differences to the delinquent and ask for his response. Then only he can proceed to impose punishment. In this case admittedly the Disciplinary Authority accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer but had sent a copy of the same seeking second stage advice from the Central Vigilance Commission. The Disciplinary Authority himself has not differed with the finding in the inquiry report. It is the Director, Central Vigilance Commission, who has differed with the inquiry report. He has got no jurisdiction to do so, in a departmental proceeding. The independent application of mind and the disagreement must be from the end of the Disciplinary Authority and not from the Central 3 2025:JHHC:30922 Vigilance Commission. If at all the Disciplinary Authority agreed with the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission he should have independently applied his mind and sent note of difference to the petitioner, seeking his explanation, but this procedure was not followed here. Since the Central Vigilance Commission had recommended to impose major punishment, mechanically the Disciplinary Authority punished the petitioner. Thus the procedure which has been followed by the respondents is not in accordance with law. Thus, the petitioner could not have been punished, as the said order of punishment in fact is not an independent decision of the Disciplinary Authority.
9. Be it noted that by now the petitioner has already superannuated. Since the petitioner had already superannuated it will be futile to remand the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to start from the aforesaid stage, as because the relationship of the employer and employee, by now has been severed. So far the punishment is concerned the petitioner has already served the punishment and as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the Central Vigilance Commission and the petitioner. The monetary implication of the punishment would be around Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/-.
At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner on instruction from the client submit that he is not also claiming the aforesaid benefit if this order is set-aside.
10. Considering the submission of the parties and the fact that the procedure has not been followed and there is violation of the principle of natural justice as second show cause notice pointing out the grounds of difference has not been issued by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner and the petitioner has been punished, I am inclined to allow this writ petition. The impugned order dated 28.10.2020 contained in letter no. 11.73.3/C1850 is quashed.
11. The other issues which has been raised by the learned counsel for the Central Vigilance Commission does not survive in 4 2025:JHHC:30922 view of the fact that the petitioner has already superannuated and the Inquiry Officer has exonerated the petitioner.
12. Consequently the appellate order dated 04.03.2021 contained in letter no. 11/78/4(4)/71 by which appeal of the petitioner has been dismissed, is also set-aside.
13. Thus, this writ petition is allowed.
(ANANDA SEN, J.) 07.10.2025 Tanuj/CP-2 5