Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Mrs. Harinder Gautam vs National Institute Of Public Finance on 10 December, 2008
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench TA No. 37/2008 New Delhi this the 10th day of December 2008. Honble Mr. Shanker Raju, Member (J) Honble Mrs. (Dr.) Veena Chhotray, Member (A) Mrs. Harinder Gautam, D-5, Sector-30, Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar-201301. -Applicant (By Advocate Shri B.S. Bhuddhiraja) -Versus- National Institute of Public Finance And Policy through its Chairman, 18/2, Special Institutional Area, New Delhi-110067. -Respondents (By Advocate Shri Rajiv Bansal) O R D E R Mr. Shanker Raju, Honble Member (J):
Principles of natural justice being components of administrative law necessitate recording of reasons by an administrative authority, exercising quasi-judicial functions. The Apex Court in a constitution Bench decision in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 594, made the following observations:
39. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.
40. We may now come to the second part of the question, namely, whether the confirming authority is required to record its reasons for confirming the finding and sentence of the court-martial and the Central Government or the competent authority entitled to deal with the post-confirmation petition is required to record its reasons for the order passed by it on such petition. For that purpose it will be necessary to determine whether the Act or the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules) expressly or by necessary implication dispense with the requirement of recording reasons. We propose to consider this aspect in a broader perspective to include the findings and sentence of the court-martial and examine whether reasons are required to be recorded at the stage of (i) recording of findings and sentence by the court-martial; (ii) confirmation of the findings and sentence of the court-martial; and (iii) consideration of post-confirmation petition.
2. In the context of an order passed, the Apex Court in State of Uttranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, 2008 (4) SCALE 22 ruled that the reasons are heartbeats, absence of which makes an order lifeless.
3. Consideration in administrative jurisdiction is worth in law where a thinking has to be done on active application of mind to all the relevant factors and aspects of the matter, as ruled by the Apex Court in Bhiku Bhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2008 (4) SCALE 248.
4. With the above background of the settled law, applicant, an Accounts Officer in the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, assails an order passed by the respondents on 30.8.2005, whereby after a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 7 (1)(f) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1986, a penalty of removal from service has been inflicted upon. Also assailed is an order passed on 31.3.2006, whereby the Appellate Board rejected the appeal, upholding the punishment imposed upon the applicant.
5. A brief factual matrix is relevant, so is highlighted. Applicant, who was appointed as a Secretary to the Provident Fund Trust of National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (hereinafter referred to as Trust), was proceeded against for a major penalty as per the Institute (Discipline & Appeal) Rules for her wilful negligence in work and performance, without maintaining devotion to duty, as a result of which one Shri Sharad Aggarwal, a Trustee has unauthorizedly withdrew the money from the Trust account right from 1999, causing loss to the Trust to the tune of Rs.1 crore. The enquiry proceeded, whereby on the basis of the prosecution, defence evidence and statement of defence of applicant though established the charge of wilful negligence of work and performance in her duties by the applicant, yet the part of charge to maintain absolute integrity was not proved. However, the disciplinary authority (DA) on concurring with the findings of the enquiring authority and holding that the charges levelled against applicant are held to be proved and on a representation by the applicant, passed the following order:
I have gone through the Inquiry Report dated May 28, 2005 in respect of chargesheet dated April 19, 2004 issued to Smt. Harinder Gautam, Accounts Officer. I have also gone through the representation dated August 7, 2005 of Smt. Gautam on the said Inquiry Report.
I do not find any merit in her representation. Her plea that cheque books, vouchers, registers etc. were in possession of Mr. Sharad Aggarwal, do not in any manner absolve her of the responsibilities as Secretary of the Provident Fund Trust. In fact, it was all the more necessary for her to be more vigilant in discharge of her duties as Secretary of the Trust.
After giving due consideration to the issues, raised by Smt. Gautam in her representation dated August 7, 2005, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the documents/proceedings of the inquiry, I have come to the conclusion that Smt. Harinder Gautam is guilty of the charges levelled against her.
The negligence on the part of Smt. Gautam has resulted in fraud and misappropriation by Mr. Sharad Aggarwal, which resulted in loss of more than one crore five lakhs to the Trust.
Keeping in view the gravity of charges, I am of the considered opinion that the punishment of removal from service, under Rule 7, sub rule 1 clause (f) of the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules, 1986, of the institute, with effect from August 31, 2005 will meet the ends of justice. I order accordingly.
6. Against the aforesaid applicant preferred an appeal, whereby the Appellate Board on proportionality of punishment and on the ground of mechanical order passed by the DA on reasoned ordered, recorded the following finding:
(iv) It was also contended by the Appellant that the punishment imposed on her is disproportionate to the act of negligence.
The gravity of charges of misconduct, for which the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and which have been substantiated fully, justify the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority. The punishment imposed is neither harsh nor undeserving.
Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that punishment imposed (i.e., removal from service) is disproportionate to the gravity of charges proved against the Appellant.
(v) It was further contended by the Appellant before us that the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order without giving opportunity and without giving oral hearing which, according to her is mandatory as per the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Ramzan Khans Case.
The Honble Supreme Court in the said case was only dealing with the issue of supply of inquiry report to the delinquent employee. In the present case, the inquiry report was supplied to the CO vide Secretarys letter No.NIPFP/05 dated 20.07.2005 and the CO was given a chance to offer her comments. The CO submitted her comments on the inquiry report vide letter dated 07.08.05 and the same were duly considered by the Disciplinary Authority at the time of passing the order impugned herein.
Thus, once the report was supplied to Mrs. Gautam and she was given in opportunity to comment on the same, it was not incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to give a personal hearing to CO. The Appellant has not brought to our notice any rule or judicial pronouncement which obliged the Disciplinary Authority to give a hearing to the delinquent employee.
(vi) It was contended by the Appellant that the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order mechanically and in limine without assigning any reason, by merely confirming the finding of Inquiry Report.
We do not find any merit in this contention. The order of the Disciplinary Authority need not be verbose. As long as it is borne out from the order of the Disciplinary Authority that the Disciplinary Authority has applied its mind to the report of the inquiry officer and representation, if any, submitted by the delinquent employees thereon, no fault can be found with the order of the Disciplinary Authority.
The disciplinary authority is required to give reasons only when Disciplinary Authority does not agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. The concurrence of the Disciplinary Authority with the reasoning and conclusion of the Inquiry Officer means that the Disciplinary Authority has adopted the conclusion, and the basis of the conclusion, as its own. It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to restate the reasoning.
In the present case, since the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in toto, it was not required to give elaborate reasons. Even otherwise, we find the reasons given by the disciplinary Authority to be sufficient.
Therefore we do not find any merit in the appeal preferred by Smt. H. Gautam and the same is hereby dismissed.
7. This has given rise to the present TA.
8. Learned counsel of applicant, at the outset, states that the order passed by the DA is against the Discipline & Appeal Rules, as no reasons have been recorded in support of the order and the previous record as well as mitigating circumstances and also the contentions raised by the applicant have not been considered and no such reasons have been recorded.
9. Learned counsel would also contend that the Appellate Board has also not gone into the proportionality of punishment.
10. Learned counsel has also projected a case of no misconduct by contending that the powers to manage finance and affairs of provident fund have been achieved on delegation to Shri Sharad Aggarwal, who with malafide intention committed fraud etc., which is not attributable to the applicant and as no connivance has been proved when the functions, as now alleged, and duties of the applicant were not delegated by the Board, she could not be held guilty.
11. Learned counsel would also contend that having completed almost 30 years of service applicants right to pension and the previous clean service record would have occasioned on doctrine of proportionality a lesser penalty, which the authorities have not considered at all.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel of respondents has vehemently opposed the contentions and cited the following decisions:
i) Union of India v. K.G. Soni, 2006 (6) SCC 794.
ii) B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1995 (6) SCC 749.
iii) K.M. Sharma v. State Bank of India, 2006 II A.D. (Delhi) 778.
iv) Union of India v. R.K. Sharma, 2001 (9) SCC 592.
v) Union of India v. J. Ahmed, 1979 (2) SCC 286.
13. It is contended that applicant who for six years had allowed Shri Sharad Aggarwal to deflate the amount of PF, as a result of which Rs. One crore and seven lakhs loss was incurred and as her duties enjoined and delegated her to scan the amount, make entries, subject the account to audit, her negligence when is so culpable with the resultant damage is apparent on a gross misconduct, when Sharad Aggarwal was also dismissed, the penalty imposed is commensurate with the misconduct, and, as the senior officers consisting of Professors and Researchers being members of the Appellate Board, the orders passed are in consonance with law and rules.
14. Learned counsel would also contend that once the authority inadvertently agreed with the enquiry report as to establishment of all charges against the applicant by the EO, the punishment has been imposed only on negligence, which is a proven charge and regarding recording of reasons by the DA it is stated that when the enquiry report is reasoned, no detailed reasons are to be recorded by the DA. A mere agreement with the enquiry officers report is the sufficient compliance of the requirement of law.
15. As far as proportionality of punishment is concerned, it is stated that there cannot be substitution for the Appellate Board by the Court and as the punishment is interfered only on any deficiency in decision-making process, as there is none, no orders are to be upheld.
16. Learned counsel also project that the applicant has filed a false affidavit, as the defence documents have already been given and she has not asked for any other document. She is taking the plea of violation of principles of natural justice. It is also stated that the applicant having appeared before the Appellate Board, the orders passed are in consonance with law. It is stated by the learned counsel of respondents that had the applicant being vigilant and performed her duties assigned to her efficiently the loss would have been prevented so as the act of Shri Sharad Aggarwal. It is her omissions, commissions and negligence in work that resulted in prejudice to the interest of the Institute.
17. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.
18. National Institute of Public Finance is governed, insofar as disciplinary proceedings are concerned by Governing Body approved Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1986. Under Rule 8 procedure is described for imposition of penalty and as per Rule 8 (6) on conclusion of the enquiry if on a proven charge a penalty is to be imposed under Rule 7 a representation is sought on the penalty proposed from the concerned employee. However, Rule 8 (7) provides as under:
In awarding any penalty to an employee under this rule, the authority imposing the penalty shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that my exist.
18. As per the import of above rule, it is obligatory upon the DA while awarding a penalty upon an employee under the Rules to take into consideration not only the gravity of misconduct but also the extenuating circumstances.
19. Insofar as appellate avenue is concerned, Rule 11 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules provides an appeal to be preferred within 30 days and the DA transmit the record of the enquiry with its own comments and thereafter Rule 11 (3) and (4) lays down methodology as under:
(3) The appellate authority may, after considering the records of the proceedings before the inquiring authority and the disciplinary authority and after giving the employee an opportunity for representing his case, pass such orders as it may deem fit including an order cancelling, reducing, enhancing or setting aside the order and remitting the case to the disciplinary authority with such directions as it may deem fit.
(4) The appellate authority shall, save for exceptional reasons to be recorded in writing, dispose of the appeal within a period of three months of the receipt by it of the appeal.
20. If one has regard to the above rule, the appellate authority after giving a personal hearing shall pass an order and save for extenuating reasons recorded in writing, dispose of the appeal within a period of three months.
21. In the above backdrop it is trite law that an administrative authority acting as a quasi-judicial authority, being creature of the Statue, has to act within the four corners. If a particular methodology is prescribed under the rules, no other procedure is to be adopted, failing which it would be acting against the rules and exceeding its jurisdiction. Non-application of mind has to be inferred in such an event.
22. In the Discipline and Appeal Rules, the DA is not absolved of recording reasons in support of the order. Rather, while imposing penalty it is incumbent upon the DA to consider the previous record of an employee and also extenuating circumstances. This implies that while imposing an extreme punishment of dismissal or removal, which are designated penalties under Rule 7, the DA has to consider the previous record of the concerned as to devotion to duty for all those years in service and also any extenuating circumstances apart from gravity of the misconduct.
23. From the perusal of the order passed by the DA on 30.8.2005 simply because applicant was negligent, which has resulted on account of fault of one Sharad Aggarwal for committing fraud and misrepresentation, causing loss to the Institute, only on gravity of charge penalty of removal from service was inflicted. We do not find either consideration of past record of the applicant or extenuating circumstances, which have been validly described as contentions by the applicant in her reply to the enquiry report. It appears that one-sided order has been passed on the basis of the enquiry report. However, as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, JT 1993 (6) SC 1, the enquiry report acts as an additional material and the conclusion thereof when responded to by a valid representation, taking several contentions not dealing with any of the contentions and not recording any reasons and as to make it apparent that the application of mind has taken place. This is denial of reasonable opportunity to the concerned, which ultimately prejudices, as the extreme penalty divests away right of pension and other benefits to the concerned. Reasons have not been recorded even in brief. Consideration has not taken place as per law. We do not find compliance of Rule 8 of the Discipline & Appeal Rules, which makes the order not only against the Rules but a bald without application of mind, which is not only unfair to applicant but also unreasonable in the circumstances. The only occasion to point out infirmities and illegalities in the enquiry report and the case of no misconduct was in the representation made on the enquiry report. Once it is not considered by the DA and the appellate authority the justification that when the DA agrees with the enquiry report, there is no requirement to state separate reasons is oblivious of the fact that the plea of the concerned as to enquiry report has been left consideration is deprivation of reasonable opportunity and in a manner violence to the embodied principle in natural justice of audi alteram partem. From time to time, the requirement to pass reasoned orders has been laid down by the Apex Court in State of Uttranchal v. Kharak Singh, 2008 (8) SCC 238, wherein it is ruled that though the decision on quantum of punishment lies with the jurisdiction of the DA, yet it does not absolve recording of such reasons, which is not dispensed with by any Rule to record reasons in support of the order.
24. In Divisional Forest Officer v. Madusudhan Rao, 2008 (3) SCC 469, the duty to record reasons in an administrative action has been well defined, with the following observations:
19. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and also having regard to the detailed manner in which the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal had dealt with the matter, including the explanation given regarding the disbursement of the money received by the respondent, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the Administrative Tribunal and endorsed by the High Court. No doubt, the Divisional Forest Officer dealt with the matter in detail, but it was also the duty of the appellate authority to give at least some reasons for rejecting the appeal preferred by the respondent. A similar duty was cast on the revisional authority being the highest authority in the Department of Forests in the State. Unfortunately, even the revisional authority has merely indicated that the decision of the Divisional Forest Officer had been examined by the Conservator of Forests, Khammam wherein the charge of misappropriation was clearly proved. He too did not consider the defence case as made out by the respondent herein and simply endorsed the punishment of dismissal though reducing it to removal from service.
19. It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum.
25. In Narpat Singh v. Rajasthan Financial Corporation, 2007 (11) SCALE 458 the aforesaid has been reiterated in respect of a particular Regulation 37, which is in pari meteria with Rule 8 of the Rules ibid in the Institute where it is incumbent upon the DA to adopt a particular methodology to pass an order of penalty. Having not followed the same, the orders passed cannot be sustained in law.
26. Proportionality of punishment earlier with an overwhelming trite law of Apex Court was based on Wednesbury principle of reasonableness, which has now in judicial review has emerged on the principle of proportionality.
27. In State of M.P. v. Hazarilal, 2008 (1) SCC (L&S) 611 the following observations have been made:
7. By reason of the said provision, thus, "the disciplinary authority has been empowered to consider the circumstances of the case where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge", but the same would not mean that irrespective of the nature of the case in which he was involved or the punishment which has been imposed upon him, an order of dismissal must be passed. Such a construction, in our opinion, is not warranted.
8. An authority which is conferred with a statutory discretionary power is bound to take into consideration all the attending facts and circumstances of the case before imposing an order of punishment. While exercising such power, the disciplinary authority must act reasonably and fairly. Respondent occupied the lowest rank of the cadre. He was merely a contingency peon. Continuation of his service in the department would not bring a bad name to the State. He was not convicted for any act involving moral turpitude. He was not punished for any heinous offence.
11. Furthermore the legal parameters of judicial review has undergone a change. Wednesbury principle of unreasonableness has been replaced by the doctrine of proportionality. [See : Indian Airlines Ltd. vs. Prabha D. Kumari : (2006) 11 SCC 67 ; State of U.P. vs. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava : (2006) 3 SCC 276 and M.P. Gangadharan and another vs. State of Kerala and others : AIR 2006 SC 2360.]
28. In Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. And another, (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68, the doctrine of administrative law has been well defined, with the following observations:
17. So far as the doctrine of proportionality is concerned, there is no gainsaying that the said doctrine has not only arrived at in our legal system but has come to stay. With the rapid growth of Administrative Law and the need and necessity to control possible abuse of discretionary powers by various administrative authorities, certain principles have been evolved by Courts. If an action taken by any authority is contrary to law, improper, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unreasonable, a Court of Law can interfere with such action by exercising power of judicial review. One of such modes of exercising power, known to law is the 'doctrine of proportionality'
18. 'Proportionality' is a principle where the Court is concerned with the process, method or manner in which the decision-maker has ordered his priorities, reached a conclusion or arrived at a decision. The very essence of decision-making consists in the attribution of relative importance to the factors and considerations in the case. The doctrine of proportionality thus steps in focus true nature of exercise the elaboration of a rule of permissible priorities.
19. de Smith states that 'proportionality' involves 'balancing test' and 'necessity test'. Whereas the former ('balancing test') permits scrutiny of excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest imbalance of relevant considerations, the latter ('necessity test') requires infringement of human rights to the least restrictive alternative. ['Judicial Review of Administrative Action'; (1995); pp. 601-605; para 13.085; see also Wade & Forsyth; 'Administrative Law'; (2005); p.366].
29. From the above decisions, it is clear that our legal system also has accepted the doctrine of proportionality. The question, however, is whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court was justified in invoking and applying the doctrine of proportionality. In our judgment, the answer must be in the negative. Normally, when disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and finding of fact has been recorded in such inquiry, it cannot be interfered with unless such finding is based on 'no evidence' or is perverse, or is such that no reasonable man in the circumstances of the case would have reached such finding. In the present case, four charges had been levelled against the workmen. An inquiry was instituted and findings recorded that all the four charges were proved. The Labour Court considered the grievances of the workmen, negatived all the contentions raised by them, held the inquiry to be in consonance with principles of natural justice and findings supported by evidence. Keeping in view the charges proved, the Labour Court, in our opinion, rightly held that the punishment imposed on workmen could not be said to be harsh so as to interfere with it.
29. In the above view of the matter, the appellate authority under Rule 11 of the Rules on a personal hearing to the concerned passed an order, which should contain reasons. Though the authorities bestowed with discretion to cancel, reduce and set aside the order or remit it to the DA, yet for want of any provision as to proportionality of punishment to be gone into the doctrine of proportionality in exercise of discretion is to be deemed on implication and in such an event it is incumbent upon the appellate authority to pass not only a reasoned order but also specifically deal with proportionality of punishment.
30. At one point of time the learned counsel of the respondents has propagated doctrine of merger to say that the order passed by the DA when merges into the appellate order, which is reasoned, any defect cropped up earlier would be impliedly rectified. The doctrine of merger is well explained by the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Kondottyparambanmoosa and others, 2008 (8) SCC 65 and would have no application when appellate authority decides a case on technical grounds but not on merits. However, an illegal order of the DA when the appellate authority in its order does not comply with the statutory obligation bestowed upon the DA then it cannot be rectified and the order of the DA be treated as legal. As we have already discussed that the DA while awarding an extreme punishment of removal or dismissal has not only to consider the gravity but also the past record and extenuating circumstances. The appellate authority in this case when a specific plea was taken in appeal by the applicant as to the punishment being harsh and disproportionate to the act of negligence, merely stating that in the disciplinary proceedings the charge has been substantiated, the penalty imposed was neither found harsh nor undeserving. Here also acting in continuation of the DA and when doctrine of merger is propagated, failure of the appellate authority to consider the past record of the applicant of almost 30 years service was absolutely clean and also the extenuating circumstances where integrity of the applicant was not involved and the act of fraud and misappropriation perpetrated by Sharad Aggarwal without any proof of connivance with the applicant having been established, non-consideration of this aspect while dealing with the proportionality of punishment, the order passed cannot be sustained in law, as it does not discharge the statutory obligation. The ipsi dixit of the appellate authority though constituted by a Board of three members is apparent that the finding of the EO when found to be detailed one, the DA is absolved from recording reasons is oblivious of the position of law and the obligation under the statutory rules. The orders passed cannot be sustained being bald, non-speaking and denying applicant a reasonable opportunity to applicants prejudice.
31. As per Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, DoP&T has from time to time on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in Mahavir Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 vide OMs dated 13.7.1981 and 5.11.1988 as an essential legal requirement in case of decisions by the quasi-judicial authorities obligated the authorities to record reasons in support of the findings, including disciplinary and appellate authorities. Though these guidelines have been issued for a civil servant but have been adopted even by the semi Government departments, yet a principle emanated from the decision of the Apex Court, which is equally binding to the Institute and in the wake of their own statutory rules.
32. Another example of non-application of mind is apparent from the fact that while the enquiry report was forwarded to the applicant by the DA, where the charge against the applicant was partly proved, yet in its letter dated 20.7.2005 the DA acted on this surmise that the charges levelled against the applicant have been held to be proved. There is no reference as to the charges being partly proved and accordingly while issuing the final order of penalty on 30.8.2005 it is reiterated that the applicant is guilty of the charges levelled against her, which includes the charge, which is partly proved. In a manner it is disagreement to the enquiry officers report, yet without following due process of law, i.e., of pre-decisional hearing to the applicant, imposition of punishment cannot be sustained, as this principle has been extended even to private bodies and Government owned Institutions, as ruled by the Apex Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union of India, 2006 (3) SLR SC 82. The aforesaid argument submitted is countered by the respondents by taking a plea that this may be an inadvertence on the part of the DA, yet when the appellate authority has held applicant guilty of only negligence, this is deemed to have been a punishment on the proven charge. We do not agree, as a legal obligation and the bent of mind of the DA to impose extreme penalty was on all the charges yet the appellate authority when states that it has agreed with the findings arrived at by the DA and the reasons are to be given only when DA does not agree with the findings of the EO, the concurrence of DA with the EOs report and its conclusion has been accepted by the appellate authority. As such the illegality committed at the level of the DA has been perpetuated at appellate level also. This has prejudiced applicant and deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to defend.
33. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, this TA is allowed to the extent that the impugned orders are set aside. The respondents are directed to deem applicant as reinstated in service from the date of removal from service and in view of her attaining the age of retirement on superannuation, her pensionary benefits be processed, calculated and paid to her within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, we do not award back wages to the applicant but she will be otherwise entitled to all consequences in law. No costs.
(Dr. Veena Chhotray) (Shanker Raju) Member (A) Member (J) San.