Punjab-Haryana High Court
H.N. Sood vs Vinod Kumar And Ors. on 13 May, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1996)113PLR611, 1997 A I H C 289, 1996 REVLR 2 146, (1996) 2 RENTLR 551, (1996) 113 PUN LR 611, 1996 HRR 350, (1996) 1 RENCR 685, (1996) 2 CURLJ(CCR) 346
Author: Sarojnei Saksena
Bench: Sarojnei Saksena
JUDGMENT Sarojnei Saksena, J.
1. Respondent-petitioner-tenant has assailed the ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller on 18.3.1992 and the lower Appellate Court's order dated 11.11.1995, whereby ejectment order is affirmed.
2. Petitioners Vinod Kumar, Narinder Kumar and Smt. Sarla Devi filed an ejectment petition under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (in short the 'Act') for ejectment of the respondent-petitioner-tenant on the grounds of non payment of rental arrears, ceased to occupy the demised premises and lastly that the respondent's wife has purchased a house No. 1285 in the same street in the year 1984 and tenant has acquired its possession.
3. Respondent-petitioner tenant controverted all the grounds of eviction though he admitted that the said house No. 1285 is purchased by his wife, but according to him, he is not the owner of this house. He also averred that he has tendered all the rental arrears and he has not ceased to occupy the demised premises as his son is residing therein with his family. The Rent Controller framed the issues, recorded parties evidence and held that since the tenant has tendered all the rental arrears, on this ground of default, petitioner-respondent-landlords cannot seek his ejectment. The other ground of ejectment was also negatived that the tenant has ceased to occupy the demised premises. But the Rent Controller held that the tenant's wife purchased a house in 1984 bearing No. 1285 in the same street in which the suit house is situated. In the suit house only one room, varandah, kitchen, latrine, bathroom and court yard are in tenant's possession while in this new house purchased by his wife, he is in occupation of four rooms, one store, one kitchen, bathroom and compound. Hence, this house is more suitable for his residence. Thus, under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the said Act, ejectment order was passed. The Rent Controller has also negatived this plea that since earlier ejectment petition was filed by Narinder Kumar claiming himself to be the landlord on the basis of family partition seeking ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement, as that petition was dismissed, this petition is filed against the tenant by the heirs of Prem Parkash with an intention to evict him and on this count, this petition is not maintainable. The Appellate Court has affirmed all these findings.
4. Respondent-petitioner's learned counsel contended that earlier Narinder Kumar filed an ejectment petitioner against the respondent-petitioner claiming himself to have become landlord of the demised premises on the basis of family partition. He also claimed respondent's eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement for his residence, the petition was dismissed. Later on, these petitioner-respondents have filed this ejectment petition claiming themselves to be the owners of the disputed house on the basis of family arrangement. Thus, these landlords' only intention is to eject the respondent and to induct a new tenant at a higher rent. The grounds alleged in the petition are all false and it is just a pretext to evict him. Respondent-petitioner's learned counsel valiantly argued that no doubt the tenant has admitted that his wife but has purchased house No. 1285 in the same street in the year 1984 and he is residing therein along with his wife but under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) he cannot be evicted from the demised premises which is in his occupation. He assiduously argued that under Section 2 (h) tenant is defined, meaning thereby "any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and in the event of such person's (tenant) death, such as are mentioned in the Schedule appended to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death,........" He contended that therefore wife cannot be treated as tenant during the life time of her husband. Only after his death, she can be treated as a tenant provided she was living with the tenant in the demised premises. According to him, the house owned by wife cannot be termed as house owned or erected by the tenant. In support of his contention, he has relied on Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, 1970 All India Rent Control Journal 417.
5. Petitioner-respondent's learned counsel argued with his usual power of persuasiveness and contended that so far as earlier petition filed by Narinder Kumar is concerned, that was dismissed but that has no bearing on the present petition which is filed by different landlords on different grounds seeking respondent's eviction. He contended that if the house is owned, erected, or purchased by wife and is in possession of the tenant on this ground also under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act, tenant is liable to be evicted. He has placed reliance on V.K. Malhotra and Anr. v. Smt. Ranjit Kaur, 1985(1) All India Rent Control Journal 250, Laxman Dass Aggarwal v. A.K. Bahal, (1986-1)89 Punjab Law Reporter 137 and Savitaben Ramanlal Shah (Since deceased) through her heirs and Lrs v. Landge Bal Krishna Mahadeo, 1995(2) Rent Law Reporter 493. He also submitted that provisions of Section 13(1)(1) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and of Section 14(l)(h) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 are Pari Materia with the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. He supported the eviction order and argued that the Courts below have not fallen into any error in passing the ejectment order and dismissing the tenant's appeal.
6. So far as earlier petition filed by Narinder Kumar is concerned, it has no bearing on the present litigation. In this petition, these landlords have alleged that on account of family settlement, they have become landlords of the suit house and they claimed respondent-tenant's eviction on three grounds enumerated above. Petitioner-tenant has not denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. He has tendered the rental arrears to these landlords. Thus, in my considered view, the Courts below have rightly held that dismissal of the earlier rent petition filed by Narinder Kumar has no bearing on the merits of the present petition.
7. Main argument in this revision centres around this legal preposition whether the house owned by wife can be said to be a house owned by the husband/tenant and as such, on this ground whether the landlord can evict the tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. In Smt. Revti Devi's case (supra), Single Bench of Delhi High Court has held that "where proviso (h) requires that the tenant himself should acquire vacant possession of another residence before he can be liable to eviction the force of its language cannot be whittled down by arguing that proviso (h) would apply even if it is not the tenant himself but his wife or his other relation were to acquire such other residence. Therefore, as a general proposition of law, the acquisition of other residence must be by the tenant himself before proviso (h) to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act can apply."
8. In V.K. Malhotra's case (Supra), another Single Bench of Delhi High Court has considered the provision of Section 14(1)(h) of Delhi Rent-Control Act, 1958. Revti Devi's case (supra) was also cited before His Lordship, but he has relied on Prem Chand and Anr. v. Sher Singh, 1981(2) D.R.J. 287 wherein the Apex Court has held "Having considered the averments of the parties on the point at issue we are satisfied that the respondent has through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi. The application of the appellants for possession of the flat is therefore allowed......."
9. In Laxman Dass Aggarwal's case (supra), the provisions of Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act were considered by a Single Bench of this High Court and it is held that "if the wife of the tenant has constructed a house in the urban area concerned, that itself provides an independent ground of eviction as contemplated under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. The tenant is liable to be ejected from the demised premises on that ground alone." A Single Bench of Gujarat High Court in Savitaben's Case (supra) has also considered the similar provisions of Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and it is held that wife of the tenant has acquired suitable accommodation, husband and wife are living together, tenant is said to have acquired and entitled to evict the tenant under Section 13(1) (1) of the Act. In that case the trial Court following the decision of the Revti Devi's case held that the defendant has not acquired any suitable residence and on that count, suit must fail. In revision, a Single Bench of Gujarat High Court relied on Hasmukhlal R. Shab v. Arvindbhai M. Kapadia, 1988 (1) GLH 122 wherein it is held........." In my view, if Section 13(1)(1) is interpreted only to mean that the tenant himself must have acquired suitable residential accommodation, then the said provision can be defeated by the tenant easily. This should not be permitted because that is not the intention of the Legislature. The object underlying this clause clearly appears that if the tenant acquires some premises, then he should be directed to vacate the tenanted premises. Even though the Rent Act is for the protection of the tenant, at the same time, under the protection of the said provision, the tenant cannot be permitted to do business out of the said protection."
10. No doubt, under Section 2(h) the word "tenant" is defined and tenant's heirs are brought within the ambit of tenant only after his death provided they were ordinarily residing with the tenant at the time of his death.
11. Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the said Act reads "The tenant has already in his own possession a residential building or subsequently acquires possession of, or erect, such a building reasonably sufficient for his requirement in the urban area concerned.
12. Admittedly, the house is purchased in 1984 in the urban area. So far as reasonable sufficiency of such accommodation is concerned, it is also apparent from the record that the suit premises consists of only one living room with kitchen, latrine, bath-room and compound etc. while in the house purchased by the wife, there are four living rooms with latrine, bath-room, kitchen and courtyard etc. It is not the tenant's case that this house owned by his wife is not reasonably sufficient for his residence. His family consists of his wife, two sons and one daughter-in-law. Admittedly, his one son with his wife is residing in the demised premises and he is residing in the house purchased by his wife. Thus, it is apparent that be is in possession of a house which is situated in urban area and which is reasonably sufficient for his residence. It will be too much to hold that the property purchased, owned or acquired by wife cannot be considered to be the property of the husband. Husband and wife form one unit. It would have been a different case if the other building is acquired or purchased by other relations of the tenant, but wife stands on a different footing altogether. Respondent-petitioner-tenant is residing with his Wife in the said house No. 1285, which is purchased by his wife in the year 1984.
13. Thus, in my considered view, the Courts below have rightly passed ejectment order against the respondent-petitioner-tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. The said finding does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity, which is based on proved facts and sound reasoning. I see no reason to interfere in that finding.
14. Finding the revision meritless, it is hereby dismissed.