Madhya Pradesh High Court
Arvind Sharma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 October, 2024
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
1 WP-32901-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 24th OF OCTOBER, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 32901 of 2024
ARVIND SHARMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Nitin Agrawal - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri M.S. Jadon - Government Advocate for the State.
Shri D.P. Singh - Advocate alongwith Surya Pratap Singh - Advocate
for the respondent No.4
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:
i. That the order dated 03.10.2024 Annexure P/1 may kindly be quashed and further reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.
ii. Any other suitable order or direction deemed fit in the circumstances of the case be issued in favour of the petitioner."
[2] Short facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Manager by the Society vide resolution dated 11.10.2006 Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
2 WP-32901-2024 which was confirmed by respondent No.3 vide order dated 29.11.2006. In the month of January, 2024, the respondent No.4 had appointed respondent No.7/Dilip Meravi on the post of Manager in the respondent/Society. Immediately, after his appointment, the respondent No.6 had issued six articles of charges to the petitioner as evident from Annexure P/4, dated 22.04.2024. After issuance of the charge-sheet, the petitioner duly submitted his reply to the aforesaid charges and denied the charges levelled against him therein. Thereafter, vide letter dated 03.08.2024 the Inquiry Officer/respondent No.8 had informed the petitioner to appear in the departmental proceedings on 13.08.2024 at 12.00 PM.
[3] On 13.08.2024, the petitioner appeared and sought time to adduce further evidence by way of filing an application. Thereupon, time was granted to him and the date for his appearance was fixed on 30.08.2024. In the meantime, a letter dated 14.08.2024 vide Annexure P/7 has been received by the petitioner from the respondent/department of preponing of the date for further appearance on 17.08.2024 at about 11.00 AM. But due to the petitioner being ill and was not in a position to appear on 17.08.2024, had sent an application seeking further time for his appearance in the departmental proceedings through e-mail and Whatsapp alongwith his medical certificate. Thereafter, without giving any intimation to the petitioner for his further appearance, only on the basis of report of the Enquiry Officer/respondent No.8, the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 has been passed by the respondent No.7 whereby the petitioner was terminated from service. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present petition has been filed.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 3 WP-32901-2024 [4] Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 has been passed by respondent No.7 is arbitrary, illegal and in utter violation of the principals of natural justice, as the same has been passed without providing the inquiry report as well as without affording opportunity to respond to it and the departmental proceedings were concluded behind his back and though a detailed reply to the allegations levelled against him was submitted by the petitioner but the contents therein were not adhered to.
[5] It was further argued that the petitioner was terminated from service without affording any opportunity of hearing and also the inquiry report on the basis of which the petitioner has been removed, was carried out behind his back, therefore, the impugned order was bad in law.
[6] It was further argued that the appointment of the petitioner was made 20 years ago which was duly confirmed by the Deputy Registrar vide order dated 29.11.2006 but in the enquiry report, it was recoded that the appointment of the petitioner was never confirmed which is incorrect on the face of the record and the entire exercise of departmental enquiry and passing of the impugned order was nothing but a formality with a predetermined mind to terminate the petitioner on flimsy grounds.
[7] It was further submitted that though a detailed reply was submitted by the petitioner but the contents therein were not adhered to and though the allegations were refuted by the petitioner, only on the basis of report of Inquiry Officer straightaway the order of termination was passed which makes the order vulnerable.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 4 WP-32901-2024 [8] On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, it was prayed that the present petition deserves to be allowed and the order impugned Annexure P/1 is liable to be set aside.
[9] Per contra, Government Advocate for the State as well as counsel for the respondent No.4 had opposed the prayer so made by counsel for the petitioner and had prayed for dismissal of the present petition alleging that no illegality has been committed by the learned authority below in passing the impugned order herein.
[10] Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. [11] It is well established principle of law that the scope of judicial review in departmental enquiry is very limited. The High Court can interfere with the departmental proceedings only if the proceedings were conducted contrary to the well established principle of law or the enquiry report is based on no evidence or where the competence of Authority has been challenged. None of the ingredients are present in the present case.
[12] The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs. N. Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
"8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decisionmaking process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
5 WP-32901-2024 1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in thatbehalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence."
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 6 WP-32901-2024 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a threeJudge Bench of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under :
(SCC pp. 759- 60, paras 12-13) "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 7 WP-32901-2024 to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have everreached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 8 WP-32901-2024 appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co- extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16) "16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 :
(2000) 1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 9 WP-32901-2024 approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with thedecision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 10 WP-32901-2024 Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 &"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
11 WP-32901-2024 matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].) ***
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, willnot in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 12 WP-32901-2024 findings by the criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him."
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13) "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has beenconducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience."
Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 13 WP-32901-2024
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335, wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review,the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 14 WP-32901-2024 findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law."
[13] Further in the matter of State Bank of India and others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 , The Supreme Court has held a under:
"6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review do not act as an Appellate Authority:
"Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority." (See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan [(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316], SCC p. 379, para 11.) Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
15 WP-32901-2024
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to theteeth of the evidence on record.
12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority, active connivance of the respondent is eloquent enough to connect the respondent with the issue of TDRs and overdrafts in favour of Bidaye.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618 : (1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623, para 15) A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that lender was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of dealing with all questions, Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 16 WP-32901-2024 either of fact or of law arising in the appeal, as the Single Judge of the High Court. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference from proved facts. (SCR p. 219)
16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989) 2 SCC 177 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held at SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:
"27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters orpunishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 17 WP-32901-2024 principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter."
17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4 SCC 310 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12 as under:
"12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the enquiryauthority's report/findings in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the banking business Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 18 WP-32901-2024 absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him."
18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar [(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468] this Court held at SCC pp. 376- 77, para 14 as under:
"14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
19 WP-32901-2024 (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly abank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court."
19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal [(2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed out as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10) "If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable."
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam [(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p. 247, para 15 held:
Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PMNEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720 20 WP-32901-2024 "15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry.""
[14] In the present case, admittedly, the charge sheet has been issued by a person who was a complainant and on whose complaint, departmental inquiry has been initiated. Though, after issuance of the charge-sheet dated 22.04.2023, the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer were appointed by the CEO, District Cooperative Central Bank Maryadit but as and when the report of the Inquiry Officer was submitted, the complainant who was the Disciplinary Authority himself had passed the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 whereby punishment of removal from service has been imposed.
[15] Another glaring fact which is evident from the impugned order is that nowhere it has been mentioned that any notice was issued to the petitioner and the inquiry report was furnished alongwith the notice, which goes to show that the proper procedure for conducting departmental inquiry was not followed and the entire departmental inquiry was conducted in a very arbitrary manner and against the proposition of law that the complaint cannot issue a charge-sheet in a departmental inquiry nor can act as a judge on of own cause and while acting as a disciplinary authority can pass an order.
[16] Thus, in light of the aforesaid discussion and the judgments quoted hereinabove, this Court prima facie finds that the entire departmental inquiry is vitiated, therefore, without calling any response from the respondents deems it fit to quash the departmental inquiry and remit the Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2024:MPHC-GWL:18720
21 WP-32901-2024 matter back to respondent No.4 for initiating fresh inquiry after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in accordance with law.
[17] With the aforesaid observations, the present petition is allowed and disposed of.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE) JUDGE pwn* Signature Not Verified Signed by: PAWAN KUMAR Signing time: 07-11-2024 06:29:27 PM