Punjab-Haryana High Court
Meena Rani vs State Of Punjab And Others on 15 October, 2025
CWP No.30561 of 2025 - 1-
116 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP No.30561 of 2025
Date of Decision:15.10.2025
...Petitioner
Meena Rani
vs.
State of Punjab and others ...Respondents
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present : Mr. Karnail Singh Ahhi, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Charanpreet Singh, AAG, Punjab
for respondents No.1, 2 and 4.
Mr. Anil Sharma, Advocate
for respondent No.3.
***
N.S.Shekhawat J. (Oral)
1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 05.11.2020 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.3, whereby, the services of the petitioner as Nurse were ordered to be terminated.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner had been working as a Nurse since 27.11.2008 with respondents No.2 and 3. In fact, the petitioner had been raising the demands of employees regarding increase in salary, improvement of service conditions, etc. from time to time, which had annoyed her employers i.e. respondents No. 2 and 3. Ultimately, one FIR No.181, dated 23.10.2020, under Sections 3, 5, 6, 18, 24, 29 of the Pre-
1 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 10-11-2025 12:23:06 ::: CWP No.30561 of 2025 - 2- natal Diagnostic Technique (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 and Sections 420, 120-B of IPC, Police Station Urban Estate, District Patiala was ordered to be registered against the petitioner and others on false and frivolous grounds. After the completion of investigation, challan was presented against the accused before the Area Magistrate, Patiala. The trial Court considered the challan and the documents accompanying it and finally, vide order dated 02.04.2025, discharged the petitioner. He further submits that now since the petitioner has been discharged in the criminal case, which was the sole basis of termination of his services, the petitioner is liable to be reinstated in service alongwith all consequential benefits and the arrears. He further contends that even the services of the petitioner have been terminated without conducting any inquiry by the respondent-department and without following the due process of law. Thus, the impugned order is legally unsustainable.
3. On the other hand, on advance notice, Mr. Charanpreet Singh, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab has appeared on behalf of respondents No.1, 2 and 4, whereas Mr. Anil Sharma, Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent No.3. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that the petitioner was working on contract basis and her services have been rightly terminated by her employer. In fact, the petitioner was working as a Nurse and Nurse in a hospital, whereas she had taken a sum of Rs.25,000 from a decoy patients, conducted sex determination test on her and disclosed the sex of the foetus to be a male. In the meantime, the raid was conducted and there was sufficient evidence to show that the petitioner was conducting sex determination test on the unregistered machine No. EDAN DUS 60. Even, she 2 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 10-11-2025 12:23:07 ::: CWP No.30561 of 2025 - 3- was ordered to be arrested on 15.12.2023 for conducting such tests. Ultimately, the FIR was ordered to be registered against the petitioner on 23.10.2020. Learned counsel further submit that from (Annexure P-4) appended with the petition itself, it is apparent that total following six FIRs were ordered to be registered against the present petitioner with similar allegations:-
Sr. No. FIR Under Section Police Station
1. 305 dated 21.11.2015 3, 4, 5, 6, 23 of the PNDT Patran, District Act & Sections 3, 4 of the Patiala IPC
2. 24 dated 15.03.2018 420, 120-B of IPC & Ahmedgarh, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 18, 23 District Sangrur of the PNDT Act
3. 42 dated 25.03.2015 283, 186, 353, 332, 147 Lambi, District and 149 IPC Sangrur
4. 34 dated 21.06.2018 314, 315, 120-B of IPC & Sanur, District 5, 23 of the PC and Patiala PNDT Act
5. 78 dated 25.05.2022 23, 25 of the PC & PNDT City-I, District Act Sangru
6. 181 dated 23.10.2020 3, 5, 6, 18, 24, 29 of the Urban Estate, PC & PNDT Act & 420, District Patiala 120-B of the IPC
4. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the impugned order was passed on 05.11.2020 and the present petition has been filed after a long delay of five years and the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation as well.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully.
6. The issue regarding dismissal of a petition on the ground of delay and laches, where there is no explanation of delay, came up for consideration before Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 551 and Hon'ble the 3 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 10-11-2025 12:23:07 ::: CWP No.30561 of 2025 - 4- Supreme Court has held that a person who sleeps over his rights for considerable period, he should not be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ Courts. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the said matter has held as follows:-
"9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to he exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
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11. For filling of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court."
7. Still further, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No.5965 of 2011 tilted as 'Sandeep Kharab Vs. State of Haryana and others' has also held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked at the will and convenience of the litigant. Anyone who claims rights must be vigilant and he must enforce his rights within reasonable time.
8. In Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar (2008) 14 SCC 295, Supreme Court has considered scope of interference in case of delay and laches and has observed as under:
"24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate 5 of 7 ::: Downloaded on - 10-11-2025 12:23:07 ::: CWP No.30561 of 2025 - 6- writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant."
9. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108, Supreme Court has ruled:
"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, 'procrastination is the greatest thief of time' and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."
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10. In the present case also, the petitioner, who was a contractual employee, was ordered to be dismissed vide order dated 05.11.2020 (Annexure P-2), and the present petition has been filed after a delay of about five years, without any explanation on the part of the petitioner. Still further, the petitioner has relied upon the order dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure P-1) to contend that now she has been discharged during the trial of FIR No.181 of 2020 and the petition would be maintainable. However, the said argument is also liable to be rejected by the Court.
11. From a perusal of the discharge order dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure P-1), it is apparent that the petitioner has been discharged due to some technicality of law. In the order dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure P-1), the trial Court observed that the FIR was registered against the petitioner without following the procedure, provided under Section 28 of the PC and PNDT Act, which is mandatory in nature. Consequently, the petitioner was discharged for the time being and there was no final adjudication of the matter. Still further, it is also apparent that the petitioner, who was working on contract basis with the respondent-department, had indulged in unfair practices and was also involved in a sex determination racket, which is evident from the registration of six FIRs against her. In fact, she has been rightly ordered to be dismissed by the respondent and the present petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court.
12. Ordered accordingly.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
15.10.2025 JUDGE
hemlata
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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