Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh ... on 25 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(1)ALT431, 2002(1)ALT(CRI)188, 2002CRILJ1962
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. The petitioner in the instant writ petition prays for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus directing the respondents to produce Mohd. Jahangir Khan (hereinafter referred to as 'the detenu'), now detained in Central Jail, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad by declaring the impugned detention order in proceedings SB (I) No.1/PDA-LG/S-1/2001, dated 11th October, 2001 of the second respondent as bad, ultra vires and unconstitutional. The petitioner accordingly prays to set the detenu Mohd. Jahangir Khan at liberty.
2. The petitioner herein is the son of Mohd. Jahangir Khan - the detenu who has been detained under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
3. The second respondent-Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act read with G.O.Rt.No.3769, General Administration (Law & Order-II) Department, dated 4-9-2001 passed the order of detention dated 11th October, 2001 directing the detenu to be detained and lodged in Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad.
4. In the detention order as well as in the grounds for detention, the detenu is characterised as a land grabber as defined in clause (j) of Section 2 of the Act.
5. In the grounds for detention, it is stated that one B.Shekhar Reddy S/o. B.Krishna Reddy filed a complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the court of XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal Courts, Nampally, Hyderabad against the detenu and eight others for the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 467, 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. In the said complaint, the said Shekhar Reddy alleged that the detenu approached him and stated that the detenu's brother Abdul Rasheed Khan alias Moin Khan is the owner of a piece of land in Plot No.7, Door No.1-4-897/91/F in Survey No.145 situated at Bakaram, Hyderabad admeasuring 250 square yards. The detenu is alleged to have made available the translation of a Urdu document dated 17-5-1968 and a xerox copy of document dated 15-2-1969 and offered to sell the said piece of land. The said Shekhar Reddy having believed the version of the detenu entered into an agreement of sale dated 19-3-1999 with the detenu and other accused whose names are mentioned in the complaint. The detenu and the said Abdul Rasheed Khan alias Moin Khan received part of substantial sale consideration and thereafter the detenu, Abdul Rasheed Khan and one P.Mutyala Goud executed the sale deed dated 12-5-1999 after receiving the balance sale consideration from the said Shekhar Reddy.
6. In the said complaint, it is further alleged that when the complainant - Shekhar Reddy entered into the property in the third week of May, 1999, the original owner Abdul Rasheed Khan objected stating that the said property belongs to him and the person who executed the sale deed was not Abdul Rasheed Khan. Thereafter, the complainant Shekhar Reddy questioned the detenu and the detenu re-affirmed that the person who executed the sale deed was Abdul Rasheed Khan.
7. The learned Magistrate made over the complaint to the Station House Officer, Musheerabad Police Station under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for investigation and report. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Musheerabad Police Station registered a case in Crime No.280/99 under Sections 109, 419, 467, 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and recorded the statements of the complainant and others.
8. The statement alleged to have been made by the said B.Shekhar Reddy need not be noticed in detail. The gravamen of the allegation made in the statement of the said Shekhar Reddy before the Investigating Officer is that the detenu and P.Mutyala Goud attested the sale deed executed by Abdul Rasheed Khan as witnesses. Enquiries revealed that Abdul Rasheed Khan produced fake documents in support of his title. The said piece of land actually belongs to one Smt. G.Amrutha Bai and not Abdul Rasheed Khan.
9. On completion of investigation, a charge sheet has been filed in the court of XVII Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad against the detenu and his associates for the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. The detenu surrendered before the learned Magistrate on 9-11-1999 and obtained bail on 10-11-1999.
10. The second incident relates to the registration of crime against the detenu in Crime No.53/2001 for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 387, 454, 406, 467, 447, 468, 474, 476, 506 read with Sections 120 (B), 109 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 (1) (a) of Arms Act on the file of Gandhinagar Police Station. It is alleged that on 7-3-2001 at about 1-30 P.M., the detenu along with his two sons - Ahmed Khan and Rasheed Khan and nephew Syed Riyajuddin armed with swords and other lethal weapons illegally entered into the government land situated at premises bearing Door Nos.6-2-97 to 100 & 102 to 110, New Boiguda, S aaA ecunderabad admeasuring 20,700 square feet and attacked one Vinod Krishna (one of the legal heirs of lessee C.V.Pandu) and his friends and attempted to kill him by putting a sword "on his throat and terrorised them and forcibly drove them away from the premises." The detenu is alleged to have threatened them that he would kill them if the property was not handed over to him. The detenu is alleged to have threatened Vinod Krishna to handover two 100 rupee non-judicial stamp papers duly signed by all legal heirs, which were handed over to his brother on 15-2-2001 with an intention to grab the property by creating false documents. The victim ran to the Gandhinagar Police Station for his life and lodged a complaint, which was registered as a case in Crime No.53/2001 under sections referred to hereinabove. The investigation so far made revealed that the detenu attacked the victim in the broad day light in the midst of City and created panic and a sense of insecurity in the public of the locality. The detenu was arrested on 10-3-2001 and a sword used in the commission of offence, two blank xerox copies of 100 rupee non-judicial stamp papers, a xerox copy of fake death certificate of C.V.Pandu were seized from the possession of the detenu. The detenu was released on bail on 10-4-2001. The further investigation is continuing.
11. The detention order is based on the aforesaid two grounds. In the grounds for detention, it is alleged that the detenu indulged in acts of land grabbing by abetting illegal sale agreement on 19-3-1999 and sale deed on 12-5-1999 in respect of 250 square yards in Survey No.145 at Bakaram, Hyderabad and also attempted to evict the occupants of government land at premises bearing Door Nos.6-2-97 to 100 and 102 to 110, New Bhoiguda, Secunderabad on 7-3-2001 using force. The detenu's activities caused a feeling of insecurity among the public and are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
12. Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that the detaining authority passed the detention order mechanically without application of mind on vague, irrelevant and non-existing grounds. It is contended that the first incident, which is the subject matter of Crime No.280/99 of Musheerabad Police Station, relates to the allegation of the detenu attesting an agreement of sale on 19-3-1999 and sale deed on 12-5-1999 executed by one Abdul Rasheed Khan. It is submitted that the said incident can never be a basis for passing an order of detention in October, 2001. The incident is not proximate but remote. Therefore, it is an irrelevant ground. That incident can never be a basis for passing an order of detention on 11th October, 2001.
13. It is further contended that the incidents referred to in ground Nos.1 and 2 of the detention order are related to the crimes registered against the detenu for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The said incidents did not affect the public order at all.
14. It is also contended that the government did not independently consider the representation of the detenu. There was a delay in consideration of the representation submitted by the detenu.
15. The learned Advocate General strenuously contended that none of the points urged by the learned Senior Counsel can be permitted to be raised since no such plea has been taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. The learned Advocate General relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Arun Kumar V. State of W.B.1 This contention of the learned Advocate General need not detain us any further since the petitioner raised all the grounds of attack in the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner which has been taken on file by this court. In fact, this court permitted the respondents to file additional counter affidavit as against the averments and grounds raised in the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner. Both the additional affidavit and additional counter affidavit are on record. Therefore, there is no legal impediment whatsoever to consider the grounds raised in the additional affidavit and the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner.
16. The learned Advocate General, however, contends that the whole of the detention order including the grounds of detention must be read as a whole and if so read it would reveal that the activities of the detenu caused a feeling of insecurity among the public and are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned Advocate General contends that the order of detention cannot be dissected into parts. Both the incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention are to be read together and not independently. It is contended that they are not different grounds as such. They are only the incidents.
17. The question that falls for consideration is as to whether the two incidents referred to in the grounds for detention, distinctly as two different grounds, are to be treated as a part of the same activity of land grabbing by the detenu as contended by the learned Advocate General?
18. A plain reading of the detention order and the grounds for detention would make it clear that the detention order is passed on two distinct and different grounds. The first incident is alleged to have taken place on 19-3-1999 when the detenu along with others attested the sale agreement as witness executed by one Abdul Rasheed Khan in favour of one Smt. Nagamani, mother of B.Shekhar Reddy in respect of a particular piece of land whose details are already referred to elsewhere in this order. With reference to the same transaction, the detenu attested the sale deed along with one Mutyala Goud on 12-5-1999 executed by the same Abdul Rasheed Khan. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the property covered under the said agreement of sale and sale deed does not belong to the said Abdul Rasheed Khan, but the same actually belongs to one Smt. G.Amrutha Bai. The incident of attestation of agreement of sale and sale deed has taken place on 19-3-1999 and 12-5-1999 respectively.
19. In our considered opinion, the alleged incident mentioned as one of the grounds for detention is too remote in point of time. That apart, the said incident cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority has power to make an order of detention if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land grabber only with a view to preventing such persons from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. We have already noticed that ground No.1 relates to the alleged incident on 19-3-1999 and 12-5-1999 which is more than 2 1/2 years prior to the date of the order of detention. The Supreme Court in Kamlakar Prasad V. State of M.P.2 held:
"It is not open to the Detaining Authority to pick up an old and stale incident and hold it as the basis of an order of detention under Section 3 (2) of the Act. Nor it is open to the Detaining Authority to contend that it has been mentioned only to show that the detenu has a tendency to create problems resulting in disturbance to public order, for as a matter of fact it has been mentioned as a ground of detention. Now there is no provision in the National Security Act, 1980 similar to Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities act, 1974 which says that where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the is or are vague, non-existent, non-relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such persons or invalid for any other reason and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention and (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. Therefore in the present case it cannot be postulated what view would have been taken by the Detaining Authority about the need to detain the petitioner under Section 3 (2) of the Act if he had not taken into account the stale and not proximate grounds 1 and 2 into consideration in arriving at the subjective satisfaction. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioner's detention is unsustainable in law."
20. The above judgment would squarely apply to the facts on hand.
In another judgment of the Supreme Court in Jagan Nath Biswas V. State of West Bengal3 it is observed:
"The order of detention challenged before us is dated 27th February, 1973. The subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate of Nadia, who directed the detention, is based upon three criminal adventures of the petitioner dated 8th November, 1971, 9th December, 1971 and 25th August, 1972.
The incidents themselves look rather serious, but also stale, having regard to the long gap between the occurrences and the order of detention. One should have expected some proximity in time to provide a rational nexus between the incidents relied on and the satisfaction arrived at. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that unexplained and long delay will be fatal to the plea of subjective satisfaction. In the present case, counsel for the State Shri G.S. Chatterjee, took time to furnish an explanation as to why there was such a long delay for the District Magistrate to pass the order of detention. Unfortunately, we are no wiser today than at the previous hearing. In short, we are not taken into confidence by the District Magistrate as to why there should have been such an inordinate delay. We, in turn, therefore, are not satisfied about the bona fides of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate.
In the result, the order of detention must fail as illegal. The petition is allowed, the rule nisi is made absolute and the petitioner directed to be released forthwith."
21. It is clear from the above judgment of the Supreme Court that though the incidents were serious, the court having regard to the long gap between the occurrences and the order of detention quashed the detention order. The Supreme Court in categorical terms held that there should be some proximity in time to provide a rational nexus between the incidents relied on and the satisfaction arrived at. The unexplained and long delay will be fatal to the plea of subjective satisfaction.
22. In the circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority based on the incidents dated 19-3-1999 and 12-5-1999 is totally vitiated, as such incidents do not provide a rational nexus between the incidents relied on and the satisfaction arrived at.
23. The Supreme Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh V. M.M. Mehta4 quashed the order of detention passed more than 16 months after the alleged prejudicial conduct. It is observed that "this long lapse of time between the alleged prejudicial activity and the detention order loses its significance because the said prejudicial conduct was not approximate in point of time and had no rational connection with the conclusion that the detention was necessary for maintenance of public order. Such a stale incident cannot be construed as justifiable ground for passing an order of detention. Such incidents, therefore, cannot be made a basis for satisfaction of the detaining authority so as to sustain the order of detention."
24. It is well settled that even if one stale and not proximate ground is taken into consideration in arriving at the subjective satisfaction, the whole of the detention order becomes unsustainable. There is no provision in the Act in hand similar to Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 where the grounds are severable. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to discern as to which ground weighed with the detaining authority while passing the detention order.
25. The learned Advocate General, however, would rely upon certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh V. State of Bihar5 which are to the following effect:
"Preventive detention for the social protection of the community is, as noted and observed in Vijay Narain Singh case , a hard law but, it is a necessary evil in the modern society and must be pragmatically construed, so that it works. That is how law serves the society but does not become an impotent agent. Anti-social elements creating havoc have to be taken care of by law. Lawless multitude brings democracy and constitution into disrepute. Bad facts bring hard laws - but these should be properly and legally applied. It should be construed that it does not endanger social defence or the defence of the community, at the same time does not infringe the liberties of the citizens. A balance should always be struck."
26. It is further observed that "preventive detention is a necessary evil in the modern restless society. But simply because it is an evil, it cannot be so interpreted as to be inoperative in any practical manner." The court further observed that "the executive authority is not the sole judge of what is required for national security or public order. But the court cannot substitute its decision if the executive authority or the appropriate authority acts on proper materials and reasonably and rationally comes to that conclusion even though a conclusion with which the court might not be in agreement."
27. There cannot be any dispute whatsoever that the court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority. But, at the same time, the court cannot dispense with the requirement in law that the grounds of detention must be precise, pertinent, proximate and relevant. Vagueness and staleness would vitiate the grounds of detention as held by the Supreme Court in various decisions and there is no need, in detail, to refer them since by this time the law is too well settled. There is absolutely no difficulty whatsoever to agree with the learned Advocate General that this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu as is required under the provisions of the Act. It is true that the sufficiency of the grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be based cannot be gone into by this court as long as the grounds have a rational probative value and are not extraneous to the scope of purpose of the legislative provision under which the detention order has been passed.
Raj Kumar Singh's case (5 supra) upon which reliance is placed by the learned Advocate General turns upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court in the said case in categorical terms observed that "the petitioner therein, as indicated in the facts of the case, was one who habitually committed the offences which are at least punishable under Indian Penal code." In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held that there is a proximity between the incidents betraying a nature and a tendency of committing those offences. The incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention in the said cases refer to the criminal propensity of the detenu therein. It is under those circumstances, the detention order was upheld.
28. We shall now advert to the question as to whether the alleged activities of the detenu had resulted in causing any prejudice to the maintenance of public order.
It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 3 of the Act, which confers power to make orders detaining certain persons.
3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section:
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period, from time to time by, any period not exceeding three months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government.
29. A reading of the preamble of the Act would make it clear that the object of the provisions contained in the Act including Section 3 referred to hereinabove is to prevent dangerous activities of certain persons who are known as bootleggers, dacoits, drug-offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders or land-grabbers by placing them under detention so as to prevent their dangerous activities causing prejudice to the maintenance of public order. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with such dangerous activities of the said class of persons having regard to the resources and influence of the said class of persons and having regard to the manner in which the dangerous activities are being clandestinely organised and carried on in violation of law by them.
30. In order to pass an order of detention under the Act against any person, the detaining authority must be satisfied that such person is a bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber. The detaining authority must also be further satisfied that an order directing such person be detained is necessary to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. A plain reading of Section 3 (1) of the Act would make it clear that power to make an order detaining a person would be available only if the detaining authority is satisfied that the detenu is one of the types of persons mentioned in Section 3 (1) of the Act and in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Obviously, the detaining authority cannot make an order directing the detention of any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber unless the detaining authority comes to a conclusion that such detention is necessary in order to prevent such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Mere fact that one is a goonda or land-grabber would not be enough to detain him under the provisions of the Act unless the detaining authority is satisfied that the activities of such person are resulting in prejudice to the maintenance of public order.
31. The distinction between 'law and order' and 'maintenance of public order' is too well known. The Supreme Court in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh (4 supra) after adverting to its earlier decisions observed:
"A distinction has to be drawn between law and order and maintenance of public order because most often the two expressions are confused and detention orders are passed by the authorities concerned in respect of the activities of a person which exclusively fall within the domain of law and order and which have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order. In this connection it may be stated that in order to bring the activities of a person within the expression of "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order", the fall out and the extent and reach of the alleged activities must be of such a nature that they travel beyond the capacity of the ordinary law to deal with him or to prevent his subversive activities affecting the community at large or a large section of society. It is the degree of disturbance and its impact upon the even tempo of life of the society or the people of a locality which determines whether the disturbance caused by such activity amounts only to a breach of "law and order" or it amounts to "public order". If the activity falls within the category of disturbance of "public order" then it becomes essential to treat such a criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal under the law as his activities would fall beyond the frontiers of law and order, disturbing the even tempo of life of the community of the specified locality. In the case of Arun Ghosh V. State of W.B. this Court had an occasion to deal with the distinction between law and order and public order. Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court observed that public order would embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. It has been further observed that the implications of public order are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Again in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta V. Commissioner of Police (1989 SCC (Cri) 438) this Court took the view that in order that an activity may be said to affect adversely the maintenance of public order, there must be material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public. If any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of the community, such act must be said to have a direct bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. The commission of an offence will not necessarily come within the purview of public order which can be dealt with under ordinary general law of the land."
32. We shall bear in mind the enunciation of law by the Supreme Court in order to decide as to whether the summary of the incident alleged against the detenu resulted in causing any prejudice to the maintenance of public order. From the summary of the incidents alleged against the detenu as mentioned in ground No.1 and noticed in beginning of this order, it may be stated that the incident is stated to have taken place on 19-3-1999 when the detenu along with the other accused attested a sale agreement as witness. The said sale agreement itself was executed by one Abdul Rasheed Khan after receiving a valuable consideration from one B.Shekhar Reddy and again on 12-5-1999 when the detenu along with the others attested the sale deed executed by the same Abdul Rasheed Khan in favour of the purchasers. On investigation, it was found that the property sold under the said agreement of sale and sale deed does not belong to said Abdul Rasheed Khan. But the title in respect of the said property vests in one Smt. G.Amrutha Bai. No doubt, the allegations would reveal the active role played by the detenu in making the purchasers to believe as if the property, in respect of which agreement of sale was executed, belongs to Abdul Rasheed Khan. May be the activities of the detenu may attract the definition of 'land-grabber' within the meaning of the provisions of the Act.
33. From the narration of the facts in the grounds for detention it is abundantly clear that the criminal activity of the detenu was directed against an individual. It is difficult to accept that such criminal activity gave rise to disturbance of public order. It is difficult to comprehend that the activity of the detenu has effected, in any manner whatsoever, the public order. Explanation to Section 2 (a) of the Act says that public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely, or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any bootlegger, dacoit, goonda, immoral traffic offender or land grabber directly, or indirectly, is causing or calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave widespread danger to life or public health.
34. There is no material to show that there has been a feeling of insecurity among the general public on account of attestation of agreement of sale and sale deed by the detenu and others. It cannot be said that the said activity of attestation of agreement of sale and sale deed by the detenu enticing the purchaser to purchase the property from a person who is not the real owner of the property, either directly or indirectly, caused any harm, danger, alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof. The alleged acts of the detenu cannot be said to have created any alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof. There is no effect whatsoever on the general public or any section thereof. The even tempo of life of the community is in no manner upset. The alleged activities at the most constitute a criminal act directed against an individual. The activities did not give rise to public order disturbing the tranquility of the general public or any section thereof.
35. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that ground No.1 is non-existent and totally irrelevant and, therefore, cannot be made a basis for satisfaction of the detaining authority to pass an order of detention against the detenu in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
36. In such view of the matter, we need not go into the question as to whether ground No.2 is relevant and proximate in order to arrive at the subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority. Even if it is a valid ground, the same would be of no consequence as the detention order is not a severable one in the absence of a provision like Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974.
37. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into various other contentions urged by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as we are quashing the order of detention for the reasons stated hereinabove.
38. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order of detention is quashed and the respondents are directed to release the detenu from the custody forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
39. Before parting with the case we make it clear that the observations, if any, made in this order shall have no bearing whatsoever upon any of the cases pending against the detenu. The cases already launched or to be launched against the detenu may have to be disposed of on their own merits uninfluenced by the observations, if any, made in this order.
40. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.