Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
M/S. Spl Projects vs The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal ... on 20 February, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIR 2019 HYDERABAD 82, (2018) 2 BANKCAS 391, (2018) 3 ANDHLD 606, (2018) 4 CIVLJ 272
Author: P.Keshava Rao
Bench: P.Keshava Rao
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR AND THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE P.KESHAVA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO.36012 OF 2016
20-02-2018
M/s. SPL Projects Petitioner .. Petitioner
The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkotta and others Respondents
Counsel for petitioner: Sri M.S.Prasad and
Sri P.A.V.Bala Prasad
Counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 2: Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for respondent No.3: Sri E.Madan Mohan Rao
Counsel for respondent No.4: Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana
and Sri C.Tulasi Krishna
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? CASES REFERRED:
1. (2017) 4 SCC 735
2. 2016 (4) ALT 193
3. (2014) 5 SCC 610
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE P.KESHAVA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO.36012 OF 2016
O R D ER
(per Honble Sri Justice Sanjay Kumar)
The petitioner firm assails the order dated 16.11.2015
passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad (hereinafter,
the Tribunal), in S.A.No.233 of 2015 and the order dated
07.09.2016 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata
(hereinafter, the Appellate Tribunal), confirming the same in
appeal, in Tender No.165 of 2015/75. It also seeks a declaration
that the auction sale held by the State Bank of Hyderabad (now,
the State Bank of India) (hereinafter, the bank) on 23.03.2015,
pursuant to the auction notice dated 16.02.2015, is illegal.
By order dated 27.10.2016 passed in W.P.M.P.No.44379 of
2016 filed in this writ petition, this Court took note of the
petitioner firms positive statement made across the bar that the
entire dues of the bank had been deposited and were lying in a
deposit and directed the fourth respondent in the writ petition, the
auction purchaser, who was in possession of the property, not to
make any encumbrances until further orders.
Facts, to the extent relevant, are as follows: The petitioner
firm availed loan facilities from the bank but as default was
committed in repayment, the bank initiated recovery proceedings
under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity, the
SARFAESI Act), by issuing demand notice dated 23.12.2011 under
Section 13(2) thereof. Further measures were deferred by the bank
upon the assurance given by the petitioner firm that it would clear
the loan. However, as it failed to do so, the bank issued a fresh
demand notice on 03.07.2013 under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act and pursuant thereto, possession notice dated
03.09.2013 was also issued under Section 13(4) thereof. The bank
then issued sale notice dated 19.09.2013 under Rule 8(6) of the
Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for brevity, the Rules
of 2002). Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner firm filed S.A.No.605 of
2013 before the Tribunal. This S.A. was dismissed by the Tribunal
on 03.02.2015. Thereupon, the bank again issued a fresh sale
notice on 16.02.2015. Assailing the same, the petitioner firm filed
S.A.No.233 of 2015 before the Tribunal. No interim orders were
granted therein as the auction sale had already been held by the
bank on 23.03.2015. The petitioner firm then moved an
application before the Tribunal seeking stay of all further
proceedings pursuant to the said sale. By order dated 01.05.2015,
the Tribunal directed the bank to maintain status quo as the
auction purchaser had already deposited the entire sale
consideration. Aggrieved by this order, the auction purchaser filed
W.P.No.14205 of 2015 before this Court. This writ petition was
disposed of on 29.06.2015, directing the Tribunal to implead him
as a party in S.A.No.233 of 2015 and dispose of the same
expeditiously after hearing the parties. Pursuant thereto, the
auction purchaser was impleaded as the second respondent in
S.A.No.233 of 2015 and after hearing all the parties concerned, the
Tribunal dismissed the S.A., by the order dated 16.11.2015.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner firm preferred an appeal before
the Appellate Tribunal vide Tender No.165 of 2015/75. This appeal
was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal by order dated
07.09.2016. Assailing both these orders, the petitioner firm is
before this Court.
Perusal of the order dated 16.11.2015 passed by the
Tribunal in S.A.No.233 of 2015 reflects the following salient points:
The main contention of the petitioner firm before the Tribunal was
that there was non-compliance with Rules 8(6) and 9(1) of the
Rules 2002 as it was not served with the sale notice giving it a
clear thirty days notice period before the date of the sale. The
Tribunal however took note of the fact that the notice dated
16.02.2015 was published in two newspapers, including one
vernacular newspaper, on 18.02.2015, which was thirty days prior
to the date of sale, i.e., 23.03.2015. The Tribunal observed that
further intimation was given to the petitioner firm on 24.02.2015
regarding the notice dated 16.02.2015 which had been published
on 18.02.2015. Opining that these documents showed that the
bank had strictly maintained a thirty days notice period as
mandated under the rules and as there was no deviation from the
procedure contemplated under the SARFAESI Act and the Rules of
2002, the Tribunal dismissed the S.A.
In appeal, the Appellate Tribunal opined that Rule 8(6) of the
Rules of 2002 provides that the authorized officer shall serve to the
borrower a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured
assets under sub-rule (5) thereof and that it does not contemplate
giving of such details in the said notice, which are to be given in a
public notice in two leading newspapers, as required under the
proviso to Rule 8(6). The Appellate Tribunal also noted that it was
not in dispute that the sale was held after expiry of thirty days
from the date on which the public notice of sale was published in
the newspapers, as the said publication was on 18.02.2015 and
the sale was held on 23.03.2015. The Appellate Tribunal found on
facts that the notice dated 04.02.2015 was in accordance with
Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002, as the said rule did not contemplate
giving details as were required to be given in the public notice in
two leading newspapers. The contention of the petitioner firm that
the notice dated 24.02.2015 should be treated as a notice under
Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 was rejected and the Appellate
Tribunal confirmed that this was only further intimation given to
the petitioner firm about the publication in the newspapers of the
auction sale notice. The Appellate Tribunal accordingly held that a
thirty days notice period would not have to be maintained from the
letter dated 24.02.2015, as the notice dated 04.02.2015 under
Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 was received by the petitioner firm
on the same day itself but it did not even seek to exercise its right
of redemption under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. As the
sale was held well after thirty days therefrom, on 23.03.2015, the
Appellate Tribunal found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.
Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel representing Sri
P.A.V.Bala Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner firm, would
argue that the notice dated 04.02.2015 issued by the bank under
Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 does not meet the requirements of
law and the notice dated 24.02.2015 issued by the bank fixing the
sale on 23.03.2015, without a clear thirty days notice, was in
violation of the mandate of Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules of 2002. The
notice dated 24.02.2015 was stated to have been posted on
28.02.2015 and was delivered to the petitioner firm only on
02.03.2015, clearly demonstrating that the required thirty days
notice period was not maintained.
Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, would also rely upon
CANARA BANK V/s. M.AMARENDER REDDY and argue that in
terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court therein, the bank
had to mention the mode, date and time fixed for the sale in the
notice issued under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 itself and as the
notice dated 04.02.2015 does not satisfy this requirement, he
would assert that it is an invalid notice in the eye of law and the
sale held pursuant thereto on 23.03.2015, on the strength of the
public notice of sale dated 16.02.2015, would stand vitiated.
He would further contend that perusal of the notices in
question clearly demonstrates the failure of the bank to abide by
the statutory mandate. He would submit that even if the notice
issued on 04.02.2015 is taken to be a notice under Rule 8(6) of the
Rules of 2002, the notice issued on 16.02.2015 under Rule 9(1)
thereof, whereby the auction of the secured asset was scheduled to
be held on 23.03.2015, was also in violation of the procedural
mandate. He would submit that the reserve price fixed at
Rs.200.54 lakh for the secured asset, a residential building
consisting of three floors, with adjoining land of 531 square yards,
at New Gaddiannaram, Saroornagar, Ranga Reddy District, and
ultimately sold for Rs.200.74 lakh, was far lesser than the market
value of the property, which was more than Rs.600.00 lakh. He
would inform this Court that the petitioner firm deposited Rs.125
lakh in another nationalised bank to show its bonafides as the
bank refused to receive the demand drafts dated 04.11.2015 and
05.11.2015 offered to it. Learned senior counsel would therefore
assert that the sale under challenge should be set aside and the
petitioner firm may now be afforded an opportunity to clear its
outstanding dues.
At this stage, it would be relevant to note the contents of the
various notices, which find mention in the orders of both the
tribunals, and form the fulcrum of the petitioner firms case. The
notice dated 04.02.2015 issued by the bank is titled SALE NOTICE
TO BORROWER/GUARANTOR UNDER SECURITY INTEREST
(ENFORCEMENT) RULES, 2002. The relevant portion thereof
reads as under:
Whereas you have failed to satisfy your/borrowers liabilities
to the bank even after receipt of notice under Section 13(2)
and Section 13(4) of the Act. Therefore the Bank in exercise
of its rights granted under the Act and Rules, issues this
notice under and Rule 8(6) (Immovable) of the Security
Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, calling upon you to
discharge in full liabilities amounting to Rs.1,22,87,695.59
(Rupees one crore twenty two lakhs eighty seven thousand
six hundred and ninety five and paise fifty nine only) as on
31.01.2015 with interest, costs and charges within 30 days
from the date of this notice, failing which, the bank shall
proceed under the Act with the sale of the secured properties
to realize the above stated outstandings, with interest and
costs. (emphasis is ours)
Thereafter, e-auction-cum-sale notice dated 16.02.2015
under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 was published in Namaste
Telangana Telugu newspaper and The Metro India English
newspaper, on 18.02.2015. The bank then issued letter dated
24.02.2015 to the petitioner firm. This communication is of great
relevance and requires reproduction, to the extent relevant:
To Dated: 24.02.2015.
Mr.S.Prabhakar,
Managing Partner,
SPL Projects,
1/301, Kalyani Block, Sahara States,
Mansoorabad, L B Nagar,
Hyderabad.
Dear Sir,
NOTICE UNDER RULE 8(6) OF THE SECURITY INTEREST
(ENFORCEMENT) RULES
Please take notice that the secured assets
mortgaged/charged to the Bank more fully described in the
schedule hereunder shall be sold by public e-auction to be
held on 23.03.2015 through https://bankauctions.in
between 12.00 noon and 1.00 pm. For further details, please
refer to the notice published in the newspaper on 18.02.2015
and websites https://bankauctions.in and
www.foreclosureindia.com.
Yours faithfully,
(Sd/- (seal))
(Authorised Officer)
.
It is the contention of Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior
counsel, that as this notice professed to be one under Rule 8(6) of
the Rules of 2002, the bank was bound to maintain a clear thirty
days notice period from the date of receipt thereof and as the said
notice was received by the petitioner firm only on 02.03.2015, the
auction sale held on 23.03.2015 was in violation of the statutory
mandate with regard to maintaining a clear thirty days gap
between the service of notice under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002
and the date of the sale.
Per contra, Sri E.Madan Mohan Rao, learned counsel
appearing for the bank, would contend that the communication
dated 24.02.2015 was not a notice under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of
2002, notwithstanding the misleading title therein, as there was no
mention of thirty days time being given to the addressee, as
required under the said rule. He would submit that this was only
an intimation to the petitioner firm as to the publication of the
notice under Rule 9(1) in newspapers and therefore, the mistake
on the part of the bank in titling the communication otherwise
would not enure to the benefit of the petitioner firm. He would
further point out that the argument advanced by the petitioner
firm before the Appellate Tribunal, to the effect that the bank had
to maintain a clear gap of thirty days in relation to the notices
under Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 independently,
was based on the decision of this Court in M.AMARENDER
REDDY V/s. CANARA BANK , but the said decision no longer
constitutes good law in the light of the reversing judgment of the
Supreme Court in CANARA BANK1. He would therefore submit
that the argument that the bank was required to maintain two
separate notice periods of thirty days, one from the notice under
Rule 8(6) and the other from the publication of the notice under
Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002, does not hold water. He would
further state that the petitioner firm itself addressed letter dated
31.12.2014 to the bank, undertaking that it would repay the dues
within thirty days, failing which the bank could proceed with the
auction of the property. As it failed to abide by this undertaking,
the learned counsel would assert that the petitioner firm lost its
right to protest against the sale held on 23.03.2015. As regards the
alleged efforts of the petitioner firm to repay the outstanding dues,
learned counsel would point out that the demand drafts dated
04.11.2015 and 05.11.2015 were secured by the petitioner firm in
the name of S.Prabhakar, its Managing Partner, and assert that
they did not amount to proper tender to clear the outstanding
dues. As the petitioner firm failed to repay these dues despite the
many assurances given by it and as the bank had already
completed the sale transaction pursuant to the auction sale held
on 23.03.2015, learned counsel would submit that the writ petition
does not merit consideration.
Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned senior counsel
representing Sri C.Tulasi Krishna, learned counsel for the fourth
respondent/auction purchaser, would contend that pursuant to
the auction sale held on 23.03.2015, the fourth respondent was
declared the highest bidder and a Sale Certificate was duly
executed and registered in his favour. Possession of the property
sold was also delivered to him on 25.11.2015. He would inform
this Court that the fourth respondent has been residing in the said
property, having leased out a portion thereof. Learned senior
counsel would reiterate the banks stand that all procedural
formalities were duly complied with and submit that the interim
order dated 27.10.2016 passed by this Court, directing the fourth
respondent not to create any encumbrances on the property,
caused hardship in his lawful enjoyment thereof as he had
purchased it for value in a valid public auction.
The primary ground of attack presently is that the failure of
the bank in stating the mode, date and time of the sale in the
notice dated 04.02.2015 would invalidate the same. It is true that
the notice dated 04.02.2015 did not divulge these details. However,
the question that arises is as to whether such a requirement is
contemplated at all by law. Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel,
would place reliance on the interpretation of Rules 8 and 9 of the
Rules of 2002 by the Supreme Court in MATHEW VARGHESE
V/s. M.AMRITHA KUMAR and, more particularly, Para 31
thereof. However, perusal of this paragraph does not lend it to the
interpretation sought to be drawn by the learned senior counsel in
as much as the Supreme Court never postulated therein that the
notice under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 must disclose the
mode, date and time of the proposed sale. The Supreme Court only
held therein that while the publication in the newspapers should
provide thirty days clear notice, a clear notice of thirty days should
also be ensured as stipulated under Rule 8(6) as well. This
judgment is therefore of no avail.
Strong reliance was also placed upon CANARA BANK1 by Sri
M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, in this regard. The issue
considered by the Supreme Court in this decision was whether this
Court was right in holding that a secured creditor must put the
borrower on separate individual notice prior to deciding on the
mode of sale of the secured asset and that such further notice
should be in addition to the notice of thirty days duration to be
given by the secured creditor, conveying the intention to put the
secured asset on sale. Notice under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002
was issued by the Canara Bank on 15.10.2015 giving the borrower
one last and final opportunity to discharge the debt within thirty
days therefrom. A copy of the e-auction notice of the same date
under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 was also enclosed along with
the said communication, indicating that the date of the sale was
fixed as 21.11.2015. The contention advanced by the borrower
before this Court was that the e-auction notice dated 15.10.2015
was illegal. Accepting the same, this Court took the view that a
separate notice of thirty days duration ought to have been given by
the bank to the borrower before the public notice fixing the date of
auction sale was issued, as both the notices could not be issued
simultaneously. This Court construed Rule 8(6) of the Rules of
2002 to mean that a notice of intended sale of the secured asset
must be de-linked from the actual sale notification to be published
in two newspapers. This Court took the view that it was imperative
for a secured creditor to put the borrower on notice of thirty days
duration about the intention to sell the secured asset and the
mode of the sale and this should precede the issuance of a public
notice for sale.
In appeal in CANARA BANK1, upon considering the legal
position, the Supreme Court observed as under:
To put it differently, the only restriction placed on the
secured creditor is to serve a notice of 30 days on the
borrower intimating him about its intention to sell the
immovable secured asset and the mode and date fixed for
sale; and also to issue a public notice in two leading
newspapers, if the sale of such secured asset is effected
either by inviting tenders or by holding public auction,
notifying the date of sale after 30 clear days from such
notice. There is no need to wait for the expiry of 30 days
from issuance of notice of intention to sell the secured asset
given to the borrower, for publication of a public notice for
sale of such asset. Nor is there any requirement to give a
separate individual notice prior to deciding on the mode of
sale of the secured asset. To the above extent, the opinion of
the High Court in the impugned judgment will have to be
overturned.
Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, would rely upon the
sentence ..the only restriction placed on the secured creditor is to
serve a notice of 30 days on the borrower intimating him about its
intention to sell the immovable secured asset and the mode and date
fixed for sale.., in the above paragraph and contend that the
notice issued under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 must itself
convey the mode and the date fixed for sale. He would submit that
as the notice dated 04.02.2015 failed to furnish these details, it
does not meet the requirement of law as spelt out by the Supreme
Court.
This argument however merits no consideration.
Rules 8(5) and (6) of the Rules of 2002, as they stood at the
relevant point of time, read as under:
8(5): Before effecting sale of the immovable property
referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer
shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved
valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the
reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any
part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following
methods:--
(a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing
with similar secured assets or otherwise
interested in buying the such assets; or
(b) by inviting tenders from the public;
(c) by holding public auction; or
(d) by private treaty.
8(6): the authorised officer shall serve to the borrower
a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured
assets, under sub-rule (5):
Provided that if the sale of such secured asset is being
effected by either inviting tenders from the public or by
holding public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a
public notice in two leading newspapers one in vernacular
language having sufficient circulation in the locality by
setting out the terms of sale, which shall include,--
(a) the description of the immovable property to be
sold, including the details of the encumbrances
known to the secured creditor;
(b) the secured debt for recovery of which the
property is to be sold;
(c) reserve price, below which the property may not
be sold;
(d) time and place of public auction or the time after
which sale by any other mode shall be completed;
(e) depositing earnest money as may be stipulated by
the secured creditor;
(f) any other thing which the authorised officer
considers it material for a purchaser to know in
order to judge the nature and value of the
property.
Rule 9(1), as it stood then, is also relevant and reads as
under:
9. Time of sale, issue of sale certificate and
delivery of possession, etc:--
(1) No sale of immovable property under these rules
shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date
on which the public notice of sale is published in
newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) or
notice of sale has been served to the borrower.
A cumulative overview of the aforestated rules and the
statutory scheme envisaged thereunder makes it clear that the
authorized officer of the secured creditor shall serve to the
borrower a notice of thirty days conveying the intention to sell the
immovable secured assets. As per Rule 8(5), such sale can be made
by him either by obtaining quotations from persons dealing with
similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying such
assets or by inviting tenders from the public or by holding a public
auction or by private treaty. At this stage, the authorized officer is
not required to disclose the date of actual sale or the mode thereof.
It is merely intimation to the borrower of the intention of the
secured creditor to sell the property, giving a clear thirty days
notice period.
The proviso to Rule 8(6) stipulates that if the sale is intended
to be effected by inviting tenders from the public or by holding a
public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in
two leading newspapers, one in vernacular language, setting out
the terms of sale as stipulated in clauses (a) to (f) thereof. It may be
noted that the time and place of the sale find mention in clause (d).
Rule 9(1) states that when such a notice is published in
newspapers, as referred to in the proviso to Rule 8(6), the sale of
such immovable property cannot take place before expiry of thirty
days from the date of such publication or notice of sale has been
served to the borrower.
Though the Supreme Court interpreted the word or in Rule
9(1) to mean and in MATHEW VARGHESE2, the lawmakers, in
their wisdom, while amending this rule with effect from
04.11.2016, vide G.S.R.1046(E) dated 03.11.2016, again repeated
the word or and did not substitute it with the word and in terms
of MATHEW VARGHESE2. Be that as it may.
The details of the time and place of the auction therefore
require to be mentioned only in the notice under Rule 9(1) of the
Rules of 2002, as per clause (d) in the proviso to Rule 8(6) thereof.
Rule 8(6), by itself, only speaks of service upon the borrower of a
notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured assets
under sub-rule (5) and no more. It does not state that the
authorized officer has to indicate therein the mode that he seeks to
take recourse to for sale of such secured assets. This is obviously
because an option would still be available at that stage to not only
the authorized officer but also the borrower to obtain proposals
from third parties and take recourse to Rule 8(5)(d), so that the
property in question may be sold privately without further ado.
Though Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, seeks to rely
upon one sentence in Para 16 of CANARA BANK1, it is pertinent to
note that a later sentence in the very same paragraph puts it
beyond doubt that the Supreme Court did not interpret Rule 8(6)
to mean that the notice issued thereunder should itself indicate
the mode and date fixed for the sale. This is clear from the later
sentence: Nor is there any requirement to give a separate individual
notice prior to deciding on the mode of sale of the secured asset.
Therefore, information with regard to the mode of sale is to be
conveyed only by the public notice under Rule 9(1) and not in the
initial notice issued under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002. Any
interpretation to the contrary would do violence to the clear
mandate of the rules. The argument of Sri M.S.Prasad, learned
senior counsel, to the contrary is accordingly rejected.
As regards the contention of Sri M.S.Prasad, learned senior
counsel, that the reserve price fixed by the bank was not in
keeping with the market value, no material whatsoever has been
produced to support this allegation. Further, it appears that this
ground was not even taken by the petitioner firm either before the
Tribunal or before the Appellate Tribunal. It is sought to be raised
for the first time before this Court. When the petitioner firm seeks
a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed by the Tribunal and
the Appellate Tribunal, it is not open to it to come up with a new
ground altogether at this stage. That apart, as stated supra, the
petitioner firm did not even place before this Court any material in
proof of the alleged undervaluation of the property by the bank.
This Court is therefore not inclined to entertain this contention or
adjudicate upon it on merits. Further, the half-hearted attempt on
the part of the petitioner firm in November, 2015 to redeem the
secured asset, long after its sale in March, 2015, needs to be
mentioned only to be rejected. The statutory scheme of the
SARFAESI Act does not recognize or lend any value to such lame
and belated efforts by a borrower to undo a concluded sale
transaction effected under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
On the above analysis, no illegality is demonstrated in the
proceedings initiated by the bank under the SARFAESI Act,
culminating in the sale held on 23.03.2015, whereby the fourth
respondent/auction purchaser was sold the secured asset.
Further, no grounds have been established warranting interference
with the orders of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.
The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly
dismissed. Interim order dated 27.10.2016 shall stand vacated.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
No order as to costs.
____________________
SANJAY KUMAR,J
____________________ P.KESHAVA RAO,J 20th FEBRUARY, 2018