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[Cites 4, Cited by 5]

Karnataka High Court

Sri Anna Rao And Ors. vs Sri Gundareddy And Ors. on 9 July, 1996

Equivalent citations: ILR1997KAR1998, 1997 A I H C 3208

Author: P. Vishwanatha Shetty

Bench: P. Vishwanatha Shetty

ORDER
 

  P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J. 
 

1. Though this matter is posted for preliminary hearing in 'B Group', with the consent of Learned Counsel for the parties, it is taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this order.

2. The petitioners, in this petition, claim to be owners in possession of land measuring 11 acres 24 guntas in Survey No. 6 situated at Chatrasal village, Chincholi Taluk, Gulbarga District. They have sought for quashing the order dated 31st October 1995 passed by the third respondent-Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"), confirming the order dated 11th January 1993 made in No. REV/RP/25/91-92 by the second respondent. Copies of the said orders passed by respondents 3 and 2 have been produced as Annexures-A and B respectively.

3. By the order Annexure-B, on the basis of the representation given by the first respondent stating that the land in question belongs to the State Government and that the names of the petitioners were wrongly entered in the revenue records, the second respondent has directed rectification of the entries in the revenue records and further directed to enter the name of the State Government in the revenue records in respect of the said land.

4. Sri K. Appa Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the names of the ancestors of the petitioners were entered in the revenue records in the year 1918 and for the last about 45 years, the names of the petitioners continued in the revenue records in respect of the land in- question. He submitted that the order Annexure-B is totally illegal and without jurisdiction. According to Sri Appa Rao, Section 25 of the Land Revenue Act does not authorise the second respondent to pass the order impugned.

5. Sri Praveen Kumar Raikote, Learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, and Sri Ashok Nayak, learned High Court Government Pleader, supported the orders impugned. They submitted that since the petitioners have already filed a suit seeking a decree for permanent injunction, this is not a fit case for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

6. I am unable to accept the submission of the Learned Counsel for the first respondent and the learned Government Pleader for respondents 2 and 3. I am of the view that the order passed by the second respondent is liable to be quashed. It is not disputed by the Learned Counsel for the first respondent and the learned Government Pleader that the names of the petitioners are shown in the revenue records eversince the year 1950-51 upto the date of passing of the order Annexure-B. It is also not disputed that the proceedings, which ultimately resulted in passing of the order Annexure-B, came to be initiated on the basis of the representation given by the first respondent and other villagers to the Chief Minister of Karnataka, which was forwarded to the second respondent for appropriate action As can be seen from the order Annexure-8, the second respondent has passed the said order in the purported exercise of the power conferred on him under Section 25 of the Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").

7. Section 25 of the Act reads as follows :

"25. Savings of inherent powers of a Revenue Court:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Revenue Court."

8. Chapter 11 of the Act provides for making necessary entries in the revenue records. Sections 136 of the Act provides for appeal and revision against the entries made in the revenue records. I am of the view that the order impugned is liable to be quashed on the short ground that it is not permissible for the second respondent to order for correction of the entries in the Record of Rights and Pahanies by deleting the names of the petitioners and in its place, by entering the name of the State Government after about 43 years from the date of the entry made in the revenue records, in exercise of the power conferred on him under Section 25 of the Act. As stated earlier, the names of the petitioners continued to exist in the Record of Rights and Pahanies eversince the year 1950-51 up-to-date. The period of limitation to claim adverse possession against the State is 30 years. Even assuming that Section 25 of the Act confers power on the second respondent to direct rectification of entries in the revenue records, the said power was required to be exercised by the second respondent within a reasonable time from the date of the entry made in the revenue records entering the names of the petitioners. It is well settled principle of law that when power is conferred on an Authority to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and the exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. This view of mine is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MANSARAM v. S.P. PATHAK AND OTHER , In the said decision, at paragraph-12 of the judgment, it is laid down as follows:

"12......Undoubtedly, power is conferred on the Collector to see that the provisions of the Rent Control Order which disclosed a public policy are effectively implemented and if the Collector, therefore, comes across information that there is a contravention, is with adequate power to set right the contravention by ejecting any one who comes into the premises in contravention of the provisions. But, when the power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, no limitation is prescribed in this behalf, but one would stand aghast that a landlord to some extent in pari delicto could turn the tables against the person who was in possession for 22 years as a tenant. In such a situation, even though the House Allotment Officer was to reach an affirmative conclusion that the initial entry 22 years back was an authorised entry and that failure to vacate premises till 9 years after retirement was not proper. Yet, it was not obligatory upon him to pass a peremptory order of eviction in the manner in which he has done."

The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court fully applies to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the orders impugned are liable to be quashed. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the question whether power is conferred on the second respondent under Section 25 of the Act directing rectification of the entries in the revenue records. Therefore, I make the following :

ORDER

9. Rule is issued and made absolute. Order dated 31st October 1995 passed by the third respondent and also order dated 11th January 1993 passed by the second respondent, are hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.