Karnataka High Court
K.C. Krishnamurthy vs K. Harish And Others on 24 June, 1998
Equivalent citations: I(1999)ACC158, 1998(6)KARLJ321, 1999 A I H C 274, (1998) 6 KANT LJ 321, (1999) 1 ACC 158, (1999) 2 CURCC 453, (1999) 2 TAC 719
ORDER
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the applicant.
2. This revision under Section 115 arises from the judgment and order dated 15-4-1994 by Sri G. Ramakrishna Rao, Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-III, Bangalore, rejecting the present revisionist-petitioner's application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC. The Tribunal has rejected the application on the ground that the application had been filed beyond the period of one year and it has been held that the petitioner cannot be permitted to be brought on record. Under the old Act prior to amendment of law by Act No. 54 of 1984, the provision of fixing limitation for making claim application has been omitted. In this case, the claim petition had been filed by one Harish K. in the year 1990 when the new Act had come into force. Later on, the revisionist moved an application for impleadment in the same petition. Section as it operated then had provided maximum limitation of one year for filing the claim petition. The Tribunal opined that the period for moving or filing claim petition had expired. The revisionist-applicant could not be allowed to be impleaded in the case as a party even on the date of passing of order dated 15-4-1994. Feeling aggrieved from this order, the applicant has come up in revision before this Court under Section 115 of the CPC.
3. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Tribunal. Revision under Section 115 of the CPC is maintainable only against the order of Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and with reference to the Civil Procedure Code it has been provided that the District Court and the Courts subordinate to Civil Court i.e., subordinate to the District Court shall also be deemed to be subordinate to High Court. That every Civil Court of a grade inferior to a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. Nowhere Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is mentioned. The scheme of the Act as per Section 165 and its constitution which provided that a person can be appointed as a member of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal if he has been a Judge of the High Court or if he is a Judge of the High Court or if he is or has been a District Judge or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of High Court or District Court. It further provides that even a practising Advocate who has completed ten years of practice, he may be said to be eligible for consideration of appointment. Even a retired District Judge can be appointed to the Tribunal if he fulfills other conditions. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act like the one namely Section 10 of the Family Courts Act to the effect that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court. Section 10 of the Family Courts Act very clearly provides that, "Family Court shall be deemed for the purpose of the Code to be a Civil Court".
4. In this view of the matter and looking to the scheme of the Act along with Sections 175 and 173(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, I am unable to accept the contention of the applicant's Counsel that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court. Might be that a Civil Judge may have occupied the office of the Member of the Tribunal. But, that itself does not make a Tribunal to be a Civil Court. Expression "District Judge" in the Constitution has been defined vide Article 236 even to include judges of a City Civil Court, Additional District Judge, Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge. So even if a Civil Judge or a District Judge is occupying the office of the Member of the Tribunal, it will not change its character as Tribunal unless and until the law so provides. In the case of Nanagouda v The B.L.D.E. Association, Bijapur, has so opined and held, in which this Court also held that the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Mrs. Noreen R. Srikantaiah v L. Dasarath Ramaiah and Others, is a decision per incuriam. That as the attention of the Court has not been invited to the provisions of Article 236 and Sections 175 and 173(2) to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. So this Court has taken a view in the case of Mrs. Noreen R. Srikantaiah, as the attention of the Court was not invited to the material provisions of law and Constitution, the decision is per incuriam. In this view of the matter, the decision being per incuriam cannot be said to be binding precedent as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of A.R. Antulay v R.S. Naik, (relevant paras 44, 49, 64 and 138). This revision, in my opinion, against the order of Tribunal is not maintainable under Section 115 of the CPC as the Tribunal cannot be deemed to be a Court as deeming it to be a Civil Court will run counter to the letter and spirit of Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act and runs counter to the letter and spirit of the provisions to Section 173(2) which provide that no appeal shall lie against any award of the Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute is less than Rs.10,000/-. In the case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, it has been held that the revisional power is the part and parcel of general power of appellate jurisdiction which is circumscribed by the conditions when this power is to be exercised. It is being exercised only as a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. To deem Tribunal to be a Civil Court and permitting to approach the High Court under Section 115 would be tantamount acting contrary to the provisions of Section 173(2). Thus having considered this aspect of the matter, this Court has taken the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal cannot be deemed and/or considered to be a Civil Court. It could only be considered as a Civil Court if the Legislature would have expressly so provided that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal be deemed to be a Civil Court as it has done in Family Courts under the Family Courts Act. In this view of the matter, the revision application by itself is not maintainable under Section 115. Learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that this Court may consider this matter in exercise of its superintendence power under Article 227 of the Constitution. He submitted that the bar cannot prevent this Court from exercising its superintendence powers under Article 227, no doubt, if the order is passed without jurisdiction or if it appears that the Tribunal had acted not in accordance with law and it touches the sense of justice of this Court and it appears that injustice is going to be done to the party and if the order is not according to law, the Court may in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court as well as to prevent the injustice likely to be caused to the party as a result of such order which suffers from jurisdictional error, this Court may exercise its superintendence powers under Article 227. But, so far as this present case is concerned, we have to see what was the law in force on the date on which the order impugned was passed. The order impugned was passed on 15-4-1994. At that time, Section 166(3) which prescribed the period of limitation for making the claim or filing of claim petition did very much exist. So looking to the law as it then existed at that time which prescribed the period of limitation for making the claim, the Tribunal opined that now permitting the impleadment will be tantamount to going against the basic principles of Section 166(3) as allowing the claim beyond limitation. It rejected the claim or application for impleadment. Learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that this Court under Article 227 may direct the impleadment of the party, because subsequent event has taken place i.e., deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166. Learned Counsel contended that this amendment has to be taken to be operative with retrospective effect. Learned Counsel for the applicant referred to a Single Judge's decision of this Court in the case of Wilfred v N.A. Maniyar and Another. The learned Single Judge Hon'ble V.P. Mohan Kumar, J., observed that the amendment to Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is retrospective in operation and govern the pending proceedings as well.
5. In this view of the matter, the position of law that comes out as a subsequent event that period of limitation for filing claim petition has given a good-bye. Anyway so far as the order on the date it was passed when amending act has not seen the light of the day, the order passed by the Tribunal rejecting the application on the ground of Section 166(3) to the effect that period of limitation has expired, as such, the application for impleadment cannot be allowed. The order prima facie does not appear to suffer from any error of law or error of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, there is no ground for this Court for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. But, no doubt, after deletion of Section 166(3) subsequent development i.e., removing the bar of limitation, it is always open to the claimant either to file fresh claim or to move fresh application in the light of change of circumstances for impleadment placing relevant law and amendment before the Tribunal itself.
Subject to the above observations, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs.