Telangana High Court
N. Laxma Reddy vs A. Indrasena Reddy on 17 April, 2026
*THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
+ APPEAL SUIT No.191 of 2019
%17.04.2026
Between
# N.Laxma Reddy
...Appellant
vs.
$ A.Indrasena Reddy and 4 others
...Respondents
!Counsel for the appellant : Sri P.Venkat Reddy, learned
counsel for appellant
^Counsel for respondents : Sri M.Damodar Reddy, learned
counsel for respondents
<Gist :
>Head Note :
? Cases referred
1. 2019 (3) ALD 177
2. 2023 (4) ALT 38
3. 2024 (2) ALD 74
4. 2024 (5) ALD 64
5. 2017 (5) ALT 8
6. (2009) 10 SCC 654
7. Second Appeal No.190 of 2004 dated 25-09-2025
8. (2003) 1 SCC 557
9. AIR 2020 SC 2721
10. (2006) 3 SCC 100
11. MANU/SC/0593/2025
12. MANU/SC/1433/2024
13. (2018) 6 SCC 422
14. AIR 1996 SC 869
15. (2004) 10 SCC 779
16. MANU/KA/2085/2015
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
APPEAL SUIT No. 191 OF 2019
DATE:17.04.2026
Between:
N.Laxma Reddy
....Appellant
And
A.Indrasena Reddy and 4 others
....Respondents
JUDGMENT
Heard, Sri P.Venkat Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri M.Damodar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record.
2. This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC'), is directed against the order and decretal order dated 08.02.2019 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar (for short 'the trial court') in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017. By the said order, the trial court allowed the application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC and rejected the plaint in its entirety, 3 holding that the suit was barred by limitation and lacked a valid cause of action.
3. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are the defendants in O.S.No.981 of 2017.
4. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are hereinafter referred to in the capacity they were arrayed before the trial Court.
5. The appellant/plaintiff instituted O.S.No.981 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, seeking the following reliefs:
a) A declaration that the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006, bearing Document No.5744 of 2006, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Ibrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District, in respect of the suit schedule property, i.e., agricultural dry land admeasuring Ac.4.20 guntas in Survey No. 67, situated at Nazdiksingaram Village, Yacharam Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as the "suit schedule property"), is null and void; and
b) A consequential relief of recovery of vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property from the defendants.4
Plaint Averments (Appellant/Plaintiff's case)
6. The case of the appellant/plaintiff, as set out in the plaint, in substance, is as follows:
i. The plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property from the 2nd defendant, who is his maternal uncle, under a registered Sale Deed bearing Document No.50 of 1971 dated 20.01.1971. It is specifically pleaded that possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff pursuant to the oral agreement of sale and, thereafter, the plaintiff became the absolute owner and possessor of the property.
ii. It is further pleaded that, owing to his employment as a Government servant in various remote places, the plaintiff was unable to personally supervise the property. Consequently, he entrusted the suit schedule property to the 2nd defendant for the limited purpose of looking after the agricultural operations. Accordingly, the 2nd defendant continued to cultivate the land and was allegedly remitting the agricultural income/proceeds to the plaintiff.
iii. After his retirement from service in the year 2006, the plaintiff sought to regularize the revenue entries and thereby, submitted an application dated 20.12.2016 5 before the Tahsildar, Yacharam Mandal, for mutation of his name and issuance of pattadar passbook. Upon such application, notice was issued to the 2nd defendant. iv. In response thereto, the 2nd defendant, by his reply dated 10.03.2017, for the first time set up a hostile claim by denying the very sale in favour of the plaintiff. 2nd defendant asserted that the suit property had fallen to his share in a partition suit in O.S.No.33 of 1990 and further claimed that he had executed a Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 in favour of his son, the 1st defendant, in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the said partition decree was collusive in nature and that the 2nd defendant had no right, title or interest to execute the said Gift Settlement Deed.
v. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that he had no knowledge of the said Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 until the reply of the 2nd defendant dated 10.03.2017 before the Tahsildar. It is only thereafter that the cause of action arose, compelling him to institute the present suit on 03.07.2017. The plaintiff has asserted that the suit is within limitation, as it was filed within the prescribed period from the date of knowledge. 6 vi. It is also borne out from the record that, in view of the objection raised by the 2nd defendant, the Tahsildar advised the parties to approach the competent civil Court, and the plaintiff was constrained to initiate the present proceedings for declaration and recovery of possession. Written Statement (Respondents/Defendants case)
7. The respondents/defendants filed their written statement resisting the suit, inter alia, denying the title and possession of the appellant/plaintiff, wherein it was specifically contended that:
i. The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit schedule property pursuant to the alleged Sale Deed of 1971; ii. The 2nd defendant had been in continuous, open, uninterrupted and hostile possession of the property for several decades;
iii. The defendants have perfected their title by way of adverse possession; and iv. The 1st defendant has been in possession pursuant to the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006.
v. The defendants further relied upon various revenue records, including pahanies from as early as 1964-65 7 onwards, to substantiate their plea of long-standing possession.
Interlocutory Application (I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017)
8. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants filed I.A.No.1189 of 2017 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Section 151 CPC, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation and did not disclose a valid cause of action.
9. The plaintiff filed a detailed counter opposing the said application, contending that the question of limitation involved disputed questions of fact and that the plaint disclosed a clear cause of action, which required adjudication in a full-fledged trial.
Impugned Order of the trial Court
10. The trial Court, by order dated 08.02.2019, allowed the said application and rejected the plaint, wherein it held as under:
Thus in my considered opinion the plaint filed by the respondent/plaintiff seeking relief of declaration that the gift settlement deed in favour of first defendant is null and void and that he is entitled to recovery of possession is not tenable and the plaint is deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, accepting the contention of the counsel for the petitioner/defendant, and following the decision relied on by him, I am of the view that the present petition filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC can be allowed.8
13. In the result, the present petition filed by the petitioner/ defendant to rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(a)& (d) of C.P.C, is hereby allowed and consequently the plaint is hereby rejected as barred by Limitation and lack of valid cause of action. Let a decree may be drawn to that effect.
11. Accordingly, the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) CPC.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant (Plaintiff)
12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff assailed the impugned order and decree dated 08.02.2019 passed in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 and advanced his submissions as under:
i. That the trial Court committed a manifest error in placing reliance upon the written statement filed by the respondents/defendants and the revenue records (pahanies) produced by them while adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It is a well- settled principle that, for the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, the Court is required to confine itself strictly to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents forming part thereof. The defence set up by the respondents/defendants cannot be looked into at that stage. By undertaking an examination of the pahanies 9 and other defence material, the trial Court has virtually conducted a roving enquiry, which is impermissible in law.
ii. That the issue of limitation, particularly in cases where the appellant/plaintiff asserts knowledge of the cause of action on a specific date, constitutes a mixed question of fact and law and cannot be adjudicated without a full- fledged trial. In the present case, the appellant/plaintiff has categorically pleaded that he came to know about the execution of the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 only on 10.03.2017, when the 2nd defendant submitted his reply before the Tahsildar. Such pleading is required to be taken as true for the limited purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. If so construed, the suit instituted on 03.07.2017 is well within the limitation prescribed under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, insofar as the relief of declaration is concerned, and under Article 65, insofar as recovery of possession based on title is concerned. However, the trial Court, failed to advert to this crucial pleading and erroneously held the suit to be barred by limitation.
iii. That the plaint comprises two distinct and independent reliefs, namely, (i) declaration that the Gift Settlement 10 Deed is null and void, and (ii) recovery of possession. Even assuming, without conceding, that one of the reliefs is barred by limitation, the entire plaint could not have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The settled position of law is that rejection of plaint is permissible only where the entire suit is barred by law. If the plaint discloses any triable cause of action, the matter ought to proceed to trial. The trial Court mechanically rejected the plaint in its entirety without examining this aspect. iv. That a meaningful reading of the plaint clearly discloses a complete cause of action. The appellant/plaintiff has asserted his title on the basis of a registered Sale Deed dated 20.01.1971, pleaded constructive possession through the 2nd defendant, who was entrusted with the property as a caretaker, and specifically averred that he came to know of the impugned Gift Settlement Deed only in March, 2017. These facts constitute a bundle of essential facts giving rise to a right to sue. v. That the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondents/defendants in their written statement is purely a defence, which requires strict proof. The appellant/plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the possession of the 2nd defendant was permissive in nature, 11 as he was entrusted with the property for cultivation. Whether such possession is permissive or adverse is a disputed question of fact, which can be adjudicated only upon appreciation of evidence during trial. Thus, the trial Court cannot accept the respondents/defendants' plea of adverse possession at the threshold and reject the plaint. vi. Further, the reliance is placed on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P. Kumarakurubaran v.
P.Narayanan & others and Babasaheb Ramdas Shirole & Ors. v. Rohit Enterprises & others wherein it has been consistently held that when the plaint specifically pleads the date of knowledge, such averment must be accepted at the threshold and the question of limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact, cannot be summarily decided under Order VII Rule 11 CPC without appreciation of evidence; and unless the bar of limitation is ex facie apparent from the plaint, the suit cannot be rejected at the preliminary stage. Submissions on behalf of the Respondents (Defendants)
13. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendants supported the impugned order and decree and advanced the following submissions: 12
i. That the appellant/plaintiff claims to have purchased the property under a Sale Deed dated 20.01.1971, but admittedly did not initiate any proceedings for recovery of possession for several decades. The revenue records (pahanies), which are public documents, disclose that the respondents/defendants and their predecessors-in- interest have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit property from as early as 1964-65 onwards. Such long, continuous and uninterrupted possession amounts to ouster of the appellant/plaintiff's title and establishes adverse possession. The suit, having been filed only in the year 2017, is hopelessly barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of 12 years for recovery of possession based on title.
ii. That the plaint does not disclose any valid cause of action. Though the appellant/plaintiff alleges that the property was entrusted to the 2nd defendant, there is neither any documentary evidence nor any specific pleading to show that the appellant/plaintiff ever demanded possession or that the respondents/defendants denied his title at any point prior to 2017. The mere filing of an application for mutation in the year 2016 does not 13 give rise to a fresh cause of action nor does it extend the period of limitation.
iii. That although the Court is primarily required to examine the plaint while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it is permissible to consider documents referred to in the plaint and forming part of the record. In the present case, the appellant/plaintiff himself has referred to the Sale Deed and the Gift Settlement Deed. The respondents/defendants produced revenue records to demonstrate that the suit is ex facie barred by limitation. Thus, the trial Court rightly took note of such material to conclude that the appellant/plaintiff had no subsisting title or enforceable right.
iv. That even if the plaint averments are taken at face value, the appellant/plaintiff admits that he was not in actual physical possession of the suit property for several decades after 1971. Appellant/plaintiff's plea that the property was entrusted to the 2nd defendant is unsupported by any averment of acknowledgment of title within the statutory period. In the absence of such pleading, the continuous possession of the respondents/defendants necessarily assumes the character of adverse possession. Hence, the suit is clearly 14 barred by limitation, and the rejection of the plaint by the trial Court is justified.
v. The respondents/defendants in support of their case has relied on the following decisions:
a) Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh 1
b) Ramisetty Venkatanna v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb 2
c) Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi 3
d) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh 4
e) Chintala Narasimha Reddy v. B. Satyanarayana 5
f) Gajara Vishnu Gosavi v. Prakash Nanasaheb Kamble 6
g) Ashok Kumar Mahto v. Sasadhar Mahto 7
14. I have taken note of the respective submissions made and the material on record including the plaint and written submissions.
Consideration by this Court
15. The scope and ambit of Order VII Rule 11 CPC are no longer res integra and stand crystallized through a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The settled position is 1 2019 (3) ALD 177 2 2023 (4) ALT 38 3 2024 (2) ALD 74 4 2024 (5) ALD 64 5 2017 (5) ALT 8 6 (2009) 10 SCC 654 7 Second Appeal No.190 of 2004 dated 25-09-2025 15 that, for the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must confine its consideration strictly to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents forming part thereof. The defence taken by the defendant in the written statement or any material produced by the defendants, is entirely irrelevant at that stage. The Court cannot traverse beyond the plaint. The question of rejection of plaint is to be determined by reading the plaint as a whole. The Court while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC does not examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the plaint, but proceeds on the assumption that the averments in the plaint are true. The sole test is whether, if the facts alleged are accepted as true, they disclose or give rise to a cause of action or make out a case for maintainability. The Court cannot conduct a mini-trial test of truthfulness or weigh the credibility of the plaintiff's assertions.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors 8, held that the Court while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC has to only consider the averments in the plaint and that the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakti Bhog 8 (2003) 1 SCC 557 16 Food Industries Ltd. v. The Central Bank of India and Ors 9, held that the pleadings in plaint ought to be read as a whole without compartmentalizing, isolation, dissection, inversion of the language in the plaint, in order to ascertain its true meaning.
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors 10, held that so long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination, the Court cannot reject it on the threshold merely because it is of the opinion that the plaintiff may not succeed in his case.
18. Insofar as the question of limitation is concerned, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is warranted only from the statement made in the plaint, on a plain reading of the plaint itself, the suit appears to be ex facie barred by the law of limitation. In cases, where the issue of limitation involves disputed questions, including the starting point or date of knowledge, the same constitutes a mixed question of fact and the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold. Where the plaintiff specifically pleads that he came to know of the impugned transaction (such as gift deed or sale 9 AIR 2020 SC 2721 10 (2006) 3 SCC 100 17 deed) only on a particular date, that pleading must be taken as true for the purpose of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The question whether the plaintiff had knowledge at an earlier point of time is a question of fact that cannot be decided without a trial being drastic in nature, contemplates rejection of the plaint as a whole, and not in part. Therefore, if the plaint discloses any triable cause of action or any part of the relief is maintainable, the plaint cannot be rejected and the matter must necessarily proceed to trial.
19. In this regard, it is significant refer to the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:
(i) P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan and Ors 11, while dealing with the starting date of limitation period under Article 59 observed as:
"11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the Plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis Under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the Plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the Appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily 11 MANU/SC/0593/2025 18 require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage Under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable."
(ii) Daliben Valjibhai and Ors. v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai and Anr 12.
10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the Defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the Plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the Plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that Under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application Under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.
(ii) Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar 13:
".... the plea regarding the date on which the Plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold."
20. A perusal of the impugned order would disclose that the trial Court has extensively relied upon the revenue records (pahanies) produced by the respondents/defendants, said to pertain to the period from 1964-65 onwards, to conclude that the respondents/defendants were in long-standing possession of 12 MANU/SC/1433/2024 13 (2018) 6 SCC 422 19 the suit schedule property and that the appellant/plaintiff had not asserted his rights for several decades.
21. Such an approach, in the considered view of this Court, is clearly impermissible in law. The trial Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, was required to confine itself to the averments in the plaint alone. The written statement filed by the respondents/defendants and the documents annexed thereto could not have been looked into at that stage. By placing reliance on such material, the trial Court has travelled beyond the plaint, undertaken an evaluation of disputed facts, and, in effect, conducted a summary adjudication on merits, which is wholly outside the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
22. It is pertinent to note that the plaint contains a specific and categorical averment that the appellant/plaintiff came to know of the execution of the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 only on 10.03.2017, when the 2nd defendant submitted his objections before the Tahsildar. This averment, for the limited purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, is required to be accepted as true. Further, if such pleading is taken at face value, the suit instituted on 03.07.2017, insofar as the relief of declaration is concerned, 20 cannot be said to be ex facie barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
23. Likewise, in respect of the relief of recovery of possession based on title, governed by Article 65, the question as to when the possession of the respondents/defendants became adverse to the appellant/plaintiff is a matter requiring evidence. The appellant/plaintiff has specifically pleaded that the possession of the 2nd defendant was permissive, as that of a caretaker. The said pleading is extracted hereunder:
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that from the said date of purchase the Plaintiff was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Suit Schedule Property. The Plaintiff humbly submits that the Plaintiff being the Government Employee in mobile soil testing, in Agricultural Department of Telangana State (earlier State of Andhra Pradesh) had been on lines from home town and also worked in Hyderabad City, Thandur, Pargi and other places in Telangana Region. The Plaintiff further humbly submits that due to the said nature of his employment the Plaintiff has requested Defendant No.2, his maternal uncle to look after agricultural activity of the Suit Schedule Property along with Defendant No.2 agricultural activity and, as such, Defendant No.2 has been looking into and paying the proceeds from said activity to Plaintiff till last year.
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Further, the question as to whether the respondents/defendants' possession had at any point assumed the character of adverse possession, and if so, the precise point of time from which such adverse possession commenced, cannot be determined solely on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint, particularly when the appellant/plaintiff 21 has specifically pleaded that the possession of the respondents/defendants was permissive in nature. Thus, the trial Court committed a manifest error in concluding that the suit was ex facie barred by limitation.
25. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the said decisions hereunder:
Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumar Sharma and Ors 14.
38. In this connection, we may emphasis that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. For all the above reasons, the plea of limitation put forward by the appellant, or by Defendant Nos. 2 to 5 as the case may be, is rejected.
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Ors 15.
11. In the eye of law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of true owner.
It is a well- settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See : S M Karim v. Bibi Sakinal MANU/SC/0236/1964 :
[1964]6SCR780 , Parsinni v. Sukhi MANU/SC/0575/1993 :
(1993)4SCC375 and D N Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0766/1997 : AIR1997SC2930 ).
Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus posited to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most 14 AIR 1996 SC 869 15 (2004) 10 SCC 779 22 important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed.
A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.
(Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma MANU/SC/0231/1996 : AIR1996SC869 ).
26. Further, the Karnataka High Court in S.D. Nagaraju and Ors. v. Sri Shivaganga Education and Charitable Trust and Ors 16. has held that the inconsistent pleas such as permissive possession alongside adverse possession, are fatal to an adverse possession claim and cannot coexist. The relevant para of the said decision is extracted hereunder:
24. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 have executed sale deeds Ex. P33 to Ex.
P37 in respect of the suit schedule properties in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on the basis of the resolution of the TMC, Sira. This resolution was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal No. 8/2000-01. The trial Court has therefore set aside the sale deeds at Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 and declared the plaintiff as the owner of the properties. The title of the vendor of the plaintiff has been confirmed in the decree in O.S. No. 5/1984. When the trial Court has concluded that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 had no right over the same, the question of other defendants having any right over the said properties cannot arise. The very defence raised by the defendants before the Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur in appeal No. 8/2000-01 cuts the plea of adverse possession because defendant Nos. 1 to 3 had set up a plea of permissive possession, which is totally analogous or inconsistent with the plea of adverse possession. They being diametrically opposite to each other cannot go hand in hand. The defendants have right to take up 16 MANU/KA/2085/2015 23 inconsistent pleas in any suit. But, it does not mean that they are at liberty to take up any inconsistent pleas which are capable of eliminating or demolishing one another.
(Emphasis supplied)
27. It is to be noted that on a meaningful and holistic reading of the plaint, it is evident that the appellant/plaintiff has asserted title to the suit schedule property under a registered Sale Deed dated 20.01.1971, pleaded entrustment of the property to the 2nd defendant for cultivation, and alleged that the 2nd defendant, without any right or authority, executed a Gift Settlement Deed in favour of the 1st defendant in the year 2006. It is further pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff acquired knowledge of the said transaction only in March, 2017. These averments, taken together, constitute a bundle of material facts giving rise to a right to sue. If established in evidence, they would entitle the appellant/plaintiff to seek declaration of the Gift Settlement Deed as null and void and also recovery of possession. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.
28. The following decisions relied upon by the respondents/defendants are distinguishable both on facts and law for the following reasons and are therefore inapplicable:
i. In Raghwendra Sharan Singh (supra 3) the plaintiff himself was an executant of the gift deed, had full 24 knowledge, and challenged it after about 22 years, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held to be a case of clever drafting to overcome limitation. In contrast, the present appellant/plaintiff is not an executant of the gift deed which was executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. The plaintiff has specifically pleaded lack of knowledge until 10.03.2017. Limitation in present case is thus, a mixed question of fact and law and not amenable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. ii. In Ramisetty Venkatanna (supra 4) the plaintiffs indirectly questioned a 1953 partition without challenging it and filed the suit after six decades, leading to rejection for clever drafting. Here, the appellant/plaintiff directly challenges the Gift Settlement Deed dated 18.04.2006 and filed the suit promptly upon knowledge.
iii. In the case of Vasantha (supra 5), the plaintiff was aware of possession and failed to seek recovery, and limitation ran from a definite legal event. In the present case, the appellant/plaintiff pleads that the defendant No.1 was asked to look after the suit schedule property (thereby pleading permissive possession to the defendant No.1) and lack of knowledge of the execution of gift deed by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 and seeks 25 both declaration and possession. Limitation here depends, begins to run from the date of knowledge, which requires evidence and cannot be decided at the threshold. iv. In Bhagwantpal Singh (supra 6) the plaint was vague and suppressed material facts despite long-standing knowledge. In contrast, the present plaint clearly discloses the date and source of knowledge, with no suppression or ambiguity apparent on its face. v. In Chintala Narasimha Reddy (supra 7), the plaint itself disclosed that the claim was based on an unregistered sale deed of 1987 and that the plaintiff was never in possession, leading the Court to hold the suit as ex facie barred by limitation and liable for rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. In contrast, the present plaint is founded on a registered sale deed of 1971, coupled with a specific plea that the impugned gift deed came to the appellant/plaintiff's knowledge only in 2017. Thus, the ban of limitation is not apparent on the face of the plaint but depends on disputed facts such as knowledge and possession, making it a mixed question of law and fact not amenable to rejection at the threshold. vi. In Gajara Vishnu Gosavi (supra 8) the case pertained to a purchaser of an undivided share in joint family 26 property, where it was held that in the absence of partition, possession could not be claimed, based on concurrent findings after trial. In contrast, the present case is founded on absolute title under a registered sale deed, coupled with a specific plea of permissive possession and a challenge to a subsequent gift deed by the person who was granted permissive possession. The questions of adverse possession, limitation, and date of knowledge are disputed and cannot be decided at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Hence, the said judgment has no application.
vii. In Ashok Kumar Mahto (supra 9) the case pertains to proof of partition in joint family property, decided after full trial on evidence. The present case, however, involves a challenge to a subsequent gift deed allegedly executed without title, based on prior ownership (which stood divested) on account of execution of a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff) and alleged permissive possession. The issues herein relate to title, possession, and limitation based on knowledge, which require adjudication upon evidence and which cannot be decided in an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 27
29. It is also relevant to note that the plaint seeks multiple reliefs, such as declaration and recovery of possession. The cause of action for the relief of declaration is specifically linked to the date of knowledge, i.e., 10.03.2017. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the relief of recovery of possession is open to challenge on the ground of limitation, the relief of declaration cannot be said to be ex facie barred on the basis of the plaint averments. Nonetheless, the trial Court, rejected the plaint in its entirety without examining whether any part of the claim was maintainable. Such an approach is contrary to the settled principles governing Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The proper course would have been to frame appropriate issues, including on limitation and adverse possession, and decide the same upon appreciation of evidence.
30. Further, there is a distinction between a plaint that does not disclose a cause of action and a plaint that has no cause of action. For determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must look only at the plaint, and if the plaint, on a plain and meaningful reading, shows a bundle of facts that gives the plaintiff a right to sue it cannot be rejected even if the defence is strong. 28 Conclusion
31. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order and decree of the trial court in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 are unsustainable in law. The trial court has acted beyond its jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by considering the written statement and extraneous documentary evidence, and by prejudging the issues of limitation and cause of action which require a full-fledged trial.
32. Accordingly, this Appeal Suit is allowed. The order and decree dated 08.02.2019 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, in I.A.No.1189 of 2017 in O.S.No.981 of 2017 are hereby set aside.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in the appeal, shall stand closed. No costs.
__________________________ G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J Date:17.04.2026 Note: LR copy to be marked.
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