Delhi District Court
Bindu Alias Bindu Kumari Alias Renu ... vs Ankesh Kumar Patel on 15 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. LOVLEEN, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS
JUDGE-03, SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
DLSE010010582025
CRL. APPEAL No. 44/2025
BINDU @ BINDU KUMARI @ RENU SINGH
D/O LALARAM
R/o H. NO. 1-1001, N-BLOCK, MANGOLPURI
NORTH WEST, DELHI-110083
Also At:
H.NO. B-110, GALI NO. 5
(NEARBY SHIVANI SCHOOL),
AMBEDKAR COLONY, CHATTARPUR,
SOUTH DELHI, NEW DELHI-110074
....Appellant
versus
ANKESH KUMAR PATEL
S/o SH. YOGESHWAR PRASAD
R/o H.NO. J-21, PREM NAGAR,
JAITPUR, SOUTH DELHI-110044.
...Respondent
Date of institution : 30.01.2025
Date of Reserving judgment : 06.06.2025.
Date of Pronouncement : 15.07.2025
Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 1/33
LOVLEEN
Digitally signed
by LOVLEEN
Date:
2025.07.15
16:23:25
+0530
JUDGMENT
1. This is an appeal under section 415 (2) BNSS, 2023 preferred by the appellant/convict against the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2024 and order on sentence dated 16.11.2024 passed by Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class-(NI Act), Digital Court- 02, South East District in CC 10155/2022 titled Ankesh Kumar Patel Vs. Bindu @ Bindu Kumari, whereby the appellant/ convict Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh was convicted of the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and was directed to pay a fine of Rs.1,70,000/- to the complainant/ respondent within 60 days from the date of order. In default of payment of the above stated fine, the appellant/ convict is to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. For the sake of convenience, the appellant/ convict herein shall be referred to as 'accused' and the respondent herein shall be referred to as 'complainant'.
BRIEF FACTS
2. The facts of the case put forth by the complainant against the accused have been correctly noted by the Ld. Magistrate in her impugned judgment. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinafter for ready reference:-
"...................................................................................... ......................................................................... ............
2. The complainant's case is that the complainant and accused are well known to each other and they were having friendly relations. In the first week of December, 2019, the accused requested and demanded a friendly loan of Rs. 1,70,000/-from the complainant Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 2/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:23:29 +0530 for starting a shop for business on assurance that the loan amount shall be returned within one year. Thereafter, believing the version of accused and considering the need and friendly relations, the complainant gave a friendly loan of Rs. 1,70,000/- to the accused through DD bearing no. 864902 of PNB, Branch Nehru Enclave, Kalkaji, New Delhi on 31.12.2019. Thereafter, accused again requested and demanded a friendly loan of Rs. 30,000/- from complainant for her business and promised to refund the same within one year. The said amount of Rs. 30,000/- was transferred by the complainant in the bank account of accused.
3. On several demands of the complainant, the accused returned only Rs. 30,000/- out of the total loan amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-, while the remaining outstanding liability of the accused is of Rs.1,70,000/-. In discharge of her legal liability, accused issued a cheque bearing no. 000023, dated 31.05.2022, Bandhan Bank, Branch Vasant Kunj, New Delhi 110070 of Rs. 1,70,000/- (hereinafter referred to as the 'cheque in question') in favor of the complainant but when the said cheque was presented three times by the complainant, the same was dishonoured for the reason "funds insufficient" vide return memo dated 02.06.2020, 08.06.2022 and 16.08.2022.
4. Thereafter, the complainant sent a legal demand notice dated 30.08.2022 U/S 138 of the NI Act asking the accused to make the payment of the cheque amount, which was duly served upon the accused, however, accused failed to make the payment despite Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 3/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN LOVLEEN Date:
2025.07.15 16:23:35 +0530 delivery of the legal demand notice. Hence, being aggrieved, the complainant has filed the present complaint and prayed that the accused be summoned, tried and punished under Section 138 of the NI Act. ............ .................................................... .............................................................................."
TRIAL
3. Vide order dated 15.12.2022, the Ld. Magistrate concerned summoned the accused to face trial u/s 138 NI Act. On 24.04.2023, a notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C. was framed upon the accused wherein she admitted her signatures on the cheque. She also admitted that all the particulars were filed by her except date on the cheque in question. She also admitted the service of legal demand notice and the address mentioned on the same to be correct. In defence, accused submitted that:- "I have taken Rs. 1,70,000/- from the complainant out of which I have already returned Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant by making payment of Rs. 10,000/- every month. I had given the cheque in question to the complainant when I had taken loan from him. I have outstanding liability of Rs. 50,000/- towards the accused."
(emphasis supplied)
4. During trial, the complainant examined himself as CW-1 in support of his allegations against the accused in this case. Statement of accused was recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C. In defence evidence, the accused examined herself as DW-1 and one Vikram Vig as DW-2. Upon the conclusion of trial, accused was convicted of the offence punishable u/s 138 NI Act vide the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2024.
Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 4/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:23:38 +0530 GROUNDS OF APPEAL
5. The grounds cited by the accused against the impugned judgement are as under :
A). Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate and properly evaluate the material evidence on record, specifically the WhatsApp chat between the Appellant and the Respondent/Complainant dated 28.05.2022 (exhibitedDW1/A).
The said WhatsApp chat clearly establishes that the Respondent/Complainant was already in possession of the alleged cheque on the said date, as he threatened the Appellant that, in the event of her failure to make the monthly instalment, he would present the alleged cheque for encashment. Furthermore Respondent/Complainant admitted in WhatsApp chat that the alleged cheque is an old cheque as evident from the conversation between the Appellant and Respondent/Complainant dated on WhatsApp dated 11.07.2022.
This evidence directly contradicts the Respondent/Complainant's deposition before the Learned Trial Court, wherein he falsely stated that he received the alleged cheque from the Appellant on 31.05.2022. Such an inconsistent and contradictory statement on the part of the Respondent/Complainant not only undermines the credibility of his testimony but also demonstrates his mala fide intent to falsely implicate and harass the Appellant.
The Learned Trial Court erred in failing to consider this glaring contradiction, which is critical the to of determination of the genuineness the Respondent/Complainant's case. This oversight has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice, warranting interference by this Hon'ble Court.
The Learned Trial Court erred in law and fact by failing to Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 5/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN LOVLEEN Date:
2025.07.15 16:23:41 +0530 appreciate the material evidence on record, which unequivocally demonstrates that out of the alleged total amount of Rs. 1,70,000/-, the Appellant had already repaid a sum of Rs. To 1,20,000/- to the Respondent/Complainant. This fact is conclusively established through the WhatsApp communications exchanged the between Appellant and the Respondent/Complainant, exhibited as DW1/A, and further corroborated by the Appellant's bank statements, exhibited as DW1/B. The specific bifurcation of the payments made by the Appellant, as supported by the aforementioned evidence, is as follows:
a) From August 2020 to May 2021 Rs.50,000/-withdrawn from the Appellant's ATM by the Respondent/Complainant on several occasions.
b) June 2021 5,000/- paid at the residence of the Appellant.
c) July 2021 5,000/- paid at a metro station.
d) 11.08.2021 5,000/- paid at a metro station.
e) 06.09.2021 10,000/- paid at TV Hospital.
f) 05.10.2021 9,999/- transferred via PhonePe.
g) 09.11.2021 9,000/- transferred via PhonePe.
h) 08.12.2021 6,000/- paid at Chhattarpur Mandir.
i) 08.02.2022 10,000/- paid at Chhattarpur Cafe.
j) 01.04.2022 10,000/- paid at Chhattarpur Cafe.
The evidence unequivocally proves that the Respondent/Complainant received the aforementioned payments, leaving an outstanding balance far less than the alleged amount of Rs1,70,000/-. The Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the Appellant's contention that the Respondent/Complainant, despite receiving substantial payments of Rs. 1,20,000/-, sought to misuse the provisions of Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 6/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN LOVLEEN Date:
2025.07.15 16:23:45 +0530 Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, to unjustly enrich himself and harass the Appellant.
The Trial Court further erred in not considering that the payments made by the Appellant were corroborated by contemporaneous WhatsApp communications, as well as banking records, which were not challenged or disproved by the Respondent/Complainant.
B). Because in the WhatsApp chat between the Appellant and Respondent/Complainant dated 11.07.2022, Respondent/Complainant texted the Appellant -
"Unhone bola ki madam ko bola hu kijitna Paisa baki hai usme se kuch cash Dene ke baad", "Jo bachega uska cheque de degi", "Or old 1,70,000 ka cheque Return kardena hai", "Or Aap batayiye"
The above conversation clearly shows that the Appellant was making regular payments to Respondent/Complainant and the recovery amount was far less than the amount of mentioned on alleged cheque i.e. Rs. 1,70,000/-.
C). Because the legally enforceable debt was only Rs. 50,000/- as on the date of presentment of cheque, at the time of issuing legal demand notice and at the time of filing of the complaint U/S 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 in case titled as "ANKESH KUMAR PATEL VS. BINDU @ BINDU KUMARI @RENU SINGH" with case No. CC NI ACT 10155/2022 before learned Trial Court.Itis pertinent to mention herein that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgement in Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahenrabhai Patel. (Crl. A. No. 1479/2022), observed that Sections 138 and 56 of NI Act, 1881 mandate that when a part-payment of the debt is made after the cheque was drawn but before the cheque is encashed, such Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 7/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:23:49 +0530 payment must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 of the Act, 1881. As such, the cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part payment, and such an endorsement can be made by a). recording the part payment, or b). the debt in the cheque or a note appended to the cheque. In consequence, if the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence under Section 138 would not be attracted since the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also laid specific emphasis on the High Court of Kerela Division Bench's case of Joseph Sartho υ. Gopinathan, that since "the representation in the cheque was for a sum higher than the amount that was due on the date that it was presented for encashment, the drawer of the cheque cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Act, 1881.".
Therefore, the Ld. Trial Court could not have convicted the appellant under sec 138 of NI Act, 1881 as part payments amounting to a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/-was made by the appellant after the cheque was drawnbut before the cheque was presented for encashment. That the sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- represented on the cheque, as such, was not a legally enforceable debt on the date of presentment of cheque.
D). Because in para 27 of the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court observed that the Appellant admitted receiving a sum of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 25,000 into her bank account from the complainant on 04.02.2020 and 05.02.2020, but the Ld. Trial Court missed to see fact that the the said transaction is not being reflected in the bank statement of Appellant exhibited as DW1/B. The relevant portion of the final order is reproduced herein;
LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 8/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:23:57 +0530 "During defence evidence, DW-1 admitted receiving a sum of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 25,000 into her bank from the complainant on 04.02.2020 and 05.02.2020, She deposed that this amount was transferred by the complainant to the accused as he urgently required cash, but had forgotten his ATM card at home, therefore he transferred the said amount to the account of the accused and withdrew the same from the account of the complainant. The accused placed reliance upon her bank statement from 01.12.2019 till 31.12.2022 which is-Ex. DWI/B (colly). During cross examination, upon specifically being asked if she could show the withdrawal of Rs. 5,000 and Rs 25,000 from her account, DW-1 deposed that she could not show the same as the same was not reflecting in Ex. DW1/B."
E). Because Para no. 30 and 31 clearly shows that the Ld. Trial Court got confused between the fact of the case and statement made by the DW2. DW 2 in his statement states that in the month of Nov,2022 appellant borrowed a sum of Rs. 60,000/- to repay the Complainant against the full and final settlement of Rs. 50,000/-.That the Ld. Trialcourt erroneously included the said amount in total payment made by the appellant to Complainantreached to the conclusion in para no. 31 that there is contradiction in the statement of DW - 2 and the Appellant. The relevant portion of the final order is reproduced herein;
"30. On the other hand, DW-2 deposed in his examination in chief that the accused had paid Re 1, Rs. 9,999/- and Rs. 9000/-through Phone Pay to the complainant in his presence, however, during cross examination he stated that he cannot tell the date, month or year when the accused had paid Rupee One, Rs. 9,999/- and Rs. 9,000/- through Phone Pay to the complainant as it was not given in his presence. He further LOVLEENCrl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 9/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:01 +0530 stated that the accused returned Rs. 1,20,000 to the complainant, out of which Rs. 50,000 was made in his presence at Chhatarpur metro station by way of ATM withdrawal by complainant from account of the accused, Rs. 60,000 was borrowed by the accused from DW-2 to be paid to the complainant, Rs. 19,000 was paid in the presence of DW-2 through PhonePay, and Rs. 40,000 was paid in his presence in 4 instalments of Rs. 10,000 each paid at Chhatarpur metro station, Nehru Place, Chhatarpur Café, and Burger King at PVR Anupama.
31. The aforementioned payments amount to a total of Rs. 1,69,000/- whereas the accused in her evidence admitted to paying only Rs. 1,20,000 to the complainant, and the same is also reflected in Ex. DW 1/A. When DW-2 was confronted with the said contradiction, he stated that he could not tell if Ex. DW/1A was a wrong document. He further stated that the additional amount may have been paid on account of interest"
F). Because in Para no. 33 the Ld. Trial court misinterpreted the testimony of DW2. The Ld. trial court in the said para of the impugned judgment observed that DW2 in his testimony deposed that he advanced Rs. 60,000/- to the Appellant/accused sometime in the November December 2022for making payment to the Respondent/Complainant, however the complaint was already been filed in October 2022. The Ld. Trial court, failed to consider that the amount was borrowed by Appellant to arrive at full and final settlement with the Respondent/ Complainant by making a payment of Rs. 50000/- out of the borrowed amount of Rs. 60.000/-This fact is also deposed by the Appellant in court during trial wherein she deposed that she offered to pay Rs. 50,000/- as full and final settlement which was refused by Digitally Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 10/33 signed by LOVLEEN LOVLEEN Date:
2025.07.15 16:24:04 +0530 Respondent/Complainant. This fact is also admitted by the Respondent/Complainant in his cross-examination dated 04.09.2023 wherein he deposed "It is correct that on previous date of hearing, accused was ready and willing to give me Rs.
50,000/- which I refused. (the outstanding amount is Rs.1,70,000/- and not Rs. 50,000/-).
G). Because the impugned judgment and order is entirely based on the presumption drawn on by the Ld. Trial Court under section 118A and 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. Ld. trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the Appellant placed sufficient material and evidence on record to rebut the presumption under enumerated under section 118A and 139of the Negotiable Instrument Act.
Ld. trial court failed to appreciate that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption 'disappears' and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having shifted to the complainant, he is obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove it would result in dismissal of his complaint case.
H). Because evidence affidavit of complainant Ex. CW-1/1 was not signed before the notary rather as admitted by the complainant in his cross-examination. The relevant extract of cross-examination of the complainant dated 04.09.2023 is reproduced here for ready reference: It is correct that my Affidavit of evidence has been prepare by my counsel. The content of affidavit was read over to me by my counsel. I do not know the meaning of vernacular language. I do not know Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 11/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:07 +0530 where the affidavit was attested(vol. It was attested by my counsel).It is correct that I did not visit any Notary public and did not sign in the register of notary public.
I). Because the impugned judgment is based on the surmises and conjectures and therefore, liable to be set aside.
J). Because the impugned order/judgment is against the well settled law on the point involved in the case and the findings of the Learned Trial Court are perverse, contrary to evidence on record, and result in miscarriage of justice. a Κ). Because learned trial court erred in not appreciating that Hon'ble Delhi High court in Shail Kumari US Saraswati Devihas held as under: -
18. There are other rules also which deal with how the endorsement is to be made at the documents which are not admitted in evidence, the documents which are required to be placed in strong cover, the consequences of not properly admitting documents etc. However, Rule 18 which has relevance to the controversy raised is necessary to be noticed.
It is as follows:
"It is the duty of the Court, before hearing arguments, finally to revise the record which is to form the basis of its judgment and to see that it contains all that has been formally admitted in evidence and nothing else. Any papers still found with the file, which have not been admitted in evidence, should be returned to the parties.
Appellate Courts should examine the records of cases coming before them on appeal with a view to satisfying themselves that subordinate Courts have complied with the provisions of the LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 12/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:10 +0530 law and instructions of the High Court on the subject, and should take serious notice of the matter when it appears that any Court has failed to do so."
L). Because in Baldeo Sahai v. Ram Chander and Ors. AIR (1931) Lahore 546 it was held:
"There are two stages relating to documents. One is the stage when all the documents on which the parties rely are filed by them in Court. The next stage is when the documents are proved and formally tendered in evidence. It is at this later stage that the Court has to decide whether they should be admitted or rejected. If they are admitted and proved then the seal of the Court is put on them giving certain details laid down by law, otherwise the documents are returned to the party who produced them with an endorsement therein to that effect."
M). Because the Ld. Trial Court has relied upon the judgment titled as "Krishna Janardhan Bhat V. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 but the Ld. Trial court failed to consider the further observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in para 33 and 34 of the Judgment relied upon by the Ld. Trial Court. The observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court is reproduced below:
"33. But, we may at the same time notice the development of law in this area in some jurisdictions.
The presumption of innocence is a human right. Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law". Although India is not bound by the aforementioned Convention and as such it may not be necessary like the countries forming European LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 13/33 2025.07.15 16:24:14 +0530 countries to bring common law into land with the Convention, a balancing of the accused rights and the interest of the society is required to be taken into consideration. In India, however, subject to the statutory interdicts, the said principle forms the basis of criminal jurisprudence. For the aforementioned purpose the nature of the offence, seriousness as also gravity thereof may be taken into consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that merely on the application of presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the same may not lead to injustice or mistaken conviction. It is for the aforementioned reasons that we have taken into consideration the decisions operating in the field where the difficulty of proving a negative has been emphasized. It is not suggested that a negative can never be proved but there are cases where such difficulties are faced by the accused e.g,. honest and reasonable mistake of fact.
In a recent Article "The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Duty" published in [2007] C.L.J. (March Part) 142 it has been stated:
In determining whether a reverse burden is compatible with the presumption of innocence regard should also be had to the pragmatics of proof. How difficult would it be for the prosecution to prove guilt without the reverse burden? How easily could an innocent defendant discharge the reverse burden? But courts will not allow these pragmatic considerations to override the legitimate rights of the defendant. Pragmatism will have greater sway where the reverse burden would not pose the risk of great injustice where the offence is not too serious or the reverse burden only concerns a matter incidental to guilt. And greater weight will be given to prosecutorial efficiency in the regulatory environment.
LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 14/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:18 +0530
34. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This, however, shall not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption, but it stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should be held to have rebutted. Other important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of innocence as human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record and having regard to legal principles governing the same."
Ν). Because the Ld. Trial Court incorrectly appreciated and placed incorrect interpretation on the oral evidence and documents on record.
O). Because the sentencing procedure wherein the appellant has been directed to pay compensation to the respondent is against the procedure established by law.
P). Any other ground/judicial pronouncement (s), during arguments with the permission of this Hon'ble Court.
6. It is prayed that the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2024 and the order on sentence dated 16.11.2024 may be set aside.
LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 15/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:22 +0530 SUBMISSIONS OF COMPLAINANT
7. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the complainant has argued that the accused has been correctly convicted by the Ld. Magistrate. He prays for dismissal of the appeal filed by the accused.
DISCUSSION
8. This Court has considered the oral submissions as well as the records.
9. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to define the contours of the law relating to the provision u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act in Rajesh Jain Vs. Ajay Singh 2023 INSC 888. The relevant extracts of the observations are reproduced below for ready reference:-
Section 138 of the NI Act - Necessary Ingredients
25. Essentially, in all trials concerning dishonour of cheque, the courts are called upon to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act.
26. In Gimpex Private Limited vs. Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705 , this Court has unpacked the ingredients forming the basis of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act in the following structure:
(1) The drawing of a cheque by person on do LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:25 +0530 Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 16/33 account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account;
(i) The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability;
(iii) Presentation of the cheque to the bank arranged to be paid from that account,
(iv) The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount
(v) A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque; and
(vi) The drawer of the cheque failing to make payment of the amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.
27. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 this Court had summarised the constituent elements of the offence in fairly similar terms by holding:
"14. The offence Under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts.The following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 17/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:28 +0530 bank, (3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (3) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice."
28. The five (5) acts as set out in K Bhaskaran's case (supra) are, generally speaking, matters of record and would be available in the form of documentary evidence as early as, at the stage of filing the complaint and initiating prosecution. Apart from the above acts, it is also to be proved that cheque was issued in discharge of a debt or liability (Ingredient no. (ii) in Gimpex's case). The burden of proving this fact, like the other facts, would have ordinarily fallen upon the complainant. However, through the introduction of a presumptive device in Section 139 of the NI Act, the Parliament has sought to overcome the general norm as stated in Section 102 of the Evidence Act and has, thereby fixed the onus of proving the same on the accused. Section 139, in that sense, is an example of a reverse onus clause and requires the accused to prove the non-existence of the presumed fact, i.e., that cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability.
Burden of Proof and Presumptions: Conceptual Underpinnings
29. There are two senses in which the phrase 'burden of proof' is used in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act, hereinafter). One is the burden of proof arising as a LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 18/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date:
2025.07.15 16:24:34 +0530 matter of pleading and the other is the one which deals with the question as to who has first to prove a particular fact. The former is called the 'legal burden' and it never shifts, the latter is called the 'evidential burden' and it shifts from one side to the other. [See Kundanlal v. Custodian Evacuee Property (AIR 1961 SC 1316)]
30. The legal burden is the burden of proof which remains constant throughout a trial. It is the burden of establishing the facts and contentions which will support a party's case. If, at the conclusion of the trial a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standards, he would lose to stand. The incidence of the burden is usually clear from the pleadings and usually, it is incumbent on the plaintiff or complainant to prove what he pleaded or contends. On the other hand, the evidential burden may shift from one party to another as the trial progresses according to the balance of evidence given at any particular stage; the burden rests upon the party who would fail if no evidence at all, or no further evidence, as the case may be is adduced by either side (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition para 13). While the former, the legal burden arising on the pleadings is mentioned in Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the latter, the evidential burden, is referred to in Section 102 thereof. [G.Vasu V. Syed Yaseen (AIR 1987 AP139) affirmed in Bharat Barrel Vs. Amin Chand [(1999) 3 SCC 35] ]
31. Presumption, on the other hand, literally means Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 19/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:38 +0530 "taking as true without examination or proof". In Kumar Exports v. Sharma Exports (2009) 2 SCC 513, this Court referred to presumption as "devices by use of which courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence."
32. Broadly speaking, presumptions are of two kinds, presumptions of fact and of law. Presumptions of fact are inferences logically drawn from one fact as to the existence of other facts. Presumptions of fact are rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. Presumptions of law may be either irrebuttable (conclusive presumptions), so that no evidence to the contrary may be given or rebuttable. A rebuttable presumption of law is a legal rule to be applied by the Court in the absence of conflicting evidence (Halsbury, 4th Edition paras 111, 112]. Among the class of rebuttable presumptions, a further distinction can be made between discretionary presumptions ('may presume') and compulsive or compulsory presumptions ('shall presume'). [G. Vasu V. Syed Yaseen (Supra)]
33. The Evidence Act provides for presumptions, which fit within one of three forms: 'may presume' (rebuttable presumptions of fact), 'shall presume' (rebuttable presumption of law) and conclusive presumptions (irrebuttable presumption of law). The distinction between 'may presume' and 'shall presume' clauses is that, as regards the former, the Court has an option to raise the LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 20/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:41 +0530 presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved, [G.Vasu V. Syed Yaseen (Supra)] Section 139 NI Act-Effect of Presumption and Shifting of Onus of Proof
34. The NI Act provides for two presumptions: Section 118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that 'unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability'. It will be seen that the 'presumed fact' directly relates to one of the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction under Section 138.
35. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a 'shall presume' clause is illustrative of a presumption of law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court 'shall presume' the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. But this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 21/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:24:51 +0530 proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the phrase 'unless the contrary is proved'.
36. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. [ Bharat Barrel Vs. Amin Chand] [(1999) 3 SCC 35]
37. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused contends that 'a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019) 4 SCC 197]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer's signature, without admitting the execution of the entire contents in the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.
38. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank towards the LOVLEEN discharge of any liability. Until this evidential burden is Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 22/33 Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:00 +0530 discharged by the accused, the presumed fact will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further.
39. John Henry Wigmore12 on Evidence states as follows:
"The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption 'disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule."
40. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non- existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. The accused must meet the standard of 'preponderance of probabilities', similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. [Rangappa vs. Mohan (AIR 2010 SC 1898)]
41. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. The words 'until the contrary is proved' occurring in Section 139 do not mean that accused must necessarily prove the negative that the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court to consider Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 23/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:05 +0530 the non-existence of debt/liability so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did not exist. [Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa (AIR 2019 SC 1983) See also Kumar Exports Vs. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513]25
42. In other words, the accused is left with two options. The first option-of proving that the debt/liability does not exist-is to lead defence evidence and conclusively establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove the non- existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour of the accused's case may be even fifty one to forty nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the case, which includes: the complainant's version in the original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice, complainant's case at the trial, as also the plea of the accused in the reply notice, his 313 statement or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding that there was 'no debt/liability'. [Kumar Exports and Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513]
43. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential LOVLEEN burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e., oral or Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 24/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:09 +0530 documentary evidence or admissions made by the opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumption of law or fact.
44. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundanlal's case- (supra) when the creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the evidence, if produced would have shown the non- existence of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Section 118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended and applied in the context of Section 139 as well.
45. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 25/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:12 +0530 the complainant and the presumption 'disappears' and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983; See also, Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441].
EXISTENCE OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
10. Trial court record reflects that at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C, the accused admitted that the cheque in question belongs to her and also bears her signatures and all the particulars on the cheque except the date. The accused also admits the handing over of the cheque in question to the complainant albeit for a different purpose then what is claimed by the complainant. Admittedly, the cheque in question was dishonored upon being presented for encashment by the complainant. A legal notice was then sent by the complainant to the accused demanding the amount due under the cheque in question. Service of the said legal notice is admitted by the accused at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC. Admittedly, the accused did not make any payment demanded vide the said legal notice within the period prescribed u/s 138 of NI Act. All the above facts are sufficient to invoke the presumptions available to the complainant u/s 118 NI Act and u/s 139 NI Act. As such, the evidential burden stood Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 26/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:15 +0530 transferred upon the accused to prove that the cheque in question was not issued towards discharge of any liability. Until the said evidential burden is discharged by the accused, the presumptions available against the accused u/s 118 NI Act and u/s 139 NI Act will have to be assumed to be true, without expecting the complainant to do anything further. The said burden could be discharged by the accused either by leading defence evidence to conclusively establish that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt / liability or by proving the non existence of debt / liability on preponderance of probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances of the case. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential burden need not necessarily be direct evidence. Once the accused produces such evidence, the burden shifts back to the complainant and the above mentioned presumptions disappear.
REBUTTAL OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
11. Now, the question left to be decided is whether the said presumptions have been successfully rebutted by the accused or not. In order to adjudicate the same, this Court must deal with the facts adduced on record by the accused during the cross-examination of complainant or during the defence evidence.
12. The said adjudication requires an understanding of the respective stands taken by the parties.
13. As per complainant, the cheque in question was handed over by the accused in order to repay the friendly loan of Rs. 1,70,000/-, advanced via a demand draft drawn on PNB. Complainant examined himself as a witness Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 27/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:19 +0530 during the course of trial.
14. On the other hand, the accused denies any such liability and claims, in response to notice framed upon her u/s 251 Cr.P.C, that "I have taken Rs. 1,70,000/- from the complainant out of which I have already returned Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant by making payment of Rs. 10,000/- every month. I had given the cheque in question to the complainant when I had taken loan from him. I have outstanding liability of Rs. 50,000/- towards the accused". In her statement recorded u/s 313 Cr.PC, the accused states that the demand draft referred to by the complainant was for an NGO namely Gyan Ganga Kalyan Sangh, where she was working. She further states that she was told to return the amount of demand draft, which she did in installments of Rs. 10,000/- each. She further states that the cheque in question was issued as a 'security' at the time of receipt of said demand draft. Accused examined herself as DW-1 and one Vikram Vig as DW-2 in defence.
15. Now we delve into the oral testimony of complainant, who examined himself as CW-1. CW-1 deposed in line with the facts mentioned in the afore-going paragraphs. He was duly cross-examined on behalf of the accused. However, nothing material could be brought on record by accused so as to create any doubt in the case set up by the complainant. In fact , CW1 has flatly denied all the suggestions given by the accused inline with the plea of defence recorded at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC. Rather, this Court notes that during the course of cross-examination of said witness, certain relevant admissions were made by the accused. The relevant extracts of the cross-examination are reproduced for ready LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 28/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:22 +0530 reference:-
"........................................................................ The amount of cheque in question is Rs. 1,70,000/-. The accused has not paid any amount to me. (Vol. Rs. 2,00,000/- was given to the accused as loan and she has repaid only Rs. 30,000/- to me. The statement of account is not on record). It is correct that no document/ loan agreement was executed between us. ............................. The loan was given by way of DD on 31.12.2019. It is correct that I did not see any document of the accused to assure if the loan was taken for business purposes. (vol. I had faith in the accused and this is why upon her request I issued DD).............. Rs. 30,000/- was given to the accused by way of UPI in two trenches of Rs. 5000/- and Rs. 25,000/-. It is correct that I did not inform the husband of the accused. (Vol. The husband was not concerened with the loan). It is correct that I have demanded the cheque amount from the accused. It is correct that we used to conversed over whatsapp) .................................... ................................................................................."
(Cross-examination of CW1 Sh. Ankesh Kumar Patel dated 04.09.2023 )
16. The above cross-examination clearly reflects that the accused admits that she availed a loan from complainant through a Demand Draft. The said admission is binding upon the accused in view of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC Online SC 355. In view of the above admission as well as the admissions made by the accused at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC (to the effect that she took a sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- from the complainant and that she herself had handed over the cheque in question to the complainant at the time of availing the said loan), all the relevant arguments of the accused disputing the above aspects are liable to be discarded. That being so, in the considered opinion of this Court, it could Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 29/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:27 +0530 be safely held that the accused has not been able to rebut the statutory presumptions operating against her during the course of cross-examination of CW1.
17. Proceeding further, this Court notes that accused has examined herself as DW-1 in her defence. DW-1 deposed as under during the course of his examination-in-chief:-
"I know the complainant since many years. I did not request or demanded any friendly loan from the complainant for Rs. 1,70,000/- but it was the complainant who had handed over a DD for Rs. 1,70,000/- to me as I used to work in an NGO. I asked the complainant as to how I shall return the amount as the DD is in my name but the complainant assured me that the payment can be made in installments and there is no rush. After six-seven months, the complainant demanded a cheque from me. I gave the cheque in question as a blank signed cheque to the complainant in the year 2020. At the time of lockdown, the complainant along with five to six other people used to visit my residence and demand his money back. I could not return the amount in one installment but I returned the amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- in various installments like Rs. 50,000/- out of which Rs. 40,000/- was given from my account and Rs. 10,000/- was given in cash. Thereafter, I paid various installments of Rs. 10,000/- by way of cash and account transfer. Till date, I have paid a total amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant and I am ready to pay rest of the amount of Rs. 50,000/- to the complainant. I have whatsapp chat with the accused which is Mark DW1/A."
18. It is very much apparent from the above oral testimony of DW-1 that she has deposed contrary to her plea of defence recorded at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC. This court must note that at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC, the accused admits that she took a sum of Rs. 1,70,000/- from the complainant and she herself had handed over the Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 30/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:31 +0530 cheque in question to the complainant at the time of availing said loan. However, accused deposes as DW1 that she did not request or demand any loan from the complainant, rather it was the complainant who handed over a demand draft of Rs. 1,70,000/- to her as she was working in an NGO. Not only she fails to clarify the above contradiction, she also fails to explain as to why the complainant would hand over a demand draft for Rs. 1,70,000/- to her merely because she was working in an NGO. That apart, at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC, the accused admits that she handed over the cheque in question to the complainant at the time of availing loan from complainant (i.e. in the year 2019). However, accused deposes as DW1 that she handed over the cheque in question to the complainant in the year 2020. Accused has failed to explain the above contradictions as well. Moving further, this Court notes that at the time of framing of notice u/s 251 CrPC, the accused admits that the particulars in the cheque in question, except the date, were filled by her. However, accused deposes as DW1 that the cheque in question was blank at the time it was handed over to the complainant. Accused has failed to explain the above contradictions also. In the absence of any reasonable and logical explanation towards the above contradictions, this court finds it appropriate to reject the oral testimony of DW1 as far as the same is concerned with respect to the above aspects.
19. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the principle of 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus' does not apply in India. As such, this Court could not reject the entire oral testimony of DW1 in a wholesale manner and is rather required to deal with the same as per the prescribed standards of law. Here, this Court must observe that DW1 has deposed that she has returned a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant and therefore her existing liability is to LOVLEEN Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 31/33 Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:34 +0530 the extent of Rs. 50,000/- only. In this regard, DW1 relies upon her bank statement Ex. DW1/B and her whatsapp chats with the complainant Ex. DW1/A. It would be appropriate to mention here that the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2024 reflects that the Ld. Magistrate has dealt with the said defence of the accused at length between paras 27 to 34. There is no doubt about the fact that DW1 has not placed on record any direct documentary proof regarding her claim as to the repayment of Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant. That apart, this Court finds that the bank statement Ex. DW1/B does not seem to corroborate her claim regarding repayment of Rs. 1,20,000/- to the complainant. However, TCR reflects that the whatsapp chat Ex. DW1/A, accompanied by a certificate u/s 65 B of IEA, between the complainant and accused bears acknowledgement by complainant regarding receipt of atleast a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- from the accused and an outstanding sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- before 04.01.2022. Complainant has not disputed the said whatsapp chat Ex. DW1/A, nor has he claimed that the above acknowledgement relates to some other transaction between the parties. Complainant has not bothered to explain as to why he has made the said acknowledgement in favour of the accused. In the absence of any such explanation from the complainant, a reasonable doubt indeed arises as to the total quantum of the outstanding amount recoverable by him from the accused. This doubt probablises the defence of the accused that she had already returned a lion's share of the loan availed by her from the complainant and that her outstanding liability is not Rs. 1,70,000/-. This fact shifts the evidential burden upon the complainant and discharges all the statutory presumptions operating against the accused. Admittedly, complainant has not placed any other material to rebut the claim of the accused.
Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 32/33 LOVLEEN Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date: 2025.07.15 16:25:39 +0530 DECISION
20. In view of the above discussions, this Court is constrained to hold that appellant Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh is liable to be acquitted. Ordered accordingly. Needless to say, the impugned judgment 25.10.2024 and the order on sentence dated 16.11.2024 are hereby set aside. Digitally signed by LOVLEEN Date:
LOVLEEN Announced & Dictated in the 2025.07.15 16:25:42 Open Court today i.e. 15.07.2025 +0530 (Lovleen) ASJ-03 (South East) Saket Courts, Delhi Crl. Appeal No: 44/2025 Bindu @ Bindu Kumari @ Renu Singh vs Ankesh Kumar Patel 33/33