Punjab-Haryana High Court
Smt. Karam Devi And Others vs The State Of Haryana Through Collector on 27 February, 2013
Author: K. Kannan
Bench: K. Kannan
RFA No.1496 of 1991 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RFA No.1496 of 1991
Date of Decision.27.02.2013
Smt. Karam Devi and others .....Appellants
Versus
The State of Haryana through Collector, Hissar and another
...Respondents
2. RFA Nos.1604, 1630, 1631, 1691 of 1991, 1406, 1407 of 1992,
3. RFA Nos.1517 to 1527 of 1994, 380 and 893 of 1998
Present: None for the appellants in RFA Nos.1496, 1604, 1630, 1631,
1691 of 1991, 1406, 1407 of 1992, 380 and 893 of 1998 and
none for the respondents in RFA Nos.1517 to 1527 of 1994.
Mr. Kunal Garg, AAG, Haryana for the appellants in
RFA Nos.1517 to 1527 of 1994 and for the respondent-State
in RFA Nos.1496, 1604, 1630, 1631,1691 of 1991, 1406,
1407 of 1992, 380 and 893 of 1998.
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment ? No
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? No
-.-
K. KANNAN J.(ORAL)
1. The appeals are at the instance of the State as well as the private land owners against the awards determining compensation at Rs.23/- per square yard with statutory benefits under the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. The details of the award are as follows:-
Date of notification u/s 4 15.5.1979
Village Hissar
Total extent acquired 141.04 acres
Purpose of acquisition Residential and commercial
Collector's award Chahi, Barani and gair mumkin
Rs.272/- per marla (Block A)
Rs.242/- per marla (Block B)
Rs.180/- per marla (Block C)
RFA No.1496 of 1991 -2-
Date of notification u/s 4 15.5.1979
Reference Court Rs.23/- per sq. yd.
Sale Instances*
Sr. Date Extent Consideration Value per Located in
No. acre/sq.yd/sq.ft rough sketch
/sq.mtr Yes/No
By claimants. -nil-
By State -nil-
Previous award
Award of District Village Notification u/s 4 Award of compensation
Court or High per acre
Court
Ex.R3 dated Rs.23/- per sq. yd.
15.5.89
Ex.R4 dated Rs.23/- per sq. yd.
12.08.1988
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State would state in this case that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 15.05.1979 and the Collector's award was passed on 11.06.1981. I have verified from the original records that the land owners have sought for reference under Section 18 within time on 08.08.1981 but there has been a belated reference by the Collector to the Court only on 20.12.1988. Consequently, when the award came to be passed by the Reference Court the Amending Act had already come into force and therefore, it had applied the benefits of Section 23(1)(A), 23(2) and 28. There could be no doubt about the applicability of the benefit under Section 23(2) and 28 in respect of matters which are pending before the Court. The issue, however, is whether the land owner would be entitled also to the benefit to additional amount provided under Section 23(1) (A).
3. This matter has been squarely considered by the RFA No.1496 of 1991 -3- Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in K.S. Paripooran Vs. State of Kerala and others (1994) 5 SCC 593. The Supreme Court was considering the transitional provisions under Section 30 of the Amending Act. The Supreme Court also held that Section 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act is a substantive provision and it must be read along with the transitional provisions of the Amending Act under Section 30. Section 30 of the Amending Act would require to be reproduced to understand the Supreme Court judgment and apply its purport to the present case.
"30. Transitional provisions.- (1) The provisions of sub- section (1A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to,-
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People], in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2)The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People] and before the commencement of this Act."
While interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court was raising the question of whether the pendency of the proceeding before the Reference Court itself alone is the criterion for application under Section 23(1A). That was precisely the view, which was held by the RFA No.1496 of 1991 -4- Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Zora Singh (1992) 1 SCC 673. An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (1990) 1 SCC 277 that took the view that for application of Section 23(1A), it shall not be merely sufficient to see whether the proceedings were pending before the Reference Court, High Court or the Supreme Court irrespective of whether an award had been passed by the Collector before the date or not. The transitional provision itself introduced a dichotomy between the date when the amendment bill was introduced in the Parliament and the date of the commencement of the Act. The amendment bill in the Parliament was introduced on 30.04.1982 and the Act commenced on 24.09.1984. Filip Tiago held that Section 23(1A) could be attracted only to situations falling within Section 30(1) (a) or (b). The Supreme Court in K.S. Paripooran's case (supra) found the judgment in Zora Singh to be erroneous and affirmed the view held in Filip Tiago to hold:-
"......For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh that sub-section (1- A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1 A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago6 to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view."
4. Since the award of the Collector had been rendered on 11.06.1981 that is before the date when the amendment bill was RFA No.1496 of 1991 -5- introduced, the benefit of Section 23(1A) cannot be applied. The award of the Reference Court stands modified with reference to the benefit of Section 23(1A) and will stay restricted to Section 23(2) and 28 only.
5. The land owners are in appeals with reference to the quantum of compensation determined. The Reference Court has made reliance on Ex.R3 and R4, which were the awards passed by the High Court in respect of acquisition notification made on the very same date namely 15.05.1979. Ex.R3 was ordered on 15.05.1989 and Ex.R4 was ordered on 12.08.1988. In both these awards, the compensation had been determined at ` 23/- per sq. yd. The determination of compensation for the acquisition through the very same notification cannot, therefore, be different and the awards passed by the Reference Court determining the compensation at ` 23/- per square yard would require to be maintained and accordingly maintained.
6. The appeals filed by the State are partly allowed and the appeals filed by the land owners are dismissed.
(K. KANNAN) JUDGE February 27, 2013 Pankaj*