Madras High Court
Smt. Vedam vs Arulanandam @ Arul on 30 August, 2016
Author: R.Mala
Bench: R.Mala
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 30.08.2016
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE Ms.JUSTICE R.MALA
Second Appeal (MD) No.845 of 2009
and
M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2009
Smt. Vedam ... Appellant/Appellant/Defendant
versus
1.Arulanandam @ Arul
2.Smr.Stella Mary Arul ... Respondents/Respondents/Plaintiffs
Prayer
Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of CPC., to set aside
the judgment and decree dated 29.12.2008 made in A.S.No.19 of 2008 on the
file of Subordinate Judge, Uthamapalayam, confirming the judgment and decree
dated 25.10.2007 made in O.S.No.71 of 2006 on the file of District Munsif,
Uthamapalayam.
!For Appellant : Mr.S.Sethuraman
^For Respondents : Mr.M.Kalifullah for
Mr.T.Lajapathiroy
JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 18.08.2016
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 30.08.2016
:JUDGMENT
The defendant, who lost the legal battle before the Courts below has come forward with this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29.12.2008 made in A.S.No.19 of 2008 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Uthamapalayam, confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.10.2007 made in O.S.No.71 of 2006 on the file of District Munsif, Uthamapalayam.
2.The respondents, as plaintiffs, filed the suit for declaration, declaring that the portion of suit property marked as ABHG is a lane and for injunction restraining the defendant, her men and her agents from interfering the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land and also for mandatory injunction, to remove the iron sheet roof made by the defendant stating that the suit properties are originally owned to one Anthonymuthu, husband of the defendant and his brother Sebasthiyar. On 29.08.1969, there was a partition in between them. The properties allotted to Sebasthiyar was purchased by one Sesurajamani under registered sale deed dated 14.09.1976. He sold the same in favour of the plaintiffs under two registered sale deeds dated 11.12.1991, in which western portion was purchased in favour of the first plaintiff and eastern portion was purchased in favour of the second plaintiff. Since, common pathway was not mentioned in the sale deeds, the same was purchased on 15.12.1991 from Sesurajamani by the plaintiffs. Thereafter, they put up construction and residing there.
3.Now, the defendant, in the absence of the plaintiffs has inserted iron rod and made a roof in the northern mother wall of plaintiffs and put up a shed stating that the suit property is a common pathway. Therefore, the plaintiffs forced to file the suit for declaration, declaring that the portion ABHG of the suit property is a common pathway and also for mandatory injunction, directing the defendant to remove the rods and roof, within the time stipulated by the Court and also for injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the pathway and prayed for a decree.
4.Resisting the same, the defendant/appellant herein has filed a detailed written statement stating that admittedly, the property is owned by the husband of the defendant Anthonymuthu and his brother Sebasthiyar. However, the defendant disputed the family arrangement dated 29.08.1969. She has stated that the sale deed in favour of Sesurajamani and other sale deeds are fabricated and the documents were not came into effect. She is enjoying the property for more than statutory period by putting up iron sheet roof and hence, she prayed for dismissal of the suit.
5.The trial Court, after considering the averments in both the plaint and written statement, framed necessary issues and considering the oral and documentary evidence and considering the arguments made on either side, decreed the suit as prayed for in the plaint, against which, the defendant has preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court, against which, the present appeal has been preferred.
6.At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law have been framed for consideration of the second appeal:
?1.Are the findings of the Courts below valid when the patta proceedings as well as the patta issued in favour of the defendant with respect to the suit property, have not been challenged by the plaintiff either prior of after filing of the suit right from the year 1994?
2.Are the title of the defendant with respect to the suit property has been settled as early as in 1994 with the knowledge of the plaintiffs vide Ex.B1 and B2, can the Courts below take cognizance of Ex.A6 (unregistered) that is solely created with ulterior motive sans the knowledge of defendant ??
Substantial Questions of Law Nos.1 and 2:
7.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that Ex.A2 is not an admissible evidence, which is an unregistered partition arrangement. For the reason, he relied on the decisions reported in AIR 2001 MADRAS 135 ? A.C.Lakshmipathy V. A.M.Chakrapani Reddiar, (2002) 1 M.L.J. 419 ? Saravanan Pillai V. Mariappan, (2003) 3 M.L.J. 45 ? Balakrishnan V. Chandrasekharan and (2004) 3 M.L.J. 608 ? Susai V. Sowriammal.
8.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would further submit that the appellant is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than statutory period and thereby, she has prescribed title by adverse possession. For the reason, he relied on the decisions reported in (2002) 1 M.L.J. 419 ? Saravanan Pillai V. Mariappan and also (2002) 3 M.L.J. 821 ? Hamsa V. Kuppa Mandiri.
9.He would further submit that the trial Court has not considered the material evidence and hence, this Court has every right to interfere with the findings of both the Courts below. For the reason, he relied on the decision reported in (2001) 3 M.L.J. 811 ? Subbiah V. Esther Ponnammal and (2002) 3 M.L.J. 821 - Hamsa V. Kuppa Mandiri.
10.He would further submit that the suit is not maintainable as per Section 34 of Specific Relief Act and hence, prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree of both the Courts below.
11.Resisting the same, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that it is an admitted fact that the property is originally owned to Anthonymuthu, the husband of the defendant and also Sebasthiyar. In pursuant to the partition deed Ex.A2, Sebasthiyar sold his property to one Sesurajamani, from whom, the plaintiffs/respondents purchased the same. Ex.A2 is an admissible evidence and it can be used for collateral purpose. For the reason, he relied on the decision reported in 2000(II) CTC 230 ? Narayanan, M.K. V. State of Tamil Nadu and unreported judgment made in C.R.P.(PD) No.3732 of 2014 dated 13.11.2014.
12.He has further submitted that from the date of 29.06.1969 onwards, their predecessors are enjoying the property and the suit property has not been used as common pathway for both the parties. The learned counsel further submitted that non examination of the defendant/appellant is a fatal to the case, because, D.W.1 is none other than the son of the defendant/appellant and he has disputed the signature in Ex.A2 even the signature in the written statement and hence, they have not given true picture and that has been correctly considered by both the Courts below and hence, he prayed for dismissal of the second appeal.
13.I have considered the rival submissions made on either and also perused the materials available on record.
14.Considering the submissions made on either side and also perusal of the materials would show that the suit properties are originally owned to Anthonymuthu and his brother Sebasthiyar is an admitted fact. According to the respondents, there was a family arrangement under Ex.A2 on 29.06.1969 and in pursuant to the same, the properties allotted to Sebasthiyar has been dealt with by him. Under Ex.A3, the properties were sold to Sesumaniraja and from him, the respondents have purchased the properties under Exs.A4 to A6 and the documents can be relied upon.
15.Now, this Court has to decide as to whether Ex.A2 unregistered document is relied upon or not?
16.It is appropriate to consider the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in AIR 2001 MADRAS 135 ? A.C.Lakshmipathy V. A.M.Chakrapani Reddiar, wherein this Court has held in paras 29, 34 and 41 as follows:
?29. The next question is how a family arrangement can be effected and what are the aspects to be considered or noted in testing the validity and binding nature of a family arrangement.
The family arrangement can even be made orally and in which obviously the question of registration does not arise. What is required to be seen is whether the family settlement is a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims at a fair and equitable decision or allotment of properties between the various members of the family. Similarly, the family arrangement should not be result of any fraud or undue influence etc. played on the member/members of the family. In other words such a family arrangement must be voluntary and entered into by the parties on their own accord and free will.
It is only when the family arrangement reduced into writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document requires registration, then it would amount to a document of title declaring for future what rights and what properties the parties to possess.
34. The next rather important question that arises for consideration is, if the family arrangement which is registerable as the same in the nature of declaring the title of the parties is also not stamped, whether it can be looked into by the Court for collateral purposes. Section 35 of the Stamp Act has already been extracted by us.
The Courts in various rulings, which we have already referred, interpreted the Section to mean that if a family arrangement which is compulsorily registerable is not stamped, then the same cannot be looked into for any purpose including for collateral purposes.
41. We hold that the document in question is being an unstamped and unregistered, the same cannot be looked into for any purpose. Similarly, oral evidence cannot be let in about the contents of the said document.?
17.It is also appropriate to consider para 42, which is extracted herein:
?42. To sum up the legal position (I) A family arrangement can be made orally.
(II) If made orally, there being no document, no question of registration arises.
(III) If the family arrangement is reduced to writing and it purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of any immovable property, it must be properly stamped and duly registered as per the Indian Stamp Act and Indian Registration Act. (IV) Whether the terms have been reduced to the form of a document is a question of fact in each case to be determined upon a consideration of the nature of phraseology of the writing and the circumstances in which and the purpose with which it was written.
(V) However, a document in the nature of a Memorandum, evidencing a family arrangement already entered into and had been prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon, in order that there are no hazy notions in future, it need not be stamped or registered.
(VI) Only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess.
(VII) If the family arrangement is stamped but not registered, it can be looked into for collateral purposes.
(VIII) Whether the purpose is a collateral purpose, is a question of fact depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. A person can not claim a right or title to a property under the said document, which is being looked into only for collateral purposes.
(IX) A family arrangement which is not stamped and not registered cannot be looked into for any purpose in view of the specific bar in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act.?
18.It is also appropriate to consider the decision reported in (2003) 3 M.L.J. 45 ? Balakrishnan V. Chandrasekharan, wherein, this Court in para 7, has held as follows:
?7. It is settled law that if the family arrangement is reduced to writing and it purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of any immovable property, it must be properly stamped and duly registered as per the Indian Stamp Act and Indian Registration Act. If the family arrangement is stamped, but not registered, it can be looked into for collateral purposes. A person cannot claim a right or title to a property under the said document, which is being looked into only for collateral purpose. A family arrangement which is not stamped and not registered, cannot be looked into for any purpose, in view of the specific bar in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. A document must be read as a whole. As to the nature of transaction under the document, it cannot be decided by merely seeing the nomenclature. Mere usage of past tense in the document should not be taken indicative of a prior arrangement. The expression "collateral purposes" is no doubt a very vague one and the Court must decide in each case whether the parties who seek to use the unregistered document for a purpose which is really a collateral one or as is to establish the title to the immovable property conveyed by the document. But by the simple devise of calling it "collateral purpose", a party cannot use the unregistered document in any legal proceeding to bring about indirectly the effect which it would have had, if it is registered. When the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration as it is, then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess.?
This Court has considered Ex.A2 along with the recitals mentioned therein. On perusal of Ex.A2, it is an agreement. In Ex.A2, it is stated that ?kid ghft];jp mf;hpbkz;L?and neither it is an oral arrangement nor partition deed and there was a division in status and each shares are enjoying the property separately. Ex.A2 has been made in the presence of panchayatdars. Hence, I am of the view that the above citations are not applicable to the facts of the case.
19.The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Ex.A2 is an unregistered document and hence, it is not in admissible evidence. At this juncture, it is appropriate to incorporate the portion in para 11 of the decision reported in (2004) 3 M.L.J. 608 ? Krishnan V. Susai V. Sowriammal.
?11.Any document which creates or declares some right in immovable property must be registered as an instrument. Sec.17(1)(b) of the Registration Act lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should by its own force operate or purport to operate to crate or declare some right in immovable property. If such document is not registered, Sec. 47 of Act will prevent its being admitted in evidence. An unregistered document like Ex.B1 can be created at any point of time. There is no proof that Ex.B1 was executed on 18.4.1980 as alleged by the defendants.?
In respect of Ex.A6 dated 15.12.1991 is concerned, admittedly Ex.A6 is an unregistered document, which was created for Rs.25/-. As per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, even oral sale is admissible. Hence,Ex.A6 need not be registered.
20.The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the unreported judgment made in C.R.P.(PD) No.3732 of 2014 dated 13.11.2014, particularly a portion of para 17,, which is extracted herein:
?17. ....... Herein, in this case, as already pointed out, the plaintiff seeks for the relief of declaration only based on the registered settlement deed and to prove the possession of his father, which being the collateral purpose, he wants to mark the unregistered partition deed. At any event, based on the respective pleadings of the parties as discussed supra and also based on the finding of the Court below that such admissibility of the document can be decided at the later point of time while deciding the suit, I am of the view that the present application filed once again by the defendant before the Court below is totally unwarranted and the same was rightly rejected by the trial Court.' Perusal of the said decision, I am of the view that the same is not relevant to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, it has been stated that admissibility of the documents to be decided at the time of deciding the suit. Therefore, the above decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
21.He has also relied another decision reported in 2000(II) CTC 230 ? Narayanan, M.K. V. State of Tamil Nadu, wherein, this Court has held that the unregistered partition can be looked into for finding out whether there was division in status and whether each sharer has taken possession of property allotted to him. For the reason, he relied on para 8 of the decision, wherein, it was stated that the document can be relied upon for collateral purpose. Para 8 of the said decision is extracted herein:
?8. Regarding the rejection of the partition dated 7.9.75 on the ground that it is an unregistered document, in C.S. Kumaraswawi v. A. Gounder, , the Division Bench of this court, after referring to three different stages, has held that an unregistered partition deed though not admissible to prove the terms of the partition can be admitted in evidence for proving the actual division and taking of possession of the properties allotted to them. Their Lordships have observed thus:-
"Thus it will be seen that in the case of an express, completed partition there will be three different stages-
(i) the stage of effecting a division,
(ii) the stage of dividing the properties by metes and bounds, and
(iii) the stage of each party taking possession of the properties allotted to his share.
As far as these three stages are concerned, it is conceded, having regard to the decided cases, that each and every one of them can be effected orally without there being a document Even if there is a written document in respect of the first and third stages, then also it is conceded that the document does not require registration, because neither the division in status nor the actual taking possession of the properties can be said to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest to or in immovable property. Therefore, it is only with regard to the second stage, namely, division of properties indifferent shares and allotment thereof to the various members, if the same is reduced to writing, it requires registration under Sec.17 (1) (b) of the Act."
Their Lordships have also held that an unregistered partition deed though not admissible to prove the terms of the partition can be admitted in evidence for proving the stages (1) and (3) namely the division in status and the taking of possession and the nature and character of the possession of the shares allotted, these being collateral purposes. In Booraswami v. Rqjakannu and others, 1978 (I) MLJ 248. another Division Bench of this court has held that unregistered partition deed can be looked into for finding whether there was a division in status or not. In para 10. Their Lordships have concluded thus:-
"It is thus clear that the unregistered document could be looked into for the purpose of finding out whether there has been any division in status."
Here, Sebasthiyar has dealt with the property even in 1976, which was not disputed. The respondents have purchased the property and made construction 13 years back, which was also not disputed and hence, he submitted that the document has been relied upon.
22.As already stated, because of the misunderstanding between both the parties, at the intervention of elderly people, the agreement has come into existence. Neither it is an family arrangement nor partition deed. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the above citation relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, Sebasthiyar has sold the property even in 1976 under Ex.A3. In Ex.A3, it was stated that in pursuance of the agreement dated 29.06.1969, Sesumaniraja has got the property and sold the property to the respondents under Ex.A4 and A5. Since in Ex.A4 and A5, pathway has not been mentioned the same has been sold under Ex.A6 on 15.12.1991.
23.Admittedly, the respondents are in possession of the properties and they have made a construction. But, it was not objected. If really there was no family arrangement or partition or agreement, the appellant would have objected the construction made in the property dealt with by Sebasthiyar. In such circumstances, I am of the view that Sebasthiyar sold the property, in which, he was in possession and enjoyment under Ex.A3, to Sesurajamani, who in turn, sold the same to the respondents under Exs.A4 to A6 and they built up the house and house tax receipts were marked as Ex.A7 and A8. Even though, the appellant herein has disputed the same, the appellant has not appeared before the Court. D.W.1 has gone to the extent of disputing the signature in Ex.A2 and he has stated that the defendant has not put the signature and she put only her Left Thumb Impression. Perusal of the written statement shows that she has signed.
24.Furthermore, while considering the age of D.W.1, at the time of examination viz., on 18.08.2003, he was in 47 years old and hence, he must be born on 1960. Ex.A2 came into effect only on 29.06.1969. So at that time, he might be in the age of 9 years and he was not competent to depose about Ex.A2, when his mother, who is the defendant was hale and healthy and not appeared and deposed before the Court.
25.While considering the cross examination of D.W.1, till 1976, Sebasthiyar was residing in the place. After he sold the property to Sesumaniraja, he gone to South street and resided there and there was no oral partition during the life time of his father. Perusal of the proof affidavit of D.W.1 would show that the same is replica of written statement.
26.As already stated, at the time of execution of Ex.A2, D.W.1 is only 9 years old and he was not competent person to speak about Ex.A2 and the defendant only was the competent person to dispute the same. Adverse inference has been drawn for non examination of the defendant. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the respondents have clearly proved that the property is owned by both Anthonymuthu and Sebasthiyhar in pursuance of Ex.A2 and Sebasthiyar sold the same to Sesumaniraja under Ex.A3, from whom, the plaintiffs/respondents purchased the same under Exs.A4 to A6 and they are in possession of the property. In the said documents, it has been specifically mentioned that the respondents are entitled 'A' schedule with pathway measuring ABHG. As per the commissioner report, the appellant is interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property by putting up iron sheet roof in the northern mother wall and hence, both the Courts below have considered all the aspects in proper perspective and came to the correct conclusion.
27.The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that to prove the adverse possession, the appellant has not filed any single scrap of paper. The document filed by the appellant are Ex.B1 patta and Ex.B2 patta and Ex.B3 is house tax receipt paid in the year 2006. There is no document to show that she has alone is enjoying the property.
28.Per contra, the evidence of D.W.1 would show that Sebasthiyar was enjoying the property, till he sold the property under Ex.A3 to Sesumaniraja and he sold the property in 1991 to the respondents/plaintiffs and immediately, they made construction and they are enjoying the property. In such circumstances, I am of the view that adverse possession has not been proved by the appellant and hence, she has not prescribed any title by adverse possession.
29.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied upon the decision (2002) 1 M.L.J. 419 ? Saravanan Pillai V. Mariappan stating that the suit itself is not maintainable under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, without seeking remedy for recovery of possession. It is appropriate to consider para 23 of the said decision, which read as follows:
?23.The last contention that was raised by the appellant's side is that both the Courts below were not correct in rejecting the claim of the appellant for the prayer of injunction in view of the better title of the appellant to the suit property than the opposite party. The court is of the considered view that there is no merit in this contention. Neither the predecessor in interest was in possession of the property at the time of the suit. Needless to say that the burden was on the appellant to prove that he has got a better title, but he has not discharged the same in any way . As rightly pointed out by the Courts below , the Predecessor of the appellant or the appellant was never in possession and enjoyment of the suit property . But on the other hand the respondents and the plaintiffs in that suit were in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. In the view of the available evidence both the courts were perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had no possession, but the respondents were in possession. In Sarkar 'On Evidence' - 14th Edition (1993) , the learned author has said thus at page 1448:
?...A person shown to be in possession of property should be presumed to be owner of it. Possession is evidence of title and gives a good title against a wrongdoer; but a person who has not had possession, cannot, without proof of title, turn others out of possession even though that they may have no title; for possession is a good title against any one who cannot prove a better...... When a person makes a costly building on a land and remains in possession for a considerable time , the presumption is that he had a right to build on it in preference to one who is the ostensible owner..... Possession is evidence of title, and if a plaintiff proves that he had possession and that the possession had been forcibly disturbed by defendant, he makes out a prima facie title which it is for the defendant to rebut. Person in lawful possession need not prove his title in a suit for injunction against a trespasser..... The mere fact that the defendant claimed rent could not defeat the presumption of title arising in plaintiff's possession when the suit was instituted ..... Possession need not be long in order to be some evidence of title..... Evidence of possession and enjoyment for a series of years is of itself, if unanswered, cogent evidence of title....?
It has to be stated that in the instant case neither the appellant nor the respondents have proved the origin of title. The appellant has miserably failed to prove the possession of the property either by his vendors or by himself either in the past or at the time of filing of the suit. On the contrary the respondents by sufficient documentary evidence have proved the long possession and enjoyment of the property. Under the stated circumstances without any hesitation it can be held that the respondents have proved their possessory title to the suit property, which the appellant has failed. The Court is of the view that the civil action filed by the appellant seeking the relief of declaration and injunction cannot also be sustained I law in view of the settled proposition of law that when a person who was found to be out of possession of the disputed property had not sought for recovery of possession as a consequential relief for the main relief of declaration, the suit could not be maintained. In the instant case, the appellant who was not in possession of the suit property, has filed a suit for declaration and injunction instead of the prayer for recovery of possession, and hence the suit filed by him is not maintainable. On the other hand the respondents who are found to be in possession of the suit property could well maintain a suit for declaration, permanent injunction and for mandatory injunction for the removal of the unlawful construction. Thus both the Courts below were perfectly correct in dismissing the suit in O.S.No.652 of 1982 and decreeing the suits in O.S.Nos.665 of 1982 and 714 of 1982. There is nothing to interfere in the judgment f the lower appellate Court. The Court is of the view that all the three second appeals are without merits and the same are liable to be dismissed.?
But, the above citation is not applicable, because, the respondents have filed the suit for mandatory injunction also and for permanent injunction.
30.The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions reported in (2002) 3 M.L.J. 821 - Hamsa V. Kuppa Mandiri, and submitted that if both the Courts have not considered the materials evidence, the High Court can interfere with the concurrent findings by invoking Section 100 of C.P.C. It is appropriate to consider the portion in para 9 of the said decision, which is extracted hereunder:
?9. .... When the lower appellate Court has grossly misappreciated the evidence failed to draw proper inference from proved facts and apply the law in the proper perspective, this Court is entitled to interfere under Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.?
31.It is also appropriate to incorporate para No.7 of the decision reported in (2001) 3 M.L.J. 811 ? Subbiah V. Esther Ponnammal.
?7.This Court well aware that in the second appeal it is not correct to reappreciate the documents and oral evidence, but have thoroughly failed to consider the material evidence. The omission to consider material evidence is a valid ground for interference by this Court in the second appeal though concurrent findings are made by the Courts below. This Court is also conscious of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to the power of High Court under Sec.100 C.P.C.?
There is no quarrel over the proposition. Perusal of the judgment of both the Courts below, I am of the view that both the Courts below have correctly considered all the aspects in proper perspective and came to the correct conclusion and decreed the suit, which does not warrant any interference by this Court. There is no necessity for invoking Section 100 of C.P.C. to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.
32.In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the judgment and decree of both the Courts below are liable to be confirmed and consequently, the second appeal deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the second appeal is hereby dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions is also dismissed.
To
1.The Subordinate Judge, Uthamapalayam,
2.The District Munsif, Uthamapalayam.
.