Madhya Pradesh High Court
Lachmandas vs State Of M.P. And Anr. on 23 March, 2000
Equivalent citations: AIR2000MP329, 2000(3)MPHT246, AIR 2000 MADHYA PRADESH 329, (2000) 3 MPLJ 21
Author: A.K. Mishra
Bench: A.K. Mishra
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, C.J.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated April 8, 1994, passed by the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal, Bhopal in Reference Case No. 29/1993, whereby the claim of the applicant has been rejected on the ground of limitation.
2. The respondents claim pertains to recovery of Rs. 1,14,960/- arising out of works contract covered by agreement No. 13/ 1984-85 for execution of certain works mentioned in the contract agreement.
3. The grievance of the applicant Is that the contractual work was completed on June 30. 1986 and the final bill prepared in May, 1991, but the respondents wrongly withheld the amount of Rs.61,200/- without notice to him. The applicant made several oral request for release of withheld amount, but all in vain. Accordingly, he submitted claims under Clause G.C. 51 of the agreement before the Executive Engineer on June 30, 1992, when no decision was given within 30 days, appeal was filed on July 20, 1992, before the Superintending Engineer, who also failed to decide the claim.
4. As a result of this inaction, the applicant moved the M.P. Arbitration Tribunal Bhopal, which has dismissed the claim being barred by time under Section 7-B(1)(a) of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, (for brevity 'Adhiniyam'). Aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, the present revision petition has been filed under Section 19 of the Adhiniyam.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the State and perused the record. Shri N. Nagrath, learned counsel for the State, contended in support of the impugned order of the Arbitration Tribunal and submitted that the starting point of limitation in this case is 1-5-1991/3-5-1991. The applicant did not file appeal before the Superintending Engineer within a period of 30 days of submission of claim before the Executive Engineer. Thus, counted, the reference before the Arbitration Tribunal is barred by time. We find ourselves unable to agree with this contention. Reading the arbitration agreement and the Adhiniyam together, it would be crystal clear that the limitation for approaching the Tribunal under Section 7-B of the Adhiniyam, as substituted by M.P. Act No. 9/1990, commences from the date of communication of decision of the final authority. The Final Authority is Superintending Engineer. No period has been prescribed for approaching the Superintending Engineer for deciding the dispute. However, proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 7-B of the Adhiniyam envisages that if the final authority fails to decide the dispute within a period of six months from the date of reference to it, petition to the Tribunal shall be made within one year of the expiry of the said period of six months. There is no limitation for approaching the Executive Engineer. The period of 30 days prescribed in the contract agreement is administrative in character object being to lay down some period for decision by the Executive Engineer, failing which to enable the aggrieved party to approach the final authority. Till the dispute reaches the final authority, the period spent before the Executive Engineer is not counted towards limitation under the Adhiniyam, which provides for the starting point of limitation not from the date when cause of action arises, but from the date when It is approached with the dispute for settlement.
6. Turning to the facts of the case, the applicant approached the Superintending Engineer on July 20, 1992. His case is that the Superintending Engineer failed to decide the dispute. With this back ground, he could approach the Tribunal within a period of one and half year. The applicant had approached the Tribunal on February 9, 1993. Therefore, it can be safely stated that the Tribunal has been approached within the statutory period and the contention to the contrary has no force. No decision to the contrary has been brought to our notice In the course of hearing.
7. Consequently, the revision is allowed, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated April 8, 1994, is set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for consideration and decision on merit. The parties shall bear their own costs.