Allahabad High Court
Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla vs State Of U.P. And Another on 19 September, 2024
Author: Krishan Pahal
Bench: Krishan Pahal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:153155 Reserved on 02.09.2024 Delivered on 19.09.2024 Court No. - 68 Case :- CRIMINAL MISC ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 438 CR.P.C. No. - 2004 of 2024 Applicant :- Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Applicant :- Akhilesh Kumar Singh,Shivendra Nath Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Shailendra Kumar Gupta Hon'ble Krishan Pahal,J.
1. List has been revised. None is present on behalf of the informant.
2. Heard Sri Chandra Kumar Rai, Advocate holding brief of Sri Akhilesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Ashutosh Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material placed on record.
3. The present application for anticipatory bail has been filed in Case Crime No.72 of 2023, under Sections 308, 504 and 506 IPC, Police Station Dohrighat, District Mau, during the pendency of trial.
4. This Court had granted interim protection to the applicant vide order dated 09.05.2024.
PROSECUTION STORY:
5. On 20.04.2023 at about 4:30 a.m., his father Markanday Shukla had gone for morning walk, as such Sarvesh Shukla and the applicant Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla attacked his father with lathi, causing injuries to his head rendering him unconscious. The other persons walking along had seen the incident.
6. The F.I.R. was instituted the same day at 10:00 a.m., under Sections 308, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against the applicant and co-accused Sarvesh Shukla.
RIVAL CONTENTIONS (Arguments on behalf of applicant)
7. The case of the applicant is at par with the co-accused person Sarvesh Shukla who has been enlarged on bail vide order dated 27.11.2023 passed by the Sessions Judge, Mau in Anticipatory Bail Application No.2582 of 2023.
8. The Sessions Judge has wrongly rejected the anticipatory bail of the applicant vide order dated 31.01.2024 passed in Anticipatory Bail Application No.215 of 2024, despite knowing the fact that his case was no different to that of c-accused Sarvesh Shukla.
9. The applicant was not arrested during investigation and has co-operated in it. The final report (charge-sheet) has been submitted under Sections 308, 504, 506 and 325 I.P.C. and he is ready to co-operate during trial also.
10. No bail cancellation order has been passed qua the co-accused Sarvesh Shukla, as such the said order dated 27.11.2023 applies to the case of the applicant to date.
11. No purpose shall be fulfilled by sending the applicant behind the bars as he was not arrested during investigation.
12. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court passed in Md. Asfak Alam Vs. State of Jharkhand and another1, wherein the Supreme Court relying on its judgment passed in Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar2 has stated that once the charge-sheet was filed and there was no impediment, at least on the part of the accused, the court having regard to the nature of the offences, the allegations and the maximum sentence of the offences they were likely to carry, ought to have granted the bail as a matter of course. However, the court did not do so but mechanically rejected and, virtually, to rub salt in the wound directed the appellant to surrender and seek regular bail before the trial court. Thus, the High Court fell into error in adopting such a casual approach.
13. The applicant is entitled for anticipatory bail as he has no criminal antecedents to his credit.
(Arguments on behalf of State By A.G.A.)
14. The anticipatory bail application has been vehemently opposed on the ground that the arguments tendered at bar pertain to regular bail application and cannot be agitated under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
15. Much reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court passed in Shivam vs. State of U.P. and Another3, whereby the applicant is not entitled for anticipatory bail as he has already filed a petition U/S 482 Cr.P.C. and has failed. The application filed U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No.32420 of 2023 has been rejected by this Court vide order dated 13.09.2023.
16. The anticipatory bail application has also been opposed on the ground that the Sessions Judge, Mau has not acted fairly as the anticipatory bail of the co-accused Sarvesh Shukla was rejected by the Sessions Judge, Mau vide order dated 02.05.2023 passed in Anticipatory Bail Application No.793 of 2023, but he subsequently allowed the second Anticipatory Bail Application No.2582 of 2023 of the same accused person vide order dated 27.11.2023.
17. There is no provision of second anticipatory bail application in the eyes of law. The second order does not indicate any special reason for granting anticipatory bail to the co-accused person Sarvesh Shukla either.
18. The injured person has sustained grievous injuries to his head which were dangerous to his life.
19. The final report (charge-sheet) has been filed in the added Section of 325 I.P.C. also along with Sections 308, 504 and 506 I.P.C., which fortifies the allegations made in the F.I.R. The case of the applicant to the co-accused person has not been distinguished in either of the three bail orders.
20. The statement of the injured person is consistent to the allegations made in the F.I.R.
21. The complainant has filed a bail cancellation application as the said order of granting anticipatory bail is illegal and perverse.
22. The anticipatory bail application has not been moved under Section 325 I.P.C., as such the applicant is not entitled for anticipatory bail.
23. Reliance has been placed on the judgement of the Supreme Court passed in Satpal Singh vs. State of Punjab4, whereby it has held that the satisfaction of the court for granting protection under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is different from the one under Section 439 Cr.P.C. while considering regular bail. In Pratibha Manchanda and another Vs. State of Haryana and another5, the Supreme Court has opined that the relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tight rope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest.
24. A three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.872-873 of 2020 'Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla Vs. Smt. Anita Agarwal & others' held that:
19. It is apposite to mention here the distinction between the considerations which guide the grant of anticipatory bail and regular bail. In Pokar Ram vs. State of Rajasthan (1985) 2 SCC 597, while setting aside an order granting anticipatory bail, this Court observed:
5. Relevant considerations governing the court's decision in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 are materially different from those when an application for bail by a person who is arrested in the course of investigation as also by a person who is convicted and his appeal is pending before the higher court and bail is sought during the pendency of the appeal. Three situations in which the question of granting or refusing to grant bail would arise, materially and substantially differ from each other and the relevant considerations on which the courts would exercise its discretion, one way or the other, are substantially different from each other. This is necessary to be stated because the learned Judge in the High Court unfortunately fell into an error in mixing up all the considerations, as if all the three become relevant in the present situation.
6. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565 clearly lays down that "the distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order of anticipatory bail is that whereas the former is granted after arrest and therefore means release from the custody of the police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest". Unlike a post-arrest order of bail, it is a pre-arrest legal process which directs that if the person in whose favour it is issued is thereafter arrested on the accusation in respect of which the direction is issued, he shall be released on bail. A direction under Section 438 is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as envisaged by Section 46(1) or confinement. In para 31, Chandrachud, C.J. clearly demarcated the distinction between the relevant considerations while examining an application for anticipatory bail and an application for bail after arrest in the course of investigation. Says the learned Chief Justice that in regard to anticipatory bail, if the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the applicant by having him arrested, a direction for the release of the applicant on bail in the event of his arrest would generally be made. It was observed that "it cannot be laid down as an inexorable rule that anticipatory bail cannot be granted unless the proposed accusation appears to be actuated by mala fides, and, equally, that anticipatory bail must be granted if there is no fear that the applicant will abscond". Some of the relevant considerations which govern the discretion, noticed therein are "the nature and seriousness of the proposed charges, the context of the events likely to lead to the making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the applicant's presence not being secured at the trial, a reasonable apprehension that witnesses will be tampered with and 'the larger interests of the public or the State', are some of the considerations which the court has to keep in mind while deciding an application for anticipatory bail". A caution was voiced that "in the evaluation of the consideration whether the applicant is likely to abscond, there can be no presumption that the wealthy and the mighty will submit themselves to trial and that the humble and the poor will run away from the course of justice, any more than there can be a presumption that the former are not likely to commit a crime and the latter are more likely to commit it".
CONCLUSION ON BAIL:
25. The medical examination of the injured person Markandey Shukla, aged 65 year, was conducted on 20.04.2023 at 5:55 A.M. And the following injuries were observed by the medical officer at PHC, Doharighat, District Mau:
"(i) L.W. 5 cm x 0.5 cm on left side of occipital bone.
(ii) L.W. 5 cm x 0.2 cm on top of skull.
(iii) Contusion swelling in center of forehead.
(iv) Contusion swelling on left side of forehead."
26. The situs of four injuries sustained by the injured person aged about 65 years, is the brain-pan which is also termed as death's-head, is nothing but a vital organ.
27. It is true that the courts have to look into the fundamental rights of the accused, but it doesn't mean to ignore the fundamental rights of the victim.
28. The response filed by the Sessions Judge states that the Anticipatory Bail Cancellation Application No.2648 of 2023 (Mritunjay Shukla vs. Sarvesh Shukla) has been filed by the complainant on 30.11.2023 and is pending before his court.
29. After hearing the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the aforesaid case laws settled in the cases of Shivam (Supra), Satpal Singh (Supra), Pratibha Manchanda (Supra) and Dr. Naresh Kumar Mangla (Supra) and the fact that the injuries sustained by the injured person are on the vital part of his body, I do not find it a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail to the applicant.
30. The arguments tendered at bar pertain to regular bail application and cannot be agitated at the stage of 438 Cr.P.C. The present anticipatory bail application is hereby found devoid of merits and is accordingly rejected.
31. It is clarified that the observations made herein are limited to the facts brought in by the parties pertaining to the disposal of anticipatory bail application and the said observations shall have no bearing on the merits of the case during trial.
INCONSISTENT ORDERS PASSED BY THE SESSIONS JUDGE:
32. For proper analysis, the chronology of the orders passed in the said FIR by the same presiding officer has to be looked into, which is as follows:
I. The Anticipatory bail application No. 793 of 2023 of Sarvesh Shukla was rejected vide order dated 02.05.2023.
II. The Anticipatory Bail Application No. 2582 of 2023 of Sarvesh Shukla was allowed vide order dated 27.11.2023.
III. The Anticipatory Bail Application No. 215 of 2024 filed by the applicant Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla was rejected vide order dated 31.01.2024.
33. This court had passed a detailed order on 23.04.024 arising out of the extra-ordinary circumstances of the instant case which arose due to the inconsistent orders passed by the Sessions Judge, Mau. A response was called from the Sessions Judge, Mau.
Response of the Sessions Judge, Mau:
34. As per office report dated 23.05.2024 a response dated 17.05.2024 was received in the office. It says that the Anticipatory Bail Application no.793 of 2023 of Sarvesh Shukla was dismissed as at the time of disposal of anticipatory bail application, it was found that injured became unconscious due to assault by the accused persons; he received 4 injuries on his body, of which two injuries were lacerated wounds and two were contused swelling and doctor advised for C.T. Scan of head. He moved another anticipatory bail application no.2582 of 2023, which was allowed on the ground that no motive was assigned to the accused. Except Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code, remaining sections are triable by Ist. Class Magistrate; no supplementary injury report was filed by the prosecution showing the injuries to be fatal to life; no criminal history of the accused was told and charge sheet was filed. In Anticipatory Bail Application no. 2582 of 2023, the fact that the previous anticipatory bail application of the accused was dismissed has not been mentioned and in this regard, he also filed his affidavit, showing that this is first application for anticipatory bail.
35. It further says that as and when this concealment of material fact came into light an Anticipatory Bail Cancellation Application bearing no.2648 of 2023 'Mritunjay Shukla versus Sarvesh Shukla' was filed by the complainant on 30.11.2023, which was fixed for hearing on 21.05.2023. In the said Anticipatory Bail Cancellation Application notice was issued to accused Sarvesh Shukla and matter is pending.
36. The Anticipatory Bail Application no.215 of 2024 of Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla was dismissed as the accused was not appearing before the Court, as such, Non-Bailable-Warrant and process under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was directed to be issued by the learned Trial Court against the accused, so role of the accused Sarvesh Shukla and Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla was found to be different and matter was not found to be at par to the co-accused, who was granted anticipatory bail.
SYNTHESIS:
37. There are only two accused persons Sarvesh Shukla and Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla named in the FIR. It is an admitted fact that as per the allegations made in the FIR the case of both the accused is identical.
38. The Anticipatory bail application No. 793 of 2023 of accused Sarvesh Shukla was rejected on merits by Sessions Judge, Mau vide order dated 02.05.2023.
39. After order dated 02.05.2023 the accused Sarvesh Shukla had only two options left with him i.e. to either file an Anticipatory bail application u/s 438 CrPC before the High Court or apply for regular bail before the trial court, but instead he filed another anticipatory bail application marked as First Anticipatory Bail Application No. 2582 of 2023. The same was allowed by the very same presiding officer vide order dated 27.11.2023. Perusal of the original record indicates that there is overwriting in it. The word 'first' has been added after putting fluid before the words 'anticipatory bail application'.
40. Thereupon the applicant Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla filed his Anticipatory Bail Application No. 215 of 2024 before the same Sessions Judge and it was rejected vide order dated 31.01.2024.
41. The statement of the star witness injured Markandey Shukla was there at the time of adjudication of the three Anticipatory bail applications of the two accused persons. In his statement he has stated that his Medical examination was conducted at PHC Doharighat and his X-ray was conducted at District Hospital, Ghazipur. He has also categorically stated that his CT Scan was conducted at BHU, Varanasi. The injury report indicated two lacerated wounds and two contused swellings, in all four injuries to his cranium.
42. The said response of the Sessions Judge implies the Anticipatory bail application No. 215 of 2024 of the applicant Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla was dismissed on the ground of process having been issued against him under Section 82 CrPC.
43. The appreciation of evidence and grant or refusal of bail or anticipatory bail may vary from one Judge to another, but first refusing and later on granting anticipatory bail to the same accused without there being any provision and new ground by the very same presiding officer seems to be transcending established notions of fairness. The parameters of granting or refusal of bail of the same accused on the basis of the very same evidence by the same presiding officer is nothing but pushing the boundaries of established justice.
44. A judicial order should carry an element of certainty. Denial of bail to the accused and further granting him without any change in circumstances, without giving any reasons creates uncertainty and doubts in the minds of the litigants and general public at large. Sure enough, consistency in judicial decisions is crucial for maintaining the integrity and trust in the legal system. Such act creates an impression of unpredictability which can lead to uncertainty and undermine public confidence in the judicial process. So, the principle of consistency in judicial decisions is cardinal for maintaining the integrity and trust in the legal system. A judicial order should not only be fair and just but also perceived as such by the litigants and the broader public. This perception is significantly influenced by the consistency and predictability of judicial decisions.
45. The expression "inconsistent" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary which means lacking consistency; not compatible with. In other words, the orders so passed by the courts must be compatible with its own previous orders in the very same matter.
46. Consistency in judicial decisions ensures that similar cases are treated alike, thereby reinforcing the principle of equality before the law. It also helps litigants and their lawyers to predict the likely outcomes of their cases based on established precedents, fostering a sense of legal stability and fairness. Moreover, reasoned decisions are crucial. They not only provide transparency but also enable higher courts to review trial court decisions effectively. Orders passed without articulating any reasoning, exhibit personal biases or arbitrary considerations.
47. The Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI6, holding that consistency in judicial decisions is crucial for maintaining the integrity and trust in the legal system has opined as follows:
"94. Criminal courts in general with the trial court in particular are the guardian angels of liberty. Liberty, as embedded in the Code, has to be preserved, protected, and enforced by the criminal courts. Any conscious failure by the criminal courts would constitute an affront to liberty. It is the pious duty of the criminal court to zealously guard and keep a consistent vision in safeguarding the constitutional values and ethos. A criminal court must uphold the constitutional thrust with responsibility mandated on them by acting akin to a high priest.
..
..
98. Uniformity and certainty in the decisions of the court are the foundations of judicial dispensation. Persons accused with same offence shall never be treated differently either by the same court or by the same or different courts. Such an action though by an exercise of discretion despite being a judicial one would be a grave affront to Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India."
(emphasis supplied)
48. Referring "The Data of jurisprudence," by W. G. Miller the eminent American jurist Benjamin N. Cardozo in his treatise "NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS" (2011 edition) has stated at page 33 'on parity' as follows:
"If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights."
49. There is another aspect to the matter that once an inconsistent order is passed by the presiding officer without specifying reasons, it becomes difficult for the superior courts in heirarchy to examine the issue of inconsistency in proper perspective. An impression is drawn that either the judicial officer concerned lacks the basic knowledge of fair legal process or he has acted on some extraneous considerations. If the officer concerned does not have the knowledge of basic judicial process of fairness, then the same is a reflection on his capability to hold judicial office. If the officer concerned has acted for extraneous consideration the same is in violation of judicial polity and conduct. There is a great difference between an executive act and the judicial act. The judicial act is required to be consistent with the law and fair procedure. The proceedings can be invalidated where the aforesaid principles are not followed.
50. The judicial system rests on the faith of the citizens. Citizens and litigants expect to be subjected to judicial orders that follow the law and fair procedure. Inconsistent judicial orders can lead to discrimination among accused persons, especially when the facts and circumstances are similar or identical. An officer practising discrimination in judicial acts commits gross misconduct. Faith in the judiciary is the cornerstone of a democratic society. When citizens bring their grievances to court, they trust that the judiciary will uphold justice impartially and consistently. This trust is eroded when judicial orders are inconsistent, creating an impression of partiality or bias. It not only harms the individuals directly affected, but also, undermines the public's perception of the judicial system's fairness and integrity. Honest mistakes are forgivable, but mischief born of ill intent is not.
51. To avoid inconsistency, Supreme Court in the case of Pradhani Jani Vs. The State of Odisha passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1503/2023 (Arising @ SLP (Crl.) No.3241/2023, vide order dated 15.05.2023), has categorically stated that to avoid contrary orders being passed by different courts in the same subject matter, they must not be placed before different presiding officers. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
"3. The perusal of the paper books would reveal that various applications filed by various accused have been entertained by different learned Single Judges of the same High Court. In many of the High Courts, the practice followed is that the applications arising out of the same FIR should be placed before one Judge. However, it appears that it is not the practice in Orissa High Court. In the present case, we have come across orders passed by at least three different Judges in the applications of various accused arising out of same FIR.
4. Such a practice leads to anomalous situation. Certain accused are granted bail whereas certain accused for the very same crime having similar role are refused bail.
5. We, therefore, quash and set aside the impugned order dated 31.01.2023 and remand the matter back to the High Court. The High Court is requested to consider the effect of the orders passed by the other coordinate Benches and pass orders afresh. The same shall be done within a period of one month from today.
6. The Registrar (Judicial) of the Registry of this Court is directed to forward a copy of this order to the Registrar General of the Orissa High Court, who is requested to take note of the aforesaid and consider passing appropriate orders so that contrary orders in the same crime are avoided."
52. Almost similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sajid Vs. State of U.P. Passed in Petiton(s) for Special Leave to Appeal No(s).7203/2023, vide order dated 31.07.2023). The relevant paragraphs are being referred as follows:
"3. However, we have perused the orders passed by the another learned Judge of the very same High Court, wherein co-accused has been already released on bail.
4. Though vide order dated 06.12.2022, the High Court has directed that the trial be concluded within three months but a period of almost eight months has lapsed thereafter, trial has not been concluded.
5. In that view of the matter and on the ground of parity, we are inclined to grant bail to the petitioners.
6. The petitioners are, therefore, directed to be released on bail in connection with FIR No.93/2017 registered with P.S. Kharkhuda, to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
7. We have come across various matters from the High Court of Allahabad, wherein matters arising out of the same FIR are placed before different Judges. This leads to anomalous situation. Inasmuch as some of the learned Judges grant bail and some other Judges refuse to grant bail, even when the role attributed to the applicants is almost similar.
8. We find that it will be appropriate that all the matters pertaining to one FIR are listed before the same Judge so that there is consistency in the orders passed.
9. The Registrar (Judicial) of the Registry of this Court is directed to communicate this order to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Allahabad, who is directed to place the same before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for his consideration."
(Emphasis Added)
53. The aforesaid orders have not been followed in true sense as inconsistent orders seem to have been passed by the very same presiding officer.
54. In the matter of R.C. Chandel Vs. High Court of M.P.7, the Supreme Court holding that the standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that of an ordinary person the made the following observations:
"29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty."
55. The Supreme Court in the case of Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra8, has again opined about the conduct of judges:
5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity. The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher than in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess the sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held as follows:
"Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. It must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm outside."
6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting standard, both inside and outside the court. This Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1:
"Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy."
7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should always remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and purity of his character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who stands in judgments over others should be incorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected of Judges.
56. The Supreme Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu9 has expressed that judicial discipline is the duty of every officer. The relevant paragraphs are being reproduced as under:
"21. It must be grasped that judicial discipline is self-discipline. The responsibility is self-responsibility. Judicial discipline is an inbuilt mechanism inherent in the system itself. Because of the position that we occupy and the enormous power we wield, no other authority can impose a discipline on us. All the more reason judges exercise self-discipline of high standards. The character of a judge is being tested by the power he wields. Abraham Lincoln once said: "Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character give him power." Justice-delivery system like any other system in every walk of life will fail and crumble down, in the absence of integrity.
22. Again, like any other organ of the State, the judiciary is also manned by human beings -- but the function of the judiciary is distinctly different from other organs of the State -- in the sense its function is divine. Today, the judiciary is the repository of public faith. It is the trustee of the people. It is the last hope of the people. After every knock at all the doors fail people approach the judiciary as the last resort. It is the only temple worshipped by every citizen of this nation, regardless of religion, caste, sex or place of birth. Because of the power he wields, a judge is being judged with more strictness than others. Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from others. It is high time the judiciary must take utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. We must remember that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm outside.
23. Since the issue involved in the present controversy will have far-reaching impact on the quality of the judiciary, we are tempted to put it on record which we thought to be a good guidance to achieve the purity of administration of justice. Every human being has his own ambition in life. To have an ambition is virtue. Generally speaking, it is a cherished desire to achieve something in life. There is nothing wrong in a judge to have ambition to achieve something, but if the ambition to achieve is likely to cause compromise with his divine judicial duty, better not to pursue it. Because if a judge is too ambitious to achieve something materially, he becomes timid. When he becomes timid there will be tendency to compromise between his divine duty and his personal interest. There will be conflict in between interest and duty. This is what exactly has happened in this case. With due respect to the learned Judge, Justice B.P. Banerjee, he has misused his divine judicial duty as liveries to accomplish his personal ends. He has betrayed the trust reposed in him by the people. To say the least, this is bad. The matter could have been different if the learned Judge got allotment from the Chief Minister's quota simpliciter like any other citizen."
57. Discussing the matter of judicial discipline, it is germane to refer the judgement of supreme court passed in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Udaysingh10, relevant part of which is as follows:
"11......................... Since the respondent is a judicial officer and the maintenance of discipline in the judicial service is a paramount matter and since the acceptability of the judgment depends upon the credibility of the conduct, honesty, integrity and character of the office and since the confidence of the litigant public gets affected or shaken by the lack of integrity and character of the judicial officer, we think that the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service is well justified. It does not warrant interference."
58. The same view has been expressed in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil11, as follows:
23. The Judges, at whatever level they may be, represent the State and its authority, unlike the bureaucracy or the members of the other service. Judicial service is not merely an employment nor the Judges merely employees. They exercise sovereign judicial power. They are holders of public offices of great trust and responsibility. If a judicial officer "tips the scales of justice its rippling effect would be disastrous and deleterious". A dishonest judicial personage is an oxymoron. We wish to quote the following observations made by Ramaswamy, J., in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339: (para 16) "The lymph nodes (cancerous cells) of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary and the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self-imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under the doctrine of control enshrined in Articles 235, 124(6) of the Constitution. It would, therefore, be necessary that there should be constant vigil by the High Court concerned on its subordinate judiciary and self-introspection."
CONCLUSION:
59. The rejection of the Anticipatory bail application of the applicant Vibhanshu Shukla @ Vipul Shukla appears to be proper, but the order of granting bail to co-accused is not in accordance with law.
60. The response filed by court concerned says that Anticipatory Bail Application of co-accused Sarvesh Shukla was allowed as the accused had concealed the fact of rejection of his earlier Anticipatory bail application; no motive was assigned to the accused; except Section 308 IPC other sections are triable by Magistrate; no supplementary injury report was filed by the prosecution showing the injuries to be fatal to life; he had no criminal history; and, charge sheet was filed. These grounds are just a cover-up and the explanation is not tenable. The facts presented for the second time remain largely unchanged from those of the first application, except for the filing of a final report (charge-sheet). Merely filing the final report (charge-sheet) does not substantially alter the facts that were previously considered. If the court rejected the initial application based on those same facts, then allowing it subsequently cannot be accepted by a man of prudence.
61. There is nothing on record to demonstrate as to how the filing of the final report (charge-sheet) either alters the legal standing or justifies reconsideration of the anticipatory bail.
62. Filing of Anticipatory Bail Cancellation Application by the complainant does not remove the illegality already committed.
63. Severe misconduct by a court concerned, evident through discriminatory practices in judicial decisions, represents a grave violation of duty. It undermines the ethical standards required of the judiciary and harms the core principles upon which justice is built.
64. The response dated 17.05.2024 does not find favour as such is hereby rejected.
65. The original record received be remitted back to the court concerned.
Order Date :- 19.09.2024 Ravi/-
(Justice Krishan Pahal)