Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Reguri Sampath Reddy And Etc. vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors. on 19 October, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(1)ALT(CRI)318, 1996CRILJ1528, I(1997)DMC99
Author: Maithli Sharan
Bench: Maithli Sharan
JUDGMENT
1. This judgment will dispose of all these three Criminal Appeals 1050 of 1992 and 329 and 780 of 1993, as they all arise out of the same judgment of conviction and sentence dated 13-10-1992 passed by the Sessions Judge, Warangal in Sessions Case No. 190 of 1990 convicting one Reguri Sampath Reddy for the offence under S. 498-A, IPC and sentencing him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month, and acquitting all the three accused A. 1, A. 2 and A. 3 for the offence under S. 304-B of the IPC. Criminal Appeal No. 1050 of 1992 is filed by the accused Reguri Sampath Reddy, challenging his conviction and sentence under S. 498-A of the IPC, as aforesaid. Criminal Appeal No. 329 of 1993 is filed by the State under S. 378, Cr.P.C. against the order of acquittal of A. 1 of the offence under S. 304-B, IPC and, instead, convicting him for an offence u/S. 498-A, IPC. Criminal Appeal No. 780 of 1993 is again filed by the State under S. 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code for enhancement of the sentence passed by the Sessions Court against A. 1 in convicting him for the offence under S. 498-A, IPC.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, may be summarised thus : The accused Reguri Sampath Reddy was married to the deceased Reguri Rama Devi, daughter of P.W. 1, on 5-5-1983. A. 2 is the father and A. 3 is the mother of A. 1. P.W. 1, the father of the deceased, is the real brother of A. 3. In this case, it is not disputed that deceased Reguri Rama Devi committed suicide on 4-5-1990 by hanging herself. According to the prosecution, at the time of the marriage of the deceased with A. 1, her father P.W. 1 had given Rs. 4,000/- cash and ten guntas of land as dowry, but afterwards, more money and articles were demanded by all the three accused persons from the parents of the deceased, and so much so, that for this purpose, she was being ill-treated and harassed. Besides, A. 1 was also intending to re-marry another woman as the deceased was not of his liking. Further, the prosecution case is that after P.W. 1 performed the marriage of his second daughter, the accused persons started demanding more money from him saying that he had spent huge money in the second daughter's marriage while he had not spent much money in deceased's marriage. All these ill-treatments and harassments, according to the prosecution, drove the deceased to end her life by committing suicide, within a period of seven years of her marriage with A. 1. She committed suicide on 4-5-1990, when there was heated discussion at about 8-30 p.m. between her and husband accused A. 1 who thereafter went away. At about 10-30 p.m. when A-1 returned home, he found the deceased hanging in the bed room. He then informed P.W. 1 and other persons and then the next day, P.W. 1 lodged a complaint Ex. P. 1 to the police and investigation was done. The inquest report was prepared, the autopsy was done on the dead body of the deceased, the police statements of the material witnesses were recorded, and after the investigation having been completed, the chargesheet was filed in the Court.
3. Charge for the offence punishable under S. 304-B of the IPC was framed against all the three accused persons who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses and marked seven exhibits. A. 1 in his statements under S. 313, Cr.P.C. stated that actually the deceased had no liking for him and her mother was not willing to send her for marital life, and though he had separated from his parents A. 2 and A. 3, the deceased could not adjust with him and, therefore, she had committed suicide. The learned Sessions Judge, on the material available on record, acquitted all the three accused persons of the charge under S. 304-B, IPC but, instead, he convicted only A. 1 for the lesser offence of 498-A, IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid.
5. I have heard the learned Public Prosecutor at length and have thoroughly gone through the record of the case. Neither the accused Reguri Sampath Reddy (A. 1) nor his learned counsel appeared to argue his Criminal Appeal No. 1050 of 1992 nor he appeared as respondent in the other two appeals 329 and 780 of 1993, though opportunity has already been given to them in this regard. Criminal Appeal No. 780 of 1993 is particularly directed for the enhancement of the sentence passed by the trial court against A. 1 for the offence under S. 498-A, IPC, but in this appeal also, the accused has not chosen to appear despite opportunity having been given to him for showing cause against such enhancement.
6. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that since it is initially a case of alleged dowry death, defined under S. 304-B, IPC, the definition of 'dowry' must be looked into. It is defined under S. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which runs as follows :
"2 Definition of "Dowry". In this Act, "Dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly -
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahar in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.
Explanation I :-
Explanation II : The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in S. 30 of the IPC (45 of 1960)."
Looking to the above provision, it is clear that the property or valuable security referred to therein, must be given or agreed to be given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the parties. Now, in this regard, it is worthwhile to look into the important evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case. P.W. 1, the father of the deceased, stated in the examination-in-chief itself that at the time of the marriage, he gave Rs. 4,000/- to the accused in cash and ten guntas of land as agreed. He has nowhere deposed as to whether the further amounts of money or articles demanded were at all agreed to be given to the accused in connection with the marriage. P.W. 2, who is the brother of P.W. 1, has no doubt deposed that P.W. 1 had agreed to give Rs. 20,000/- as dowry and ten guntas of land to the accused, and that during the marriage, P.W. 1 gave Rs. 4,000/- in cash to A-1, Rs. 1500/- to the sisters of A. 1 and ten guntas of land and articles worth Rs. 4500/-. He further deposed that the accused had demanded for the balance amount of Rs. 10,000/- two years after the marriage. True, this witness P.W. 2 did state something in this regard, but, according to him, the agreement for giving of this money was between the accused and P.W. 1, but, surprisingly enough, P.W. 1 himself did not state anything in this regard, as observed above. So, it cannot be assumed that the other items and cash, alleged to have been demanded by the accused from P.W. 1, after the marriage, were at all agreed to be given in connection with the marriage. Thus, I am of the view that the alleged demands, if at all made by A. 1, cannot be termed as "dowry" as defined under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
7. Section 3-4-B of the IPC relates to the dowry death and explanation appended to it goes to indicate that for the purpose of sub-section (1), "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in S. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Since, as observed above, the alleged demands of money and the articles do not constitute 'dowry' in the technical and legal sense of the term, I am afraid, the provisions of S. 304-B of the IPC are also not attracted. A Division Bench of this High Court in Ayyala Rambabu v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 Andh LT (Cri) 73 has also taken the same view.
8. That apart, the provisions of S. 304-B of the IPC are not attracted in some other way as well. For the sake of convenience, this section is reproduced below :
"304. B. Dowry Death : (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise that under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation : For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in S. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
Thus, in order to attract the above provisions of the IPC, the alleged death of the woman must occur within seven years of her marriage. In the instant case, P.W. 1 the father of the deceased has no doubt deposed that the marriage of the deceased with A. 1 was performed on 5-5-83, but, he did not mention this date in the complaint Ex. P. 1 filed by him with the police nor there is anything in this regard in the FIR. P.W. 2, the brother of P.W. 1 has also not deposed anything in this regard. Besides, no document from the school where the deceased had studied nor her horoscope was produced by the prosecution to substantiate the version of P.W. 1. Thus, the solitary statement of P.W. 1 in this regard, uncorroborated by any other evidence, does not inspire much confidence, and it was also correctly not believed by the learned Sessions Judge. True, the date of 4-5-1990 of the suicidal death of the deceased is no disputed, but when the date of marriage itself is not correctly ascertainable, it could not be said that the alleged death of the deceased had occurred within seven years of her marriage with A. 1. So, looking, the instant case with this angle also, I am of the view that the provisions of the offence of dowry death under S. 304-B of the IPC are not attracted.
9. So far as the cruel treatment and harassment of the deceased by her husband accused A. 1 is concerned, the learned Sessions Judge has very elaborately dealt with this aspect. The material witnesses in the case are P.W. 1, the father of the deceased, and P.W. 2 the paternal uncle of the deceased. Both these witnesses categorically deposed in regard to the cruel treatment and harassment meted out to the deceased at the hands of A. 1. P.W. 1 deposed that A. 1 had written a letter to his daughter Rama Devi, who was at that time at his house mentioning that he did not like her and he loved another girl and wanted to marry her. He has also deposed that A. 1 had demanded Rs. 2,000/- for the purpose of tape-recorder and afterwards he had also demanded Rs. 10,000/- cash. He further made demands for scooter and some gold. The deceased, according to P.W. 1, was tortured on this point. He has also deposed that about a month prior to the death of the deceased, he had performed the marriage of his second daughter and gave dowry of rupees one lakh, and seeing all this, A. 1 again started demanding more dowry from him and harassing the deceased.
10. Similarly, P.W. 2 the paternal uncle of the deceased also deposed that A. 1 had written a letter mentioning therein that he loved a woman by name Symala Devi and he wanted to marry her. He also deposed that A. 1 had demanded Rs. 2,000/- from P.W. 1 for the purpose of tape recorder and afterwards made demands for gold and Rs. 10,000/- cash, and when P.W. 1 could not meet these demands, he gave cruel treatment to the deceased and also harassed her. She had once attempted to commit suicide, but her life could be saved at that time. He has also deposed that after P.W. 1's second daughter's marriage, A. 1 again started demanding more money from him and started harassing the deceased in this regard. Thus, the depositions of these two material witnesses, corroborated by each other, pointedly go to indicate that A. 1 had subjected the deceased to cruelty and harassed her with a view to coercing her to meet his unlawful demands for the property, from her father i.e. P.W. 1. I have no doubt in my mind that the prosecution has been successful in establishing this factual position on the basis of the material available on record, particularly, the clinching evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. Consequently, it was successful in bringing home charge for a lesser offence provided under S. 498-A of the IPC in this regard, and the learned Sessions Judge was right in convicting A. 1 for this offence. The learned Public Prosecutor has admitted that certainly there is no clinching evidence against A. 2 and A. 3 and they were rightly acquitted of the charge leveled against them.
11. In view of the above discussion, on the factual and the legal aspects involved in the case, I find that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge leveled against all the three accused persons for the offence under S. 304-B, IPC, but, instead, it was successful in bringing home the case under the mischief and ambit of the provisions of S. 498-A, IPC so far as only A-1 is concerned. Thus, I find no substance in Criminal Appeal No. 1050 of 1992 and Criminal Appeal No. 323 of 1993. Now, so far as the enhancement of the sentence awarded to A. 1 for the proved offence under S. 498-A, IPC. is concerned, looking to the material available on record, particularly the acute cruelty and the harassment meted out to the deceased (wife) at his hands, I agree with the learned Public Prosecutor that the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court to A-1 in this regard is much lenient. As observed much earlier in this judgment, neither the accused nor his counsel appeared in this Court to show cause against such enhancement, though proper opportunity was given to them. Therefore, the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court is set aside and A. 1 is sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of two years instead of six months as awarded by the Sessions Court, I am of the view that this enhanced sentence, under the acute circumstances of the case, dilated above, would meet the ends of justice. So far as the sentence of fine of Rs. 500/- passed by the Sessions Court against A. 1 is concerned, I feel that it does not require to be interfered with.
12. In the result, therefore, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1050 of 1992 and 329 of 1993 are dismissed while Criminal Appeal No. 780 of 1993 is allowed as aforesaid.
Order accordingly.