Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. Ramana Reddy And Ors. vs The State Of A.P. Rep. By Its Secretary, ... on 13 September, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1992(1)ALT437
JUDGMENT Easwara Prasad, J.
1. The petitioners are the members of Valigonda Mandal Praja Parishad for short. The third respondent is the president of the MPP. The Petitioners are questioning the validity of G.O.Ms. No. 335 PR & RD (Mandal II) Department dated 31-5-1989 issued by the first respondent State Government and are praying for a declaration that the third respondent ceased to be the president of MPP on the ground that the third respondent committed default in holding the meeting of the MPP, as required under Section 26(7) of the Andhra Pradesh Mandal Praja Parishads, Zilla Praja Parishads & Zilla Pranalika Abhvridhi Sameeksha Mandals Act, Act No. 3 of 1986 (The 'Act', for brevity).
2. The third respondent was elected as the president of the Valigonda Mandal Praja Parishad on 15-3-87. According to the Petitioners, the third respondent held a meeting of the MPP on 24-12-87 and thereafter did not convene any other meeting within the period prescribed under Section 26(7) of the Act, thereby ceased to be the president of the MPP. The Petitioners made a representation to the Government on 23-3-88 bringing the said fact to the notice of the Government. The Government, by an order dated 18-7-88 instructed the District Collector, Nalgonda, respondent No. 2 herein, to issue an order in accordance with Section 26(7) of the Act. Accordingly the Collector issued an order dated 21-7-88 declaring that the third respondent ceased to be the president of the MPP. Thereupon, the third respondent filed a review/revision petition dated 23-7-88 before the Government. The Government issued orders on 27-7-88 staying the order of the Collector dated 21-7-88. The petitioners questioned the said order of the Government in W.P.No. 1088/89 and this court by its order dt.27-1-89 suspended the order of the Government dated 27-7-88. The writ petition was finally disposed of oh 10-3-89 directing the Government to pass orders on the review/revision petition filed by the third respondent. The Petitioners also filed a petition before the Government on 25-3-89. The Government called for a report from the District Collector and after considering the same passed the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 335 dated 31-5-1989, setting aside the order of the Collector dated 21-7-1988, and allowing the third respondent to continue as the President of the MPP.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the review/revision petition filed by the third respondent was not maintainable under Section 95(2) of the Act and the Government had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. It was further contended that the report of the District Collector should have formed the basis for the Government in passing orders, as the Dt. Collector has clearly reported that the third respondent failed to convene the meeting within time, as required by law.
4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is without substance. Section 95 of the Act empowers the Government either suo motu or on an application from any person interested, to call for and examine the record of Mandala Praja Parishad or a Zilla Praja Parishad or of its standing Committees or of any authority officer or person in respect of any proceeding to satisfy themselves as to regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and, the Government may pass orders annulling, modifying) reversing or remitting for reconsideration of the said order. It is clear from a reading of the section that the order or the proceeding of any authority or officer, or person can be the subject-matter of review or revision by the Government. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that "the officer or person" mentioned in Section 95 relates only to an officer' of the Mandal Praja Parishad, cannot be accepted. The provision is wide enough and the order or proceeding of the Collector issued under the Act can also be the subject -matter of revision. We, therefore, hold that the Government has the power to revise the orders of the Collector and to pass necessary orders thereon under Section 95 of the Act.
5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Government was in error in reversing its own earlier order as well as that of the Collector. The earlier order of the Government was issued without notice to the third respondent and was made in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Government was therefore correct in reversing its earlier order. The entire matter was again reviewed by the Government afresh as directed by this court in W.P.No. 1088/89 dated 10-3-1989.
6. Contentions relating to the merits of the case were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and have been considered at length. It was contended that the third respondent did not convene the meeting within a period of sixty days or within the further grace period of 30 days from the date of the last meeting on 24-12-87, that the third respondent did not conduct the meeting as required by Section 26(7) of the Act, that merely issuing instructions to the Mandal Development Officer to convene the meeting without seeing that the notices of the meeting were served on the members of the Mandal Praja Parishad, is not convening a meeting 'within the meaning of the Section that there was non-compliance with the provisions of the law, and that the meeting dated 23-3-88 was not at all a meeting in the eye of law.
7. While adverting to the contentions of the petitioners we have to examine the provisions of Section 26(7) of the Act which read as under:
Section 26(7) "It shall be the duty of the president or the person for the time being exercising the powers and performing the functions of the president to convene the meetings of the Mandala Praja Parishad so that at least one meting of the Mandala Praja Parishad is held in every sixty days. If the president or such person falls to discharge that duty with the result that no meeting is held within the said period of sixty days or within thirty days following such period, he shall with effect from the date of expiration of the thirty days aforesaid, cease to be the president, or as the case may be cease to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the president unless such cessation has otherwise occurred before that date and for a period of one year from such date he shall not be eligible to be elected as president or to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the president."
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of a learned single judge of this court reported in Ramachary v. State of A.P., 1964 (2) An.W.R. 375 where the learned Judge held that "to convene a meeting" is to conduct and to hold the meeting and that the president should not merely satisfy himself with giving directions to the Block Development Officer to convene a meeting and that he should see that the notices are served on the members. In that case the president of the Panchayat Samithi did not even fix the date of the meeting and the learned judge was therefore right in holding that the meeting was not convened as the president failed to discharge his statutory duty to convene the meeting. The further observations of the learned Judge that "to convene the meeting" mean "holding or conducting of the meeting" was not necessary for a decision in that case. We are not able to agree with the observation of the learned Judge that "to convene a meeting" means "to hold or conduct a meeting". To that extent we hold that the said decision is hot correct.
9. A Division Bench of this Court in Nandlal Jain v. The State of A.P., 1979 (2) A.P.L.J. 155 and others had an occasion to deal with Section 26 of the A.P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 which is analogous to Section 26(7) of the Act in this case. The learned Judges held that the expression "to convene a meeting" is different from 'to hold a meeting' and that when once the sarpanch orders in summoning or calling for a meeting of the Gram Panchayat, the actual calling and summoning must be carried out by the Executive Officer or the clerk that being a ministerial act that the sarpanch can be said to have discharged his duty when once it is proved that he has convened the meeting of the gram panchayat. It was further held that the sarpanch who is democratically elected, cannot be punished for the failure of the Executive Officer or any other employee in the discharge of his duty or due to any other act of God or any other circumstances beyond the control of the sarpanch.
10. Section 22(7) of the A.P. Panchayat Samathis & Zilla Parishads Act, 1969, which is identical with Section 26(7) of the Act in this case was considered in D. Venkatareddy v. The Govt. of A.P, 1982 (2) A.L.T. 380. The learned Judge held that failure to hold a meeting of the general body of the panchayat samithi should be the direct result of the failure of the president to convene a meeting of the Panchayat Samithi in order to attract the penal Provisions of Section 22(7) as it resulted hot only in cesation of the office of the president but also in a statutory disqualification or ineligibility to be elected as a president for a period of one year and that the ordinary rules of interpretation would call for a strict interpretation of those provisions. The learned judge went on to observe "nothing can be more unjust than to dethrone an electee to a public office and declare him in eligible for one year on the basis of happening of an event which he never wished for nor was responsible in any way". We are in entire agreement with the views expressed by the learned judges in the above two cases namely N. Nandulal Jain, 1979 (2) A.P.L.J. 155 and Venkat Reddy, 1982 (2) A.L.T. 380 and hold that "to convene a meeting" mean to fix the date and place of such meeting and issuance of instructions by the president to the executive officer of the Panchayat Samithi. Prudence requires that a president ought to be diligent in enforcing the orders issued by him to convene a meeting by being vigilent over the actions of his ministerial staff.
11. In the present case, the facts would reveal that the president instructed the Mandal Development Officer to issue notices to the members of the Samithi after fixing the date and place of the meeting. She was under the impression mat notices were duly issued and served on the members and she attended the meeting on the date fixed but the same had to be adjourned for went of quorum. It cannot therefore be said that the president in this case failed to convene the meeting. The Government in the impugned order dated 31-5-89 have rightly observed that the president has convened the meeting on 23-2-1988 within the stipulated time, but the notices about the meeting which were to be issued by the Mandal Development Officer were not despatched and the president cannot be asked to perform the duties of the Mandal Development Officer which is administrative in nature and that the actions of the Mandal Develop ment Officer and the staff in not complying with the order of the President in issuing notices to the members amounts to cheating. We should however, and that it is for the authority functioning under the Act namely, the Collector and the Government to examine the facts of each case and see whether the president has discharged duties diligently by verifying and ascertaining at periodical intervals as to what follow-up action is taken by the administrative and ministerial officers "to convene" the meeting within the specified period as instructed by him. In case of proved complacency or lack of diligence, the president or the person for the time being holding charge of the post may be declared by the competent authority to have ceased to hold office, but not otherwise. The facts of this case do not disclose any such absence of diligence on the part of the first respondent. It is also on record that the president is an illiterate person and it was the duty of the Mandal Development Officer, who is an officer of the Government functioning as the chief executive officer of the Panchayat Samithi to carry out the orders of the president without any lapses. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 300/-.