Telangana High Court
M/S Monotech Systems Limited vs National Consumer Disputes Redressal ... on 5 May, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, HYDERABAD
***
WRIT PETITION No.8285 of 2025
Between:
M/s.Monotech Systems Limited
Represented by its Managing Director
Petitioner
VERSUS
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Represented by its President and 3 others
Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON : 05.05.2026
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
___________________________
GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
2
*THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
+ WRIT PETITION No.8285 of 2025
%Dated 05.05.2026
# Between:
M/s.Monotech Systems Limited
Represented by its Managing Director
Petitioner
VERSUS
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Represented by its President and 3 others
Respondents
! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri K.Pratik Reddy
^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri K.V.Bhanu Prasad, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Sri Jayanth Naidu
and Sri Srinivas Swaroop
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1.(1995) 3 SCC 583
2. (2018) 14 SCC 81
3. (2020) 16 SCC 318
4. SLA (c) No.5510 of 2020 Dt.18.03.2025
5. (2023) 8 SCC 362
6. (2020) 2 SCC 265
7. (2013) 10 SCC 136
8. (1973) 1 SCC 633
9. (2022) 19 SCC 442
10. Civil Appeal No.6588 of 2023 dated 04.02.2026
11. (2011) 11 SCC 269
12. (2024) 9 SCC 509
3
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
****
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
Writ Petition No.8285 of 2025
DATE : -05-2026
Between :
M/s. Monotech Systems Limited,
represented by its Managing Director.
...Petitioner
And
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Represented by its President and 3 others.
...Respondents
ORDER:(per Hon'ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar) Heard Sri K.Pratik Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri K.V.Bhanu Prasad, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Jayanth Naidu and Sri Srinivasa Swaroop, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. The Writ Petition is filed assailing the orders dated 31.01.2025 passed by the 1st respondent - National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (for short, 'the National Commission'), in F.A.No.24 of 2023 as well as the order dated 22.11.2022 passed by the 4 2nd respondent - Telangana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (for short, 'the State Commission') in C.C.No.64 of 2016, whereby the claim of the complainant, who is the 3rd respondent herein, is partly allowed. By the said orders, the opposite party No.2, the petitioner herein, was directed to refund a sum of Rs.40,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 12.5% per annum from 30.06.2015 and to pay compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- together with costs of Rs.20,000/-. It was further directed that upon such payment, the petitioner shall be entitled to take back the entire machinery from the complainant. It was also stipulated that in the event of non-compliance with the payment of Rs.40,00,000/-, the rate of interest shall stand enhanced to 14% per annum.
3. The facts leading to filing of the complaint before the learned State Commission are that the complainant - M/s.Bhargava Art Printers is a small propriety concern engaged in printing work for earning livelihood through self-employment. The complainant purchased Amsky Auesetter-832 CTCP with G & J-85 Plate Proposer with accessories vide Invoice 20.04.2015, but it was installed only in the month of June, 2015. After installation, the complainant came to know that the machine supplied belonged to the 2014 Model and not the 2015 Model, despite the purchase order having been placed on 12.02.2015. It is the further case of the complainant that instead of supplying brand new 5 one, the petitioner supplied a used and damaged one and after installation, several defects were noticed, including in starting the machine, accompanied by a continuous beeping sound indicating malfunction. It was observed that when a paper role was placed between the machine and the PSB, it caused damage and upon providing support with a paper role, the machine emitted abnormal noise when switched on and that the display panel located at the top right corner of the machine frequently showed error messages, on account of the leakage of air from the compressor.
4. The complainant asserts that in all paid Rs.40,00,000/- and due to pay Rs.3,05,000/- and requested the petitioner to deliver the machine, but the petitioner demanded to issue cheques for the balance amount towards security, thereby the complainant - the 3rd respondent herein executed six blank cheques in the month of February, 2015. However, taking advantage of the blank cheques, the petitioner misused the same and issued legal notice on 16.09.2015, for which, appropriate reply was also issued on 30.09.2015; and that the complainant is ready and willing to pay the balance amount of Rs.3,05,000/- subject to replacement of defective machinery with a new one. However, despite the repeated requests, the petitioner did not turn up to rectify the defects. On the contrary, the petitioner allegedly misused the blank cheques issued by the complainant, and 6 therefore, the 3rdrespondent - complainant approached the learned State Commission for redressal of his grievance. The same was numbered as CC.No.64 of 2016.
5. On the other hand, the opposite party No.1 before the State Commission, who is the 4th respondent herein, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the complaint both on facts and in law; that the complainant does not fall within the ambit of 'consumer' as defined under Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, 'the 1986 Act'), inasmuch as the machinery in question was purchased purely for commercial purpose and therefore, it was urged that the complaint is liable to be dismissed.
6. Secondly, the petitioner herein took a plea that the cheques issued by the complainant were dishonoured on the ground of "payment stopped by drawer", which resulted in initiation of criminal proceedings under Section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the 1881 Act') before the XII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, which came to be numbered as CC No.764 of 2016. It was therefore contended that the present complaint has been filed only with a view to evade the said criminal proceedings, and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the same with exemplary costs. 7
7. Basing on the material available on record, the learned State Commission framed the following points for determination:
i) Whether the opposite party No.2 (petitioner herein) supplied Demo Machinery with defective parts with the 2015 make?
ii) Whether the complainant is liable to pay how much amount towards outstanding for the purpose of machinery? If so, to what amount?
iii) Whether there is deficiency in service or unfair trade practice on the part of the opposite party No.2?
iv) Relief?
8. On behalf of the complainant, Sri T.Satyanarayana, who is the Proprietor of the complainant, was examined as PW.1 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.21, whereas Sri Sadanand Praveen Kumar, the Senior Executive Accountant of opposite party No.2 (petitioner herein) was examined as RW.1 and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.4. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the opposite party No.1.
9. The learned State Commission upon elaborate consideration of the issues recorded a finding that no evidence was placed on record by the opposite party No.2/petitioner herein to establish that a brand new machine of the 2015 make along with its peripherals, was either supplied or installed. It was observed that the petitioner had primarily concentrated on the alleged balance amount payable, stated to be Rs.8,05,000/-, without addressing the specific contention regarding the year of manufacture of the machine.
8
10. The learned State Commission further noted that instead of effectively rebutting the evidence of PW.1, undue emphasis was placed by the opposite party No.2/petitioner on the dishonour of three cheques issued by PW.1, amounting in total to Rs.6,00,000/-. It was held that the issue of cheque dishonour is not directly connected with the transaction covered under Exs.A.1 and A.2. The learned State Commission also took note of the fact that in respect of the dishonoured cheques, the petitioner had already initiated separate proceedings under the 1881 Act and that PW.1 had, in turn, initiated criminal proceedings alleging cheating and other offences.
11. It was further held that the question as to the guilt or otherwise of PW.1 in respect of the cheque dishonour is a matter to be adjudicated by the competent criminal Court and that the petitioner cannot under the guise of such proceedings evade its liability to supply a brand new, defect free machine. The conduct of the opposite party No.2/petitioner herein was held to constitute an unfair trade practice.
12. Accordingly, the learned State Commission partly allowed the claim directing the petitioner/opposite party No.2 to refund Rs.40,00,000/- with interest at 12% per annum from 30.06.2015 till the date of payment and further directed to pay compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- besides costs of Rs.20,000/-.
9
13. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Dealer/petitioner herein preferred First Appeal No.24 of 2023 before the learned National Commission under Section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (for short, 'the 2019 Act') inter alia raising grounds with regard to maintainability.
14. The learned National Commission, upon considering the rival contentions advanced by the parties and placing reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxm i Engineering W orks v/ s. P .S.G. I ndustrial I nstitute 1 , P aram ount Digital Colour Lab v/ s. Agfa I ndia P rivate Lim ited 2 , wherein it was observed that "commercial purpose does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by mean of 'self- employment'", rejected the objection raised by the petitioner herein. It was observed that the complainant was not a 'consumer' cannot be considered on the basis of a bald statement without any supporting evidence and that the plea of "commercial purpose" must be established by cogent evidence in each case, which the petitioner failed to do so. Consequently, the National Commission held that the State Commission cannot be faulted for adjudicating the issues framed therein.
1(1995) 3 SCC 583 2(2018) 14 SCC 81 10
15. The National Commission further held that, as regards the core issue of supply of machinery for consideration, the petitioner/dealer is liable for deficiency in service in the sale and installation of the printing machine. It was noted that no evidence was adduced by the petitioner to rebut the complainant's allegation that the machine supplied was of the 2014 model instead of 2015. The contention of the petitioner that the year of manufacture was not mentioned on the machine or in the invoice cannot be considered; particularly when the order was placed in the year 2015 and the price quoted also pertained to the said year. It was further observed that the machine supplied was defective, displaying errors and not functioning properly.
16. With regard to the contention of non-payment of the entire consideration, the National Commission held that the same has no bearing on the issue of defective functioning of the machine, especially when approximately 95% of the consideration had already been paid through RTGS. The complainant admitted that directions were issued to the bank to stop payment of certain cheques as the machine was not working and full payment was not considered prudent. The inability of the petitioner to rectify the machine and replace the same with the current model, despite receiving the consideration is justified the findings of the State Commission. The National Commission also observed that the pendency of proceedings before other Courts does 11 not preclude adjudication of the consumer dispute under the provisions of the 2019 Act.
17. Accordingly, the National Commission held that the First Appeal is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed. While affirming the order of the State Commission, the impugned order was modified to the extent that the amount received by the petitioner/dealer shall be refunded with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 30.06.2015, payable within a period of 60 days from the date of the order, failing which the rate of interest shall stand enhanced to 12% per annum till realization. Further, the direction awarding additional compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- was set aside, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DLF Hom es P anchkula P rivate Lim ited v/ s. D.S.Dhanda 3 holding that grant of multiple compensations for a singular deficiency is not sustainable in law.
18. Aggrieved by the order passed by the National Commission in First Appeal No.24 of 2023, affirming with modification the order of the State Commission, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the legality and correctness of the said orders. 3(2020) 16 SCC 318 12
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri K.Pratik Reddy, vehemently contended that the 3rd respondent herein - M/s.Bhargava Art Printers (complainant) is engaged in the business of manufacturing cardboard boxes, printing magazines, posters, flexes and other allied printing activities. It is submitted that in the year 2015, the 3rd respondent purchased printer worth Rs.43,05,000/- manufactured by the 4th respondent company and on 04.05.2015, the 3rd respondent entered into MOU with respect to the payment schedule and other terms and conditions. Clause 10 of the said terms provided for a warranty of one year and an additional one year warranty for spare parts, excluding electrical components.
20. It is further contended that no evidence whatsoever has been adduced by the 3rd respondent to establish that the electrical components of the printer were defective or damaged, pursuant to the complaint made before the learned State Commission during March, 2016. Learned counsel also submits that the learned State Commission failed to appreciate the fact that the 3rd respondent is not a 'consumer' under the 2019 Act and however, a bald pleading was made that the complainant established business for his livelihood and the entire family depends upon the said business and that the printer is purchased for commercial purpose and therefore, the 3rd respondent claiming to be a consumer is not entitled for any relief. 13
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner further vehemently contended that the learned State Commission failed to give any finding whatsoever on the fundamental issue of jurisdiction i.e. Whether the 3rd respondent qualifies as a 'consumer' under Section 2(7) of the 2019 Act. It is further submitted that the State Commission erroneously recorded that a sum of Rs.43,05,000/- was paid, in the absence of any such specific averment, whereas in fact, only an amount of Rs.35,00,000/- was paid.
22. Similarly, learned counsel contended that the National Commission did not consider the various contentions raised by the petitioner and dismissed the appeal, on the ground that the petitioner has made a bald statement that the 3rd respondent is not a 'consumer'. Learned counsel submits that the correct test is not merely whether the activity is for livelihood, but whether the goods were purchased for commercial use. However, the National Commission, according to him, erroneously concluded that in the absence of written submissions by the petitioner, the objections as to maintainability could not be considered.
23. Learned counsel further urged that the 3rd respondent itself admitted that it employed 8 employees and is engaged in manufacturing activities and therefore, the printer is clearly used for commercial purposes. In support of his contention, he placed reliance 14 upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veerender Singh v/ s. Dharshana Trading 4 , in which, it was held that where a business is carried out on as a commercial venture with the aid of employees, even if on a small scale, it would not fall within the ambit of "self-employment" under the 2019 Act.
24. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National I nsurance Com pany Lim ited v/ s. Harsolia M otors 5 , Lilavati K irtilal M ehta M edical Trust v/ s. Unique Shanthi Developers 6 , Jagm ittar Sain Bhagat v/ s. Director, Health Services, Haryana 7 , R aza Textiles Lim ited v/ s. I ncom e Tax Officer, R am pur 8 and SGS I ndia Lim ited v/ s. Dolphin I nternational Lim ited 9 and contended that the onus of proof that there was deficiency in service is on the complainant. If the complainant is able to discharge its initial onus, the burden would then shift to the respondent in the complaint. The rule of evidence before the civil proceedings is that the onus would lie on the person who would fail if no evidence is led by the other side. Therefore, the initial burden of proof of deficiency in service was on the complainant, which 4SLA (c) No.5510 of 2020 Dt.18.03.2025 5(2023) 8 SCC 362 6(2020) 2 SCC 265 7(2013) 10 SCC 136 8(1973) 1 SCC 633 9(2022) 19 SCC 442 15 he has failed to do so, and thus, the Commission has erred in law to draw adverse inference against the petitioner herein.
25. Learned counsel finally contended that the learned State Commission did not whisper any finding on the issue of jurisdiction, whereas the learned National Commission by merely placing reliance on Laxm i Engineering's case (supra), assumed jurisdiction without properly determining the jurisdictional fact. It is submitted that failure to decide a jurisdictional issue vitiates the entire proceedings. On these grounds, learned counsel prayed that the impugned orders be set aside and the Writ Petition be allowed.
26. Per contra, Sri K.V.Bhanu Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently contended that the 3rd respondent herein is a small enterprise running by its Proprietor for eking out his livelihood and both the learned State Commission and the learned National Commission upon appreciation of the material evidence on record while observing that the contention of the petitioner/Dealer that the 3rd respondent/complainant was not a consumer, held that it is a bald statement which has not been established by any evidence being led and relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lax m i Engineering' s (case), recorded a clear finding that the 3rd respondent herein is a proprietary firm engaged in printing technology related works for the purpose of 16 earning his livelihood, and purchase for self-employment to earn livelihood remains protected, which do not call for the scrutiny of this Court.
27. Learned counsel further contended with regard to the principal objection raised by the petitioner company with regard to maintainability of the complaint that the complainant is not a 'consumer' is no longer res integra, in view of the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinit Bahri v/ s. M / s. M GF Developers Lim ited 10 , wherein it was held that the burden of proving 'commercial purpose' lies on the opposite party but not on the consumer-complainant. The Dominant intention at the time of purchase is the decisive test mere earning of income or business does not exclude the consumer jurisdiction. Applying the said principle to the present facts and circumstances of the case, it is contended that the printer was purchased for self employment and livelihood and not for the purpose of resale, to lease, or for the purpose of generating large scale profit. Therefore, contended that the petitioner company has failed to discharge the burden of establishing that the purchase was for a commercial purpose and consequently, the complaint is maintainable.
10Civil Appeal No.6588 of 2023 dated 04.02.2026 17
28. Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon in Lilavati K irtilal M ehta M edical Trust's case (supra) and contended that in order to attract the exclusion clause, there must be close nexus with profit oriented commercial activity. In the present case, the printer was used by the proprietor personally for the livelihood, no industrial scale activity is shown and hence, exclusion clause does not apply.
29. Learned Senior Counsel strongly contended that the petitioner supplied a defective machine and failed to provide proper after-sales service and that the documents relied upon by the petitioner are fabricated, evidencing unfair and unethical practices.
30. Learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rubi (Chandra) Dutta v/ s. United I ndia I nsurance Com pany Lim ited 11 , wherein it was held that writ Courts cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact. Learned Senior Counsel therefore contends that the Writ Petition is devoid of merit, frivolous and amounts to an abuse of the judicial process and accordingly prays for dismissal of the Writ Petition and uphold the orders passed by the learned National Commission and the State Commission.
11(2011) 11 SCC 269 18
31. We have given our earnest consideration to the contentions urged by both the parties and perused the record.
32. The principal issue that arises for consideration in the present Writ Petition is 'whether the complainant falls within the ambit of 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and whether the concurrent findings recorded by the fora below warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India'.
33. The first and foremost contention of the petitioner consistently is that the complainant will not fall under the ambit of 'consumer' under Section 2(d) of the 1986 Act and that the complainant purchased the machine for the 'commercial purpose' only and therefore, the entire adjudication made by the learned State Commission which was upheld by the learned National Commission is arbitrary.
34. In this regard, it is just and necessary to outline the meaning and scope of the term 'consumer'. The said term has been defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act and the same is reproduced below for ready reference:
"2.Definitions (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
...
19
d) "Consumer" means any person who,--
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, "commercial purpose" does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment;"
35. A bare perusal of the above provision reveals that the term 'consumer' encompasses any person who buys goods or avails services for consideration, but excludes a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. The Explanation 20 to the said clause clarifies that 'commercial purpose' does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. While the 1986 Act does not exhaustively define 'commercial purpose', the Explanation to Section 2(1)(d) gives an exception for self-employment and earning livelihood, the intention or purpose of the transaction is determinative of whether the purchaser falls within the exclusion clause.
36. Section 2(1)(d) contemplates for the goods exclusively for the purpose of earning livelihood by self employment are excluded from the ambit of "commercial purpose". Here purchase of the machinery from the petitioner in the absence of making profits but only for the purpose of making livelihood by self-employment does not qualify 'commercial purpose'. The term 'commercial purpose' as referred to under Section 2(1)(d) nowhere been defined under the provisions of the 1986 Act.
37. It is appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the judgment in Laxm i Engineering 's case (supra) is as under:
"...if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self- employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided 21 in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasis what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer..."
"The word 'consumer' is a comprehensive expression. It extends from a person who buys any commodity to consume either as eatable or otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation, store, fair price shop to use of private or public services. In Oxford Dictionary a consumer is defined as, "a purchaser of goods or services". In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained to mean, "one who consumes. Individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of products and services. A member of that broad class of people who are affected by pricing policies. financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit reporting. debt collection, and other trade practices for which State and Federal consumer Protection Laws are enacted. "
The Act opts for no less wider definition. It reads as under:
" consumer' means any person who, -
(i)buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred 22 payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose, or
(ii)hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised or under any system of deferred payment when such services are availed of with the approval of die first mentioned person; [Explanation.-- For the purposes of subclause
(i), 'commercial purpose' does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment;]"
It is in two parts. The first deals with goods and the other with services. Both parts first declare the meaning of goods and services by use of wide expressions. Their ambit is further enlarged by use of inclusive clause. For instance, it is not only purchaser of goods or hirer of services but even those who use the goods or who are beneficiaries of services with approval of the person who purchased the goods or who hired services arc included in it. The legislature has taken precaution not only to define 'complaint', 'complainant', 'consumer' but even to mention in detail what would amount to unfair trade practice by giving an elaborate definition in clause (r) and even to define 'defect' and 'deficiency' by clauses (f) and(g) for which a consumer can approach the Commission. The Act thus aims to protect the economic interest of a consumer as understood in commercial sense as a purchaser of goods and in the larger sense of user of services."
Conclusions "We must, therefore, hold that:
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(i) The explanation added by The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act 50 of 1993 (replacing Ordinance 24 of 1993) with effect from 18.6.1993 is clarificatory in nature and applies to all pending proceedings.
(ii) Whether the purpose for which a person has bought goods is a "commercial purpose" within the meaning of the definition of expression "consumer" in Section 2(d) of the Act is always a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.
(iii) A person who buys goods and use them himself, exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self employment is within the definition of the expression "consumer"
38. Even on perusal of the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinit Bahri 's case (supra), relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.3 herein, the decision of the Apex Court in Laxm i Engineering W orks (supra) has been referred, wherein it was observed that the Explanation, being an exception to an exception, clarifies that purchase of goods for 'commercial purpose' would not take the purchaser out of the definition of 'consumer' if the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. The Explanation reduces the question of what constitutes 'commercial purpose' to a question of fact to be decided in the circumstances of each case, and it is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to.
24
39. Further, in the above recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying on its own decision in the case of Shriram Chits (I ndia) P rivate Lim ited Earlier K now n as Shriram Chits (K ) P rivate Lim ited v/ s. R aghachand Associates 12 , it was held that the onus of proving that the appellants therein falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act rests upon the respondents and the determinative question is whether the dominant intention or dominant purpose behind purchasing the flat was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity and whether there exists a close and direct nexus between the purchase and such profit generating activity. The respondents therein have not placed any cogent material on record to establish such nexus. In the absence of such proof, the appellants therein cannot be excluded from the definition of 'consumer' under the 1986 Act.
40. In the facts of the present case also unless the profit making is established, the burden of proof lies upon the petitioner. Therefore, for all the purposes, it can be safely held that the burden of proving the 'commercial purpose' lies on the opposite party but not the complainant.
12(2024) 9 SCC 509 25
41. Though the objection as to maintainability of the complaint on the ground that the complainant had purchased the machinery for 'commercial purpose' has been consistently raised by the petitioner, both the Fora below have concurrently rejected the said contention by recording a categorical finding that the petitioner failed to substantiate the plea by adducing cogent evidence.
42. The statutory scheme under Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, as extracted hereinabove, makes it abundantly clear that while a person purchasing goods for 'commercial purpose' is excluded from the definition of 'consumer', the Explanation makes out a significant exception, viz., where such goods are used by the purchaser himself exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. Thus, the determinative factor is not the value of the goods purchased or the scale of operation, but the dominant purpose for which such goods are put to use.
43. The complainant is a proprietary concern. The consistent stand taken before the Fora below is that the machinery was purchased for carrying on printing work as a means of livelihood. Though the petitioner has contended that the complainant employed certain workers and was engaged in business activities, 26 no documentary evidence has been placed on record to establish that the transaction in question had a direct nexus with large scale commercial profit making so as to bring it within the exclusion clause.
44. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment in Veerender Singh (supra) does not advance the case of the petitioner in the absence of foundational facts. Whether a transaction amounts to 'commercial purpose' is essentially a question of fact. In the instant case, both the Fora below have upon appreciation of evidence recorded a concurrent finding that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden cast upon it.
45. On the contrary, the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinit Bahri (supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case, wherein it has been held that the burden of proving that the transaction falls within the exclusionary clause of 'commercial purpose' lies on the opposite party. In the absence of such proof, the complainant cannot be non-suited on the ground of maintainability.
46. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the 27 complainant is not a 'consumer' is devoid of merit and has been rightly rejected by the learned State Commission as well as the learned National Commission. The contention that there is failure to decide a jurisdictional fact is misconceived, as the said issue has been duly considered and answered based on the material available on record. Thus, the jurisdictional fact as to whether the complainant falls within the definition of 'consumer' under Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act has been duly considered and determined by both the Fora below based on the material available on record.
47. Both the Fora below have recorded a concurrent finding that the machinery supplied by the petitioner was not a brand new 2015 model as agreed upon, but was of an earlier make and was also defective in functioning. The said findings are based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, including the testimony of PW.1 and the exhibits marked on behalf of the complainant. Significantly, the petitioner has failed to place any material evidence to rebut the specific allegation that the machinery supplied was of 2014 make or that it was free from defects. The emphasis placed by the petitioner on the alleged outstanding payment and dishonour of cheques has been rightly held by the Fora below to be extraneous to the core issue relating to deficiency in service.
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48. The contention of the petitioner that the complainant has not discharged the initial burden of proof is also liable to be rejected. The complainant has adduced sufficient evidence to establish defects in the machinery and the circumstances under which the same was supplied. Once such prima facie case was made out, the burden shifted upon the petitioner to disprove the same, which the petitioner has failed to do.
49. It is also well settled that proceedings under the 1986 Act are summary in nature and the standard of proof is based on preponderance of probabilities. The findings recorded by the Fora below do not suffer from perversity or patent illegality warranting interference. Accordingly, deficiency in service on the part of the petitioner stands established on the standard of preponderance of probabilities
50. The further contention relating to pendency of proceedings under Section 138 of the 1881 Act has also been rightly rejected by the Fora below, holding that such proceedings are independent and do not bar adjudication of a consumer dispute and do not absolve the petitioner from its liability. We find no infirmity in the said reasoning.
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51. It is trite law that this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of fact recorded by statutory Tribunals. In R ubi (Chandra) Dutta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless the same are perverse or based on no evidence.
52. The findings recorded by the learned State Commission and confirmed by the learned National Commission are based on proper appreciation of evidence and sound legal principles. No perversity, arbitrariness, or jurisdictional error has been shown by the petitioner. We are mindful of the scope of the interference by way of re-appreciation of facts as well as reevaluation of the evidence substituting the findings of both the Fora in the absence of perversity, jurisdictional error as well as violation of principles of natural justice.
53. Insofar as the modification made by the learned National Commission with regard to the rate of interest and setting aside of additional compensation is concerned, the same has been done in accordance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in DLF Hom es P anchkula P vt. Ltd. (supra), and we find no reason to interfere with the same.
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54. Viewed from any angle, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit. The petitioner has failed to make out any case warranting interference with the well reasoned and concurrent orders passed by the Fora below.
55. Accordingly, W.P.No.8285 of 2025 is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Interim orders granted if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
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MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
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GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J
Date: .05.2026
GJ