Karnataka High Court
M/S. Ranjit Commercial Enterprises vs P.R. Ashokanand S/O Late P. Ramachandra ... on 3 February, 1995
Equivalent citations: AIR1996KANT1, ILR1995KAR653, AIR 1996 KARNATAKA 1, (1995) ILR (KANT) 653, (1996) 2 RENCJ 287, (1995) 1 RENTLR 741
ORDER
1. The petitioner -- a Madras based Private Limited Company, assails the impugned order of eviction passed in respect of a guest house maintained by it at Bangalore which is used for occupation of its two Directors during their occasional visit to the city.
2. The petitioner has filed I.A. No. V for admitting certain correspondences entered into between the parties relating to the petition premises as additional evidence. The respondent has also filed a petition along with an affidavit disclosing certain subsequent events. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting parties do not object to taking into account the facts emerging from the said petitions. Therefore, I am taking notice of those facts as well.
3. The respondent-landlord at present is residing in a house owned by his wife. The said house consists of two bed-rooms, a hall and dining room with kitchen. His family consists of himself, his wife and two sons. The elder son aged 29 years, who has completed his B.M.S. Engineering course, has been married. The younger son aged about 23 years is presently pursuing his studies in B.Com. course.
4. The petitioner-tenant is a limited Company having its registered office at Madras and Factory at Hosur. It had taken the petition premises on rent in 1979 and it is being used as a guest house. This premises comprises of three bed-rooms and ancillary facilities, located in Bangalore at M. G. Road, one of the prestigious localities of the town.
The rent fixed for the said premises is Rs. 3,300/-. According to the evidence of R.W. 1, the sole witness examined on behalf of the tenant, the guest house is used by the two Directors of the Company as and when they visit Bangalore.
5. The respondent-landlord has filed the present eviction petition on the ground of bona fide personal need which became imperative because of lack of suitable accommodation for the two grown-up sons and the unhealthy surrounding of the existing premises. According to him, his two grown-up sons need two independent rooms to maintain their privacy and to pursue their occupation and studies which is not feasible because of paucity of additional space. It was also stated by him that in the vicinity of his exisling premises there is accumulation of filth and cow-dung which is adversely affecting his health. It is also his case that he being a cricketer of national repute, presently working as Development Manager of senior grade in State Bank of Mysore and associated with various national and international associations needs comfortable space and accommodation to entertain his guests of status which is not possible in the present premises.
6. Keeping in view the facts on record drawn from the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the respective parties, the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court held that the petition premsies was bona fide and reasonably required by the landlord for the occupation of his family and accordingly passed the impugned order of eviction directing the petitioner to vacate the premises.
7. Sri Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the impugned order by submitting that the purported need of the respondent-landlord is neither bona fide nor reasonable. According to him, the present eviction petition had been filed by the landlord just as a device for getting higher rent. In support of his submission he has relied on the correspondences brought on record by way of additional evidence. His further submission is that, if the landlord had any genuine need for having a larger accommodation for his family, it was open for him to construct a residential unit on the first floor of the petition premises instead of putting up a non-residential construction and letting it out on higher rent. According to him, the respondent is also guilty of suppressing a material fact pertaining to availability of some other alternative premises owned by his father.
8. Learned Counsel for the respondent Sri Shivakumar has refuted all the charges by referring to various facts and circumstances appearing from the records of the case.
9. The petitioner-tenant has not challenged the foundational facts pertaining to the number of members in the family of the landlord and the living rooms available in the presently held premises. Keeping in view these facts, apart from the unhygenic condition surrounding the premises, it cannot be disputed that the family needs additional accommodation. It is because out of the two adult sons of the landlord, one having already married and the other pursuing his higher studies certainly they need two separate rooms. Their need under normal situation cannot be fulfilled with existing one room available for their occupation.
10. In the case of Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Ranadhir Chandradutta , in somewhat similar circumstances as appearing in this case where the question for consideration was as to whether the one left-out room for three grown up sons of the landlord can be said to be sufficient for accommodation, their Lordships have held that :
"The High Court has further held that so long as the three major sons of the appellant remain unmarried they can all occupy one room as they have been doing hitherto. It is inded strange that the High Court should think that three grown up sons aged 34, 29 and 27 years could be asked to huddle themselves in small room and live there without reference to factors of privacy and convenience. The High Court has also observed that the evidence on record did not show that there was any prospect of the three sons getting married in the forseeable future. When the members of the family are not having adequate living space for themselves, it is futile for the High Court to expect the appellant to adduce tangible evidence to show that there were imminent prospects of the celebration of the marriages of the three sons."
On those facts the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the High Court and restored that of the appellate Court and the trial Court, which had directed eviction on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. Therefore, it has to be held that the respondent-landlord reasonably requires the petition premises comprised of three bed rooms, which is adequate and suitable for occupation of the family comprised of husband, wife and two adult sons.
11. Now, I come to the ground of mala fide alleged on behalf of the petitioner-tenant. It is a matter of record that the petition premises was tenanted in 1979 on term lease of two years subject to renewal. The correspondences show that at the time of renewal, on mutual agreement of the parties, the rent was being enhanced. There is nothing to show that at any point of time any coercion was exercised for enhancement of rent. It further appears that in 1985, when the respondent-landlord intended to put up a construction on the first floor, the same was obstructed by the petitioner by filing a suit being O.S. No. 622 of 1985. Ultimately the said suit ended in a compromise on 12-12-1985 (marked as Ex. P21) whereunder the stair-case room of the petition premises was allowed to be used by the landlord for making construction on the first floor. But this was agreed by the tenant on reduction of monthly rent from Rs. 4100/- to Rs. 3,300/- with effect from 1-9-1985. Thereupon the respondent made non-residential construction comprising of one room on the first floor and let it out to Madura Coats. There is nothing on record to show that thereafter the landlord had ever asked for any enhancement of rent. Therefore, the allegation of mala fide based on the demand of higher rent is not substantiated by the material on record.
11A. The second ground built up for demonstrating mala fide is also equally fallacious. According to Mr. Krishnan, since the landlord who could have constructed a residential premises on the first floor, had advisedly put up a non-residential premises for earning higher rent, which ex facie demonstrates lack of bona fide on his part. The submission is that the landlord should have well in advance foreseen his requirements and should have put up residential construction on the first floor. According to , the tenant, the landlord having failed to exercise that option available to him, cannot now be allowed to turn upon the tenant for fulfilling his requirement and drive him out of the premises.
12. In my opinion for the purposes of assessing the present need of the landlord, it is wholly inconsequential and irrelevant as to what the landlord could have done in the past anticipating his future need and what he has not done. What is material for the present purpose is that as a matter of fact, the landlord bona fide and reasonably is in need of a suitable premises for the residence of his family and that he does not have any other premises for the said purpose except the petition premises. This answer by itself clinches the issue.
13. The last submission on behalf of the tenant pertaining to lock of bona fides of the landlord is to the effect that admittedly the father of the respondent had a house in the city and after his death the petitioner (respondent) must have got a share in it. But the landlord has placed no material on record to show as to how that premises is not suitable for his occupation. According to Mr. Krishnan, the mere assertion of the landlord in the pleadings as also in the evidence is to the effect that :
"Apart from my present premises, I have no other suitable premises of my own"
is not enough to discharge his onus in this regard. In this connection I may point out that despite the said deposition of the landlord who has examined himself as P.W. 1 no suggestion was made to him in cross-examination with regard to any other suitable alternative accommodation being available to him. In case the tenant knew about any alternative accommodation, it was incumbent upon him to confront the witnesses with that aspect. In that event he could have elaborated as to how any other accommodation, if at all available, was not suitable. In the case of Dr. Saroj Kumar Das v. Shri Arjun Prasad Jogani the landlord was the appellant before the Supreme Court. He had lost in the High Court on the ground that he had one more flat in the town apart from the petition premises though it was pleaded by him that it was not suitable. The Apex Court while dealing with this issue, in paragraph 14 of the judgment has held thus:
"The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant said nothing else except the statement that this flat is not suitable for his purpose but it is very significant that this statement made by the appellant when he was examined additionally after the pleadings were amended. This statement is not challenged by way of cross-examination at all and it clearly states that for the purpose for which the appellant needs the premises and he sought eviction this flat is not at all suitable for that purpose which also is apparent from the situation and the circumstances discussed above."
14. For the foregoing reasons I have no hesitation in accepting the finding of the Court below that the requirement of the respondent-landlord is reasonable and bona fide as correct. The question of comparative hardship has also been rightly weighed in favour of the landlord, since the respondent-landlord immediately requires the petition premises for the residence of his family, whereas the tenant is mainly using it as a guest house for the convenience and comfort of its two Directors on their occasional visits to Bangalore, who otherwise permanently reside at Madras. If the tenant-Company still intends to maintain any guest house at Bangalore for the comfort of its Directors, it has definitely enough resources to acquire an alternative premises.
15. The question of partial eviction also cannot arise because the entire family of the landlord cannot be accommodated in the petition premises by awarding partial eviction and it will be too unreasonable on the part of the Court to ask the family to disrupt in order to comply with the concept of partial eviction. Such an approach has been disproved by the Supreme Court in the case of B. C. Nandan .
16. For the reasons afo esaid, I find no infirmity in the impugned order. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 3,500/-.
17. Petition dismissed.