Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
G.S. Venkata Ramana And Ors. vs General Manager, South Central Railway ... on 19 June, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(6)ALD264, 2002(5)ALT600
Author: Bilal Nazki
Bench: Bilal Nazki
JUDGMENT Bilal Nazki, J.
1. This is a Writ petition filed by the petitioners who have filed an O.A being O.A.No.666 of 2002 before the Tribunal challenging the memorandum issued by South Central Railways dated 30th May, 2002. Along with the O.A an application for interim stay was filed. The Tribunal has passed the following order:
"Heard the Counsel on both sides. We consider it necessary to get a reply statement from the respondents. The learned Counsel for the applicant sought for an interim direction in the matter. We are not inclined to grant any interim direction in this matter."
2. Before coming to the controversy it is necessary to refer to certain material facts. The petitioners were appointed after a notification for filling up of certain vacancies. There were 90 vacancies of Junior clerks-cum-Typists in the scale of Rs.950-1500 in the South Central Railway zone. It was stipulated in the notification that the selection would be made on the basis of written examination and interview, skill test/psychology test. The petitioners appeared for the test on 18-2-1996, the results were published in the Employment news dated 16-22 March, 1996. The petitioners were declared successful. They received individual call letters. They appeared for the interview and skill test. They also contend that they appeared for the typewriting test before the committee of officers at Bangalore in March, 1996 and eventually they were selected and appointment letters were issued to them. The petitioners joined their services thereafter some of them were given promotions also. In the meantime, respondents No.2 and 3 issued notice of termination of services dated 20-4-1999 and 21-4-1999 to the petitioners alleging that it had come to their notice that serious irregularities had been committed during the recruitment of the posts of Junior clerks-cum-Typists. These notices of termination were challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench in O.A.No. 683 of 1999 and O.A.No.887 of 1999. They were disposed of at the admission stage. The Tribunal passed the following order:
"The applicant if so advised may submit a detailed representation to the impugned show-cause notice dated 21-4-1999 within the stipulated time. If such a representation is received from the applicant within the stipulated time the same should be disposed of in accordance with the rules. If it is decided to terminate the services of the applicant after the perusal of the representation of the applicant, such an order shall come into force only after 20 days of the receipt of the order by the applicant."
3. A detailed representation in pursuance to the order of the Tribunal was given by the petitioners to the respondents 2 and 3. However, the respondents even, after representation issued termination orders on 17-8-1999. The petitioners again went, to the Tribunal, filed O.A.Nos.1267 and 1312 of 1999. The order of termination was set aside by the Tribunal.
4. The case of the petitioners is that the order of the Tribunal quashing the termination order of the applicants has become final. Ft was not challenged through writ petition in the High Court nor was it challenged in the Supreme Court. However, in a similar matter being O.A.No. 1265/99 in which same orders had been passed by the Tribunal the respondents challenged the order in the High Court by Writ Petition No. 4898/2000. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. The respondents filed S.L.P. against the order of High Court in W.P.No. 4898/2000. The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal No.1326 of 2002 and upheld the order of termination in case of one Mr. O. Chakradhar. Now, the question is Mr. O. Chakradhar and the present petitioners were appointed by the same process of selection which was found to be faulty by the respondents therefore they terminated the services of O. Chakradhar and also the present petitioners. The present petitioners challenged the orders before the Tribunal through O.A.Nos. 1267 and 1312 of 1999 whereas Mr. O. Chakradhar filed a separate O.A being O.A.No. 1265 of 1999. In all the matters the Tribunal quashed the orders of termination. The respondents, however, went in appeal to Supreme Court only in O. Chakradhar's case. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of termination. Now, the only question which remains after the judgment of the Supreme Court is, when the order of termination passed in the year 1999 against Mr. Chakradhar has been upheld can the petitioners claim that since no appeal was filed against the judgment passed in their case therefore the order of Tribunal has assumed finality. This is the argument put forth by Mr. D.V. Seetharam Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioners. We are not purposely deciding the issue because that may prejudice the parties who will have to litigate it before the Tribunal, but suffice it to say that there are number of judgments of the Supreme Court which could be pressed into service even by the respondents. One of the judgments to which a reference could be made is Shenoy & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, . The facts of this case are that, the State of Karnataka had enacted the Karnataka tax on Entry of Goods into local areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1979 in order to augment the resources of the local bodies. This Act was challenged by number of petitioners by way of 1590 writ petitions in the High Court. The Karnataka High Court struck down the Act, allowed the writ petitions and issued writ of mandamus against the State Government forbearing it from taking any proceedings under the Act. The State preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, however, only one appeal was filed and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of the Act. So, out of 1590 persons the judgment of the High Court had been struck down in case of only one person. It was contended that as against the persons against whom the State had not gone to the Supreme Court the judgment of the High Court had assumed finality and no recoveries could be made against them. The Supreme Court while considering many other decisions illustrated the fallacy of the argument in the following words:
"The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by looking at the submissions made from a slightly different angle. Assume for arguments sake that the mandamus in favour of the appellants survived notwithstanding the judgment of this Court. How do they enforce the mandamus? The normal procedure is to move the Court in contempt when the parties against whom mandamus is issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed and notices are issued to the State. The State's answer to the Court will be "Can I be punished for disrespecting the mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued, which law is equally binding on me and on you?" Which Court can punish a party for contempt under these circumstances? The answer can be only in the negative because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court, of the validity of 1979 Act."
The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Vallapally Plantations Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, . According to him it is not in each and every case that the Supreme Court judgment would apply to the cases which are finally settled between the parties. But these are matters which have to be gone into. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondents refers to a judgment of Supreme Court in Vallapally Plantations Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, , in which a matter between the parties has become final in view of the decision of the single Judge of the High Court, some time thereafter in a similar matter the Division Bench of High Court took a different view and in the result the earlier judgment of the High Court stood overruled therefore the earlier decision was sought to be revoked, the Supreme Court held;
"23. Considering the question regarding applicability of Section 85(9) to the case in hand in the conspectus of statutory provisions we are of the view that answer to the question is in the negative. The provision in Section 85(9) as we see it, is intended to enable the Board to set aside its order under Sub-section (5) or Sub-section (7), as the case may be. The power vested in the Board under the provision is in wide terms, and therefore, the necessity for circumspection in exercise of the power. The provision is intended to empower the Board to correct errors in its orders and not to upset judgment/order/decree of competent Courts which are binding on the parties. To hold otherwise will amount to vesting powers to reopen any proceeding disposed of by a competent Court at any point of time (there is no period of limitation provided in the section) which may result in unsettling positions settled between the parties. On a fair reading of the provision it is to be held that the power to set aside its order and reopen a proceeding should be exercised by the Board in a fair and reasonable manner. In a case where the dispute on being determined by the Taluk Land Board was carried in revision to the High Court by the person affected or by the Government and the revisional order passed by the High Court was not challenged before superior Court and thus attained finality, to vest the power in the Taluk Land Board to ignore such an order and reopening the proceeding will not only result in unsettling settled positions between the parties but also go against judicial discipline.
24. No doubt in the present case the order that was sought to be set aside was of the Board. But the said order was passed in pursuance to the directions of the High Court in the revision petition. In other words in substance and in effect, in passing the order the Board was only complying with the direction of the High Court. To vest jurisdiction in the Board to set aside such an order will be permitting the Board to interfere with the decision of the High Court which has attained finality inter-parties."
5. The Tribunal has only postponed its decision on the interim application. It has neither allowed the application nor rejected it. If one reads in between the lines of the order passed by the Tribunal one comes to only one conclusion that the Hon'ble Members of the Tribunal wanted to decide the fate of the application after getting a counter from the respondents. The learned Counsel for the respondents has also referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in R. Manjula v.
Prl. Secretary to Govt., Revenue (Ser.I) Department, (DB), in which parameters have been laid within which the High Court should interfere when writs are filed against granting or refusal of interim orders.
6. For these reasons, we do not find merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed.