Delhi District Court
Syed Azmat Ali vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui on 9 October, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. SACHIN SOOD,
DISTRICT JUDGE - 01, CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
RCT ARCT No. 57/2025
CNR No DLCT01 008033 2025
Syed Azmat Ali
S/o Late Hashmat Ali
At 3899, Khirki Tafazzul Hussain
Jama Masjid, Delhi-110006. ...............Appellant
Versus
Ghaus Mohd Farooqui
(G. M. Farooqui)
S/o Late Afzal Hussain
R/o 107, First Floor, Narain Narar,
Lalita Park, Laxmi Nagar,
Delhi-110092 ............Respondent
Date of institution : 02.06.2025
Date of decision : 09.10.2025
ORDER
1. The present appeal is directed against the order dated 17.02.2025 whereby the Ld Additional Rent Controller, Tis Hazari Courts has dismissed the application filed under the provisions of Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC by the Appellant herein (Respondent before the Ld Trial Court) seeking appointment of a local commissioner in Eviction Petition no 819/2018.
2. Vide the impugned order the Ld Additional Rent controller has held that the power of appointment of commissioner for local investigation cannot be exercised by the court to enable any party to collect evidence through the commissioner, where the party can collect the evidence by itself. It has further been held that the burden to prove the fact as alleged by the RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 1 /16 respondent is upon the respondent. It has further been held that the matter is at the stage of respondent evidence, where the respondent can lead evidence in support of his contention that the property in question is not as per the site plan or the sale deed as relied upon by the petitioner and Local commissioner cannot be appointed to collect evidence on behalf of the respondent.
3. In the present case the eviction petition has been maintained by the respondent under section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in respect of shop bearing private no 7, Ward No XI, part of property No 3889, Khirki Tafazzzul Hussian, Near Jagat Cinema, Jama Masjid, Delhi 110006.
4. The Respondent in the said eviction (Appellant herein) has filed an application under the provisions of order XXVI Rule 9 CPC seeking appointment of the Local Commission to take measurements of the shop in the possession of the Appellant herein to show that the shop is not measuring 9 X 9 but is measuring 8 X 12 and also to prove that the boundaries of the said shop in possession of the Appellant herein do not tally with the sale deed filed by the Petitioner/Respondent herein. In order to prove these facts, the appeallant sought the appointment of a local Commissioner to ascertain the area, dimension, measurements and boundaries of the premises under occupation of the appellant which as per the appellant are different from the sale deed filed along with the eviction petition.
5. Since the order impugned herein emnates from the petition filed under the provisions of section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act which falls in Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, Ld counsel for the appellant was directed to address arguments on RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 2 /16 the maintainability of the present appeal filed under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Analysis and conclusions.
6. It is essential to deal with the question that whether an appeal under Section 38 of the Act is maintainable against the impugned order. The appellant has argued that every order passed by the Ld. ARC is appealable under Section 38 of the DRC Act and therefore, the present appeal is maintainable. He has placed reliance in the judgments passed in the matter of Mohd Tahir vs Khwaja Syed Mohd Mehdi Nizami (CM ( M) 1288/2019) and also in the matter of Jagdish Pershad Vs Hardayal Singh (AIR 1982 Delhi 298).
7. Ld Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon the judgment passed in the matter of Jagdish Pershad vs Hardayal Singh (AIR 1982 Delhi 298) to contend that once leave has been granted, the eviction petition has to be tried as any other eviction petition. In other words, it is the contention of the Counsel for the appellant that after the grant of leave to defend the appeal against any order would be maintainable. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case since in the said matter the question was whether after the grant of leave to defend the landlord can be permitted to amend the eviction petition with a view to add a ground of eviction. It was held that after grant of leave the leave to amend the pleadings would be maintainable. The said judgment is completely silent as to whether the order granting leave to amend the pleadings would be appealable.
8. Ld Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgement passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Raj kumari Kapoor Vs C RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 3 /16 K Das and Ors 67 (1997) Delhi Law Times 701 wherein it has been held that remedy of a person aggrieved by an order passed by rent controller including interlocutory order is to file an appeal before the rent control tribunal. It has further been held that such orders which effect valuable rights of a party would be judicial reviewed in Appeal by the tribunal. The said judgment is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case wherein the eviction proceedings were filed Under chapter III and not under chapter III A.
9. Ld counsel for the appellant on the strength of the said judgements has contented that an appeal shall lie from every order of the controller made under the Delhi Rent Control to rent control tribunal. It is thus contended that since the order passed by the Ld Additional Rent Controller is an interlocutory order hence the present appeal is maintainable.
10. In the present case, it is a matter of record that the present appeal arises out of the proceedings initiated under Sec 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25 (B) of the DRC Act. It is well-settled law that Section 25 (B) DRC Act provides a special procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction under the ground of bona-fide requirement. The Section 25(B)(8) of DRC Act provides that no appeal shall lie against an order for recovery of possession or any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure prescribed under this section and the only remedy has been provided by way of a revision before the Hon'ble High Court.
11. At this stage it is appropriate to reproduce relevant portions of Section 38, 25(A) and 25 (B) (8) of the DRC Act, as under:
"38. Appeal to the Tribunal.
(1)An appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act [only on questions of law] [Inserted by Act 57 of 1988, section 16 (w.e.f. 1-12- 1988).] to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 4 /16 consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette:[Provided that no appeal shall lie from an order of the Controller made under section 21.] [Inserted by Act 57 of 1988, section 16 (w.e.f. 1-12-1988).] (2)An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order made by the Controller: Provided that the Tribunal may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time...."
"25A. Provisions of this Chapter to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force.
Section 25(B) Special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.
......
(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section:
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. ...."
12. It is necessary to mention that the non-obstante Clause in Section 25(A) DRC Act provides that "the provisions of this Chapter (Chapter III A) or any rule made there under shall have the effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law for the time being in force".
13. Further, Section 25 (B) of the DRC Act provides that if an application is made under Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) it has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified therein and not under the provisions contained in Chapters other than Chapter III-A. The procedure laid down in Section 25(A) read with Section 25(B)(1) envisages a separate and concise procedure for proceedings before the Ld. Rent Controller. The rationale of providing the present mechanism is to provide RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 5 /16 an expeditious remedy to the landlord/owner in respect of his bonafide needs of the tenanted property.
14. The Delhi Rent Control Act as originally framed provided for the control of rents and of eviction of tenants. Various safeguards were created to ensure security of tenure to tenants residing in the urban area of Delhi and the right of the landlord to evict his tenant was restricted and made available only on the specified grounds as contained in Section 14 of the Act. The other Courts were divested with the jurisdiction to decide the disputes that were covered by the Rent Act. Section 38 laid down that every order of the Controller made under the Act shall be appealable before the Tribunal who shall have all the powers of a Court under the code of Civil Procedure while hearing an appeal.
15. A need was felt in around 1975 to ensure speedy trial for recovery of possession from the tenants by the Government Officers, who were retiring or were vacating the premises. The Act was therefore amended by Ordinance No. 24 of 1975 and Chapter III-A was added which provided for "Summary Trial of Certain Applications" and consists of three sections i.e. Sections 25A, 25B and 25C.
16. The non-obstante Clause in Section 25 A provides that "the provisions of this Chapter or any rule made there under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law for the time being in force". Section 25-B states that if an application is made under Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) it has to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified therein and not under the provisions contained in Chapters other than Chapter III-A. The procedure laid down in Section 25A read with Section RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 6 /16 25B (1) envisages a shortcut to the conclusion of the proceedings before the Rent Controller.
17. Section 25B (8) DRC Act makes a variation in the procedure and states that when "an order for the recovery of possession of any premises" has been made by the Controller on an application covered by Section 25B, no appeal or second appeal shall lie therefrom. The provisions under Section 38 of the Act have been specifically made inapplicable. Proviso to Sub Section (8) however empowers the High Court to call the records of the case to satisfy itself and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. The reason is that scheme of the Act and the object to intervene by introducing Section 14 A and Chapter III (A) into it by the amending act was to provide exhaustive remedy in regard to right of appeal and revision in relation to proceedings under this Chapter. Prior to the amendment, no distinction was made and the uniform procedure was provided for appeal and second appeal. It was felt that the procedure, as prescribed defeated the object on account delay involved and also defeated the very purpose of eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act and accordingly Chapter III-A was introduced to introduce sweeping reforms in the then existing provisions.
18. With the aforesaid background it has to be interpreted whether Section 25 B (8) is applicable only in case of an order of possession or to any order made in respect of petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act.
19. This aspect came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary vs. Narain Devi Taneja, AIR 1980 SCC (2120). While specifically repelling the contention of the tenant that under Section 25B DRC Act, it is only an order for recovery of possession of premises which is covered, it was observed:
RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 7 /16 "7.......Sub-section (8) no doubt in terms speaks only of an order "for the recovery of possession of any premises" and does not mention one which refuses the relief of eviction to the landlord; but then it appears to us that the expression "order for the recovery of possession of any premises" has to be construed, in the context in which it appears, as an order deciding application for the recovery of the possession of any premises. Our reasons in this behalf are two-fold.
Firstly, if an order in favour of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by sub section (8), an order refusing such relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under Section 38 so that there would be two procedures for the end product of the Controller's proceedings being called in question; one when the same is in favour of the landlord, and another when it goes against him, which would obviously entail discrimination and make the sub section suffer from a constitutional invalidity. We do feel that the language used is not happy but then it would not be doing violence to it if it is construed as just above stated.
Secondly, the scheme of the Act and the object of the introduction of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA into it by the amending act make us form the opinion that sub section (8) of Section 25B is exhaustive of the rights of appeal and revision in relation to the proceedings held under that Chapter".
20.It was thus, concluded that sub section (8) provides for the abolition of the right of appeal and second appeal under S.38 and S.39 and replaces it by a power in the High Court to revise an order passed by the Controller. That provision must necessarily be construed as laying down procedure exclusive of that provided in Section 38 & 39. It was further explained that in the way of the above interpretation of sub Section (8) of Section 25 B, the provisions of sub Section (10) thereof do not pose a hurdle. All that sub Section (10) states is that the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction covered by sub section (1) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of other applications by Controllers, except as provided in Chapter IIIA. Sub section (8) governs an application covered by sub section (1) of Section 25B and expressly takes away the right of appeal or second appeal, while providing the remedy of revision instead. The provisions of sub section (8) are exhaustive of the remedies available to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller in applications RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 8 /16 triable under Chapter III A, such applications fall outside the category of those which can be disposed of like other applications under sub Section (10) read with the provisions contained in other chapters of the Act. 21 It was concluded in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary (supra) that the remedy against any order made in eviction petition under Section 14 (1) (e) whether allowing or dismissing any application, shall be by way of revision in High Court and not by way of appeal under Section 38 & 39 of the Act.
22.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Dutt Sharma vs Ratan Lal Bhargava, 1984 (1) RJ 325 held that all the applications under Section 14(1) (e) of the Act fall within the protective umbrella of the new procedure provided in Chapter IIIA.
23. In I. R. K. Parikh Vs Smt Uma Verma 1978 (2) RCR 275 (Delhi High Court), the question answered was: Is Section 38 inconsistent with the procedure of Chapter IIIA of the Act. It was observed that a glance of provisions of Chapter III−A would show that the policy and purpose of the legislature in enacting Sections 25A, 25B and 25C is to introduce a swift and expeditious procedure for trial where the landlord's application for eviction is founded on the ground of bonafide requirement. Such cases could not be decided under the old procedure, which provided for first appeal under section 38 before the Rent Control Tribunal and second appeal to the High Court under section 39 DRC Act? This procedure meant delay. The legislature was impatient with "law's delays" and has therefore devised a shortened procedure of a speedy trial cutting out the right of first and second appeals altogether and substituting it with the remedy of revision to the High Court.
24. It was observed by Hon'ble Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J:
RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 9 /16 "11.The legislature seems to have entered a period of cautious weighing and adjusting. Fashions in legal thinking and parliamentary draftsmanship are not unchanging. The legislature now wanted to free the procedure from the shackles and constraints of the Slum Act, the rigidity of a full length trial and the road blocks of the first appeal and the second appeal All these consumed time. How to shorten the time was the question. The old procedure was dialatory. It did not keep pace with the time. The landlord's need was urgent. The procedure was tardy. The pace was too slow. The legislature has now increased its pace. Where once the courts and tribunals moved slowly the legislature of late has accelerated their pace. It has introduced in Ch. IIIA "an accelerated remedial procedure", to use a phrase of Krishna Iyer J. (See Kanta Goel v. B. D. Pathak (1977) 2 S.C.C. 814 (819) and Busching Schmitz v. P.T. Menghani, (1977) 2 S.C.C. 835 (839). In a word the legislature has quickened the pace of procedure.
.......
15. The paramount object of Chapter IIIA being to avoid delay in the trial of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement it would be absurd to hold that an appeal lies to the Tribunal under s. 38 of the Act from the order of the Controller granting the tenant leave to contest the application. The truth is that in the scheme of Chapter IIIA the Tribunal has no role to play and no function to perform. It has completely gone out of the picture. When first and second appeals are expressly barred from the final order of recovery of possession it is inconceivable that the legislature intended to retain for the landlord his right to appeal to the Tribunal from an intermediate order granting leave to the tenant. So incompatible and incongruous is the right of appeal to the Tribunal with the "accelerated remedial procedure" provided by s.
25B of the Act that the legislature could never have intended to preserve it.
........
19. The object of the legislature in incorporating the non obstante clause both in s. 14A and s. 25A of the Act is to do away with the first and second appeals contained in ss. 38 and 39 of the Act because they are "inconsistent". And anything inconsistent to be found "elsewhere in this Act" must give way to the paramount provisions of s. 14A and s. 25A.
20. The non obstante clause, the vesting or a right to immediate recovery in the landlord under s. 14A, the creation of a summary procedure under s. 25B, the overriding effect of that special procedure, the tone and tenor of the new amendments, all emphasise that the right of appeal (s. 38) and second appeal (s. 39) have been abolished at one single stroke with a view to meet an old standing and persistent "demand for simplifying the procedure" for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation (Statement of Objects and reasons dated 4th January, 1976).
21. On the ground that the legislature has given a primacy to Chapter IIIA which has an overriding effect even over the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act the Supreme Court held in Sarwan Singh Vs Kasturi Lal RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 10 /16 A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 265 that the Slum Act is inconsistent with Chapter IIIA of the Act. Following that line of reasoning I would hold that the right of first appeal to the Tribunal under s. 38 is inconsistent with the symmetry and design of Chapter IIIA. The two cannot co-exist. This is what "inconsistent" means. The overriding procedure such as we have in Chapter IIIA is both dominating and hegemonic. So superior is its authority that it subordinates everything to itself."
25. In Pran Nath Kapur vs. Ram Shiksh Mehta & Ors.1980 RLR 451 (Delhi High Court) it was reiterated that the petition under Section 14 (1)
(e) DRC Act has to be dealt with the procedure specified in Section 25B Chapter III−A. The said procedure is compulsory and not optional. The words used are "every application... shall be dealt with..." which shows that the procedure is mandatory and not elective.
It was observed as under:
"13. The theory of two procedures, one of appeal to the tribunal in certain cases and the other of revision to the High Court in yet other cases was roundly condemned by the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chaudhary's case. This is not the legislative habit of Parliament. Nothing in my view could be more dangerous than to assume by inference that Parliament intended that both the appellate and the revisional remedies should be available to landlords and tenants in the summary procedure unless it has given a clear mandate. I find no such clear mandate in Chpater IIIA. A court of law has no right to approach the question of construction with an a priori belief or intuition as to what Parliament is likely to have intended to allow."
26. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kewal Singh vs. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161 observed that the statute puts personal necessity of a landlord as a special class requiring special treatment for quick eviction of the tenant and to cut out all delays plugs all the loopholes which may cause delay in getting the relief by the landlord. By virtue of Sub Section 8, first and second appeal has been barred before the Tribunal and remedy by way of revision to the High Court against the orders has been provided. It was further observed that that legislature has not taken away the right of the tenant in cases falling within the RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 11 /16 ambit of Sections 14A and 14 (1) (e) of the Act but has limited it to a right to file revision.
27. In Bata India vs Smt Sarla Sharma AIR online 2021 DEL 532J an eviction petition was under Section 14-(1)(e) of DRC Act and ex parte eviction order was passed against the tenant and in favour of the landlord. The tenant filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC praying for setting aside of the eviction order passed ex parte. The application was allowed with certain conditions. Later, landlord filed an application for issuance of warrants of possession alleging therein that the tenant had failed to comply with the condition. Such application was allowed. The question arose whether appeal was maintainable against such order. This Court held that appeal was not maintainable against such order. Relying on Prithpal Singh vs Satpal Singh (2010) 2 SCC 15, it was observed that Section 25-B of the Act is a complete Code by which the entire procedure to be adopted for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement filed by the landlord in respect of a premises shall be followed. Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959, which provides for the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal to be guided by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall have no application. The following observations need to be extracted:-
"27. A reading of the abovequoted provisions of the Act as also the above- referred judgments, would clearly show that Section 25-A of the Act gives primacy to the procedure contained in Section 25-B of the Act for an eviction petition filed under Section 14(1)(e), or Sections 14-A, 14-B and 14-C or Section 14-D of the Act, and a remedy of an appeal under Section 38 of the Act would not be available to the parties to such eviction petition against any order passed in exercise of such procedure. However, in such a petition, if an order passed by the learned Rent Controller is not traceable to the special procedure prescribed in Section 25-B of the Act, a remedy of an appeal under Section 38 of the Act, if otherwise available in eviction petitions or proceedings filed under other provisions of the Act, shall be available to the parties.
RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 12 /16
43. In the present case, the eviction order itself is not applicable in terms of sub section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore even if the application is treated to be one u/o 9 Rule 13 of the Code, an order dismissing the said application would not be appealble under Section 38 of the Act. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the object of introducing chapter III A to the Act in as much as an appeal, which even otherwise is not maintainable under the code, would be considered as maintainable under section 38 of the Act which itself has been held to be restricted in application (Refer : Central Bank of India Ltd. Case [Central bank of India Ltd v. Gokal Chand AIR 1967 SC 799]).
28. Recently the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Mohd Arshad And Others Vs Syed Mohd Yahaya Nizami 2024 SCC Online Del 7173 after minutely reviewing the entire case law on the aspect of maintainability of an Appeal under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act against the order of dismissal of objections preferred by the Tenant before the executing court has authoritatively observed and held that an execution cannot be divorced from the eviction proceedings and it would be a travesty of justice and somewhat ironical and incongruous as well, if the procedure prescribed for the trial continues to be summary, but the remedial procedure qua the orders passed in execution thereof is permitted to be governed by conventional manner i.e. the manner in which the execution for other eviction petitions are dealt with. The very purpose of introducing summary procedure would be lost if the objection is also not dealt with, in the same manner.
29. Vide Para 38 of the Judgment it has further been held as under :
"38. The execution is merely a procedure prescribed for reaping fruits of decree. Therefore, if after the culmination of trial of any such eviction petition, there is a bar in filing appeal, such bar should continue to operate and exist while dealing with execution of any such decree. More so, while disposing of the above said objection petition, the learned Controller also, simultaneously, issued warrants of possession. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the order in question is akin to order for recovery of possession and, therefore, it cannot be said that the above said proviso attached to sub-section 8 of Section 25B of DRC Act, would not be applicable."
RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 13 /16 Vide Para 51 and 52 of the judgment it has further been held that :
"51. Thus, clearly, summary procedure has been introduced by the Amending Act so as to cut down the time factor, drastically. It would come into play even where eviction petition was dismissed or leave was granted. Naturally, in such a situation, there is no order for recovery of possession but despite that the right of appeal has been snatched away. This is indicative of the intention of legislature that the governing factor would be the ground for which there is a summary procedure. It cannot, therefore, be imagined that while dealing with any objection, related to eviction order passed on the prescribed grounds, including ground of bonafide requirement, such procedure would be given a go bye where there is an order of possession as well, thereby frustrating the very intent of legislature.
52.Therefore, the fast-tracked procedure has to be made applicable for any subsequent order as well, which, too, seeks recovery of possession."
30. Vide para 55 and 56 of the said Judgment it has thus been concluded :
"55. After carefully delving on all the attendant facts and circumstances and in view of foregoing discussion and while ensuring utmost care and abundant caution in interpreting the relevant statutory provisions, the picture which emerges out goes on to suggest that right to appeal is not available to the tenants herein as the above bar given under proviso attached to Section 25-B(8) of DRC Act continues to exist in context of the proceedings herein. The order in question, even if not actually an order of eviction, has all the shades and trappings of eviction order, as it even directs issuance of warrant of possession. Such interpretation seems not only rational but also purposive one, in complete synchronization with the legislative intention.
56.The remedial procedure prescribed for challenging any order of eviction is, admittedly, an accelerated one and, therefore, it will be incomprehensible to hold that the remedial procedure for any such order passed in execution thereof should be any different. Any interpretation, to the contrary, would, manifestly, mitigate against the legislative intention behind introduction of swift procedure for such like eviction petitions."
31. It may thus be concluded that no appeal against any order made in an eviction petition under S 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25 (B) is maintainable under S.38 of the Act and the only remedy available is to file a revision petition before Hon'ble High Court.
32. Now coming to the present case, the grievance of the appellant is against the order dismissing the application seeking appointment of the local commissioner. The said order even otherwise is not appealable under order RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 14 /16 XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure and accordingly the observations made in para 43 of Bata India Ltd (Supra) are squarely applicable to the present case since even the final order passed in the eviction petition filed under Section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25 B would not be the subject matter of an appeal. In case the argument of Ld Counsel for the appellant to the effect that an appeal lies from every order of the controllor made under the Act is to be accepted then that would defeat the very object of introducing Chapter III A of the Act and would lead to a travesty of justice.
33. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Central Bank of India Vs Gokal Chand 1967 (1) SCR 310 has held that the order of the controller refusing the appointment of Local Commissioner for inspection of the property was merely a procedural order not effecting any rights or liabalities of the parties. The aforesaid judgment was passed by Hon'ble Apex Court even prior to the introduction of Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act whereby the right to appeal has been curtailed and instead the remedy by way of revision has been provided. Vide para 3 and 5 of the said judement it has categorically been held as follows:
"3. The The object of S. 38 (1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right or liability. In the context of S. 38 (l), the words "every order of the Controller made under this Act"! though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Ss. 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 15 /16 ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding . Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under S. 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under S.38 (1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus , an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal.
4. .........
5. The order of the Controller dated May 29, 1965 refusing to issue a commission for inspection and preparation of a plan of premises No. 17, Alipur Road was a mere procedural order not affecting any right or liability of the appellant. The issue of a commission is only a step for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case. It is open to the appellant to canvass the error defect or irregularity, if any, in the order in an appeal from the final order passed in the proceeding for eviction. But no appeal from the order lay to the Rent Control Tribunal under S. . 38 (1)."
34. In accordance with the legislative intent in introducing Chapter IIIA in the Delhi Rent Control Act, ratio of the judgment passed in the matter of Bata India (Supra) and particularly in accordance with the ratio of the judgment passed in the matter of Central Bank of India (Supra) which was passed even prior to the introduction of Chapter III A in the Delhi Rent Control Act, the present appeal under Section 38 of the Act against the order dt 17.02.2025 declining the appointment of Local Commissioner not effecting any right or liabality of the appellant and as passed in the pending eviction petition maintained under Section 14 (1) (e) read with Section 25 B against the said interlocutory/procedural order is therefore held to be not maintainable.
35. In view of above, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.
36. A copy of this order be sent to the court of Ld Additional Rent Controller.
37. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Digitally
signed by
SACHIN
SACHIN SOOD
Announced in the open court (SACHIN SOOD)
SOOD Date:
2025.10.09
18:18:16
+0530
on 09.10.2025 DJ-01, (Central)
Tis Hazari Courts Delhi.
RCT ARCT 57/25 Ayed Azmat Ali Vs Ghaus Mohd Farooqui Page No 16 /16