Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
G. Rama Sharma vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh ... on 4 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(2)ALT593
ORDER S.R. Nayak, J.
1. This writ petition is filed by a dismissed judicial officer for a writ in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the notification issued in G.O. Ms. No. 55 Law (LA & J, Cts. CI) Department dated 7.4.1999 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the 1st respondent herein, dismissing the petitioner from judicial service as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution of India and for a consequential direction to the State Government and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the 2nd respondent herein, to accept the resignation submitted by the petitioner on 26.10.1996 and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
2.The petitioner while serving as Subordinate Judge (now redesignated as Senior Civil Judge), Narasaraopet, was served with a charge memo dated 10.9.1997 by the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer by the High Court vide its orders dated 21.3.1997, to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner in respect of the awards passed by him in Land Acquisition matters relating to acquisition of lands submerged due to construction of Priyadarshini Joorala Project. Earlier to that date, the High Court, by its order dated 21.12.1996, had placed the petitioner, who was at that time on leave, under suspension in contemplation of the enquiry and public interest with immediate effect. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner received the transfer order on 9.4.1996 and he was relieved at Gadwal on 11.4.1996 and reported for duty at Narasaraopet. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner applied for leave with effect from 1.8.1996 to 31.8.1996 and subsequently extended the leave up to 31.1.1997. In the interregnum, the petitioner submitted his resignation to the post on 26.10.1996 when he was on leave. As many as 28 charges are framed against the petitioner. They are the following:
1. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahabubnagar District after hearing the arguments on 8.4.1996 despite your transfer from the Sub Court, Gadwal on 3.4.1996 itself, thus violating the norms not to hear the case after being transferred, that you mis-used and abused your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal in disposing of the case and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, in contravention of Rule 3(2) of A.P.Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
2. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, while functioning as Sub Judge, Gadwal, heard the arguments in L.A.O.P.No. 287/94 on 8.4.1996 and pronounced the Judgment on the very next day on 9.4.96, that you never pronounced Judgments in any Land Acquisition case at Gadwal on the very next day after hearing the argument, that you acted in a manner placing your position under embarrassment by exhibiting undue and great haste in hearing and disposing of Land acquisition case O.P. No. 287 of 1994 and thus misused your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and thereby committed grave misconduct by behaving in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and in a manner which placed your official position under embarrassment in contravention of Rule 3(2) and 3(3) of A.P.Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
3. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, while functioning as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahabubnagar District, disposed of L.A. Case NO. OP. No. 287/94 on 9.4.96 fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.60/- per sq yard (Rs.2,90,400/- per acre) on yardage basis, whereas the acquired land is not an extent of more than 168 acres, that you were conscious that sale deeds on yardage basis cannot be taken into consideration in determining the market value of an acquired land if they are extensive, that the value determined by you is more than 20 times than the value fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, that the fixing of the value on yardage basis, where the extent of the acquired land is very vast is nothing but misuse and abuse your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
4. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, during your functioning as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, disposed of L.A.O.P. No. 346 of 92 on 20.9.1995, that while the L.A.O. fixed the compensation at Rs.20,500/- per acre, you enhanced the compensation to Rs.48,500/- per acre on the basis of Ex.A.3 sale deed, that Ex.A.3 sale deed contains the value at Rs.48,500/- per acre whereas you fixed the value at the rate of Rs.64,000/- per acre and fixed the compensation at Rs.48,000/- per acre deducting the value by 1/4th towards the formation of roads, that there was no basis for your fixing the value of the acquired land at Rs.64,000/- on the strength of Ex.A.3 sale deed, that fixing the value at Rs.64,000/- and fixing the compensation at Rs.48500/- per acre is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixation of value and compensation against the standard decisions and norms can be considered to be only due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
5. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of L.A.O.P.No. 234 of 1992 on 16.2.1996 in respect of Ac.3.30 cts of land acquired by the Government to provide house sites to backward classes, that while the LAO fixed the compensation at Rs.3000/- per acre, you fixed the value of the land at Rs.40,000/- per acre on the basis of Ex.A.1 sale deed for Ac.0-10 cts and reduced the same by 1/4th to fix the compensation at Rs.30,000/-, that you are aware that the sale deeds for small extents of land shall not made the basis to determine the market value when the acquired lands are vast, that the fixing of the value on the basis of sale deed for small extent of land while the acquired land is large is nothing but misuse and abuse of your power and position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixation of value against the standard decisions and norms is to be reckoned to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
6. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of L.A.O.P.No. 426 of 1987 on 25.7.95, that LAO determined the compensation at the rate of Rs.2860/- per acre in respect of categories I and II, at the rate of Rs.2150/-, for Category III and at the rate of Rs.100/- for category IV, that on the basis of a decision of the High Court fixing compensation for the similar land at Rs.65000/-, you have enhanced the compensation to RS.65000/- per acre, that while ding so, you have fixed the compensation at Rs.65000/- per acre for all the four categories without giving proper reasons why the lands in Categories I to IV shall have the same market value, that this fixation of value for all the four categories of land identically is nothing but mis-use and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixation of value against the standard decisions and norms can be considered to be owing to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
7. That you Sri G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, disposed of L.A.OP. No. 108/89 on 19.7.1995, that whereas the LAO fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs.4000/- per acre, you fixed the value at Rs.20,000/- and after deducing 1/4th towards formation of roads, you fixed the compensation at Rs.15,000/- per acre, that there is no basis for such fixation of compensation, that the fixation of the compensation at Rs.15,000/- per acre without any basis is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixation without any basis can be considered to be owing to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
8. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal disposed of O.P. No. 193/86 on 29.4.1995, that the LAO fixed the compensation for the acquired land to an extent of Ac. 10-19 cts at Rs.2500/- per acre, that you fixed the value at the rate of Rs.28/- per sq. yard and compensation at the rate of Rs.19/- per sq. yard by deducting 1/4th value on the basis of Ex.A.4 Judgment of the High Court, that Ex.A.4 which was in respect of acquisition of Ac. 2-15 guntas, cannot be the basis for determining the market value of Ac.10-19 gts., of acquired land, that you were aware that determining the market value of acquired properties on yardage basis even when the acquired land were vast is not permissible under law, that the fixing of the value of the land on yardage basis by you where the acquired land is at an extent of Ac.10-193 guntas is nothing but misuse and abuse of your power and position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixation of value against the standard decision and norms can be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
9. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal disposed of O.P. No. 124/98 on 28.7.1995, that while the LAO fixed the compensation at Rs.5000/- per wet land and Rs.4000/- per dry land, you enhanced the compensation to Rs.48400/- per acre for both varieties of lands, fixing the compensation at the rate of R.10/- per sq. yard on yardage basis, whereas, the acquired land is at an extent of Ac.2.04 guntas of dry land and Ac.0-14 guntas of wet land, that you are conscious that sale deeds on yardage basis cannot be taken into consideration in determining the market value of acquired land, if the acquisition is extensive, that the value determined by you is nearly 10 times than the value fixed by the LAO, that the fixing of the value on yardage basis, where the extent of acquired land is vast, is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as sub Judge, Gadwal, that the said fixing of the value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
10. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No. 252/90 on 13.12.1995 fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.15000/- after deducting 1/4th of the amount from the initial compensation of Rs.20,000/- on the basis of the only document filed by the claimant under Ex.A.l, that while the value given in ExA.1 at Rs.32,000/- per acre, the compensation was fixed by you at Rs.15,000/- per acre without any basis, that while Ex.A.1 sale deed for Ac.0-10 guntas of land, you took Ex.A.l into consideration in determining the compensation for the acquired land admeasuring Ac.4.75 cents, disregarding the standard decisions and norms, which shall be considered due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
11. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No. 48/93 on 29.3.1996 fixing the compensation at the rate of Rs.9/- per sq. yard after deducting the 1/3rd from the initial value determining at Rs.12/- per sq. yard on the basis of Ex.A.1 and Ex.A.2 sale deeds, which are for 213 sq. yards and 147 sq. yards respectively, whereas the acquired land was Ac.3.00 guntas, in extent, that the fixing of the value on yardage basis, where the extent of acquired land is Ac.3.00 guntas in extent, is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
12. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No. 240/94 on 9.4.1996 after hearing the arguments on 8.4.1996, that you heard the arguments on 8.4.1996, although you was transferred from Sub Court, Gadwal on 3.4.1996, that you thus violated the norms not to hear the cases after you being transferred, that you misused and abused your position as sub Judge, Gadwal in disposing of the case and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
13. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No. 1977/84 on 27.4.1994, that while the extent of acquired land was Ac.2.88 cents, you fixed the market value at Rs.22,500/- (deducting the 1/4th value from the initial compensation of the value at Rs.30000/-) on the basis of Ex.X.1 sale deed which was only for 48 sq. yards, that the fixing of the value on the basis of the said sale deed is nothing but abuse and misuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
14. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No. 146/91 on 19.4.1994, that while the LAO categorised the lands into five classes, you awarded compensation for categories I to III at Rs.45,000/- without distinguishing the categorisation baselessly, that the fixation of the value for categories I to III at the same rate, without any basis is nothing but abuse and misuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
15. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.156/89 on 19.4.1994, that you fixed the value for categories-I at Rs.8000/- and on category II Rs.25,000/-, Category III Rs. 34,000/- without any basis, that the fixation of the value at the above mentioned rates by you is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
16. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.101/86 on 25.4.1994, that while the claimants examined five witnesses and LAO examined one witness, the typed depositions of PW.1 and RW.1 are carbon copies, that it reveals that you did not record the depositions of P.W.1 and R.W.1 and has used the carbon copies of the depositions in OP. No 51/86 on the file of Sub Court, Gadwal, that using carbon copies of depositions instead of recording the depositions by you is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
17. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.51/86 on 21.5.1994, that while the claimant examined five witnesses on their behalf that the LAO examined one witness on his behalf, that the depositions of PWs. 2 to 5 are carbon copies, that the carbon copies of depositions reveals that you did not record the depositions of PWs. 2 to 5 in this case, but reproduced the depositions of PWs 2 to 5 in OP. No. 101/86 on the file of Sub Court, Gadwal, as depositions in this case, that not recording the evidence of the witnesses but using the carbon copies of the depositions of the witnesses is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
18. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.170/86 on 20.4.1995, that you fixed the compensation at Rs.20,000/- per acre, that while the acquisition was to construct house sites for backward classes people, you did not deduct 1/4th amount from the fixed compensation towards the formation of roads etc., that you have been aware of the deduction of 1/4th towards roads, which was followed by you in other cases disposed of by you, that not deducting 1/4th amount from the compensation although the acquisition was for house sites by you shall be considered it to be for extraneous considerations, that you misused and abused your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
19. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.465/97 on 25.4.1995, that whereas the acquired land admeasuring Ac. 14.23 guntas you fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.50/- per sq. yard deducting 1/3rd from the initial fixation of Rs.75/- per sq. yard as the market value on the basis of the sale deeds under Ex.A.2 to A.4 which are for small extents, that the fixing of compensation on yardage basis while the extent of acquired land is more than Ac. 14.00 gts of land is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
20. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.172/86 on 28.4.1995, that while the acquired land admeasuring Ac.7.20 gts. You awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.19/- per sq. yard without any basis, that the award of Rs.19/- per sq. yard, without any basis and also fixing compensation on yardage basis, where the extent of acquired land is more than Ac.7.00 acres is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
21. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.18/89 on 26.4.1995, that while the extent of acquired land was nearly Ac.8.00 gts., in extent, you determined the compensation at Rs.40/- per sq. yard on the basis of Ex.A.1 to A.3 sale deeds, which are for less than 300 sq. yards in extent, that the fixation of the value on yardage basis where the extent of acquired land is nearly Ac.8.00 is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
22. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.360/90 on 1.2.1996, that while the extent of acquired land was nearly Ac.6.96 gts. you determined the compensation at Rs.15/- per sq. yard disregarding the norms that the compensation shall not be awarded on yardage basis, where the extent of land is much, that the fixation of the value on yardage basis, whereas the extent of the acquired land is nearly Ac.7.00 is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
23. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.240/94 on 9.4.1996, that while the acquisition was for the A.P.I.I.C. in an extent over 100 acres of land, you fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs.60/- per sq. yard, on the basis of the sale deeds, which are for small extent of yards, that the fixation of the value on yardage basis, where the extent of acquired land is very very vast, is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
24. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.240/94 on 9.4.1996, after hearing the arguments on 8.4.1996, that you were transferred on 3.4.1996 itself, that your hearing the arguments on 8.4.1996 and disposing of the case on 9.4.1996 is thus violation of the norms not to hear the cases after being transferred, that you misused and abused your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal in disposing of O.P. No. 240/94 and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
25. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.641/94 on 26.3.1996, that while the extent of the acquired land was more than 20 acres, you awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.50/- per sq. yard, that the fixation of the value on yardage basis, where the extent of acquired land is over Ac.20.00 is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
26. That you G.Rama Sarma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District disposed of LA O.P. No.74/97 on 28.7.95, that whereas the extent of the acquired land was Ac.4.83 cents, you relied upon Ex.A.l to Ex.A.3 sale deeds, which were for the extent of 0.03 cents, 0.03 cents and 0.09 cents respectively and fixed the compensation at Rs.75/- per acre, that the fixation of the value on the basis of sale deeds for small extents when the acquired land is large, is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, that the said fixing of value against the standard decisions and norms shall be considered to be due to extraneous considerations, and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
27. That you G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District from 17.2.1993 till 11.4.1996 disposed of more than 2000 land acquisition cases, that barring for L.A. OP. No. 240/94 and 287/94, in no other case you pronounced the Judgments on the very next day after hearing the arguments, that while you heard the L.A. OP. No. 240/94 and 287/94 on 8.4.1996, you pronounced the Judgments in these two cases on 9.4.1996, that you exhibited indecent haste in pronouncing the Judgments in these two cases, that hearing the cases on 8.4.1996 and pronounced the Judgments on 9.4.1996 after you were transferred from the post of Sub Judge, Gadwal is nothing but misuse and abuse of your position as Sub Judge, Gadwal and that you thereby committed grave misconduct unbecoming of a judicial officer in contravention of Rule 3(2) of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
28. That you G.Rama Sharma, during your tenure as Sub Judge, Gadwal, Mahaboobnagar District, while you were under suspension filed contempt case under SR. No. 77573 of 1996 on the file of High Court of Judicature, A.P. Hyderabad against Sri Ramoji Rao, Chief Editor, Eenadu Telugu Daily and Sri M.E.N. Patrudu, Registrar (Vigilance), that arraying Registrar (Vigilance) as a party to the contempt case is gross indiscipline on your part and that you thereby committed gross indiscipline in contravening of Rule 3(1) of the A.P Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
3. This charge memo was served on the petitioner on 12.9.1997. The petitioner submitted his statement of defence dated 25.9.1997, on 26.9.1997. Not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner, the High Court directed the Enquiry Officer to conduct regular departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Accordingly, he issued summons to the Chief Ministerial Officer, Sub Court, Gadwal, Mr. A.Rajaiah, Subordinate Judge, Mahabubnagar, who was appointed as the Presenting Officer by the High Court, and also to the delinquent officer, fixing the enquiry on 6.12.1997. On 6.12.1997, the petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer. The Presenting Officer as well as the Chief Ministerial Officer, Sub Court, Gadwal, were also present. The Chef Ministerial Officer, Sub Court, Gadwal, was examined as P.W.1 and through him as many as 27 documents were marked as Exs. A.1 to A.27 with the consent of the petitioner-delinquent officer. Although an opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine P.W.1, he did not avail of that opportunity. Immediately after the evidence of P.W.1 was recorded on 6.12.1997, the petitioner-delinquent officer submitted a previously prepared statement styled as written arguments/additional written statement. Subsequently, the petitioner-delinquent sent a copy of his transfer order dated 3.4.1996 transferring him from Gadwal to Narasaraopet, and marked as Ex.B.1 and a sheet containing news items dated 25.10.1997 and 18.9.1997 published in A.P. Times and Deccan Chronicle, respectively and marked as Ex.B.2. The Enquiry Officer, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence placed before him and on appreciation of the same, in his report dated 27.1.1998, held that all the charges framed against the petitioner are proved. On receipt of the report of the enquiry officer and on independent consideration of the evidence led in the regular departmental enquiry, the High Court came to the conclusion that charge Nos. 1, 12, 16, 17 and 24 are not proved against the delinquent, and as regards other charges, the High Court concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. Thereafterwards, the High Court, through its Registrar (Vigilance), issued show cause notice dated 19.3.1998 to the petitioner-delinquent proposing to impose the penalty of dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure and the said show cause notice was received by the petitioner on 21.3.1998. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said show cause notice on 26.3.1998. The High Court, on consideration of the reply of the petitioner to the show cause notice and not being satisfied with the same, recommended to the Government to impose the penalty of dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure for the proven misconduct. Accepting the recommendation of the High Court, the Government issued G.O. Ms. No. 55 dated 7.4.1999 dismissing the petitioner from service by virtue of the power conferred upon it under Clause (x) of Rule 9 of A.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1963 (for short, CCA Rules). Hence this writ petition assailing the validity of the said Government Order.
4. Sri M.Surender Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while assailing the validity of the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the impugned G.O., would first contend that the charges framed against the petitioner are as vague as they could be and, therefore, the enquiry initiated on such defective and vague charges is vitiated. Secondly, the learned Counsel would contend that despite the request of the petitioner-delinquent officer to furnish relevant documents, on the basis of which charges are framed, the Enquiry Officer did not furnish the documents and on account of that, the petitioner was prejudiced greatly. The learned counsel would maintain that the refusal to furnish the relevant documents resulted in infraction of principles of natural justice and fair play in action and consequently that vitiates the entire disciplinary proceedings. Thirdly, the learned counsel would contend that even assuming that the charges framed against the petitioner are established in the enquiry, even then, it cannot be said that the petitioner has committed any misconduct within the meaning of Conduct Rules warranting initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners under the CCA Rules. Elaborating this contention, the learned counsel would maintain that even assuming that the compensation awarded by the petitioner to the claimants is on a higher side, that action itself would not tantamount to actionable misconduct. Lastly, the learned counsel would contend that the function of the petitioner-delinquent officer in adjudicating the claims of the owners of the acquired lands arising out of Land Acquisition proceedings is undoubtedly a judicial function and, therefore, his conduct relating to such adjudication can never be a subject matter of misconduct, liable to be punished under the CCA Rules, and that if the awards passed by the petitioner are irregular and illegal, they can be corrected or set at naught by the affected parties like the Government or the owners/claimants, as the case may be, by availing legal remedies provided under the Land Acquisition Act and/or the Constitution of India.
5. On the other hand, Mr C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent-High Court, while supporting the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner by the High Court, would maintain that even the conduct of a judicial officer in discharging judicial function can be subject of disciplinary proceeding. The learned Standing Counsel would maintain that the Enquiry Officer or the High Court have not violated principles of natural justice; that at no point of time, the petitioner demanded inspection of any document and further he did not specify the so called relevant documents needed by him in his written brief filed after the conclusion of the oral hearing. The learned Standing Counsel would contend that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the High Court, except the findings recorded on charge Nos. 1,12,16, 17 and 24, are based on preponderance of probabilities and valid grounds. The learned Standing Counsel would conclude that no ground is made out for interference by this Court with the impugned G.O.
6. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and this Court that while reviewing a disciplinary action taken by an employer, the Court would only see whether the disciplinary authority, in conducting departmental enquiry against the delinquent has adhered to the statutory rules or administrative guidelines governing the enquiry, and in the absence of such statutory rules or written norms, whether a fair procedure which would conform to the demands of principles of natural justice has been adopted, whether the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are based on some legally admissible substantive evidence or not, and whether the punishment imposed on the delinquent is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by him resulting in failure of justice. These are the parameters of judicial review of disciplinary action, to put it briefly. The Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others1 has held-
Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
7. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and Findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, this court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued
8. The Supreme Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Uday Singh2, dealing with the nature of proof required in departmental enquiry held-
"....But the disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial. Therefore, the scope of enquiry is entirely different from that of criminal trial in which the charge is required to be proved beyond doubt. But in the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. The test laid down by various judgments of this court is to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether a reasonable man, in the circumstances, would be justified in reaching that conclusion...."
9. Let us now proceed to consider the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is appropriate to consider the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner first, because it goes to root of the matter. The contention is that since the allegation levelled against the petitioner-delinquent relates to his judicial function in adjudicating the claims of the owners of the acquired land, his conduct relating to such adjudication cannot be subject matter of misconduct, and that even assuming that the awards passed by the petitioner are irregular and illegal, they could be corrected only by resorting to the legal remedies provided under the Land Acquisition Act and/or under the Constitution. By a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, it is now fairly well settled that the conduct of an officer discharging quasi-judicial or judicial function could also be a subject matter of disciplinary proceeding. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India3, a contention was raised that the function of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, while discharging his statutory powers in disregard of the provisions of Section 29 of the Madras Act, 19 of 1951, though quasi judicial in nature cannot be subject matter of a misconduct. While rejecting that contention, the Supreme Court held :
" We next proceed to examine the contention of the appellant that the Commissioner was exercising a quasi-judicial function in sanctioning the leases under the Act and his orders cannot therefore be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The proposition put forward was that quasi-judicial orders, unless vacated under the provisions of the Act are final and binding and cannot be questioned by the executive government through disciplinary proceedings. It was argued that an appeal is provided under s. 29(4) of the Act against the order of the Commissioner granting. sanction to a lease and that it is open to any party aggrieved to file such an appeal and question the legality or correctness of the order of the Commissioner and that the government also may in revision under S. 99 of the Act examine the correctness or legality of the order. It was said that so long as these methods were not adopted the government could not institute disciplinary proceedings and re-examine the legality of the order of the Commissioner granting sanction to the leases.
The first part of charge No.1 was that the appellant in utter disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, passed orders sanctioning the leases, in the cases mentioned in the statement of allegations. The relevant portion of the allegation reads as follows: `You were the Commissioner H. R. & C. E. (Admn.) Department from 1/2/1957 to 19-10-62. Under section 29 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951, any exchange, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding 5 years of any immovable property belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of any religious institution shall be null and void unless it is sanctioned by the Commissioner as being necessary or beneficial to the institution. Under the proviso to the section, the particulars of the proposed transactions shall be published at least in one daily newspaper inviting objections and suggestions with respect. to the proposals and the suggestions and objections, if any, received should be considered by the Commissioner before the sanction is accorded. By the rules made under section 29, clauses (1) and (3) of the Act, notice of the proposals for a lease for a period exceeding five years of immovable property belonging to a religious institution shall contain particulars of the nature of the proposed transaction, the correct description of the properties and information regarding the survey number, extent and boundaries, the probable price or the rental as the case may be. The rules made under section 100(2) of the Act provide that all leases of lands, buildings, sites or other immovable properties and rights belonging to a religious institution shall be made by public auction. Leases otherwise than by public auction should not be resorted to except with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. It follows from the above that the proposals for leasing out the Devaswom lands have to be initiated by the Trustee or the 'Fit Person' and that such leases have ordinarily to be granted only by auction. in exceptional cases, lands may be leased out by the trustee without auction subject to the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. This provision does not, however, authorise the Commissioner, to dispose of lands without auction. His duty is to give notice of the proposal which may be received from the trustee, to call for objections and suggestions and to accord sanction if he is satisfied that the transaction is beneficial to the Devaswom. After the Commissioner accords sanction further steps for leasing out the lands have to be taken by the trustee who is the lessor and the proposed lessee. Contrary to the above provisions leases were sanctioned by you in the following cases. It is apparent that the first part of charge No.1 read with the relevant allegations is that in utter disregard of the provisions of s. 29 of the Act and the Rules and without being satisfied that the leases were beneficial to the Devaswoms the appellant sanctioned them and this action of the appellant discloses misconduct, irregularity and gross recklessness in the discharge of his official duties. The charge is therefore one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions of s. 29 and the Rules thereunder in sanctioning the leases. On behalf of the respondents it was argued both by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad and Mr. Bindra that the Commissioner was not discharging quasi-judicial functions in sanctioning leases under s. 29 of the Act, but we shall proceed on the assumption that the Commissioner was performing quasi- judicial functions in granting leases under s. 29 of the Act. Even upon that assumption we are satisfied that the government was entitled to institute disciplinary proceedings if there was prima facie material for showing recklessness or misconduct on the part of the appellant in the discharge of his official duty. It is true that if the provisions of s. 29 of the Act or the Rules are disregarded the order of the Commissioner is illegal and such an order could be questioned in appeal under s. 29(4) or in revision under s. 99 of the Act. But in the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner. The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his functions he acted in utter disregard of the provisions. of the Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharged his functions that is brought up in these proceedings. In other words, the charge and the allegations are to the effect that in exercising his powers as Commissioner the appellant acted in abuse of his power and it was in regard to such misconduct that he is being proceeded against. It is manifest therefore that though, the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act, the government is not precluded from taking disciplinary action if there is proof that the Commissioner had acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power. We see no reason why the government cannot do so for the purpose of showing that the Commissioner acted in utter disregard of the conditions prescribed for the exercise of his power or that he was guilty of misconduct or gross negligence. We are accordingly of the opinion that the appellant has been unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case."
10. In Union of India v. A.N.Saxena4, it was contended that no disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the respondent - Income Tax Officer regarding his judicial or quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders in question. The Supreme Court rejecting that contention held:
" It was urged before us by learned Counsel for the respondent that as the respondent was performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders in question even if his actions were wrong they could be corrected in an appeal or in revision and no disciplinary proceedings could be taken regarding such actions.
In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely, a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken."
11. In Union of India v. K.K.Dhawan5, the Apex Court held that the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary action against an erring officer for violation of the conduct rules even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers. The Supreme Court in para (28) of the judgment enumerated the circumstances in which disciplinary action can be taken with regard to exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The Supreme Court held :
"Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:
(I) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago "though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great".
12. Further, the Apex Court in para (29) of the same judgment has made it clear that the instances catalogued in para (28) of the judgment are not exhaustive. Therefore, it is well settled by the above noticed judgments of the Supreme Court and several other decisions to follow them that even the conduct of an official or an officer while exercising judicial or quasi judicial powers could be subject matter of disciplinary proceeding, and therefore, it cannot be said as a rule that under no circumstance the conduct of an official discharging judicial or quasi judicial function can be subject matter of disciplinary proceeding and action. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that a disciplinary proceeding is not justified against an official or officer discharging judicial or quasi judicial function for a mere technical violation or merely because the order passed by him is wrong. The question whether there is justification to initiate disciplinary proceeding against an officer or official discharging judicial or quasi-judicial function will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no absolute rule can be postulated. The power of disciplinary action vested in the Government or State employer against an officer discharging judicial and quasi-judicial function should not be resorted to lightly or casually, and such action should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of the delinquent's actions, and only if the circumstances so warrant. Otherwise, it is trite, the initiation of such proceeding is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned, as cautioned by the Supreme Court itself in A.N.Saxena's case (supra 4). To the same effect is the caution administered by the Apex Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India and others6 and P.C.Joshi v. State of U.P7.
13. It is true the Courts have held that the charges framed against a delinquent official cannot be vague, ambiguous, but they should be definite, specific. A Division Bench of this Court in K.David Wilson v. Secretary to Government8, to which one of us (S.R.NAYAK, J) was a member, dealing with the essentials of a valid charge-memo, held :
"....It is trite that a charge sheet is the charter of disciplinary action. The domestic/departmental enquiry commences with the service of the charge sheet. In other words, before proceeding with the departmental or domestic enquiry against a delinquent official, he must be informed clearly, precisely and accurately of the charges levelled against him. The charge-sheet should specifically set out all charges which the delinquent is called upon to show-cause against and should also state all relevant particulars and details without which he cannot defend himself. The object of this requirement is that the delinquent employee must know what he is charged with and have the adequate opportunity to meet the charge and to defend himself by giving a proper explanation, after knowing the nature of the offence or misconduct with which he is charged; otherwise it will amount to his being condemned unheard. Fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite catalogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet it. If the charges are imprecise and indefinite or vague or unintelligible, the person charged could not be able to understand them and defend himself effectively and in those circumstances, the subsequent enquiry would not be a fair and just enquiry. The charged official ought to be informed of the charges levelled against him as also the grounds upon which they are based. Charge of misconduct should not be vague. The charge-sheet must be specific and must set out all the necessary particulars and details irrespective of the fact whether the delinquent knows it or not, he must be told about the charges and it was not his duty to connect the charge-sheet with his alleged understanding or knowledge of the charge. However, it is true that the charge need not be framed with the precision of a charge in criminal proceeding. But, at the same time, it must not be vague or so general as to make it impossible of being traversed. Therefore, the test is whether the charge conveys to the delinquent employee, the exact nature of the alleged misconduct in a way that would enable him to meet the charge effectively. It is well established that if a vague charge is given to a delinquent, it is a fatal defect, which vitiates the entire proceedings. It is also relevant to notice that the vagueness in the charge is not excused on the plea that the employee concerned should be deemed to have known the facts correctly. It should not be left to the delinquent official to find out or imagine what the charges against him are and it is for the employer to frame specific charges with full particulars."
14. I have extracted the charges framed against the petitioner above. It cannot be said that the charges framed against the petitioner are vague as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The contention is that the Enquiry Officer who framed the charges has failed to indicate either basis for each charge or the evidence in support of the same. Suffice it to state that though the basis for or the imputation of individual charge has not been separately mentioned, the charges framed by the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner-delinquent are self contained. Necessary details are included in the charge proper itself. Even assuming that the charges do not conform to the form, undoubtedly they are complete in content and necessary details. There are three categories of charges. The first category of charges like charges 3, 8, 9, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25 allege that the petitioner awarded compensation on yardage basis though the acquired land is of vast extent. The second category of charges like charges 7, 10, 13 and 18 allege that the petitioner has taken into consideration the sale deeds under which small extents of land are sold while fixing compensation for acquisition of large extents of land. The third category of charges include charges like 4, 6 and 15 wherein it is alleged that regardless of the nature of the land acquired whether it is wet or dry etc., and without giving any reasons, a uniform rate of compensation applicable to wet and irrigated land is fixed for all kinds of lands. It needs to be emphasized that the petitioner is the author of all the judgments in respect of which allegations are framed. In other words, the petitioner is not a stranger to the judgments on the basis of which misconduct is attributed to the petitioner. At the same time, I am quite aware that it is unreasonable to expect that a judicial officer who passes the judgments and decrees, in hundreds and thousands of cases during his tenure as a Judge, should always remember the specifics and details of every judgment, he has handed down. It is true that in the charges, all details and circumstances are not set out, but at the same time essential allegations are found in the charges. When the petitioner received the charge-memo, if he wanted the copies of the judgments in respect of which misconduct is attributed to him or any other connected documents or materials for the purpose of preparing effective statement of defence or to defend himself effectively in the course of departmental enquiry, nothing prevented him from approaching the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer either to supply copies of the same or for permitting him to peruse the same. But, quite curiously, the petitioner did not make any request to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer to furnish either the copies of the judgments or any other documents to enable him to prepare his defence statement, or in the course of enquiry. It is also relevant to notice that the relevant documents, viz., the judgments were produced and marked through the custodian of the records i.e., PW1, and though an opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine PW1, he did not avail of that opportunity. It is not the case of the petitioner that the judgments produced and marked through PW1 are not the judgments handed down by him. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charges are vague and unspecific.
15. Similarly, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that despite the request of the petitioner to furnish relevant documents, the Enquiry Officer did not furnish the documents and therefore the enquiry is vitiated. As pointed out supra, when charge-memo was served on the petitioner-delinquent, admittedly he did not make any request to the disciplinary authority or to the enquiry officer to furnish any document or seek permission to peruse the official records in order to prepare his statement of defence or for the purpose of enquiry. The enquiry was conducted against the petitioner under the CCA Rules. Rule 19(2)(a) of the said Rules provide :
"19.(2)(a): Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants' Inquiries Act, 1850 (Central Act 37 of 1850) in every case where it is proposed to impose on a member of a service any of the penalties specified in items (iv), (vi), (vii) and (viii) in rule 8, the authority competent to impose the penalty shall appoint an inquiry officer, who shall be superior in rank to the person on whom it is proposed to impose the penalty or shall itself hold an inquiry either suo motu on a direction from a higher authority. In every such case the grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of definite charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged, together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders in the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to file a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires an oral inquiry or to be heard in person or both. The person charged may, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect, and take extracts from such official records as he may specify provided that the inquiry officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse such permission, if in his opinion, such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against public interest to allow access thereto. On receipt of the statement of defence within the specified time or such further time as may have been given, an oral inquiry shall be held if such an inquiry is desired by the person charged or is decided upon by the inquiry officer or is directed by the competent authority. At that enquiry, oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the persons charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish, provided that the inquiry officer may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to file, calla witness. In the case where disciplinary action is initiated on the report of Anti Corruption Bureau, the inquiry officer may allow the concerned investigation officer to adduce evidence, to examine the witnesses and to cross-examine the defence witnesses with a view to proving the charges. After the oral inquiry is completed, the persons charged shall be entitled to file, if he so desires, any further written statement of his defence. If no oral inquiry is held and the person charged desires to be heard in person, a personal hearing shall be given to him. The inquiry officer shall, on completion of the inquiry or the personal hearing of the person charged or both, forward the proceedings of the inquiry to the authority competent to impose the penalty unless he is himself such an officer. The proceedings shall contain the charges framed against the person charged along with the grounds of charge, written statement filed in defence, if any, a sufficient record of the evidence adduced during the oral inquiry, a memorandum of the points urged by the person charged during the personal hearing, if any, and a statement of findings of the inquiry officer on the different charges and the grounds therefor.
Provided that when the inquiry is conducted before the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, the Director or Additional Director of Prosecution shall lead the prosecution evidence in addition to or in lieu of the Investigating Officer of the Anti Corruption Bureau on behalf of the Government."
16. Undoubtedly, under the above rule, if the petitioner so desired, he had a right to demand for inspection of the relevant documents for the preparation of his written statement and for defending himself in the enquiry. The petitioner admittedly did not make any specific request for supply of any documents before he submitted his statement of defence or during the course of enquiry. He also did not make any request to the disciplinary authority or Enquiry Officer to permit him to peruse the official records, and therefore, now it is not permissible for the petitioner to plead violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner, for the first time, in his reply to the show-cause notice issued by the High Court after the conclusion of the enquiry and after supplying the enquiry report to the petitioner, contended that that non supply of documents, like the Note dated 25.12.1996 written by the learned Judges of this Court who constituted the Division Bench to decide Appeal Suits arising out of the awards passed by the petitioner, vitiated the enquiry proceedings. In his reply dated 26.3.1998 to the show-cause notice issued by the High Court dated 19.3.1998, the petitioner in para (VI) has contended :
"I submit that the non-supply of any documents or records, especially most important and relevant documents like the letter dt.25.12.'96, written by their Lordships Hon'ble Justice D.Reddeppa Reddy and Hon'ble Justice V.Bhaskara Rao, the letter dt. 12.12.'96 written by Gadwal Youth Association, which are the very basis for my suspension and initiation of departmental enquiry, would vitiate the entire Enquiry Proceedings, for failure to give reasonable opportunity to effectively conduct my defence."
17. In the first place, before the enquiry, the petitioner did not request for supply of or permission to peruse any document from the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer. Even at the belated stage, the petitioner did not specify the so-called relevant documents, except mentioning the Note dated 25.12.1996 written by the learned Judges and the letter dated 12.12.1996 written by the Gadwal Youth Association. Although para (VI) refers to these two documents, in our considered opinion, they are not at all relevant for the purpose of the enquiry. The charges framed against the petitioner or the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer against the petitioner are not based on the communication between the learned Judges with the Chief Justice on the administrative side or the complaint lodged by the Gadwal Youth Association vide its letter dated 12.12.1996. The charges are framed against the petitioner solely on the basis of the negligent, reckless, erratic, irregular, and irrational exercise of judicial power in handing down the judgments in certain land acquisition compensation matters. Be that as it may, neither the Enquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority have made use of the note of the learned Judges placed before the learned Chief Justice of the High Court or the letter of the Gadwal Youth Association dated 12.12.1996 in recording adverse findings against the petitioner. Therefore, those documents, in the first place, cannot be said to be relevant documents, and secondly supplying copies of those documents to the petitioner would not arise, because those documents are not made use of by the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal,9 cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner would in no way advance the case of the petitioner. In that case, the charge sheet issued to the delinquent was based on the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry and those witnesses were proposed to be examined at the departmental trial. In that context, the Supreme Court opined that though the statement of witnesses were recorded during the preliminary enquiry, if a request is made by the delinquent to supply copies of the statements of those witnesses, it becomes the duty of the disciplinary authority to supply copies of the statements of the witnesses. That is not the fact situation in the present case. As already pointed out, the note sent up by the learned Judges to the Chief Justice on the administrative side and the letter of Gadwal Youth Association dated 12.12.1996 are not the basis of the charges framed against the petitioner and, therefore, supplying copies of the note and the letter would not arise, and secondly the delinquent did not seek copies of those documents before the commencement of the enquiry and after receipt of the charge-memo. Alternatively, even assuming that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer in conducting the enquiry is not in full conformity with the principles of natural justice and the rules governing the procedure, even then, on that count itself, the Court shall not step in and nullify the disciplinary action taken against the petitioner, unless it is established that the departure from the specified procedure or infraction of the principles of natural justice resulted in prejudice to the delinquent official occasioning failure of justice. In this case, nowhere the petitioner has pleaded that prejudice is caused to him on account of non-supply of any documents.
18. As pointed out supra, although the petitioner has had a procedural right for perusal of the relevant documents under Rule 19(2)(a) of the CCA Rules, he did not demand for the same, and thereby he waived the right. It needs to be emphasised that rule 19(2)(a) of the CCA Rules is a procedural provision, which is not of a mandatory character and the right given under such procedural provision can undoubtedly be waived by a delinquent official, and if a delinquent official waives such a right, it is not permissible for him to later contend that non-compliance with the procedural provision vitiates the disciplinary action. Be that as it may, as often said and reiterated by the Constitutional Courts, principles of natural justice are handmaids of justice and they are meant to foster and advance justice and not to thwart or defeat justice and they are meant to meet the ends of justice. In this connection, it is quite apposite to quote what the Apex Court has to say in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma10.
"Sub-clause (iii) is, without a doubt, conceived in the interest of the delinquent officer and hence, he could waive it. From his conduct, the respondent must be deemed to have waived it. This is an aspect which must be borne in mind while examining a complaint of non-observance of procedural rules governing such enquiries. It is trite to remember that, as a rule, all such procedural rules are designed to afford a full and proper opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee to defend himself and are, therefore, conceived in his interest. Hence, whether mandatory or directory, they would normally be conceived in his interest only.
Now, coming back to the illustration given by us in the preceding para, would setting aside the punishment and the entire enquiry on the ground of aforesaid violation of sub-clause (iii) be in the interests of justice or would it be its negation? In our respectful opinion, it would be the latter. Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demanded that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter-productive exercise."
19. The Supreme Court in U.P. State Coop.Land Development Bank LTD. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey11 held :
"...An enquiry proceeding is not held as if it is a trial in a criminal case or as if it is a civil suit. Rules of natural justice require that a party against whom an allegation is being inquired into should be given a hearing and not condemned unheard. As to what are the rules of natural justice to be followed in a particular case would depend upon the circumstances in each case and must also depend on the provisions of law under which the charges are being inquired into in the disciplinary proceedings. In Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Division and Appeals(AIR 1958 SC 398), this Court held that-
"the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened, should be decided not under any preconceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions."
The respondents were apprised of the evidence against each of them and given opportunity of being heard in person and also to produce evidence in defence. Nothing more was required on the part of the enquiry officer. Procedure after the receipt of the reports of the enquiry officer was followed as prescribed. In our view, the High Court, therefore, fell in error in returning a finding that the Rules of natural justice or the Regulations and Service Rules which are statutory in nature have not been followed."
20. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even assuming that the compensation awarded by the petitioner to the claimants is on higher side, that act itself would not tantamount to an actionable misconduct, is not acceptable to me. As could be seen from the charges, except Charge NO.28, all other charges accuse the petitioner that he has awarded the compensation ignoring the well settled principles of law pertaining to fixation of market value of the acquired land and ignoring evidence produced in the Ops. In charges 3, 8, 9, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 25, it is specifically alleged that the petitioner awarded compensation on yardage basis though the acquired land is of vast extent. Charges 7, 10, 13 and 18 accuse that the petitioner has taken into consideration the sale deeds under which small extents of land are taken into consideration while fixing the compensation for the large extent of land. Further, in charges 4, 6 and 15, it is alleged that the petitioner regardless of the nature of the land acquired, awarded compensation at uniform rates in respect of dry, wet and irrigated lands. On perusing the enquiry report and the materials placed before the Court, I am fully satisfied that the above charges levelled against the petitioner are satisfactorily proved by adducing legally permissible evidence. The kind of exercise of judicial power by the petitioner in determining the quantum of compensation for the acquired lands in the OPs concerned clearly goes to show that the petitioner exercised the judicial power negligently, recklessly and against the public interest and totally ignoring the well settled principles of law governing fixation of market value of the acquired land and such a conduct can undoubtedly be a `misconduct' and subject matter of a disciplinary proceeding in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.K.Dhawan's case ( 5 supra). This Court while exercising power of judicial review cannot act like an appellate authority and reappraise the evidence on record and come to a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts as held by the Apex Court in the case of B.S.Chaturvedi (1 supra). This Court while reviewing the disciplinary action cannot go into the adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which factual finding is recorded. When that is the settled position in law even in respect of an ordinary administrative authority, the factual finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer who is no other than a responsible, a high-ranking judicial officer, and accepted by the High Court on administrative side, cannot lightly be interfered by the High Court while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226. The High Court can interfere with such finding only when such finding is found to be perverse or suffers from a patent error on the face of the record or based on `no evidence' at all. That is not the position obtaining in the instant case. Therefore, if the Court were to reappreciate the evidence on record and record a factual finding different from the one recorded by the High Court as a disciplinary authority, then, it would tantamount to the Court overstepping its legitimate judicial review power under Article 226 of the Constitution and meddling with the legitimate power of the High Court on administrative side in controlling the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution of India. However, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that some of the awards passed by the petitioner are confirmed by this Court in appeals and in that view of the matter the exercise of the judicial power by the petitioner in awarding compensation can never be treated as a misconduct. It is very material and important for us to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decisions of the petitioner but we are very much concerned with the conduct of the petitioner in discharge of his duties as a judicial officer. As a hard and fast rule, it cannot be said that under no circumstance disciplinary proceeding can be initiated against a person exercising judicial or quasi judicial power for misconduct committed by him in exercising such power if the outcome of the exercise of such power i.e., the order or award is affirmed or confirmed in an appeal preferred against such order or award. The course and level of enquiry in an appeal and in a disciplinary proceeding is basically different. Secondly, it is not that this Court affirmed all the awards passed by the petitioner in relation to which the charges are framed against him. It was brought to our notice by the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court that the charges framed against the petitioner reflect only few samples and they constitute only the tip of the ice berg and that the petitioner during his tenure as Sub-Judge at Gadwal decided hundreds of land acquisition OPs and charges could not be framed against him in respect of each and every OP where he awarded compensation apparently at highly abnormal rates ignoring relevant evidence on record, and negligently and recklessly and in utter disregard of the settled principles of law pertaining to fixation of market value of the acquired lands. Therefore, the charges framed and the proof placed in the enquiry have to be considered in the context of the above submission of the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court. Judicial dishonesty and/or corruption is something which can hardly be established by any direct proof. The way the petitioner fixed the compensation for the acquired lands in the OPs concerned, as already noticed above, speaks volumes and badly about his conduct and clearly goes to show the erratic, irregular, irrational, negligent and reckless way of exercising the judicial power on his part and if the High Court, on administrative side, on the basis of such materials thinks that the petitioner committed the misconduct specified under Rule 3(1), (2) and (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and therefore he is unfit to be in the service, this Court, on judicial side, cannot interfere with such decision of the High Court taken by it on administrative side lightly or casually. It is trite, provision of Article 235 of the Constitution is to ensure independence as well as credibility of judiciary. The faith reposed in Indian Judiciary enjoins upon the Judges to act fairly and reasonably and in accordance with law, without fear or with favour. It is the duty of the High Court to maintain purity in subordinate judiciary. Condoning or compromising with the dishonest deed of a Judicial Officer through exercise of power under Article 226 would result in erosion of the judicial foundation. In High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S.Palil12, the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court on the administrative side found a Judicial Officer on investigation on a complaint guilty of judicial conduct and he was compulsorily retired, but the High Court on the judicial side disagreed with the disciplinary committee and set aside the punishment. When that judgment of the High Court was assailed before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that such review required great care and circumspection and be strictly confined to the parameters for such review and set aside the order of the High Court. In Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court13, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary is a `judicial' function since it is conducive to the administration of justice and hence, contempt of the Judges, while exercising the power of `control', would constitute `contempt of court'.
21. After going through the enquiry proceedings and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority and the High Court and on perusal of the original records made available to us by the learned Standing Counsel for the High Court, and on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am fully satisfied that a fair procedure was followed by the Enquiry Officer in conducting the enquiry and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and accepted by the High Court are based on substantive legal evidence. There is no failure of justice. I do not find any merit in any of the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition is devoid of merit.
22. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed, with no order as to costs.