Patna High Court
Bimal Kumar Azad @ Vimal Kumar Azad vs The State Of Bihar And Ors on 15 May, 2026
Author: Anshuman
Bench: Anshuman
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.4104 of 2015
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Bimal Kumar Azad @ Vimal Kumar Azad Son of Late Lameshwari Prasad
Yadav resident of Village P.O. - Shankarpur, Police Station - Muffasil,
District- Munger.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State Of Bihar through Principal Secretary, Department of Labour
Resources, New Secretariat, Baily Road, Patna.
2. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhagalpur.
3. Indian Tobacco Company Ltd. ITC Ltd. At Basudeopur, District - Munger,
through its Management.
... ... Respondent/s
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Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Kumar Manglam (AC to SC-24)
For the Resp. no.3 : Mr. Mrigank Mauli, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Indrajeet Bhushan, Advocate
Mr. Tejas Vatsa, Advocate
Mr. Navin Kumar Singh, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 15-05-2026
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
counsel for the State and learned Senior counsel for the Indian
Tobacco Co. Ltd. (Respondent no.3).
2. The present writ petition has been filed for
quashing of the Award dated 28.12.2012 passed by the
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Respondent no.2 as contained in Annexure-1, by which it has
been held that the dismissal of work man Sri Bimal Kumar Azad
(the petitioner) by I.T.C. Munger (Respondent no.3) is just
proper and the workman is not entitled to grant any type of
relief.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner directly raised
a contention that the Tribunal has to decide this matter in
accordance with law laid down under section 11A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter
referred to as 'I.D. Act of 1947'). He submits that the proviso
laid down under section 11A is very categorical that under this
section, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the
case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall
not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter. Counsel
submits that here in the present case, on the request of counsel
for the petitioner, this Court has called for the Lower court
records (LCR) vide order dated 17.03.2026. He submits that
from the Lower court records, it become crystal clear that the
Labour Court has fixed a case vide order dated 26.07.1999 for
adducing evidence. He submits that the Tribunal fixing a date
for adducing evidence clearly indicates that fixing a date for
adducing evidence is basically in gross violation of the proviso
Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026
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under section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947. Therefore, he submits
that the Labour court not relied on the materials already on
record and instead thereof, he has fixed the case for adducing
evidence, adopted bad procedure and hence, the entire order
passed by the Labour Tribunal is fit to be set aside on this
technical ground.
4. In support of his argument, learned counsel for
the petitioner relied on various judgments. The first judgment on
which he relied is in the case of Bharati Bhawan Karmachari
Sangh Vs. The State of Bihar through the Secretary & Ors.
reported in 2017 SCC Online Pat 3078. He submits that in the
said case, the Hon'ble Division Bench has pleased to set aside
the order passed by the Single Judge and restored/affirmed the
award of the workman dated 22.02.2007 passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, Patna in Reference Case No. 14 of 2003.
4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
relied on a judgment in case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs.
R.C. Srivastava reported in (2021) 19 SCC 281 and submits that
section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 the order of the Tribunal has
been restored by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India holding
that the finding of the domestic enquiry was fair and proper then
the Tribunal has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with same
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unless there is apparent perversity in finding of the fact recorded
of violation of the principles of natural justice or punishment
imposed is disproportionate to allegations proved.
4.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
relied on a judgment in case of Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs.
Delhi Administration through Secretary (Labour) and Ors.
reported in (1984) 4 SCC 635 and submits that it has been held
that under section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947, the Arbitrator,
Labour Court or Tribunal as well as the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution can re-appreciate evidence on
the basis of which employer passed the order of dismissal.
4.3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
relied on a judgment in case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre
and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. Vs. Management & Ors.
with other analogous cases reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813
(equivalent to AIR 1973 SC 1227). He further relied on Full
Bench decision of the Hon'ble Patna High Court (Ranchi
Bench) in case of M/s Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. Vs. The
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi and Anr. reported in
1990 (2) PLJR 797 and submits that under Section 11A of the
proviso of the I.D. Act of 1947, the right of a workman to
adduce evidence before the Tribunal to make out a case of bias,
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want of good faith or victimisation or unfair labour practice has
not been taken away by insertion of this section. However, there
is a bar against receiving fresh evidence while re-appraising
evidence in the domestic enquiry, on the Tribunal.
4.4. In conclusion, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the Labour Court in gross violation of the
principles of natural justice under Section 11A (proviso) has
taken evidence before conducting the reference case and
thereafter, decided the reference case against the petitioner,
which is absolutely bad and therefore, the impugned order dated
28.12.2012passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhagalpur in Reference Case No. 01 of 1992 be set aside.
5. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the Indian Tobacco Co. Ltd. (Respondent no.3), on the other hand, raised objection to the argument made by the counsel for the petitioner and submits that from the record of the trial court, it transpires that the date has been fixed for adducing evidence, but no fresh evidence has been taken, rather, those evidences which were already on record in the domestic enquiry has been acknowledged by a Quasi Judicial Court. He submits that by the mouth of the witness, the court has acknowledged all the materials brought in the domestic enquiry in the record of the Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 6/30 Labour Court and he has committed no mistake for the same. In support of his argument, learned Senior counsel placed para 4 of the impugned order dated 28.12.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhagalpur in Reference Case No. 01/1992. Senior counsel submits that the provision of section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 as well as the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. Vs. Management & Ors. with other analogous cases reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813 (equivalent to AIR 1973 SC 1227) were well within the mind of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court and it has been well acknowledged by him that the provision of section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 is applicable on the basis of the materials which is on the basis of proper and valid enquiry as well as the correctness of finding. He submits that the Labour Court has not taken fresh evidence, rather, made re-appraisal of the same evidence given in the domestic enquiry by the management and the finding of the enquiry, and therefore, he submits that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not in accordance with law and the argument made by him may not be accepted.
6. In support of his argument, learned Senior Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 7/30 counsel appearing for the Respondent no.3 also relied on various judgments. The first judgment on which he has relied is in the case of Workmen of Balmadies Estates Vs. Management, Balmadies Estates & Ors. reported in (2008) 4 SCC 517 and submits that it has been held that section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 empowers the Labour Court of re- appreciation of evidence considered during the domestic enquiry. He submits that it is well within the power of the Labour Court under the I.D. Act of 1947 to consider the evidences which have been collected during the domestic Tribunal. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act No. 1 of 1872) is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry, though, principles of fairness are to apply. The guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the proof of misconduct would be sufficient.
6.1. Learned Senior counsel further relied on a judgment in case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Gajadhar Nath reported in (2022) 3 SCC 190 and submits that in this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has pleased to discussed the principles laid down in Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. (supra). He submits that in terms of section 11A where finding of Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 8/30 misconduct is recorded in domestic enquiry, authorities under the Act have full power and jurisdiction to reappraise evidence and to satisfy themselves whether evidence justified finding of misconduct. However, where the enquiry is found defective, employer can lead evidence to prove misconduct before the authorities concerned.
6.2. Learned Senior counsel further relied on a judgment in case of Neeta Kaplish Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Anr. reported in (1999) 1 SCC 517 and submits that the proviso of section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 creates an obligation of Labour Court/Tribunal to rely only on the material on record and not to take fresh evidence. But, domestic enquiry which is declared by Labour Court/Tribunal to be vitiated, neither was fresh evidence nor did it constitute material on record and therefore, proceedings of such enquiry have to be ignored. The management then has to lead evidence before Labour Court/Tribunal to justify its action of discharge or dismissal of workman or suffer the consequences. But, in this case, the matter was remanded to the Labour Court for fresh decision after awarding opportunities to both parties to lead evidence.
6.3. In conclusion, learned Senior for the Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 9/30 Respondent no.3 submits that in the present case, the Labour Court has not taken any fresh evidence. He submits that in the reference case, the parties have contested before the Labour Court on the issue of fairness and domestic enquiry and vide order dated 26.07.1999, domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper and thereafter, the parties were given opportunity for adducing evidence on merit. He submits that in the present case through the witnesses of the material which was subject to the domestic enquiry has been marked exhibited and only re- appraisal of the evidence given in the domestic enquiry has been decided by the Labour Court. He submits that the contention of the counsel for the petitioner is not correct as he is raising only a few technical question.
7. After hearing the parties and upon perusal of the record as well as the law and the judgments relied by the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to quote Section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 which states as follows:-
"[11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.--Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 10/30 and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:
Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.]"
8. The case of Bharati Bhawan Karmachari Sangh (supra) on which the petitioner make reliance has no application in the present writ petition due to the reason that in the said judgment, the question of section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 has not involved.
8.1. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank (supra), it is necessary to quote the relevant para 18 to 20 which reads as under:-
"18. The Tribunal after reappraisal of the record of domestic enquiry held it to be fair and Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 11/30 proper, has a very limited scope to interfere in the domestic enquiry to the extent as to whether there is any apparent perversity in the finding of fact which has been recorded by the enquiry officer in his report of enquiry obviously, based on the evidence recorded during the course of enquiry and as to whether the compliance of the Bipartite Settlement which provides the procedure of holding enquiry is violated or the punishment levelled against the workman commensurate with the nature of allegation proved against him and if it is grossly disproportionate, the Tribunal will always be justified to interfere by invoking its statutory power under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act.
19. In the instant case, after we have gone through the record, we find that the Tribunal has converted itself into a court of appeal as an appellate authority and has exceeded its jurisdiction while appreciating the finding recorded in the course of domestic enquiry and tested on the broad principles of charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt which is a test in the criminal justice system and has completely forgotten the fact that the domestic enquiry is to be tested on the principles of preponderance of probabilities and if a piece of evidence is on record which could support the charge which has been levelled against the delinquent unless it is per se unsustainable or perverse, ordinarily is not to be interfered by the Tribunal, more so when the Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 12/30 domestic enquiry has been held to be fair and proper and, in our view, the Tribunal has completely overlooked and exceeded its jurisdiction while interfering with the finding recorded during the course of enquiry in furtherance of which, the respondent was dismissed from service and the High Court has also committed a manifest error while passing the judgment impugned.
20. The decision of the Labour Court should not be based on mere hypothesis. It cannot overturn the decision of the management on ipse dixit. Its jurisdiction under Section 11A of the 947 Act although is a wide one but it must be judiciously exercised. Judicial discretion, it is trite, cannot be exercised either whimsically or capriciously. It may scrutinise or analyse the evidence but what is important is how it does so."
8.2. In the case of Rajinder Kumar Kindra (supra), it is necessary to quote the relevant para 16 & 17 which reads as under:-
"16. Mr Jain contended that once Mr Kakkar came to the conclusion that the appellant was given full opportunity to participate in the domestic enquiry neither High Court under Article 226 nor this Court under Article 136 can sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry officer and Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 13/30 reappraise the evidence. We have not at all attempted to reappreciate the evidence though in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 11- A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 both arbitrator and this Court can reappraise the evidence led in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the evidence led by the employer established misconduct against the workman. It is too late in the day to contend that the arbitrator has only the power to decide whether the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer were plausible one deducible from the evidence led in the enquiry and not to reappreciate the evidence itself and to reach the conclusion whether the misconduct alleged against the workman has been established or not. This Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Management held that since the introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Industrial Tribunal is now equipped with the powers to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied upon by the employer establishes the misconduct alleged against the workman. It is equally well-settled that the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A is comprehended in Section 11- A. This Court in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha held that an arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is comprehended in Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 14/30 Section 11-A and the arbitral reference apart from Section 11-A is plenary in scope. Therefore it would be within the jurisdiction both of the arbitrator as well as this Court to reappreciate the evidence though it is not necessary to do so in this case. It is thus well-settled that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man would come, the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A or this Court in appeal under Article 136 can reject such findings as perverse. Holding that the findings are perverse does not constitute reappraisal of evidence, though we would have been perfectly justified in exercise of powers conferred by Section 11-A to do so.
17. It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. The Industrial Tribunal or the arbitrator or a quasi-judicial authority can reject not only such findings but also the conclusion based on no legal evidence or if it is merely based on surmises and conjectures unrelated to evidence on the ground that they disclose total non- application of mind. Viewed from either angle, the conclusion of the enquiry officer as well as of the arbitrator Mr Kakkar are wholly perverse and Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 15/30 hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was clearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence."
8.3. In the case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. (supra) on with both parties have relied, its relevant para 13 & 65 reads as under:-
"13. The above position has been completely changed by Section 11-A. It is now obligatory on an employer to hold a proper domestic enquiry in which all material evidence will have to be adduced. When a dispute is referred for adjudication and it is found that the domestic enquiry conducted by the management is defective or if it is found that no domestic enquiry at all had been conducted, the order of discharge or termination passed by the employer becomes, without anything more, unjustified and the Labour Tribunals have no option but to direct the reinstatement of the workman concerned, as his discharge or dismissal is illegal. Even in cases where a domestic enquiry has been held and finding of misconduct recorded, the Labour Tribunals have now full power and jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence and to satisfy themselves whether the evidence justifies the finding of Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 16/30 misconduct. Even if the enquiry proceedings are held to be proper and the finding of misconduct is also accepted, the Tribunal has now power to consider whether the punishment of dismissal or discharge was necessary for the type of misconduct of which the workman is found guilty. In such circumstances, the Tribunal can also give any other relief to the workman, including the imposing of a lesser punishment. In cases where an employer had not conducted any enquiry or when the enquiry conducted by him is held to be defective, the employer will not be given any opportunity to adduce evidence before the Labour Tribunal for justifying his action. Various decisions of this Court have emphasised that there is an obligation on the part of an employer to hold a proper enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman. And it has also been stated that the enquiry should conform to certain well defined principles and that it should not be an empty formality. If the management, being fully aware of this position in law, does not conduct an enquiry or conducts a defective enquiry, the order passed by it is illegal and it cannot take advantage of such illegality or wrong committed by it and seek a further opportunity before the Tribunal of adducing evidence for the first time. Generally, the Standing Orders also provide for the conduct of an enquiry before imposing a punishment. The Standing Orders have been held to be statutory terms of Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 17/30 conditions of service. If an employer does not conform to the provisions of the Standing Orders, he commits an illegality and an order passed, which is illegal, has only to be straightaway set aside by the Tribunal. Decisions of this Court, while recognising that an opportunity has to be given to an employer to adduce evidence before the Tribunal for the first time, have not given due importance to the effect of a breach of a statutory obligation committed by an employer in not conducting a proper and valid enquiry as per the Standing Orders. This anomaly has now been removed by the Legislature.
65. We have already expressed our view regarding the interpretation of Section 11-A. We have held that the previous law, according to the decisions of this Court, in cases where a proper domestic enquiry had been held, was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of misconduct except under certain circumstances. The position further was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer both in cases where the misconduct is established in a proper domestic enquiry as also in cases where the Tribunal finds such misconduct proved on the basis of evidence adduced before it. These limitations on the powers of the Tribunals were recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the power to take disciplinary action and impose punishment was Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 18/30 part of the managerial functions. That means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a period of years, had recognised certain managerial rights in an employer. We have pointed out that this position has now been changed by Section 11-A. The section has the effect of altering the law by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as the punishment imposed by him. Hence in order to make the section applicable even to disputes which had been referred prior to the coming into force of the section, there should be such a clear, express and manifest indication in the section. There is no such express indication. An inference that the section applies to proceedings, which are already pending, can also be gathered by necessary intendment. In the case on hand, no such inference can be drawn as the indications are to the contrary. We have already referred to the Proviso to Section 11-A, which states "in any proceeding under this section". A proceeding under the section can only be after the section has come into force. Further the section itself was brought into force some time after the Amendment Act was passed. These circumstances, as well as the scheme of the section and particularly the wording of the proviso indicate that Section 11-A does not apply to disputes which had been referred prior to December 15, 1971. The section applies Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 19/30 only to disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after December 15, 1971. To conclude, in our opinion, Section 11-A has no application to disputes referred prior to December 15, 1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with according to the decisions of this Court already referred to."
8.4. From the analysis of this judgment, it transpires that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there is an obligation on the part of employer to hold a proper enquiry before dismissing or discharging a workman. If, the management being fully aware of this decision of law does not conduct an enquiry or conduct a defective enquiry, the order passed by it is illegal and it cannot take advantage of such illegality or wrong committed by it and seek further opportunity before the Tribunal for adducing evidence for the first time. Then, it be permitted.
8.5. In the case of M/s Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. (supra), it is necessary to quote the relevant para 5, 7, 8 & 38 which reads as under:-
"5. Thus the parameters of industrial adjudication in the matter of disciplinary proceedings against employees were well settled when Section 11-A was inserted in the Act on 15 December, 1971. There was, however, one aspect Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 20/30 which was not satisfactory. Even though adjudication by Tribunals was provided for settling disputes relating to disciplinary action by the employer or the jurisdiction of the Tribunals hearing these matters did not extend to reappraisal of evidence led in domestic enquiry, like an appellate body. The Tribunal did not also have power to award lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal if the circumstances of the case so required. It was with a view to confer these powers on the Tribunal that Section 11-A was inserted in the Act as would be clear from the following statement of object and reasons appended to Bill No. XXIII of 1971, which resulted in the enactment of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971, inserting Section 11A in the Act:
"Statement of objects and reasons.- In Indian Iron and Steel Co. Limited and another. v. Their workmen, [1958-I L.L.J. 260], the Supreme Court, while considering the Tribunal's power to interfere with the management's decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the services of a workman, has observed that in cases of dismissal on misconduct the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc., on the part of the management.
Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 21/30
2. The International Labour Organisation, in its recommendation (No. 119) concerning 'termination of employment at the initiative of the employer' adopted in June 1963, has recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination, among others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a Court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and in the other circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief.
3. In accordance with these recommendations, it is considered that the Tribunal's power in an adjudication proceeding relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman should not be limited and that the Tribunal should have the power, in cases wherever necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal any direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such other Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 22/30 relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. For this purpose, a new Section 11-A is proposed to be inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."
It would thus be clear that S. 11-A was not inserted in the Act to limit the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which it passed by virtue of the law laid down by the Supreme Court but it was inserted to confer power on the Tribunal to reappraise evidence adduced in the domestic enquiry and to grant appropriate relief to workman, powers which the Tribunal did not possess earlier. In the circumstances, the question for consideration is how Section 11-A of the Act should be construed.
7. If the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act is construed reasonably, it would be clear that the proviso was inserted by the Parliament to place limitation on the powers of a Tribunal as an appellate authority hearing appeals from the decision in the domestic enquiry. The proviso to Section 11-A lays down, as held by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1227 (supra), that the Tribunal for the purpose of exercising power conferred by the main provision of Section 11-A cannot call for further or fresh evidence as an appellate authority, may normally do under a particular statute, when considering the correctness or otherwise of an order passed by a subordinate body. The bar to receiving fresh Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 23/30 evidence contemplated by the proviso to Section 11-A would apply only against receiving fresh evidence, while reappraising evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry.
8. There is also another aspect which has to be borne in mind while construing the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act. It is well settled that the language of a proviso, even if general, is normally to be construed limiting its operation to the field covered by the section to which the proviso is appended. The following observations in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf, [A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1758], are pertinent:
"... The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' [1912 A.C. 544]..."
The proviso to Section 11-A of the Act cannot be held to exclude reception of evidence in relation to matters not touched or intended to be touched by the section to which the proviso is appended. In Mohan Meakin Breweries, Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Excise, Bihar, and others [A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1171: 1968 PLJR SC 115], the Supreme Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 24/30 Court held that though in the proviso to rule 147 of the rules framed under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915, the expression used was "an excisable article" that expression did not embrace foreign liquor not imported under the bond because the main part of the rule, to which the proviso was appended applied only to foreign liquor imported under the bond. The proviso to Section 11-A of the Act will, there fore, come into play only when the wider powers of an appellate authority conferred on a Tribunal by Section 11-A are sought to be exercised by the Tribunal for ascertaining the correctness or otherwise of the finding in the domestic enquiry. In matters not covered by the main section, the proviso would not be attracted. That is why the Supreme Court held in A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1227 (supra), that the proviso did not bar reception of fresh evidence by the Tribunal when the domestic enquiry was set aside and the management proceeded to justify its action by adducing evidence before the Tribunal about the guilt of the workman in exercise of right available to the management under the law evolved by the Supreme Court in the matter of adjudication of disputes relating to disciplinary action taken by the management. For the same reasons, if according to law laid down by the Supreme Court prior to the year 1971, a workman became entitled to assail the action of the employer before the Tribunal on the ground that the action against him is vitiated on Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 25/30 account of violation of the principles of natural justice, or on the ground of victimisation or unfair labour practice or mala fide and if this matter is not covered by the main section, how can a workman be debarred from adducing evidence in that behalf on the ground that the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act shut out that evidence? The learned Single Judge was, in my opinion, right in holding that the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act did not take away the right of respondent 2 to adduce evidence with regard to bias or victimisation.
38. Evidently thus, the Parliament had no intention to curtail the power of Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court, as the case may be which it had prior to insertion of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, in my opinion, in the instant case, the Parliament by inserting Section 11-A of the Act, has remedied the then existing unsatisfactory state of affairs, See 1975 (1) All E.R. Page 810 at 818, which has been referred to by the Supreme Court in Goodyear India, Ltd. v. State of Haryana, reported in [1989 (4) J.T. 229:
1990 (2) S.C.C. page 72 at page 85]. Section 11-A of the Act has, thus, to be construed in this back- drop. In this view of the matter, the proviso which seeks to restrict the power conferred upon the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court as the case may be, in terms of Section 11-A of the Act which must be read in the context of the said provision Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 26/30 only and the restrictions imposed by the provision to Section 11-A can not be extended to any other power of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be. Section 11-A read with its proviso, if thus construed, would not only be in consonance with the intent and object of the Act but also would be in consonance with principles of interpretation of statutes. It is true that a proviso may have three separate functions and four different purposes as has been held by the Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. page 582], wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
"The well-established rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a proviso may have three separate functions. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment."
8.6. This judgment clearly concluded in the manner that the plea of victimization, mala fide and unfair practice by the workman or on the part of the management is an allegation serious in nature and thus, the same, if proved, may entail a Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 27/30 finding that the domestic enquiry was vitiated. And in this view of the matter, the proviso which seeks to restrict the power confers upon the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be in terms of section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 must be read in the context of the said provision only and the restriction imposed by the proviso to section 11A cannot be extended to any other power of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court as the case may be. Section 11A read with its proviso if construed, would not only be in consonance with the intent of object of the Act, but also would be in consonance with the principles of interpretation of the statutes. Normally, a proviso is meant to be an exception to something within the main enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of the main enactment.
9. On the basis of the above discussion of the judgments as well as section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 and upon considering the merit of the case which has been placed before this Court, this Court finds that the procedure before the Industrial Tribunal as guided accordingly to the Code of Civil Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 28/30 Procedure, 1908 (Act No. 5 of 1908) has clearly mentioned in section 11 of this act. And, according to the procedure of the C.P.C. and for the appreciation of any material on record, there are two ways. First is the adducing oral evidence and second is the documentary evidence, which was subsequently, marked as exhibits.
10. It transpires to this Court that all the evidences produced in the domestic enquiry has been discussed before the proceeding of the reference case vide order dated 26.07.1999.
The case was fixed for evidence with a view to production of those documents and materials which were the subject matter of the domestic enquiry and marked as exhibits so that at the time of deciding the reference case, proper appraisal of the evidence could be made.
11. The Labour Court at the time of passing of the final order has categorically discussed that only reappraisal of the evidence given in the domestic enquiry by the management and the finding of the enquiry has been done by the Labour Court.
12. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the contention raised by counsel for the petitioner that for the purpose of reappraisal of the materials and findings in the Patna High Court CWJC No.4104 of 2015 dt.15-05-2026 29/30 domestic enquiry those materials collected by the Labour Court putting the case at the stage of evidence in the reference proceeding cannot be said to be taking fresh evidence. And, it is due to this reason, this Court is of the firm view that there is no violation of the proviso of Section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 as argued by the counsel for the petitioner. Rather, contention of the reference case whose final decision is order impugned here, fully discussed those evidences collected during domestic enquiry and those materials were marked exhibits for the purpose of reappraisal only. The counsel for the petitioner has raised only technical question that by fixing date for evidence in reference case is violation of Section 11A of the I.D. Act of 1947 is not acceptable due to the reasons discussed above.
13. This Court upon scrutiny of the decision of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in Reference Case No. 01 of 1992 reached on the conclusion that the Labour Court has properly appreciated the materials collected during the domestic enquiry, as well as, findings, considering all the materials on record and reached on the correct finding. It also transpires to this Court that the findings of the Labour Court is also on the question of quantum of punishment and on the legal as well as the factual matrix.
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14. Hence, this Court deems it appropriate not to interfere in the decision and finding of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhagalpur. In result, this writ petition stands dismissed with aforesaid observations.
(Dr. Anshuman, J) Divyansh/-
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