Kerala High Court
K.S. Syriac S/O.Sakarias John vs A.M. Ismail S/O.Muthumeeran on 16 October, 2018
Author: A.Hariprasad
Bench: A.Hariprasad
AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
TUESDAY ,THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2018 / 24TH ASWINA, 1940
AS.No. 568 of 2001 (F)
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 30.03.2001 IN OS NO.8/1997
of SUB COURT,THODUPUZHA
APPELLANT/PLAINTIFF:
K.S. SYRIAC S/O.SAKARIAS JOHN, KALLIDUKKIL HOUSE,
ALAKODE KARA AND VILLAGE, THODUPUZHA TALUK,
IDUKKI DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.SRI.P.G.PARAMESWARA PANICKER (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.GRASHIOUS KURIAKOSE (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.MATHEW JOHN (K)
SRI.BABY THOMAS
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:
1 A.M. ISMAIL S/O.MUTHUMEERAN
ALACKAL HOUSE, ALAKODU KARA AND VILLAGE,
THODUPUZHA TALUK, IDUKKI DIST.
2 SHINY W/O.ISMAIL A.M., DO.DO.
3 E.K.LATHEEF S/O.KANTHALAM, INCHAKKATTU HOUSE,
KARIKODU KARA AND VILLAGE, THODUPUZHA TALUK.
BY ADVS.SRI.N.SUKUMARAN (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.S.ANANTHASUBRAMANIAN
SRI.S.SHYAM
SRI.BOBBYMATHEW KOOTHATTUKULAM
SRI.LATHEESH SEBASTIAN
SRI.SAJI VARGHESE KAKKATTUMATTATHIL
THIS APPEAL SUITS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11.09.2018, ALONG
WITH AS NO.589/2001, THE COURT ON 16.10.2018 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
TUESDAY ,THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2018 / 24TH ASWINA, 1940
AS.No. 589 of 2001(D)
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 30.03.2001 IN OS NO.111/1996
of SUB COURT,THODUPUZHA
APPELLANT/DEFENDANT:
K.S. CYRIAC S/O.SAKARIAS JOHN,
KALLIDUKKIL HOUSE, ALAKODE KARA AND VILLAGE,
THODUPUZHA TALUK, IDUKKI DISTRICT.
BY ADVS.SRI.P.G.PARAMESWARA PANICKER (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.GRASHIOUS KURIAKOSE (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.MATHEW JOHN (K)
RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:
E.K. LATHEEF S/O.KANTHALAM,
INCHAKKATTU HOUSE, KARIKODU KARA AND VILLAGE,
THODUPUZHA TALUK.
BY ADVS.SRI.N.SUKUMARAN (SENIOR ADVOCATE)
SRI.S.ANANTHA SUBRAMANYAM
SRI.BOBBYMATHEW KOOTHATTUKULAM
SRI.S.SHYAM
THIS APPEAL SUITS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11.09.2018, ALONG
WITH AS NO.568/2001, THE COURT ON 16.10.2018 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 3
COMMON JUDGMENT
These appeals arise out of a common judgment passed by the Subordinate Judge, Thodupuzha in O.S.Nos.8 of 1997 and 111 of 1996. In both these appeals, the appellant is one Cyriac, who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.8 of 1997 and the defendant in O.S.No.111 of 1996. It is seen from the trial court's judgment that O.S.No.111 of 1996 was taken as the leading case and evidence was recorded in that case.
2. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and respondents.
3. Shorn off unnecessary details, bare minimum facts are as follows:
O.S.No.111 of 1996 was filed by the respondent in A.S.No.589 of 2001 against the appellant. Ext.A1 agreement to sell property was executed on 27.07.1994 between the appellant and respondent. Total sale consideration was fixed at `3,80,000/-. The respondent had paid an advance of `1,00,000/-
to the appellant and he was put in possession of the property. He would contend that he continues in possession of the land in part performance of the contract. The time fixed initially for performance of the contract was AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 4 30.10.1994. Later, time was extended by mutual consent on 28.10.1994 upto 15.12.1994, on 28.12.1995 upto 30.01.1996, on 03.02.1996 upto 31.03.1996 and on 06.04.1996 upto 30.06.1996. Ext.A2 is the notice sent by the respondent to the appellant seeking performance of his objections under the contract. Appellant did not respond to the notice. Hence, O.S.No.111 of 1996 was filed on 17.11.1996 seeking specific performance of the contract.
4. In the written statement in the suit and in the plaint in O.S.No.8 of 1997, a suit filed by the appellant, common contentions are raised. It has to be noted that in O.S.No.8 of 1997, apart from the respondent in A.S.No.589 of 2001, two other defendants were also impleaded. 1st defendant Ismail is the uncle of the respondent (who is 3rd defendant in O.S.No.8 of 1997) and 2 nd defendant Shiny is the wife of 1st defendant, Ismail. Plaintiff (appellant) in O.S.No.8 of 1997 sought for recovery of possession of item No.1 of plaint A schedule property, which is Ext.A1 property, alleging that terms in Ext.A1 contract were later modified as per an oral agreement dated 28.10.1994 and Ext.A1 could not be enforced as such. It is the contention of the appellant that subsequent to Ext.A1 agreement, he entered into another agreement with one Vilasini on 28.07.1994 to purchase item No.2 property shown in the plaint schedule for a total consideration of `1,95,000/-. `25,000/- was given as advance. As per terms of the agreement, the deed was to be executed before 30.12.1994. Meanwhile two attachment orders were passed in suits in respect AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 5 of item No.1 by two creditors of the appellant. This development was not in the contemplation of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant wanted some more time to perform his obligations under Ext.A1 agreement. Appellant was eager to fulfill the contractual obligations that he had with Vilasini in regard to item No.2. The respondent feared that attachments would not be cleared off immediately and therefore they wanted further assurance and security from the appellant.
5. Under these circumstances, the appellant and respondent engaged themselves in negotiations. Finally, they arrived at a fresh contract to facilitate sale of item No.1 in favour of the respondent and to safeguard the interest of all persons. Thereupon a new contract between the respondent on one hand and the appellant on the other hand was entered into on 28.10.1994. It was agreed that the appellant would facilitate sale of item No.2 at his expense in favour of the 2 nd respondent in A.S.No.568 of 2001 as per the terms and conditions that he had entered into with Vilasini. The respondent agreed to give sufficient time to the appellant to settle his transactions with creditors. It was further agreed that the time fixed for execution of Ext.A1 could be extended from time to time. Eventually, after settlement of both the transactions within a reasonable time, item No.1 could be sold in the name of 1 st defendant (1st respondent in A.S.No.568 of 2001) or his nominee. It was agreed that simultaneously item No.2 would be AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 6 transferred by the 2nd defendant Shiny in favour of the appellant without any further payment. It is contended that the 1 st defendant also agreed to pay a further sum of `30,000/- from out of the price agreed upon for item No.1. It was the understanding that the appellant should give a postdated cheque for the amount as further security. Thus a new contract for settlement and adjustment of all the transactions between the parties was entered into on 28.10.1994.
6. As per the contract dated 28.10.1994, the 1st defendant Ismail paid `30,000/- to the appellant and the appellant entrusted a postdated cheque to the 1st defendant. The payment is endorsed in the agreement itself. Appellant, at his own expense, caused the sale of item No.2 in the name of 2nd defendant Shiny. Appellant is an attestor to the sale deed. Actual balance consideration of `1,70,000/- was paid by the appellant to the vendor. He also met the registration and other expenses even though the sale deed was executed in the name of Shiny. Appellant took possession of the property and also he got possession of the original documents in respect of the property. Period of performance of the contract in respect of item No.1 was extended several times.
7. Although the appellant wanted some more time to pay off his creditors, the 1st defendant did not accede to his demand. Defendants threatened the appellant that they would take possession of item No.2 and AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 7 take steps for sale of item No.1. According to the appellant, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as modified by the subsequent agreement. 2nd defendant filed O.S.No.226 of 1996 and pursuant to the order of temporary injunction, defendants 1 and 2 entered into possession of item No.2 in violation of the agreement between the parties. It is therefore contended that the appellant is entitled to recover possession of item No.1 with mesne profit from the defendant on the strength of his title.
8. The suit is resisted by the respondents in A.S.No.568 of 2001 by strongly contending that the appellant unjustly tried to wriggle out of Ext.A1 contract and he has no right to recover possession of the property. They flatly denied any modification of Ext.A1 contract, said to have been made on 28.10.1994 as contended in the appellant's plaint. On 28.10.1994, the 3 rd defendant Lathif made a further advance of `30,000/- to the plaintiff in cash and time for performance was extended at the request of the appellant. 3 rd defendant has nothing to do with sale of item No.2. Appellant did not give any postdated cheque to the 1st defendant towards sale of item No.1. According to the respondents, there was no new contract on 28.10.1994. 3rd defendant was agreeing to the appellant's request for extension of time on many times. The endorsement regarding extension made by the appellant on 28.10.1994 clearly rules out any possibility of a new agreement. Appellant is not entitled to any relief.
AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 8
9. Two witnesses were examined on the appellant's side and six witnesses on the respondents' side. Exts.A1 to A7 and B1 to B27 are the documents produced by either side.
10. Trial court decreed the respondent's suit, viz., O.S.No.111 of 1996 and dismissed the appellant's suit, viz., O.S.No.8 of 1997 finding that Ext.A1 agreement between the parties was valid and operative. It also found that no new agreement had been made between the parties on 28.10.1994 as contended by the appellant. It further found that the appellant is not entitled to recovery of Ext.A1 property. It took a view that the respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and therefore, discretion of granting specific performance should be exercised in his favour.
11. Ext.A1 agreement to assign dated 27.07.1994 with additions thereto, marked as Exts.A1(a) to A1(g), are admitted documents. Stated precisely, there is no dispute regarding execution of Ext.A1 or execution of the documents showing subsequent extensions of time for performance. As mentioned earlier, the original time fixed in Ext.A1 contract was 30.10.1994. It was later extended upto 30.06.1996. First extension was made on 28.10.1994. `30,000/- was paid by the respondent to the appellant on that day and the appellant had endorsed the terms and conditions mentioned in the endorsement on the above date. Thereafter on 28.12.1995 time for performance was extended till 30.01.1996. Another endorsement made by the AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 9 appellant on 03.02.1996 would show that the term of agreement was again extended as per his request till 31.03.1996. Then comes to the last extension at the request of the appellant made on 06.04.1996 and the term was extended till 30.06.1996.
12. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent contended that the appellant's case that on 28.10.1994 Ext.A1 agreement was modified drastically is not borne out from any of the endorsements made by the appellant himself marked as Exts.A1(a) to A1(g). In fact the case put forwarded by the appellant that Ext.A1 was materially deviated and there was an understanding between the parties in respect of item No.2 shown in the plaint schedule are not at all revealed from any of the documents produced. In answer to this contention the learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that the parties made an oral agreement on 28.10.1994 regarding extension of time in the wake of passing attachment orders over the property by two creditors of the appellant. What prevented the appellant from getting a new contract executed between the parties showing the modified terms and conditions in the backdrop of the attachment orders passed has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant either in his pleadings or at the time of evidence.
13. Another aspect pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the respondent is that the appellant's versions about striking a new deal between AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 10 the parties are incongruous. It has been argued that the appellant's pleadings are materially different from the case that he ventured to prove in the witness box. My attention has been drawn to the averments in the plaint in O.S.No.8 of 1997 filed by the appellant and the appellant's written statement in O.S.No.111 of 1996.
14. It is pertinent to note that in both these appeals the appellant has plainly admitted execution of Ext.A1 agreement. It is the case pleaded by the appellant in the plaint in O.S.No.8 of 1997 that on 28.07.1994 he had entered into an agreement with one Vilasini for purchasing item No.2 in the plaint schedule. In the plaint, the appellant after narrating the situation which led to the passing of orders of attachment in respect of plaint item No.1, says in the following manner:
"10. In the above circumstances the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants on the other entered into negotiations and as agreed to and consented by all the parties finally arrived at a fresh contract to facilitate the sale of item No.1 in favour of the defendants, and to safeguard the interests of all, and also affording plaintiff sufficient time to settle his accounts with his creditors who placed the attachment on plaint item No.1 on making some bargain with them.
11. Thereupon a new contract between defendants on AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 11 one hand and plaintiff on the other was entered into on 28.10.1994. The terms of this new contract were as given here in below. The plaintiff should cause the sale of item No.2 at his expense in favour of the second defendant as per the contract he entered into with Vilasini as on 28.7.1994. The defendants agreed to give sufficient time for plaintiff to settle the transactions with his creditors who placed the attachments. To enable such settlement it was agreed that the period for performance of the contract of sale dated 27.7.1994 should be sufficiently extended from time to time. Eventually after settlement of those transactions within a reasonable time as agreed to by parties, plaint item No.1 should be sold in the name of either Ismail or other person whom he nominate at the price originally agreed upon. Simultaneously with the execution of that sale, item No.2 should be transferred by the second defendant to the plaintiff without any further payment and at plaintiff's expense. The first defendant also agreed to pay a further sum of Rs.30,000/- from the price agreed upon for item No.1. But in the circumstances the plaintiff was to give a post dated cheque for that amount as a further security. Thus a contract in settlement and adjustment of all contracts and AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 12 transactions between all parties was entered into on 28.10.1994 between plaintiff and defendants with mutual promises between them as above said. In view of and exigencies of the proposed settlement with creditors and the difficulty, to specify the time that may be required for such settlement and other circumstances the terms as stated above were not specifically and formally reduced to writing in a fresh agreement.
12. As per the above contract on 28.10.1994 itself first defendant gave to plaintiff this amount of Rs.30,000/- and plaintiff entrusted a post dated cheque with the first defendant. The said payment of Rs.30,000/- has also been endorsed in the agreement of sale dated 27.7.1994. The plaintiff at his own expense caused the sale of item No.2 in the name of the second defendant. In the said sale deed No.2583/94 of the Arakulam Sub Registry Office, executed in the name of the second defendant plaintiff is an attestor. The actual balance consideration of Rs.one lakh seventy thousand (after crediting the advance of Rs.25,000/- from total consideration of Rs.1,95,000/-) was paid by plaintiff to the vendors. Plaintiff also met registration and all other expenses. The stamp duty for sale was Rs.2500/- since only a lesser consideration was shown in AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 13 the deed of sale to minimise expenses. Registration fee amounted to Rs.255/-. The document writer fee of Rs.150/- and brokerage given for the transaction was Rs.2000/-. Thus plaintiff spent all such amounts and had to incur in all an amount is Rs.1,99,905/- for the above said sale. The receipt of document writers fee is produced herewith. Even though sale deed was so executed in the name of second defendant the plaintiff took possession of the property and also of the original document of sale and remained in possession of them."
15. In the written statement in O.S.No.111 of 1996, the appellant pleaded thus:
"10. In the above circumstances plaintiff, Ismail and his wife Shiny along with defendant to safeguard the interests of all the above parties entered in a fresh contract giving up and terminating the contract dated 27.7.1994.
11. As agreed to by all on 28.10.1994 it was mutually agreed upon and consented between plaintiff, defendant and others namely Ismail and Shiny the following terms were settled upon. As per this contract Ismail agreed to pay a further sum of Rs.30,000/- to the defendant from the price agreed upon plaint property and defendant entrusted a post AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 14 dated cheque with him. The said payment of Rs.30,000/- has also been endorsed in the agreement of sale dated 27.7.1994. This defendant should cause sale of the Kudayathoor property at his expense in the name of Shiny. The plaintiff and Ismail and Shiny agreed to give sufficient time to this defendant to settle his transaction with his creditors and got the attachments placed on plaint property released. For that suitable extension for the sale of plaint property was to made from time to time. It was thus the extensions of the contract sale dated 27.7.1994 of plaint property was made several times. It was also agreed that on eventual settlement and release of attachment with in a reasonable time, as agreed to by parties, plaint property will be sold to Ismail or plaintiff or whom they wanted. Simultaneously with that sale the Kudayathoor property taken in the name of Shiny would be conveyed without any payment at this defendant's expense to this defendant. Thus a contract in the above terms in settlement and adjustment of all contracts and transactions between all parties was entered into on 28.10.94 between plaintiff defendant and others with mutual promises between them as above said. In view of and AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 15 exigencies of the proposed settlement with the creditors and the difficulty of fixing a definite time that may be required for such settlement and other circumstances this new contract and settlement was not reduced to writing in a fresh agreement. But the contract so entered into on 28.10.1994 was really struck between parties. Therefore the contract of 27.7.1994 has been terminated, superseded and discharged. So the plaintiff cannot maintain this suit or claim any reliefs as prayed for in this suit. The plaintiff has not paid any money to defendant. Rupees one lakh and thirty thousand only has been received from Ismail. The B relief in the plaint cannot be granted." (underline supplied) It is clear that in unambiguous terms, the appellant had pleaded that Ext.A1 contract was terminated, superseded and discharged. If that is so, the liability is solely on the appellant to establish the formation of a new oral contract.
16. In the light of the above pleadings, the learned senior counsel for the respondent contended that the appellant cannot claim the relief of recovery of possession of plaint schedule item No.1 in his suit, nor can he resist the suit for specific performance filed by the respondent.
17. DW1 is the appellant. When he was examined, a specific question was put to him regarding non-execution of a modified agreement AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 16 between the parties in the light of the developments subsequent to the execution of Ext.A1. According to him, he did not insist on executing a new agreement in modification of Ext.A1 as he was unsure of the time when the obligations could be performed. DW1 further asserted that Ext.A1 agreement cannot independently stand. According to him, modification made to Ext.A1 on 28.10.1994 by way of an oral agreement has to be considered for the existence of Ext.A1. This stance of his goes against his pleadings. On appraisal of the testimony of DW1 in toto, I find no justification for accepting the modification of Ext.A1 as put forwarded by him especially in the light of the subsequent endorsements made by him confirming the validity of Ext.A1 for seeking extension of time.
18. DW2 is a broker in the deal. He deposed in the chief-examination in terms of the case put forwarded by the appellant. He supported the case of appellant that item No.2 property was purchased in the name of Shiny in a peculiar situation existed at that time and there was an agreement to convey the property to the name of appellant at the time of finalisation of contract between the appellant and respondent in respect of item No.1. In cross- examination DW2 deposed that he was an accused in a theft case and the appellant, who is a lawyer, had appeared for him in that case. DW2 also did not state any convincing reason for not writing down a modified contract said to have been entered into between the parties on 28.10.1994. AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 17
19. DW3 is an advocate commissioner, who inspected the property in O.S.No.400 of 1996 before the Court of Munsiff, Thodupuzha and submitted Ext.B27 report. DW4 is a witness cited to prove possession. DW5 is a scribe. He was cited to prove the appellant's contention that Ext.B13 receipt was prepared by him at the instance of the appellant. DW6 was cited to prove that the appellant was keeping possession and taking income from item No.2 in the plaint schedule.
20. I shall just make a mention of the evidence on the side of the respondent as well. PW1 is the respondent, who deposed in terms of plaint in O.S.No.111 of 1996 and the written statement filed in O.S.No.8 of 1997. He strongly denied any modification of Ext.A1 as per an oral agreement on 28.10.1994. According to him, the transaction in respect of item No.2 has nothing to do with the sale of item No.1 and the obligations arising out of Ext.A1 agreement. PW2 is the 1st defendant in O.S.No.8 of 1997. He also supported the testimony of PW1. Both of them denied any connection between the sale of property in the name of Shiny and the disputes centered around Ext.A1 property.
21. On an evaluation of the evidence, I find no reason to deviate from the findings of the court below that the appellant failed to establish that on 28.10.1994 the terms and conditions in Ext.A1 agreement were materially deviated by way of an oral agreement. As mentioned above, subsequent AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 18 admissions by the appellant by way of writings for extension of time cuts at the root of the appellant's case regarding change in terms and conditions borne out from Ext.A1.
22. Learned senior counsel contended that the court below erred in finding that setting up of an oral agreement in modification of Ext.A1 will fall within the mischief of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, "Act"). According to him, the 4th proviso to Section 92 of the Act was not considered by the court below. It says that the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents. Admittedly, an agreement for sale of property as on the date of its execution was not necessarily be in writing and there was no mandatory requirement of registration of an agreement for sale as the contract was in the year 1994. Therefore, the matters covered by the 4th proviso to Section 92 of the Act could have come to the rescue of the appellant, had he established by convincing evidence that there was a modification of the terms and conditions in Ext.A1. As pointed out earlier, I find no reason to attach any credence to the testimony of the witnesses examined on the side of the appellant to prove that the terms and conditions in Ext.A1 were modified later by a parole AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 19 agreement. Even at the cost of repetition, I may say that Ext.A1(a) to A1(g) would certainly improbabilise the case of appellant in this regard.
23. One of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the respondent (plaintiff in O.S.No.111 of 1996) is not entitled to get specific performance of Ext.A1 for the reason that he has not averred and proved his readiness and willingness to perform the obligations in the contract. In paragraph 6 of the plaint in O.S.No.111 of 1996 it has been clearly pleaded that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and on all the dates stipulated for execution of the sale deed, including the extended dates. Further the endorsements made as per Exts.A1(a) to A1(g) would show that the extensions were required at the instance of the appellant himself. Therefore, this contention of the appellant cannot be sustained.
24. In the evidence as well as in the pleadings, the appellant attempted to put forward a contention that the respondent had no sufficient means to purchase the property. In answer to this contention, learned senior counsel for the respondent contended that he had deposited the amount before the court below long before and money is still lying with the court below. An execution petition has been filed before the court below in O.S.No.111 of 1996 for executing the decree for specific performance of Ext.A1. In that matter the deposit was made by the respondent. AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 20
25. It is also seen that the appellant had preferred an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for rescinding the contract which was dismissed. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that when that matter was challenged in a revision petition before this Court, it was observed that the issue can be raked up in this appeal. However, considering the nature of contentions I refrain from passing any comment on the maintainability of the application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act as it is not a matter directly arising in these appeals.
26. After hearing the learned senior counsel on both sides and on perusal of the materials placed before this Court, I find no reason to find fault with the trial court's judgment. The trial court has taken a reasonable view based on evidence. It is well settled that in such a situation, the appellate court shall not take a view different from that of the trial court.
In the result, the appeals are found to be devoid of merits. Hence they are dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer their costs.
All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.
A.HARIPRASAD, JUDGE.
cks AS Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 21 A.HARIPRASAD, J.
A.S.Nos.568 & 589 of 2001 COMMON JUDGMENT 16th October, 2018