Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri Ankit Kalawant vs The Commissioner Of Police on 30 August, 2011
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH OA 4042/2010 NEW DELHI THIS THE 30th DAY OF AUGUST, 2011 HONBLE MR. G. GEORGE PARACKEN, MEMBER (J) HONBLE MR. A.K. JAIN, MEMBER (A) Shri Ankit Kalawant, S/o Shri Hariram, R/o Village & Post Keshwana, Tehsil-Kotputli, Distt. Jaipur Rajasthan-303108. Applicant. (By Advocate Shri Sachin Chauhan) VERSUS 1. The Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, IP Estate, New Delhi. 2. The Joint Commissioner of Police Recruitment Through the Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, IP Estate, New Delhi. 3. The Dy. Commissioner of Police Recruitment New Police Lines, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi. Respondents. (By Advocate Shri B.N.P Pathak) ORDER
Mr. G. George Paracken:
The applicant was a candidate for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police. His candidature was cancelled vide the impugned Annexure A-2 letter dated 21.10.2010 after giving him a show cause notice vide Annexure A-1 letter dated 23.02.2010.
2. According to the aforesaid show cause notice, the applicant had applied for the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police during the recruitment held in the year 2009 and selected provisionally against Roll No. 405268, subject to verification of character and antecedents, medical fitness and final checking of documents etc. However, on receipt of his character and antecedents report from DCP/Special Branch, Delhi, it was revealed that a criminal case FIR No. 96/2006 u/s 143/341/323 IPC, PS Kotputli, Distt. Jaipur (Raj.) was registered against him in which he was acquitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, vide order dated 29.11.2009. All the candidates, who were involved in criminal cases were asked to deposit the copies of the FIR and the judgments in Recruitment Cell to examine their cases. Accordingly, he had also deposited a copy of the FIR and the judgment in Recruitment Cell. However, according to the respondents, the applicant has concealed the fact of his involvement in the above criminal case in the relevant columns of the application form and the attestation form and tried to seek appointment in Delhi Police by adopting deceitful means and malafide intention. They have further observed that the aforesaid concealment was deliberate and it was despite the clear warning given at the top of the forms that furnishing of any false information and concealing any facts would be treated as disqualification in the Delhi Police.
3. The applicant has submitted a reply to the aforesaid show cause notice vide his letter dated 05.03.2010. According to him, his failure to mention the aforesaid facts of his involvement in the criminal case was a bonafide mistake as he was not aware of the criminal case registered against him, being a juvenile at the relevant time and the local police also did not inform him about it. His further contention was that his family members have also not guided him properly in the matter and, therefore, he did not mention the aforesaid facts in the application form and the attestation form, by mistake.
4. According to the respondents, the aforesaid plea of the applicant was not found convincing because of the reasons that he was very well in a position to understand the information to be given in the application form and the attestation form but he did not mention it deliberately. They have further stated that the applicant had filled up the application form on 12.03.2009 and against the entries in Column No. 15 (a to e), he was required to give the details of the criminal proceedings but he put tick mark against NO and also left the Column No. 16 of the said form blank against which he was required to give full particulars of the case, section under which it was charged, the police station in which the said case was registered and the status of the case at the time of filling up the application form. Further, he filled up the attestation form for verification of character and antecedents on 07.09.2009 and in Column No. 11 (Kha), he had clearly mentioned NAHI, MERE VIRUDH KOI FIR DARJ NAHI HUI HAI. He has thus concealed the fact of his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case despite clearly warning on the application form and the attestation form that furnishing of any false information or concealing any fact would be treated as disqualification for appointment in Delhi Police. Therefore, the respondents have rightly come to the conclusion that he was not suitable for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police and accordingly his candidature was cancelled.
5. The applicant has challenged the aforesaid Annexure A-1 show cause notice and the Annexure A-2 cancellation letter in this O.A on the ground that on the days of filling up of the application form and the attestation form, he was not having the knowledge of being named in the FIR and, therefore, he could not give information in relation to the aforesaid criminal case. Therefore, his action was bonafide and there was no deliberate intention on his part to conceal anything. Further, he has submitted that once he was acquitted in the criminal case and inadvertently failed to mention the said information in the application as well as the attestation forms, then the same cannot be treated as a deceitful action on his part to seek employment in Delhi Police.
6. The learned counsel for the applicant Shri Sachin Chauhan has relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dinesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. (2006 (4) SCT 429) in support of the aforesaid contentions of the applicant. In the said judgment, it was held that in the absence of conviction, mere registration of criminal case is no ground for disqualifying a candidate and the non-disclosure of those facts does not amount to concealment. The relevant part of the said judgment reads as under:
7. This Court has already taken the view that once a person is not convicted then non-disclosure of such an information does not amount to concealment of fact. In the case of Subhash v. State of Haryana, 1994 (4) SLR 525, this Court has observed as under:-
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the necessary record I find that the plea taken by the respondents is highly hyper-technical and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. It is not a concealment of fact regarding his earlier conviction which can be taken into consideration against an employee and on the basis whereof his appointment can be set aside later on. In the present case, petitioner had only been prosecuted and was acquitted by a competent Criminal Court. It was not necessary for the petitioner to disclose this fact to the respondents at the time of his submitting application for recruitment to the police service. In any case, the fact stands that there is nothing against the petitioner on the basis whereof his appointment could be set aside having already been made by order dated 4.9.1989 Annexure P-1. Therefore, the non-disclosure of the information relating to his acquittal in the criminal case is no ground for withholding the appointment of the petitioner. In view of the above, we allow this writ petition and direct the respondents to take steps for issuance of appointment letter to the petitioner subject to fulfillment other conditions by him. It is made clear that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been appointed as Constable Driver with effect from the date persons lower in merit to him as per the merit determined by the Selection body is appointed. However, he shall not be entitled to any arrears of salary.
7. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in WP (C) No. 3566/2010 decided on 24.05.2010 Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. Vs. Jai Prakash (Annexure A-6) wherein it has been held as under:
11. A bare reading of the observations made by the Apex Court in this judgment goes to show that when one has to consider the question of disqualification, the reason for disqualification must flow from the rules at least in the case of public employment. If there is some prohibition under the rules for such disqualification, the disqualification may be considered in accordance with the rules so prescribed.
8. He has also relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in WP (C) No. 2068/2010 Govt. of NCT of Delhi Vs. Robin Singh wherein it was held as under:
49. The last issue which we need to discuss is, whether the respondent should be denied employment in the Police department. It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that persons who have a brush with criminal law, even if they are acquitted, are undesirable elements to be inducted as Police Officers. As stated above, there are no guidelines available with the petitioner to declare as to who is undesirable element to prohibit his induction in Delhi Police.
50. The respondent is not being inducted in the higher cadre of the Police i.e. the IPS cadre. He is entering the lower rungs. His address shows his rural background. The same is: R/o VPO Mulhera, District Meerut, U.P.
51. We have discussed hereinabove the necessity to harmonize the various social imbalances and in particular in favour of those who have been denied the opportunity of developing their consciousness and thereby being deprived of their conscious acting as a mirror to their acts. We have highlighted as to how in various jurisdictions abroad the issue is dealt with. We have discussed hereinabove the deliberations at the All India Seminar on Correctional Service? where emphasis for re-habilitation of ex-convicts, committing minor offences, by induction in public service was accorded primacy in the deliberations.
52. It would be advisable for the petitioner to devise a selection procedure by subjecting those who are desirous of seeking employment under the Police to the various tests which we have noted in para 16 above and which we have culled out from jurisprudence followed in matured democracies.
53. The respondent was born on 21.05.1987. The age of the respondent when he was made an accused in the Non-Cognizable Report would be 19 years. The trivial offence of what he was charged of, in which he has been acquitted, cannot make him a criminal of a kind where public interest requires his non-induction in the Police force and that too as a Sub-Inspector (Executive) and that means his duties would be clerical and not with arms and surely not on the streets requiring him to deal with public. Assuming that the petitioner did the acts of which he was accused of, thesame is a trivial brawl which he had in the village. Some fist blows with choicest abuses in tandem were hurled at the victim. 54. The writ petition is dismissed and the direction issued by the Tribunal is upheld. 55. No costs.
9. The other precedent relied upon by him is the order of a co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA 1415/2010 decided on 01.02.2010 Ajay No. 10540/PTC Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. In the said case also, the candidature was cancelled on the ground of concealment of facts. After examining the facts and circumstances of the case, this Tribunal relying upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dinesh Kumar (supra) held as under:
6. Therefore, the question would arise as to what would have happened if the applicant had mentioned the fact of his involvement in criminal case? If a regular assessment and analysis is made of this case, the applicant would point out that his selection could not have been done at that point of time because the issue of his involvement was too petty and small even going by the FIR but after the acquittal it became more clearer that no stigma could ever be attached to the applicant. Taking a bit further, in village parlance it is possible to have families hostile to each other and it would be sufficient for any one of them to file a false criminal case and get the prospects of others pre-judicially affected. Therefore, the second question to be considered is what is the nature of offence alleged against him? The allegation is only of causing simple hurt and criminal intimidation. It does not involve any question of moral turpitude or lack of integrity, which would pre-judicially affect a young mans entry into the government service. On this respect, then, his averment in his defence statement that he was unaware of the legal and consequential meaning must be taken that he was unaware of the effect of the case. The applicant had produced the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Haryana & others v. Dinesh Kumar, (2008) 3 SCC 222, wherein their Lordships considered the effect of such submission and the effect of words arrest and custody and what will be the effect of such in the employment prospects of a candidate. The Honble Apex Court has held that since the concerned person has been released on bail, the benefit of a mistaken impression, rather than that of deliberate and willful misrepresentation and concealment of facts, are to be the crucial fulcrum in this adjudicatory process. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana & others, 2006 (4) SCT 429 has held that the termination because of non-disclosure of registration of criminal case, in the absence of conviction, mere registration of the criminal case is no ground for disqualifying a candidate and non-mention of such fact does not amount to concealment of any fact. A similar question was considered in great detail by the Tribunal itself in Vikram Singh v. Union of India & others (OA-1795/2005) decided on 13.12.2006. The Tribunal had then formulated certain definitive guidelines as follows:
Non-disclosure of the case being an inadvertent error is not willful concealment, It was a salutary incident emanating from a sudden quarrel, which did not involve any moral turpitude or even a serious offence. It was not indicative of any propensity to crime; and The applicant was acquitted full and convincingly without even going through the formality of 313 Cr. PC.
7. To this, we have to examine the circumstance of full disclosure of this case at the time of application itself forgetting the relevancy of the dates since his selection was based on analysis of competitive merits, the fact that he was acquitted and the offence was so minor and petty and the circumstances thereof are too late to be mentioned of, would have ensured the selection in the first place. Therefore, the impugned orders are vitiated by non-application of mind as to the cause and effect of the actions alleged against the applicant. It is also guided by the judgment of the Honble High Court of Delhi in GNCT of Delhi & another v. Dinesh Kumar (WP (C) No.5510/2010) decided on 11.11.2010, in which a similar situation of great magnitude was considered by their Lordships and held that there cannot be any bar to seek public employment, especially since one of the petitioners in that case was also charged under Section 323 along with Section 341 IPC. We are inclined to follow the dicta of the High Court and the superior judicial fora and on facts also, there is no ground, which can be brought out to reject the pleas of the applicant.
8. Therefore, the OA is allowed. Impugned orders are hereby quashed. The applicant is to be reinstated back in service forthwith with all consequential benefits, including seniority, except arrears of pay. But it is made clear that he shall be entitled to the pay also from today onwards. No costs.
10. The learned counsel for the applicant has also relied upon the orders of co-ordinate Bench in OA 1795/2005 Vikram Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. wherein it was held as under:
11. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made and the case law cited at the bar. It is not disputed that the applicant while submitting his application form for recruitment to the post of Constable (Executive) has not disclosed that he was prosecuted in two criminal cases but was acquitted. Technically speaking he can be said to have violated the term III and 11 aforementioned of the application form. But the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar (supra) and Subhash (supra) fully covers the present case. We do not find any fact and circumstances to record the representation of the applciant that non-disclosure of particulars of the applicant are deliberate and intentional. Applicant would have gave nothing by keeping the particulars of those cases concealed since the character antecedent this information would have easily listed either from the candidate himself or from other sources by the verifying authorities. The Honble Delhi High Court in the case of Sanjeev Kumar (supra) also considered a similar case where the candidature of a Head Constable (Ministerial) who were provisionally selected was cancelled because he has concealed the factum of involvement in the criminal case. After elaborate discussion and after relying upon the order of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Kirpal Singh CW No. 3084/2001 and the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police of Delhi vs. Dhaval Singh JT 1999 (9) SC 429 held that non-disclosure of criminal case in which applicant has been acquitted, in application form, was inadvertent error and not willful concealment and that in the first available opportunity he made bonafide disclosure about incident while filling in the Attestation Form prior to his selection and without receipt of any show cause notice from the respondents. A bench of this Tribunal also dealt with a similar case in OA-964/2005 in the case titled Hanuman Prasad Meena vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi decided on 1.2.2006. It was a case of Head Constable (Ministerial) in Delhi Police who had allegedly not disclosed about his involvement in the criminal case. It was found that during investigation, nothing had turned out, therefore, he was neither arrested, prosecuted or kept in detention, bound down or convicted by any court of law. The bench held that the applicant was neither prosecuted nor was convicted in a court so there was no non-disclosure of material information in the Attestation Form. A similar question of cancellation of the candidature of the provisionally selected candidates in the post of Constable in Delhi Police was considered by the Honble High Court in a bunch of ten writ petitions WP (C) No.6042-43/05 in the case titled Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs. Deepak Kumar and other writ petitions decided on 28.11.2005 in which the Honble Court elaborately discussing the case law and in the peculiarity of the facts and circumstances quashed the order of cancellation of candidature and remitted the matter back to the disciplinary authority by passing appropriate order in accordance with law in the light of the observation made in the order.
12. After Tribunals case discussed in OA-1677/2005 decided in the case titled Santosh Kapoor vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi also the candidature of a candidate for the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police was cancelled on the ground that he had given false information in the attestation form submitted for character and antecedent verification. Since he has concealed his criminal prosecution in which he had been acquitted. The Tribunal after relying upon the judgment of the Honble High Court and this Tribunal referred to above has quashed the order of cancellation of the candidature of the applicant in the OA and had directed the Commissioner of Police to consider the case of the applicant for appointment to the post of Constable (Executive).
13. The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Kerala Solvent Extracitons Ltd. (supra) is on peculiarly distinguishable facts. The non-dislosure of the correct and true educational qualification at the time of the recruitment and appointment as an employee was considered and it was found that the rule specifically provided that the candidate should not be more than 8th standard pass. The educational qualification of the employee was much more than 8th standard when he applied for and when appointed to the post, so he was not eligible for consideration when the application was submitted.
14. In the present case applicant was otherwise eligible for consideration for recruitment to the post of Constable (Executive). His candidature has been cancelled after serving a show cause notice on the ground that he has not disclosed in the application form that he had been prosecuted in the criminal case and was acquitted in 1996, i.e. before he submitted the application for recruitment during the year 1997.
15. Having regard to the above discussion and the case law cited, we hold that the concealment of the information about the applicants criminal prosecution in two cases and his acquittal in the application form cannot be held to be intentional and non-disclosure of material information to disqualify him from being appointed to the post of Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police.
16. Accordingly, we quash the order of the respondent dated 26.9.98 (Annexure A-1) and direct the respondent to consider the case of the candidature of the applicant for being appointed to the post of Constable (Executive) in Police as per the rules within one month from the date a copy of this order is received by the respondent. However, the applicant would not be entitled to any past benefit or seniority or his appointment would come into effect from the date notified by the respondents. No costs.
11. The applicants counsel has further invited our attention to an order of the co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA 1683-2008 - Bhagirath Vs. Govt. of NCTD & Ors. In the said case, the applicant therein was also not aware of the pendency of criminal case against him as the police or the court has never summoned him. In the said case, this Tribunal held as under:
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case.
6. We are distressed to find that the concerned authority while passing impugned order dated 10.07.2008 has not applied its mind at all. A stereo type order, which we have seen in number of such cases, seems to have been passed. The plea of the applicant, which was substantiated, was that he himself never knew about lodging of any complaint against him and, therefore, there was no occasion for him to have made a mention of the same in the relevant columns of the application form. It is surprising to note that as to when the applicant would not himself know about lodging of the complaint against him, how could he be saddled with the responsibility of deliberate concealment of facts. This precise issue we have dealt with in the matter of Bharat Ratn v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others (OA No. 2654/2006 decided on 05.10.2007), which squarely covers the issue involved in present case.
7. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this Original Application and quash order dated 10.07.2008 with direction to the respondents to proceed with the appointment of the applicant on the post of Constable without taking into consideration that he had concealed any material fact, in accordance with law, subject to medical test. Let this exercise be done within a period of one month from today.
12. The case of OA 1007/2007 Satya Narayan Meena Vs. Union of India & Ors. relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant was a case where a person was dealt with under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and acquitted in the criminal case. Later on, when he was selected for the post of Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police, he concealed those information and the respondent, Delhi Police cancelled his candidature for non-disclosure of his involvement in the criminal case. While considering the said case, the Tribunal held as under:
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance examined the records of the case.
14. The Act of 2000 came into being for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent juveniles. The very introduction of the Act of 2000 would reveal that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was enacted by the Parliament. Several provisions of the Constitution including clause (3) of article 15, clauses (e) and (f) of article 39, articles 45 and 47 also impose on the State a primary responsibility of ensuring that all the needs of children are met and that their basic human rights are fully protected. On 20th November, 1989 General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child wherein a set of standards to be adhered to by all State parties in securing the best interests of the child has been prescribed. The convention emphasizes social re-integration of child victims, to the extent possible, without resorting to judicial proceedings. The statement of Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000 would further reveal that under the Juvenile Act, 1986, much greater attention was required to be given to children in conflict with law or those in need of care and protection. It was specifically mentioned that the justice system as applicable for adults is not considered suitable for being applied to a juvenile or the child or any one on their behalf including the police, voluntary organizations, social workers, or parents and guardians, throughout the country and there was urgent need of creating adequate infrastructure necessary for the implementation of the proposed legislation with a larger involvement of informal systems specially the family, the voluntary organizations and the community. In the context aforesaid, number of proposals were made, some of which are enumerated below:
to make the juvenile system meant for a juvenile or the child more appreciative of the developmental needs in comparison to criminal justice system as applicable to adults;
to minimize the stigma and in keeping with the developmental needs of the juvenile or the child, to separate the Bill into two parts one for juveniles in conflict with law and the other for the juvenile or the child in need of care and protection;
to provide for effective provisions and various alternatives for rehabilitation and social reintegration such as adoption, foster care, sponsorship and aftercare of abandoned, destitute, neglected and delinquent juvenile and child.
What clearly emerges from the Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000 is that judicial system has to be more appreciative of the developmental needs of children in comparison with the adults. The same is also to make effective provisions and various alternatives for rehabilitation and social integration and to minimize the stigma of a juvenile, for which purpose, the Bill is in two parts one for juvenile in conflict with law, and another for juvenile in need of care and protection. In the background of Objects and Reasons of Act of 2000, relevant provisions of the Act need to be examined. Section 19 of Act of 2000, pertaining to removal of disqualification attaching to conviction, reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law (emphasis supplied).
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the relevant records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be.
A careful reading of the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 and Section 19 thereof, would make it abundantly clear that a juvenile in conflict with law has to be rehabilitated and the stigma of conviction has also to be minimized. It appears to us that if a juvenile having been dealt with under the Act of 2000 is unable to secure a Government job for the rest of his life, it would be neither his rehabilitation nor reduction in the stigma that may be attached to the conviction for an offence for which he might have been tried.
15. Mr. Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel representing the respondents would, however, contend that the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 as also provisions as contained in Section 19 thereof, would not come to the rescue of the applicant, as what is relevant in obtaining a Government job and that too in a disciplined force, is the conduct and character of a candidate and not the consequence of a conviction that might have been provided under the Act of 2000. The learned counsel then refers to provisions contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1958 which are pari materia to sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Act of 2000, and contends that while interpreting Section 12 of the Act of 1958, in the very context of obtaining a Government job, even on acquittal in a criminal case, the courts in the country have taken a view that what is relevant is conduct or character of a candidate. The learned counsel for his contention as noted above, relied upon two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration & Others Vs. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC, 605 and Harichand Vs. Director of School Education, 2000 (1) SCT, Page 272, and a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, in the matter of Naresh Kumar Meena Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Police & Another, decided on 17.5.2004.
16. The facts of Delhi Administration & Another vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) would reveal that Sushil Kumar had appeared for recruitment as constable in Delhi Police in 1989-90. He cleared written test and interview and was found physically fit. He was selected provisionally. On verification of character and antecedents it was found that he was not desirable person to be appointed and accordingly his name was rejected. Aggrieved, he successfully approached Central Administrative Tribunal which observed that he had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offences under sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC and, therefore, he could not be denied right of appointment to the post under the State. In an appeal preferred by the State, this view taken by the Tribunal was under challenge. The Honble Supreme Court observed that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable for a post under the State. On account of antecedent record, the appointing authority found Sh. Sushil Kumar not desirable to be appointed to a disciplined force and that view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. Tribunal was not justified in giving direction for re-consideration of his case. It was further observed that even though Shri Sushil Kumar was discharged or acquitted in the criminal offences, same has nothing to do with question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. (emphasis supplied). The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. The appointing authority, therefore, rightly focused this aspect and rightly considered him not desirable to continue him in service.
17. In Harichand (supra), the appellant was convicted of an offence under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-. In appeal, the Sessions Court upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence and directed release of applicant on probation under Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1958, on his entering bond for good conduct in the sum of Rs.5000/- and furnishing a surety for the like amount. The appellant was dismissed from Government service. He challenged his dismissal in High Court but without any favourable result. Thus, the appellant challenged the order of High Court in the Honble Supreme Court. The counsel representing appellant urged, on the basis of section 12 of the Act of 1958, that the appellant even though found guilty, would not suffer any disqualification, if any, attached to his conviction and therefore, he could not be removed from service. For his contention, he relied upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Aritha Chander Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1981 (Supp) SCC 17. While dealing with the plea of the counsel for the appellant, the Honble Supreme Court observed thus:
7. In our view Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act would apply only in respect of a disqualification that goes with a conviction under the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. That is the plain meaning of the words disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law therein. Where the law that provides for an offence and its punishment also stipulates a disqualification, a person convicted of the offence but released on probation does not by reason of Section 12 suffer the disqualification. It cannot be held that, by reason of Section 12, a conviction for an offence should not be taken into account for the purpose of dismissal of the person convicted from Government service. In Naresh Kumar Meena (supra), the applicant therein was involved in an FIR punishable under section 3 read with Section 6 of the Rajasthan Examination Act and was ultimately admonished and was given benefit of section 3 of the Act of 1958. The applicant had applied for appointment to the post of Constable in Delhi Police but was not appointed in view of his involvement in case referred to above. His challenge to cancellation of his candidature before this Tribunal fizzled out on the basis of following observations:
Once the applicant had been held guilty of an offence and released giving him the benefit of doubt under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, he cannot claim a right to be posted keeping in view his antecedents. If the authorities felt that he is not a proper person to be so appointed, there is little scope for interference.
18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties as noted above. We are of the firm view that once the very Object of the Act of 2000 is to, inter-alia, rehabilitate the child in conflict with law and to minimise the stigma, and when a provision has been made by Legislature to achieve this object and further when there is a conscious distinction made between a juvenile and adult in conflict with law, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 even though para material to sub section 1 of Section 19 of Act, of 2000, and the judicial precedents that have been cited by Mr.Luthra, would not be of much relevance. Once, a juvenile in conflict with law has necessarily to be dealt with under the provisions of Act of 2000, it is obvious that Act of 1958 would apply to adults.
19. We have gone through the statement of Objects and Reasons of 1958 and the same are only to release the Offenders on Probation for good conduct, instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. In several states, there were no separate probation laws and even in the States where there were number of laws they were not adequate to meet the present requirements. Meanwhile, there was increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender as useful and self reliant member of society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of jail life. It is in this background that Central law on the subject came into being which may be uniformly applicable to all the states. The object of the Act was further to admonish in respect of certain specific acts and to empower Courts to release them on probation if they are found to be less than 21 years of age. The sole object of the Act of 1958, appears to be an endeavour to reform a person who is not a juvenile but below age of 21 years, with regard to some offence so as not to send him to jail where he may mix with hardened criminals and become menace to the society. The object of the Act, does not reflect rehabilitation of an offender.
19. Having seen different objects of the two Acts i.e. 1958 and 2000, it is now time to see if there is any material difference between Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Act of 19 of 2000. Same read thus:
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 reads thus, 12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence. Section 19 of the Act of 2000, reads thus :
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the relevant records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be.
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2000 do appear to be pari materia. There is, however, substantial difference between the two. There is no sub-section (2) in the Act of 1958, like sub-section (2) of section 19 of Act of 2000. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 provides that record of conviction of a delinquent has to be removed after expiry of period of appeal or reasonable period as prescribed in the rules, as the case may be. Certainly, if the record of conviction has to be removed within the period of appeal or reasonable time, it would certainly mean that the conviction of a juvenile would not come in his way in securing a government job, as otherwise there was no question of removing the record as such.
20. In the context of the distinction between two Acts, the judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, have to be analyzed. In so far as judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) is concerned, it was not a case where Sushil Kumar may have been dealt with under the provisions of either of the two Acts mentioned above. It was a simple case where having successfully competed for the post of constable, the department on verification had found that he was involved in a case under sections 304, 324/34 read with section 324 of IPC, wherein even though he was acquitted, but the concerned authorities had found him not a fit person to be appointed on the post of Constable. Honble Supreme Court observed that it is the conduct and character of a person seeking appointment to service, which is relevant and not the result of a criminal case. As mentioned above, there was no discussion in this case with regard to the effect of provisions as contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1958 or Section 19 of the Act of 2000. In Harichand vs. Director of School Education (supra), it was indeed a case where, Harichand was removed from service on account of involvement in a case under section 408 of IPC, and even though sentenced, in first instance, he was given benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958. In this case, however, Honble Supreme Court observed that Section 12 would apply only in respect of disqualification that goes with the conviction in the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. The plain meaning of word disqualification if any, would be attaching to conviction of an offence, under such law. Under the provisions of the Act of 1958, disqualification as interpreted by the Honble Supreme Court is attaching a conviction for an offence under law as made under the Act of 1958. The position is not so insofar as the Act of 2000 is concerned. There is no provision in the Act of 1958 which may suggest that conviction will not be a disqualification for securing a Government job, whereas under the Act of 2000, keeping in view the Objects and Reasons of the Act and sub-section (2) of Section 19 thereof, it has to be held that conviction would not debar a juvenile from securing a Government job. As mentioned above, one of the main objects of the Act of 2000 is to rehabilitate a juvenile in conflict with law and reduce the stigma of conviction. Further, sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the said Act would clinch the issue beyond any pale of controversy. We are of the considered opinion that if the record of conviction of juvenile has to be removed, and that too within the period of limitation or within a reasonable time which shall not be more than six months to a year, after his conviction the same could be only with the object that the conviction of a delinquent would not come in his way in securing a government job. Any other interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 would not only run counter to the Object and Reasons of Act of 2000 but also plain and simple interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of Act of 2000. The judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, referred to above, are distinguishable and would not apply to a case of the juvenile, who has been dealt with under the provisions of the Act of 2000. Insofar as the judgment of this Tribunal in Naresh Kumar Meena (supra) is concerned, it adopts similar reasons as given by the two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as mentioned above.
21. Before we may part with this order, we would like to mention that the nation and the society owe a duty to rehabilitate those who might have fallen on bad ways at some weak moment of their lives. If reformed, the stigma of conviction, particularly when it may be for an offence which is petty, should not continue unabated for the rest of the life of a person. It is not unknown that when reformed, either because of reformatory measures that may be taken or when ones own conscious may guide one to completely change his ways, some people not only follow the ordinary guidelines or principles as settled by the society, but become totally pious and excel in all walks of life. It would be a travesty of justice if the law and the society may not give any chance to such people to come into main stream and contribute in advancement of the nation. We are, in the present case, however, concerned only with those to whom the law consciously would like to rehabilitate. We are of the considered view that the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 read with Section 19 thereof would clearly suggest the intention of the Legislature in not debarring a juvenile for securing a Government job for the rest of his life. We may only further mention that in the present case, the applicant was involved in three petty cases of theft twelve years prior when he was selected on the post of constable and was given in supervision to his father. It would be too iniquitous and unjust not to rehabilitate a juvenile who was of tender years at the time of the crime and may not be himself knowing what he was doing was wrong.
22. For the reasons as mentioned above, we quash the order, Annexure A-1 dated 6.12.2006 cancelling the candidature of the applicant and in consequence thereof direct the respondents to consider appointing him on the post of Constable, which has been kept vacant on the dint of the orders passed by the Honble High Court, as continued by this Tribunal till date. In the facts and circumstances of the case, costs of the litigation are made easy.
13. Again in a similar case O.A. 2473/2009 Pradeep Kumar Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., a co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal held as under:
6. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the records.
7. In fact, in the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 the juvenile was considered upto 16 years of age but in subsequent amendment as Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 age upto 18 years was raised, which is effected from 1.4.2001. In the above view of the matter, the Apex Court in Jameel v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 420 discussed the impact of Juvenile Justice Act with the following observations:-
14. The applicability of the provisions of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Another [(2005) 3 SCC 551], wherein, inter alia, it was held :
"31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special provision in respect of pending cases and begins with non-obstante clause. The sentence "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on date of which this Act came into force" has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term "any court" would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a "juvenile" under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had crossed 16 years or girl had crossed 18 years. This shows that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that Court as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the Court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile.
xxx xxx xxx
34. This Rule also indicates that the intention of the Legislature was that the provisions of the 2000 Act were to apply to pending cases provided, on 1.4.2001 i.e. the date on which the 2000 Act came into force, the person was a "juvenile" within the meaning of the term as defined in the 2000 Act i.e. he/she had not crossed 18 years of age.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The 2000 Act would be applicable in a pending proceeding in any court/authority initiated under the 1986 Act and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the person had not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001."
15. The appellant was above eighteen years of age on 01.04.2001. The 2000, therefore, cannot have any application whatsoever in the instant case.
8. Further, in Ranjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 9 SCC 453, the above proposition has been relied upon. Also in Amit Singh alias Chintu & another v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 522, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 has been relied upon.
9. With the aforesaid backdrop, applicant on 12.2.2002, who at the time when the FIR was registered against him keeping in light his date of birth, i.e., 18.2.1985, was below 18 years of age but more than 16 years of age. As such, he was juvenile as per Juvenile Act 2000. In this view of the matter, the following observations in Satya Narayan Meenas case (supra) would apply to the applicant herein:-
18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties as noted above. We are of the firm view that once the very Object of the Act of 2000 is to, inter-alia, rehabilitate the child in conflict with law and to minimise the stigma, and when a provision has been made by Legislature to achieve this object and further when there is a conscious distinction made between a juvenile and adult in conflict with law, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 even though para material to sub section 1 of Section 19 of Act, of 2000, and the judicial precedents that have been cited by Mr.Luthra, would not be of much relevance. Once, a juvenile in conflict with law has necessarily to be dealt with under the provisions of Act of 2000, it is obvious that Act of 1958 would apply to adults.
19. We have gone through the statement of Objects and Reasons of 1958 and the same are only to release the Offenders on Probation for good conduct, instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. In several states, there were no separate probation laws and even in the States where there were number of laws they were not adequate to meet the present requirements. Meanwhile, there was increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender as useful and self reliant member of society without subjecting him to the deleterious effects of jail life. It is in this background that Central law on the subject came into being which may be uniformly applicable to all the states. The object of the Act was further to admonish in respect of certain specific acts and to empower Courts to release them on probation if they are found to be less than 21 years of age. The sole object of the Act of 1958, appears to be an endeavour to reform a person who is not a juvenile but below age of 21 years, with regard to some offence so as not to send him to jail where he may mix with hardened criminals and become menace to the society. The object of the Act, does not reflect rehabilitation of an offender.
19. Having seen different objects of the two Acts i.e. 1958 and 2000, it is now time to see if there is any material difference between Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Act of 19 of 2000. Same read thus:
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 reads thus, 12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence.
Section 19 of the Act of 2000, reads thus :
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of this Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.
(2) The Board shall make an order directing that the relevant records of such conviction shall be removed after the expiry of the period of appeal or a reasonable period as prescribed under the rules, as the case may be.
Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and Section 19 (1) of the Act of 2000 do appear to be pari materia. There is, however, substantial difference between the two. There is no sub-section (2) in the Act of 1958, like sub-section (2) of section 19 of Act of 2000. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 provides that record of conviction of a delinquent has to be removed after expiry of period of appeal or reasonable period as prescribed in the rules, as the case may be. Certainly, if the record of conviction has to be removed within the period of appeal or reasonable time, it would certainly mean that the conviction of a juvenile would not come in his way in securing a government job, as otherwise there was no question of removing the record as such.
20. In the context of the distinction between two Acts, the judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, have to be analyzed. In so far as judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) is concerned, it was not a case where Sushil Kumar may have been dealt with under the provisions of either of the two Acts mentioned above. It was a simple case where having successfully competed for the post of constable, the department on verification had found that he was involved in a case under sections 304, 324/34 read with section 324 of IPC, wherein even though he was acquitted, but the concerned authorities had found him not a fit person to be appointed on the post of Constable. Honble Supreme Court observed that it is the conduct and character of a person seeking appointment to service, which is relevant and not the result of a criminal case.
As mentioned above, there was no discussion in this case with regard to the effect of provisions as contained in Section 12 of the Act of 1958 or Section 19 of the Act of 2000. In Harichand vs. Director of School Education (supra), it was indeed a case where, Harichand was removed from service on account of involvement in a case under section 408 of IPC, and even though sentenced, in first instance, he was given benefit of section 4 of the Act of 1958. In this case, however, Honble Supreme Court observed that Section 12 would apply only in respect of disqualification that goes with the conviction in the law which provides for the offence and its punishment. The plain meaning of word disqualification if any, would be attaching to conviction of an offence, under such law. Under the provisions of the Act of 1958, disqualification as interpreted by the Honble Supreme Court is attaching a conviction for an offence under law as made under the Act of 1958. The position is not so insofar as the Act of 2000 is concerned. There is no provision in the Act of 1958 which may suggest that conviction will not be a disqualification for securing a Government job, whereas under the Act of 2000, keeping in view the Objects and Reasons of the Act and sub-section (2) of Section 19 thereof, it has to be held that conviction would not debar a juvenile from securing a Government job. As mentioned above, one of the main objects of the Act of 2000 is to rehabilitate a juvenile in conflict with law and reduce the stigma of conviction. Further, sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the said Act would clinch the issue beyond any pale of controversy. We are of the considered opinion that if the record of conviction of juvenile has to be removed, and that too within the period of limitation or within a reasonable time which shall not be more than six months to a year, after his conviction the same could be only with the object that the conviction of a delinquent would not come in his way in securing a government job. Any other interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of the Act of 2000 would not only run counter to the Object and Reasons of Act of 2000 but also plain and simple interpretation of sub section 2 of Section 19 of Act of 2000. The judicial precedents relied upon by Mr. Luthra, referred to above, are distinguishable and would not apply to a case of the juvenile, who has been dealt with under the provisions of the Act of 2000. Insofar as the judgment of this Tribunal in Naresh Kumar Meena (supra) is concerned, it adopts similar reasons as given by the two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as mentioned above.
21. Before we may part with this order, we would like to mention that the nation and the society owe a duty to rehabilitate those who might have fallen on bad ways at some weak moment of their lives. If reformed, the stigma of conviction, particularly when it may be for an offence which is petty, should not continue unabated for the rest of the life of a person. It is not unknown that when reformed, either because of reformatory measures that may be taken or when ones own conscious may guide one to completely change his ways, some people not only follow the ordinary guidelines or principles as settled by the society, but become totally pious and excel in all walks of life. It would be a travesty of justice if the law and the society may not give any chance to such people to come into main stream and contribute in advancement of the nation. We are, in the present case, however, concerned only with those to whom the law consciously would like to rehabilitate. We are of the considered view that the Objects and Reasons of the Act of 2000 read with Section 19 thereof would clearly suggest the intention of the Legislature in not debarring a juvenile for securing a Government job for the rest of his life. We may only further mention that in the present case, the applicant was involved in three petty cases of theft twelve years prior when he was selected on the post of constable and was given in supervision to his father. It would be too iniquitous and unjust not to rehabilitate a juvenile who was of tender years at the time of the crime and may not be himself knowing what he was doing was wrong.
22. For the reasons as mentioned above, we quash the order, Annexure A-1 dated 6.12.2006 cancelling the candidature of the applicant and in consequence thereof direct the respondents to consider appointing him on the post of Constable, which has been kept vacant on the dint of the orders passed by the Honble High Court, as continued by this Tribunal till date. In the facts and circumstances of the case, costs of the litigation are made easy.
9. As such, in all fours, the claim of the applicant herein is covered by the above ratio. Resultantly, the OA is allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Respondents are directed to consider appointing the applicant on the post of Constable (Executive) with all consequences in law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.
14. Lastly, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Commr. Of Police & Ors. Vs. Sandeep Kumar (Civil Appeal No. 1430 of 2007). In the said case also, the respondent Sandeep Kumar applied for the post of Head Constable (Ministerial) in the year 1999. In the application form against Column No. 12 (a) which says Have you ever been arrested, prosecuted, kept under detention or bound down/fined, convicted by a court of law for any offence debarred/disqualified by any Public Service Commission from appearing at its examination/selection or debarred from any Examination, rusticated by any university or any other education authority/Institution, he gave the answer `No. As in the present case, the candidature of the respondent Sandeep Kumar was cancelled for concealment of facts. However, the Apex Court considered the fact that the incident in the said case happened when the respondent was about 20 years of age and at that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be condoned. The relevant part of the said order is as under:
We respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court that the cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but we wish to give our own opinion in the matter.
When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young people often commit indiscretions, and such indiscretions can often be condoned. After all, youth will be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as older people.
Hence, our approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives.
15. The respondents have filed their reply reiterating their position in the impugned show cause notice as well as the order of cancellation of the candidature of the applicant. Their contention is that when the applicant has concealed the material information in spite of the warning given in the application form as well as in the attestation form. The learned counsel Shri B.N.P Pathak appearing on behalf of the respondents has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav (2003 SCC (L&S) 306. According to the said judgment, an employee (probationer) is required to give his personal data in an attestation form in connection with his appointment (either at the time of or thereafter), if it is found that the employee had suppressed or given false information in regard to matters which had a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated from service during the period of probation without holding any inquiry. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:
11. It is not in dispute that a criminal case registered under Sections 323, 341, 294, 506-B read with Section 34 IPC was pending on the date when the respondent filled the attestation form. Hence, the information given by the respondent as against column nos. 12 and 13 as "No" is plainly suppression of material information and it is also a false statement. Admittedly, the respondent is holder of B.A., B.Ed, and M.Ed, degrees. Assuming even his medium of instruction was Hindi throughout, no prudent man can accept that he did not study English language at all at any stage of his education. It is also not the case of the respondent that he did not study English at all. if he could understand column nos. 1-11 correctly in the same attestation form, it is difficult to accept his version that he could not correctly understand the contents of column nos. 12 and 13. Even otherwise, if he could not correctly understand certain English words, in the ordinary course he could have certainly taken help of somebody. This being the position, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the contention of the respondent and the High Court committed a manifest error in accepting the contention that because the medium of instruction of respondent was Hindi, he could not understand the contents of column nos. 12 and 13. It is not the case that column nos. 12 and 13 are left blank. The respondent could not have said "no" as against column Nos. 12 and 13 without understanding the contents. Subsequent withdrawal of criminal case registered against the respondent or the nature of offences, in our opinion, were not material. The requirement of filling column Nos. 12 and 13 of the attestation form was for the purpose of verification of character and antecedents of the respondent as on the date of filing and attestation of the form. Suppression of material information and making a false statement has a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the respondent in relation to his continuance in service.
12. The object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot-claim right to continue in service. The employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence or the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has failed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the offences, in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature. In the present case the respondent was to serve as a Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. The character, conduct and antecedent of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age. The appellants having considered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. The Tribunal after due consideration rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the appellants. The high Court was clearly in error in upsetting the order of the Tribunal. The High Court was again not right in taking note of the withdrawal of the case by the State Government and that the case was not of a serious nature to set aside the order of the Tribunal on that ground as well. The respondent accepted the offer of appointment subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein with his eyes wide open. Para 9 of the said memorandum extracted above in clear terms kept the respondent informed that the suppression of any information may lead to dismissal from service. In the attestation form, the respondent has certified that the information given by him is correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief; if he could not understand the contents of column Nos. 12 and 13, he could not certify so. Having certified that the information given by him is correct and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of termination of services clearly shows that there has been due consideration of various aspects. In this view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 9 of the memorandum, the termination of service was not automatic, cannot be accepted.
13. The High Court in passing the impugned order took support of the judgment of this Court in Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda vs. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal and another [(1999) 2 SCC 247], The very judgment specifically stated, thus:- "We make it clear that this order of ours is rendered on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned earlier and will not be treated as a precedent in future."
14. It is unfortunate that the High Court treated the said judgment as a precedent despite this Court's saying that it will not be treated as a precedent in future, while confining the said judgment to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
15. In view of what is stated above and taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court may not disturb the impugned order exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
16. In our considered view, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the order passed by the Tribunal is restored. No costs. Appeal allowed.
16. He has also relied upon the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in OA 3216/2010 decided on 25.03.2011- Jai Singh Vs. GNCT of Delhi & Anr. In the said case, the candidature of the applicant for the post of Constable (Executive) Male in Delhi Police was cancelled like the case of the applicant. The applicant therein also did not disclose the fact of his involvement in the criminal case in the relevant column of application form and attestation form. He was also acquitted by the Juvenile Court and sought protection under Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of Children Act, according to which, one cannot be held disqualified even after his clear acquittal. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Ratan Yadavs case (supra), the Tribunal dismissed the O.A. The relevant part of the said judgment is as as under:
15. Thus, in view of the law, as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Ratan Yadav (supra), the services of an employee can be terminated on ground of suppression of material information regarding verification of character and antecedents and nature of gravity of offence and ultimately result of the criminal case is not the relevant consideration. According to us, the matter is squarely covered by the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Ram Ratan Yadavs case (supra). Similar view was also taken by the Honble Apex Court in Sukhen Chandra Dass case (supra), which was a case where the services of the respondent before the Honble Apex Court were terminated under the CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 when factum of pendency of case came to the notice of the Department at the time of verification of character antecedents. It may be stated that Sukhen Chandra Das furnished wrong information in the form relating to verification of character and antecedents, despite warning given in the form itself that wrong information would result in termination of service. The respondent therein filed a writ petition before the learned Single Judge, who vide order dated 1.8.2001 held that the order of termination of the respondent was passed on alleged misconduct and the same could not be treated as an order simpliciter covered by the CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. The learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition of the respondent, however, reserved liberty to the appellants to initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent for alleged misconduct. The writ petition filed before the Division Bench against the order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed. As such, the matter was carried to the Honble Apex Court and the Apex Court relying upon the clause 1.12 (a) of Central Reserve Police Force Recruitment Manual, 1975 as well as sub-para (d) of the said Manual, 1975, which prescribed, if a person is adversely reported upon in the attestation form by the local authorities, his services will be terminated by giving him one months notice or one months pay in lieu thereof under CRPF Rule 16 read with Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965, held that services of such employee could have been terminated as per the provisions contained under CRPF Rule 16 read Rule 5 of the CCS (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965 even without issuing the show cause notice.
16. We may also notice another decision of the Honble Apex Court in Delhi Administration through its Chief Secretary & others v. Sushil Kumar, 1997 SCC (L&S) 492, although it is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case, as the candidature of the applicant herein has been cancelled on account of suppression of material information and making false statement in the application form as well as in the attestation form. The Honble Apex Court in the said case has held that the discharge of acquittal of a person under criminal offence has nothing to do with denial of appointment to him on the ground of undesirability based upon the antecedents of candidates. That was not a case of suppression of material information and making false statement in the application/attestation form but was a case where the appointment was denied to the respondent before the Honble Apex Court on account of his antecedents record where he was involved in a criminal case but acquitted by the competent court. That was a case where the respondent appeared for recruitment as a Constable in Delhi Police Services in the year 1989-90. Though he was found physically fit through endurance test, written test and interview and was selected provisionally, his selection was subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. Feeling aggrieved, he filed OA in the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The Honble Apex Court held that though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focused this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the service.
17. Thus, viewing the matter from the law laid down by the Honble Apex Court, we are of the view that the applicant has not made out any case for our interference. The OA is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.
17. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the entire documents available on record. The FIR No. 96/2006 u/s 143/341/323 IPC was filed against the applicant in the year 2006. Admittedly, the applicant has filled up the application form as well as the attestation form on 12.03.2009 and 07.09.2009 respectively without disclosing his involvement in the aforesaid criminal case. He was later on acquitted in the aforesaid criminal case on 25.11.2009 by the Juvenile Justice Board, Jaipur. Similar situations have been considered by the co-ordinate Benches of this Tribunal in Satya Narayan Meenas case (supra) and Pradeep Kumars case (supra). Again the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra) is also an apt one. The candidature of the respondent Sandeep Kumar was also cancelled for concealment of the facts about his involvement in the criminal case under Section 325/34 IPC. It was compromised and thereafter he was acquitted. Considering the fact that the respondent therein was only 20 years of age at the time of occurrence of the incident and considering the fact that such indiscretions are characteristics of youth and also the approach in such cases should be to condone the minor indiscretions rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives, the Apex Court directed the Delhi Police to take back him in service.
18. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this O.A. Consequently, the impugned Annexure A-2 letter dated 21.10.2010 is quashed and set aside. The respondents shall forthwith appoint the applicant as Constable (Exe.) with all consequential benefits except back wages. There shall be no order as to costs.
( A.K. Jain) ( G. George Paracken ) Member (A) Member (J) SRD