Madras High Court
K.Gopalsamy Chetty vs Selliamman Koil Co-Operative House ... on 25 January, 2019
Author: N.Seshasayee
Bench: N.Seshasayee
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Judgment Reserved on : 22.11.2018
Judgment Pronounced on : 25.01.2019
CORAM: THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE N.SESHASAYEE
A.S.No.266 of 2007
1.K.Gopalsamy Chetty
2.K.Kothandaraman (Deceased)
3.K.Veeraraghavan
4.K.Kesavalu (Deceased)
5.Ranganayaki Ammal
6.K.Mohana
7.K.Ravichandran
8.K.Lakshmi
9.K.Lakshmana
10.K.Vittabai
11.K.Rohini Devi
12.K.Jayanthi Bai
13.K.Lokesh
14.K.Vijaya Baskar` ... Appellants
[Appellants 5 to 9 are brought on record as LRs of deceased
2nd appellant Vide order of Court dated 23.11.2015 in MP.No.4/2015]
[Appellants 10 to 14 are brought on record as LRs of deceased
4th appellant Vide order of Court dated 23.11.2015 in MP.No.5/2015]
Vs
1.Selliamman Koil Co-operative House Site
Society Limited X.N.C.722
Having its office at No.80,
Thanthai Periyar Nagar, Ayanavaram
Chennai – 600 023.
Rep by its Vice President (Incharge-Secretary),
Thiru.J.Sampath
2.Thanthai Periyar Nagar Welfare Association
Rep. by its Secretary Mr.S.G.Parameswaran
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
3.Rani Real Estate Agencies
Rep. by its Prop. K.Deivasagayam
S/o.Koilnadar,
Having Office at : No.2/11, Main Road
United India Nagar
Kodambakkam
Chennai – 600 024. ... Respondents
[Respondent 2 impleaded as party respondent Vide order
of this Court dated 18.12.2017 made in CMP.No.21358/2017
in A.S.No.266 of 2007
[Respondent 3 are given up]
Prayer :- Appeal Suit filed under Section 96 of CPC, against the judgment and
decree made in O.S.No.13877/1996 dated 16.10.2006 passed by the learned
Additional District Judge, Chennai, Fast Track Court-II.
For Appellants : Mr.D.Rajasekar
For Respondents : Mr.Badrinath [ R1]
Mr.M.Prabaharan & Mr.V.Raj [R2]
R3 – Given up
JUDGMENT
The defendants 1 to 4 in a suit laid for specific performance have come forward with this appeal challenging the decree passed therein. During the pendency of this appeal, defendants 2 and 4 have died, consequent to which, their respective legal representatives were brought on record as respondents 5 to 14.
http://www.judis.nic.in 3 The Pleadings:
2. The material facts on which the first plaintiff has found the cause for its action are:
● The plaintiff is a Co-operative House Site Society registered under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. The plaintiff- society has a membership over 1500. To fulfill the object of the Society and to enable its members to have their own house-sites, the plaintiff intended to purchase the property of the defendants, measuring fractionally over 117 grounds in T.S.No.54 (part) and 62 of Block No.11 of Ayanavaram Vaillage, Madras.
● Be that as it may, on 21.5.1975, the defendants 1 to 4 had entered into a sale agreement with the fifth defendant for sale to it or to its nominees for a total consideration of Rs.7,61,453/-, @ Rs.6,500/- per ground. The fifth defendant had paid a sum of Rs.5000/- towards advance on the very date of the said agreement. Defendants 1 to 4 delivered vacant possession of the property to the fifth defendant in part performance of the said contract. On taking possession, the fifth defendant cleared the entire area of the trees and bushes. ● In this background, on 19.6.1978, defendants 1 to 4 as the first party, the 5th defendant as the second party and the plaintiff as the third party had entered into a tripartite agreement, whereby the plaintiff had agreed to buy the said property for a total consideration of Rs.9 lakhs. http://www.judis.nic.in 4 The plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.1,000/- to defendants 1 to 4 and Rs.5,000/- to the fifth defendant towards the advance amount that it had earlier paid to the other defendants. The defendants 1 to 4 agreed to receive a sum of Rs.7,50,453/- directly from the plaintiff. The fifth defendant had agreed to receive Rs.1,44,547/- from the plaintiff. The balance Rs.6,000/- represents the interest.
● The aforesaid agreement dated 19-06-1978 was executed when the Tamil Land Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as “ULC Act”), had come into force, which prohibited alienation of any land beyond the ceiling area prescribed in the said Act. Therefore, it was agreed to between the parties to the agreement dated 19-06-1978 that the sale transaction would be completed within a year from the date of obtaining exemptions/clearance of the suit property, under the ULC Act.
● So far as the payment due to the fifth defendant under agreement of sale is concerned, it has been fully paid, and the plaintiff obtained possession of the property too. On its part, plaintiff invested Rs.2,14,314/- for improving the land and engaged a contractor for the purpose. It had incurred an additional amount of Rs.77,032.10 for the said purpose. The plaintiffs divided the property into various plots and allotted the same to its members for consideration. Most of them have put up their independent residential building.
http://www.judis.nic.in 5 ● Be that as it may, defendants 1 to 4 have filed O.S.No.5247 of 1981 before the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras for a decree of permanent injunction, seeking to restrain the plaintiff and the fifth defendant from dealing with the suit properties prejudicial to their interest. They averred in the suit that the Government of Tamil Nadu, Vide its proceedings dated 26.06.1980 had declined to grant exemptions of land from the provisions of ULC Act.
● But the plaintiffs, on their part too have been representing to the Government, the competent Authority under the Act to obtain an exemption. Their efforts brought favourable results with the Competent Authority declaring Vide its order dated 06.4.1985 that the property involved did not attract the provisions of the ULC Act. Right through, the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but the entire delay in performance had occasioned owing to the issue involving exemption of the property from the ULC Act. While things stood thus, shortly prior to the plaintiff's obtaining an exemption of the property from ULC Act from the Competent Authority on 06.4.1985, the defendants 1 to 4 had issued a legal notice dated 31.10.1984 informing the plaintiff that they had rescinded the contract, owing to impossibility of performance, in view of the Competent Authority declining to exempt the land under ULC Act. It was aptly replied to by the plaintiff Vide their reply dated 03.1.1985. It was only http://www.judis.nic.in 6 subsequently the order dated 06.4.1985 was passed by the Competent Authority as referred to above. This has now created a situation where the contract has become capable of being performed. Hence, the suit is laid.
3.1 In their written statement, the defendants 1 to 4 have contended that to seek specific performance, some seven years after the date of sale agreement is inequitable, since the price of the property had gone up between 1978 and 1985. In the agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff, certain specific clauses were included solely to serve the interest of the plaintiff, ignoring the interest of the defendants. The very clause 8 in the agreement which stipulates one year time for the performance of the contract from the date of obtaining exemption from the Competent Authority under ULC itself is bad in law as it is rooted in uncertainty. Further, the suit property is a joint family assets in the hands of these defendants in which all the children in the male line are entitled to share. There never existed a legal necessity for the joint family to sell the property.
3.2 So far as the executability of the agreement goes, it became incapable of performance, the moment the Government declined exemptions to these defendants Vide its order dated 26.9.1980. The agreement having become inexecutable and was barred by limitation beyond 1983, and hence it is not now open to the plaintiff to rely upon a subsequent order dated 06.4.1985 to maintain the suit. This apart, even Vide its notice dated 31.10.1984, these http://www.judis.nic.in 7 defendants have cancelled the sale deed. The suit is also barred on the grounds of latches and at any rate, the specific performance of the contract cannot be decreed as effecting the shares of the minors. 4.1 For the plaintiff, its Vice President was exmained as P.W.1, whereas the second defendant examined himself as D.W.1. The agreement on which the plaintiff has rested its cause of action was marked as Ext.A1. The copy of the proceedings of the Competent Authority dated 06.4.1985 was marked as Verify Ext.A15. P.W.1 has marked Ext.A1 to Ext.A15, Ext.B1 to B5 and the second defendant D.W.1 has marked Exts.B6, B7, Exts.A16 to Ext.A18. 4.2 On appreciating the evidence the trial Court has decreed the suit.
Aggrieved by which, the defendants came forward to filed this appeal.
5. The points for consideration are:
1. Is Ext.A-1 sale agreement invalid and void ab initio for violating the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Ceiling Act
2. Whether Ext.A-1 sale agreement is capable of being enforced?
3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
4. Whether plaintiffs deserve to be shown discretion for specific enforcement of Ext.A-1 agreement.
6. The counsel for the appellants raised only two points in his arguments:
● Ext.A-1 agreement was executed in contravention of Sec.6 of the Tamil http://www.judis.nic.in 8 Nadu Urban (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978, and in P. Gopirathinam & others Vs Ferrodous Estate (P) Ltd., [1999(II) CTC 181 (FB)], following a few earlier judgements of the Division Bench of this Court, a Full Bench of this Court has held that even though Sec.6 of the Act on the face of it prohibits only transfer of land beyond the ceiling limit, still it will include an agreement of sale, and consequently Ext.A-1 inasmuch as it contravenes the bar under Sec.6 of the Act, is void and hence is incapable of being performed. While it is true, under Ext.A-15, dated 06-04-1985, an exemption under the ULC Act was granted to the plaintiffs, yet it came to be reversed by the Appellate Authority Vide Ext.B3 dated 05-12-1988 on the ground that the authority who had passed Ext.A-15 order was not competent to pass the same, and remanded the matter back to him. This is admitted by P.W.1. In effect the exemption required to be obtained under the ULC Act is not obtained. And, the fact that during the pendency of the suit, the ULC Act itself has been since repealed T.N.Act 20/1999 will not impact the invalidity of the Ext.A-1 agreement as per the ratio in Raptamkos Brett and Company (P) Ltd., Vs Modi Business Centre (P) Ltd., [2006 (2) CTC 799].
● As per the proceedings dated 26.06.1980, Government has declined to grant exemption of the suit property following which the appellants had issued Ext.A-11 notice rescinding the contract, and since the suit is laid beyond three years after the one year period stipulated in clause 8 of http://www.judis.nic.in 9 the contract, the suit is barred by limitation. Secondly, the conduct of the plaintiffs is such that they are not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance of the contract and the hardship that would visit the defendants would be more as the rate at which agreement was entered into in 1978 cannot be equated to that which prevail when the suit is laid.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents would argue that at no time was there any intention to contravene any of the provisions of the Act, and this is evident from Clause 8 of Ext.A-1 contract under which time is stipulated for performance of the contract only after obtaining exemption of the property contracted to be sold as per Ext.A-1 in terms of the Act. This sanction was obtained by the respondents as per Ext.A-15 dated 06-04-1985. Therefore, the contract is capable of performance. Secondly, Urban Land Ceiling Act itself has been repealed on 16-06-1999, and there no longer exists a statutory cloud in enforcing Ext.A-1 contract. The suit is originally laid before the Original side of this Court as C.S.286 of 1985, and it was during the pendency of this suit, under Ext.B-3 the proceedings under Ext.A-15 was set aside, but the fact remains that when the suit was finally decreed on 16-10-2006, the ULC Act itself came to be repealed. It might be true that Ext.A-15 proceedings were set aside under Ext.B-3 proceedings of the special Commissioner (Land Administration), but the matter was only remanded back to the authority for a fresh consideration by the authority competent to decide it since the authority who passed Ext.A-15 order was found not have http://www.judis.nic.in 10 competency. Here there is no case for the defendants/appellants that after remand the prayer of the plaintiffs seeking exemption under the ULC Act had been rejected. There is hardly any delay in filing the suit, since the same was instituted almost immediately after the proceedings in Ext.A-15 was passed. Of discussion & Decision:
8.1 Two facts stand out:
(a) When a tri-parte agreement for sale in Ext.A-1 was executed on 19.06.1978, the Urban Land Ceiling Act was in force, and the parties knew that the property to be transferred in terms of the said contract was in excess of the ceiling limit, the transfer of which Sec.6 prohibits.;
(b) The agreement Vide Clause 8 thereof provides that “the entire transaction shall be completed within the period of one year from the date of obtaining exemption in respect of this land from the Urban Land Ceiling Regulation Act,” and this brings into focus that the parties to Ext.A-1 did not share an intent to violate the Act, but to postpone the performance of the contract till the exemption under the Act is obtained. And, the time for performance in terms of clause 8 is to commence only on obtaining the exemption.
8.2 Here it is required to be stated with a degree of emphasis that the parties have chosen not to fix any time limit within which they ought to obtain the exemption under Sec.21 of the Act. Though Ext.A-1 is a triparte agreement, http://www.judis.nic.in 11 once the 5th defendant was paid what was promised it became a bilateral contract and its true import needs to be understood the way parties intend it to be understood.
9.1 Is the Ext.A-1 agreement void, notwithstanding the fact that the very ULC Act for whose violation the defendants/appellants now cry foul of the agreement, has come to be repealed? This now invites a consideration in the context of Sec. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978. It reads:
6. Transfer of vacant land : No person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land, or part thereof, by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under section 7 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub-section (1) of section 11; and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void.
9.2 What Section 6 prohibits is actual transfer, by which right vested in one is transferred and gets vested in another. An agreement to sell a property though does not convey any right over the property, yet where it is sought to be performed, or enforced, it would instantly gate crash into the very zone which Sec.6 expressly prohibits. If any such agreement for sale whose performance would violate Sec.6 of the ULC Act, is to be enforced through Court of law, then it will have the effect of achieving that which the statute prohibits. After all, what cannot be transferred inter vivos between the parties http://www.judis.nic.in 12 cannot be achieved through the mechanism of the decree of the Court. In other words, Court will not compel the performance of a contract which the parties themselves cannot perform. It is in this context, the Full Bench of this Court in P. Gopirathinam & others Vs Ferrodous Estate (P) Ltd., [1999(II) CTC 181 (FB)], has held that in the context of a suit for specific performance, an agreement of sale too will fall within the prohibitory ambit of sec.6 of the Act, meaning thereby, an agreement whose performance is certain to violate Sec.6 cannot be enforced, and will fall within the meaning of Sec.6 of the Act.
10. The facts on hand are vastly different. The Act, in Sec.21 has vested the State Government with the power to exempt the lands in excess of the ceiling limit and to keep the same outside its purview. Sec.21(a), which is relevant in the context reads:
21. Power to exempt – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, -
(a) Where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, the State Government may, by order, exempt [whether prospectively or retrospectively and] subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter;
http://www.judis.nic.in 13 Here the parties do not intend to violate the statute, but have declared their intention to sail with the statute, and to make their performance of respective contractual obligations subject to the contingency of they obtaining exemption under Sec.21. This contract is therefore, a contingent contract, within the meaning of Sec.31 of the Contract Act, which reads:
Sec.31. “Contingent contract” defined – A 'contingent contract' is a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen. Since, Ext.A-1 does not intend to violate Sec.6, it cannot be termed that it is per se void, but is valid as its performance is made contingent upon obtaining the exemption under Sec.21 of the Urban land Ceiling Act. If however, the exemption is not obtained or denied, and the same has become final, then the contract becomes incapable of performance. This amounts to frustration of contract and would become void under Sec.56 of the Contract Act. There is a world of difference between the parties who ignore a statutory bar forbidding a certain classes of contracts and still enter it, and the parties who play along the statute and act with a sense of responsibility and respect for the statute. While the law does not tolerate the former, as that class of forbidden contract will instantaneously fall within the mischief of Sec.23 of the Contract Act, the latter is generally accommodated, more so when the statute itself provides a window to perform that which it prohibits.
http://www.judis.nic.in 14 11.1 Accordingly, if there was no Clause 8 in Ext.A-1 agreement, or if there is no Sec.21 in the ULC Act providing for power of exemption, necessarily this agreement would be hit by Sec.6 as per the law declared in P. Gopirathinam & others Vs Ferrodous Estate (P) Ltd., [1999(II) CTC 181 (FB)]. But not in the instant case, where the parties have adopted a method to seek an exemption at the first instance to make the contract performable. 11.2 This Court notices that the facts of the present case share a greater similarity to the one before a Division Bench this court in N. Shanmugham Vs Rathinam & others [2003-2-LW 314] than the one in Raptamkos Brett and Company (P) Ltd., Vs Modi Business centre (P) Ltd., [2006 (2) CTC 799]. The agreement involved in Shanmugham's case contained a term similar to the one which this Court witnesses which provided that the vendor under the agreement should obtain necessary sanction under Sec.21 of the ULC Act in order the agreement could be performed. The vendor applied for exempting the land belatedly, and this was returned by the competent authority requiring the applicant-vendor to comply with certain other formalities. But in the meantime the ULC Act itself came to be repealed.
Distinguishing the Full Bench decision of this Court in P. Gopirathinam & others Vs Ferrodous Estate (P) Ltd., [1999(II) CTC 181 (FB)], the Court held that the scheme of the ULC Act does not impose a total bar on transfer of lands and that the parties before it did not attempt to violate it, and even as the request for obtaining exemption was pending the ULC Act itself came to be repealed as a result of which the whole proceedings stood abated. http://www.judis.nic.in 15 11.3 The Raptamkos Brett case [2006 (2) CTC 799] which the appellants rely on, was set to an entirely different facts-situation. That was a case where the parties have consciously entered into an oral agreement of sale of the lands in excess of ceiling limit. An attempt appears to have been made to seek exemption and the Government Order that came to be passed kept the lands in question outside the ULC Act. The plaintiff/the purchaser under the agreement would claim that he was given possession of the property in question and would first institute a suit for injunction, and then would file a suit for specific performance. In the specific performance suit, the defendant had taken out an application for rejection of the plaint on the ground the suit was laid in violation of Order II Rule 2 CPC. This application was allowed. While reasoning its conclusion, the learned single Judge of this Court had incidentally touched upon the effect of the Repeal Act on the agreement said to have been made between the parties, and has held that the agreement was void on the date when it was made, no matter that the ULC Act was subsequently repealed. Critically the Order on its face did not seem to have considered how the facts of the case before it was different from the one in Shanmugham case [2003(2) LW 314(DB)]. As has been pointed earlier this Courts finds factual similarity between the one in the Shanmugham case with the one now before it, and prefers to apply the Division Bench authority in the Shanmugham case, and accordingly holds that Ext.A-1 agreement is valid and capable of being enforced, provided however, it does not become incapable of performance.
http://www.judis.nic.in 16 12.1 What now stands in the way is the effect of Ext.B-3 proceedings which set aside the Ext.A-15 proceedings by which exemption was earlier granted under Section 21 of the Act and the request for exemption was remanded to the Competent Authority to decide. This implies the request for seeking exemption under Sec.21 of the Act continues to be pending. And whether the contract is capable of being performed or gets frustrated depends upon the outcome of decision to be made on this request.
12.2 The judgment in this suit was delivered by the trial Court (to which the suit was later transferred due to amendment to the pecuniary jurisdiction) on 16-10-2006. Now, there is no case for the defendants/appellant that subsequent to the remand made by Ext.B-3, and before the repeal of the ULC Act in 1999, the Competent Authority had rejected the plaintiff's request for exemption. P.W.1 was examined in chief on 15-04-2004, and was cross examined on 07-12-2004 and thereafter on 14-12-2004, 21-07-2006 and finally on 24-08-2006. Nowhere have the defendants even suggested to P.W.1 that the first plaintiff's request to obtain exemption of the suit property under Sec.21 of Act had been rejected before the repeal of the Act. Nor, D.W.1, the only witness to have been examined for the defendants speaks to this fact. This in other words would mean that both the parties proceed on the premise that the request for exemption sought was pending. And, as in Shanmugham's case under the Repealing Act, the very request was abated. http://www.judis.nic.in 17 12.3 Given the fact that Ext.A-1 does not stipulate the time within which the exemption under Sec.21 of the ULC Act must be obtained, and given the fact that during the pendency of the suit the exemption earlier granted under ExtA- 15 dated 06-04-1985, (which provided the critical fact necessary to constitute the cause of action for the suit, and but for which the suit could not have been laid except as one instituted prematurely) had been cancelled Vide ExtB-3 in 1988, the defendant had an opportunity to non suit the plaintiff by resorting to Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, but the suit was allowed to stay alive. One pendete lite development was thus allowed to pass without any consequence on the suit. Then came the T.N.Act 20/1999 repealing the ULC Act. The situation is that a suit which was instituted on the premise that Ext.A-15 was valid, but lost its foundation midway through its pendency, has again acquired legitimacy for its continued stay in the docket due to subsequent statutory developments (which T.N.Act 20/2009 signifies). This Courts cannot be oblivious to the legislative developments and change of law, and administer the same when the conditions warranting its operation itself has been legislatively changed.
13. The only point now required to be addressed is that when in terms of the ULC Act, the lands in ceiling limit would vest in the Government, whether defendants have control over the land for them to execute the sale deed. There is no evidence that the excess lands have actually vested in the Government under Sec.11(3) of the ULC Act. And possession too has not been taken by the Government, since it is an admitted fact on both sides that http://www.judis.nic.in 18 the first plaintiff Co-operative society has formed a layout, allotted all the plots to about its 1,500 strong members, that all these allottees have constructed their houses and have formed their residential Association (the 2nd plaintiff). When several houses had come up in the entire suit property, it stands as an obvious testimony that the Govt. has not taken possession of the excess lands. When this court finds that there has been no violation of any of the statutory provision, it sees no reason to hold that the agreement is not specifically enforceable.
14. Still the relief is discretionary. Should the Court grant it in favour of the plaintiff? One of the resistance to specific performance is founded solely on the validity of Ext.A-1 agreement and not based on any adverse conduct of the plaintiff. And when an all new colony of houses has developed in the suit property which now stands firm for over couple of decades, to deny specific performance would affect the rights of several house owners seriously.
15. Here the defendants accuses the plaintiff of latches. When according to the defendants their efforts to obtain exemption under Sec.21 of the ULC Act was met with failure on 26.06.1980, still they showed no anxiety to terminate the contract immediately, but issued a notice terminating the contract on the grounds of impossibility of performance only Vide Ext.A-11 notice dated 31-10-1984. In Ext.A-12 reply, the plaintiff had clarified that after the rejection of defendants' request for exemption, they had requested the plaintiff to make an attempt to obtain the exemption. This fact proves to be http://www.judis.nic.in 19 true by the nature of events that have followed. Where then is the latches? Factually none.
16. Having stated thus, in an agreement executed in 1978, and in a suit that laid only in 1985, whose sustainability itself was in a state of oscillation till the ULC Act was repealed Vide TN Act 20/1999, to pin down the performance of the contract to the consideration agreed under a four decade old Agreement appears inequitable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zarina Siddique Vs. A.Ramalingam [(2015) 1 SCC 705]; Laxman Tatyaba Kankate Vs.Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak [(2010) 7 SCC 717]; Viswanath Sharma Vs. Shyam Shadkar Goela [(2007) 10 SCC 595]; Faquir Chaad Vs. Sudesh Kumari [(2006) 12 SCC 146]; S.Santha Vs. T.Sadasivam and 5 others [(2010) 3 MLJ 1189] has shown the way to balance any inequity that might arise due to the inadequacy of the consideration in the face of delay and change of circumstances by directing the purchasers under the agreement to pay additional consideration at the rate that it fixed. During the hearing the plaintiffs have offered to pay an additional Rs.400/- per sq.feet over and above the sale consideration agreed upon in Ext.A-1. Applying this to 117 grounds and 0352 sq.feet, or 2,81,152 sq.feet, the total additional amount payable is (2,81,152 sq.ft X Rs.400) Rs. 11,24,60,800/- and this would partake the character of balance sale consideration. A memo dated 28-11- 2018 too has been filed in the Court by the plaintiffs/respondents and the same is recorded. In arriving at this amount this court is conscious of the fact that roads have been formed within the property, which as per the plaintiffs http://www.judis.nic.in 20 Memo covers an extent of 67,716 sq.ft but this Court has decided to include this to the total area, as the formation of roads is internal to the affairs of the plaintiffs – in the manner they choose to enjoy the property The plaintiffs shall deposit the additional amount now determined before the trial Court within a period of six months from today.
17. In conclusion this appeal is disposed of with a modification that the decree of the trial court is modified to the extent of directing the plaintiffs to deposit additional amount of Rs.11,24,60,800/- before the trial court within a period of six months from today. As to the rest, the decree of the trial court shall stand confirmed. No costs.
25.01.2019 ds Index : Yes / No Internet : Yes / No To:
1.The Additional District Judge, Chennai, Fast Track Court-II.
2.The Section Officer, High Court, Madras.
http://www.judis.nic.in 21 N.SESHASAYEE.J., ds Pre-delivery Judgment in A.S.No.266 of 2007 25.01.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in