Punjab-Haryana High Court
Randhir Singh & Ors vs Phool Pati And Ors on 12 February, 2026
1 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
Court. The record of the trial Court, as available on the Document
Management System (DMS), has been duly perused.
3. Pleadings : A perusal of the pleadings reveals that the plain!ffs
had ini!ally ins!tuted a civil suit seeking a decree of permanent injunc!on so
as to restrain defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from aliena!ng the suit land situated
within the revenue estate of village Bhadaur, Tehsil and District Panipat, in
favour of the defendants or any other person. During the pendency of the
suit, the suit land was sold and leased out. Consequently, the plaint was
amended and addi!onal relief was claimed, seeking a declara!on to the
effect that the sale deed dated 27.11.1984 and the lease deed dated
29.05.1985, executed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of defendant Nos.
5, 6, and 8 to 15, are null, illegal and void.
4.1 According to the plain!ffs, they are co-sharers and co-owners of
the suit land measuring 38 kanal 11 marla, as detailed in the head-note of the
plaint. It was pleaded that their forefathers were the real owners of the suit
property, which had been given to one Phulla, the father-in-law of defendant
No. 1, in Dholi. The plain!ffs claimed that they have now become owners by
way of survivorship and that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were merely Dholidars
over the suit land. It was further pleaded that Zile Singh, the husband of
defendant No. 3, had expired and his three minor children were accordingly
impleaded as defendants.
4.2 It was alleged that during the pendency of the suit, defendant
No. 1 had illegally executed a lease deed dated 29.05.1985 in favour of
Sarupa and Nihala (defendant Nos. 5 and 6). It was further alleged that
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had also illegally executed a sale deed dated
27.11.1984 in favour of defendant Nos. 8 to 15 (now appellants). According
to the plain!ffs, both the said transac!ons were null, illegal and void and
were liable to be set aside.
5. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 contested the suit by pleading that Surja,
the husband of defendant No. 1, was the owner in possession of the suit
land, and prior thereto, Phulla, the father of Surja, was the owner in
Page 2 of 12
2 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
possession. It was claimed that Surja and Phulla might have been owners as
Dholidars. They admi7ed that Phulla was gi8ed a part of the suit land along
with possession. In the alterna!ve, they also set up a plea of ownership by
way of adverse possession.
6. The remaining defendants, including the subsequent purchasers,
also resisted the suit. Defendant Nos. 8 to 15 claimed that they were bona
fide purchasers for valuable considera!on, having purchased land measuring
07 kanal 17 marla vide sale deed dated 27.11.1984. They asserted that the
plain!ffs were neither owners nor co-owners of the suit land and denied that
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were Dholidars. On these premises, they prayed for
dismissal of the suit.
7. In the rejoinder, the plain!ffs reiterated the averments made in
the plaint and controverted the stand taken by the defendants.
8. On the basis of the pleadings of the par!es, the learned trial
Court framed the necessary issues. The par!es were afforded due
opportunity to lead their respec!ve evidence, which was duly considered by
the trial Court.
9. Findings of the Courts Below : On the material issues, the
learned trial Court returned categorical findings that the plain!ffs were co-
owners and co-sharers of the suit land; that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were
merely Dholidars thereof; and that defendant Nos. 1 to 3 had illegally
alienated the suit land. It was further held that the lease deed dated
29.05.1985 as well as the sale deed dated 27.11.1984 were null, illegal and
void ab ini o. Consequently, both instruments were set aside and, on the
basis of these findings, the suit was decreed.
10.1 Apprecia on of Evidence by the First Appellate Court :
Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, defendant Nos. 8 to 17 preferred
an appeal. While re-apprecia!ng the evidence on record, the First Appellate
Court observed that the principal controversy between the par!es was
whether the plain!ffs were the owners of the suit land, or whether
Page 3 of 12
3 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were Dholidars, who had acquired ownership rights
therein. Considering the pleadings of the par!es, it was rightly no!ced that
the subsequent defendants, being purchasers or lessees, derived their rights,
if any, only from defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Therefore, the determina!on of the
status of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was decisive.
10.2 Upon examina!on of the revenue record, it was found that
Sadhu Ram and Gopi Ram were recorded as owners of the suit land.
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, namely Smt. Chanderwa! and Smt. Omwa!, were
shown to be in possession on parts of the suit land as Dholidars and on some
parts as gair-maurusi. In the rent column, their possession was recorded as
gair-maurusi, with no rent being paid, indica!ng long possession. From these
entries, the Appellate Court concluded that while the plain!ffs were co-
sharers in the suit land, the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was only
that of Dholidars. The admission of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 that Surjan was in
possession of the suit land as owner and might have been a Dholidar was
treated as a clear admission of Dholi tenure. Such admission, coupled with
the revenue record, was held sufficient to establish the Dholidar status of
defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
10.3 The Appellate Court further observed that although some
por!on of the land was shown in possession of the defendants as gair-
maurusi, the defendants never claimed tenancy rights. Their possession,
therefore, was rightly presumed to be that of Dholidars on the basis of their
own admissions. Significantly, the defendants failed to lead any cogent
evidence to establish ownership by way of adverse possession. The witness
produced by them, namely Zile Singh, merely stated that the land was gair-
maurusi and did not depose that the defendants had acquired ownership by
adverse possession. Consequently, the statutory presump!on of correctness
a7ached to the revenue record remained unrebu7ed, as the onus to prove
the nature of possession lay squarely upon the defendants, which they
u7erly failed to discharge.
Page 4 of 12
4 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
10.4 The First Appellate Court also relied upon the tes!monies of
Sadhu Ram (plain!ff) and Ra! Ram (Sarpanch), which corroborated the
jamabandi entries for the year 1979-80 and established that the land had
been given in Dholi and that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were in possession only
as Dholidars. The statement of Zile Singh further supported the plain!ffs'
case, as he expressed ignorance about any transfer of ownership to Phulla by
the forefathers of the plain!ffs.
10.5 The sale deed dated 27.11.1984 (Ex. DW5/A) and the lease deed
dated 29.05.1986 (Ex. DW3/B) were also examined by the first appellate
court and it was found that in the lease deed, Smt. Chanderwa! herself
described her status as that of a Dholidar in respect of part of the land. These
admissions in the transac!onal documents were held to be clinching
evidence against the defendants.
10.6 On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the First Appellate Court
held that once it stood proved that the plain!ffs were owners of the suit land
and defendant Nos. 1 & 2 were only Dholidars, any sale or lease executed by
them was void ab ini o. Consequently, the subsequent purchasers or lessees
could not derive any valid right or protec!on on the plea of being bona fide
purchasers. Reliance was placed on Si al Das and Anr. v. Financial
Commissioner, Haryana and others, 1991(1) LJR 485, wherein it was held
that any sale, mortgage or other aliena!on of Dholi tenure is void ab ini o.
10.7 Addi!onally, since both the sale and lease in the present case
were executed during the pendency of the suit, they were also held to be hit
by the doctrine of lis pendens.
10.8 Accordingly, the learned First Appellate Court, vide judgment
dated 19.08.1999, affirmed all the findings recorded by the trial Court and
dismissed the appeal.
11. It is against the concurrent findings of the courts below that the
present second appeal has been filed by defendant Nos. 8 to 15, who had
Page 5 of 12
5 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
purchased land measuring 07 kanal 17 marla comprised in Rect. No. 29,
Khasra No. 14/1 (0-19) and Khasra No. 15/1 (6-18).
12.1 Submissions on Behalf of the Appellants-Defendants : Assailing
the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants-defendants N: 8 to 15 contended that the
Courts below have mis-appreciated the true legal character of Dholi tenure.
It was argued that Dholi is either (i) a grant or trust for religious purposes, or
(ii) a gi8 conferring absolute ownership. Learned senior counsel submi7ed
that if Dholi is construed as a grant or trust for religious purposes, the
Dholidar is merely a trustee and has no right to use or alienate the property
for purposes other than those for which the trust was created. In such an
eventuality, any devia!on from the religious purpose would result in
termina!on of the Dholi tenure, causing the property to revert to the original
owner. On the other hand, if Dholi is treated as a gi8, then upon acceptance,
the Dholidar becomes the absolute owner with full rights of aliena!on. In
support of this proposi!on, reliance was placed on Dharamvir v. Bahadur
Singh and another, reported as 2007(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 217.
12.2 It was further contended that in cases, where inalienability of
Dholi tenure is pleaded, the burden lies on the plain!ffs to plead and prove
the origin, nature and terms of the Dholi. In the absence of any evidence
regarding the crea!on or condi!ons of the Dholi, the findings regarding
inalienability could not be sustained. According to learned senior counsel, the
plain!ffs neither pleaded nor proved that the Dholi was created for any
religious purpose, nor that it was inalienable.
12.3 It was also argued that the finding of the Courts below that the
en!re suit land was Dholi land has not been challenged by the plain!ffs and
has, therefore, a7ained finality.
12.4 An addi!onal argument was raised on the strength of 'The
Haryana Dholidar, Bu mar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Ves ng of
Page 6 of 12
6 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::
RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010', contending that by virtue of the said
enactment, Phulla, the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos.1 to 4, had
become the absolute owner of the suit land. The cons!tu!onal validity of the
Act having been upheld by this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. State of
Haryana and others, 2024 (2) Law Herald 995, it was urged that the sale
deed and lease deed executed in favour of the appellants deserved to be
upheld.
12.5 With all these submissions, prayer is made for dismissal of the
suit by accep!ng this appeal and by seKng aside the judgments of the courts
below.
13.1 Submissions on Behalf of the Respondents-Plain ffs : Per
contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents-plain!ffs submi7ed at the outset that defendant Nos.1 and 2, who were consistently recorded as Dholidars in possession on part of the suit land, have not preferred any appeal. The present appeal has been filed only by defendant Nos.8 to 15, who are subsequent purchasers.
13.2 It is urged that the suit was ins!tuted on 18.07.1984 and that both the sale deed dated 27.11.1984 in favour of defendant Nos.8 to 15 and the lease deed dated 29.05.1985 in favour of defendant Nos.5 and 6 were executed during the pendency of the suit. The appellants were, therefore, lis pendens transferees and could not claim any independent or superior rights.
13.3 Learned senior counsel further submi7ed that the concern of the appellants is confined only to two khasra numbers, namely Khasra Nos. 15/1 and 14/1 of Rect. No.29, which were purchased during the pendency of the suit. A7en!on was drawn to the revenue record showing that on these khasra numbers, defendant Nos.1 and 2 were recorded merely as gair- maurusi, without payment of rent. It was further submi7ed that four other khasra numbers forming part of the suit land were specifically recorded as Dholi, with a clear s!pula!on that the Dholi was Bawajah Punarth, i.e. for religious purposes.
Page 7 of 12 7 of 12 ::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 ::: RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601 13.4 It was emphasised that the defendants themselves, in their
pleadings, had denied that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were Dholidars. Having taken such a stand, the appellants could not now be permi7ed to turn around and assert Dholidar rights to sustain the aliena!ons. Reliance was also placed upon the tes!monies of DW-1 Zile Singh, DW-2 Jug Lal, DW-3 Seva Singh and DW-6 Ranbir Singh, all of whom stated that the land was gair- maurusi and not Dholi. It was contended that once such a stand was taken, the burden lay squarely on the appellants to establish how valid !tle passed to them from persons, who were neither owners nor had any alienable interest.
13.5 Learned senior counsel for the respondents fairly did not dispute the legal proposi!on laid down in Dharamvir v. Bahadur Singh (supra), as reiterated in Durga Das alias Dawarka Dass Chela v. Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar and Ors. 2012 (2) PLR 394, that when Dholidar rights are claimed on the basis of inheritance, the terms and condi!ons of the Dholi must be pleaded and proved. It was, however, argued that in the present case, the revenue record itself conclusively establishes that a substan!al por!on of the suit land was held as Dholi for religious purposes (Punarth), whereas the remaining land was in unauthorised possession as gair-maurusi. Even if the en!re land is assumed to be part of the Dholi, it was clearly a religious Dholi and, therefore, inherently inalienable.
13.6 Reliance was further placed on State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. B. Ranga Reddy (D) by Lrs and others, 2020 (15) SCC 681, to submit that a successful party is not required to file cross-objec!ons against an adverse finding, if the ul!mate decree is in its favour.
13.7 With respect to the reliance placed by the appellants on the Haryana Act of 2010, learned senior counsel for the respondents submi7ed that the Act creates ves!ng rights for the first !me and is not retrospec!ve in opera!on. Aliena!ons made by Dholidars prior to enforcement of the Act are not validated by it. For this proposi!on, reliance was placed on Hukum Chand v. Ram Dia (since deceased) through LRs 2014 (2) RCR (Civil) 997.
Page 8 of 12 8 of 12 ::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 ::: RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601 13.8 Further reliance was placed on Narender Kumar Sharma and
others v. DLF Universal Ltd. and others, 2010 (4) Law Herald 3258, wherein it was held that permanent aliena!on of Dholi land, including long-term leases, is inconsistent with the very concept of Dholi tenure. It was reiterated therein that Dholi is a rent-free grant for religious purposes, the con!nuance of which is dependent upon performance of religious du!es, and that aliena!on by sale, mortgage or lease is void as being contrary to the essence of Dholi tenure.
14. Considera on by the Court : This Court has heard learned senior counsel for the par!es at length and has carefully considered the rival submissions in the light of the pleadings, evidence on record and the concurrent findings returned by the Courts below.
15. Substan al Ques ons of Law : Upon hearing learned counsel for the par!es and on perusal of the record, the following substan!al ques!ons of law arise for considera!on in the present second appeal:
a. Whether the concurrent findings of the Courts below holding that de- fendant Nos.1 and 2 were Dholidars and not owners of the suit land suffer from perversity or misreading of evidence?
b. Whether, in the absence of specific pleadings and proof regarding the origin and terms of Dholi, the Courts below could hold the Dholi tenure to be inalienable?
c. Whether aliena ons made by a Dholidar by way of sale and lease prior to enforcement of the Haryana Dholidar, Bu mar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Ves ng of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010 are validated by the said Act?
d. Whether the appellants-purchasers, being transferees pendente lite, can claim protec on as bona fide purchasers?
Page 9 of 12 9 of 12 ::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 ::: RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601
e. Whether the findings of the Courts below regarding Dholi nature of the en re suit land are liable to be interfered with in second appeal under Sec on 100 CPC?
16. Considera on and Findings : This Court has given its thoughNul considera!on to the rival submissions advanced by learned senior counsel for the par!es and has carefully examined the record in the light of the concurrent findings returned by the Courts below.
17. At the outset, it requires to be no!ced that the founda!onal issue throughout the li!ga!on has been the status of defendant Nos.1 and 2 in rela!on to the suit land. Both the Courts below, upon apprecia!on of documentary as well as oral evidence, have returned a concurrent finding that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were not owners of the suit land but were merely Dholidars in possession thereof. This finding is borne out from the revenue record, which consistently records the plain!ffs' predecessors as owners, whereas defendant Nos.1 and 2 are shown to be in possession either as Dholidars or as gair-maurusi without payment of rent. Possession recorded as long possession without rent does not vest ownership rights, nor does it clothe the possessor with any power of permanent aliena!on.
18. Significantly, defendant Nos.1 to 4 themselves pleaded that Surjan, and prior thereto Phulla, "might be owner as Dholidar". Such pleading cons!tutes a clear admission of Dholi tenure. The said admission stands reinforced by the contents of the lease deed executed by defendant Nos.1 and 2, wherein their status as Dholidars is expressly acknowledged. Admissions of this nature are substan!ve evidence, and when read in conjunc!on with the revenue entries, leave no manner of doubt that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were only Dholidars and not proprietors. The concurrent findings in this regard are neither perverse nor based on misreading of evidence so as to warrant interference in second appeal.
19. The argument raised on behalf of the appellants that the plain!ffs failed to plead or prove the origin and terms of the Dholi also does not merit acceptance. The reliance placed on Dharamvir v. Bahadur Singh Page 10 of 12 10 of 12 ::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 ::: RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601 (supra) is misconceived in the facts of the present case. The requirement to plead and prove the terms of Dholi primarily arises, when Dholidar rights are asserted as a source of ownership. In the present case, the plain!ffs have never claimed ownership through Dholi; rather, they asserted their ownership as recorded proprietors and referred to Dholi only to demonstrate the limited and non-alienable nature of the defendants' possession.
20. More importantly, the revenue record itself records Dholi on several khasra numbers as "Bawajah Punarth", i.e. for religious purposes. Such an entry unmistakably establishes the religious character of the Dholi tenure and its inherent inalienability. As regards the remaining khasra numbers, where possession of defendant Nos.1 and 2 is shown as gair- maurusi without payment of rent, such possession is plainly unauthorised and cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, confer ownership or aliena!on rights. Thus, the finding that the Dholi was inalienable flows directly from unimpeachable revenue entries and admissions and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
21. The conten!on founded upon the Haryana Dholidar, Bu mar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Ves ng of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010 is equally devoid of merit. The said enactment creates ves!ng rights prospec!vely and does not validate aliena!ons made prior to its enforcement. This posi!on stands authorita!vely se7led by Hukum Chand v. Ram Dia (supra), wherein it was held that transac!ons of aliena!on effected by Dholidars prior to the coming into force of the Act are not cured or legalized thereby.
22. In the present case, the sale deed dated 27.11.1984 and the lease deed dated 29.05.1985 were executed decades prior to the enactment. At the !me of their execu!on, defendant Nos.1 and 2 had no transferable !tle, and consequently, no valid right could pass to the appellants.
23. The plea of the appellants that they are bona fide purchasers also cannot be sustained. The record leaves no room for doubt that the impugned sale and lease deed were executed during the pendency of the Page 11 of 12 11 of 12 ::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 ::: RSA No.154 of 2000 (O&M) 2026:PHHC:021601 suit. The appellants are, therefore, transferees pendente lite and are squarely hit by the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in Sec!on 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Even otherwise, a purchaser cannot acquire a be7er !tle than that possessed by the vendor. Since defendant Nos.1 and 2 had no alienable interest, the appellants could not acquire any valid right, irrespec!ve of considera!on or good faith. It is well se7led that aliena!on of Dholi land is void ab ini o, as held in Si al Das v. Financial Commissioner (supra), and a void transac!on does not create any rights in favour of the transferee.
24. The argument that the plain!ffs ought to have challenged adverse observa!ons regarding certain khasra numbers also deserves rejec!on. The plain!ffs having succeeded in the suit were not required to file cross-objec!ons against any adverse finding. This principle stands affirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ranga Reddy (supra), and fully applies to the present case.
25. Viewed from any angle, the appeal essen!ally seeks re- apprecia!on of evidence and subs!tu!on of concurrent findings with a different view, which is impermissible within the narrow confines of Sec!on 100 CPC. No perversity, illegality or substan!al ques!on of law warran!ng interference has been demonstrated.
26. Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to disturb the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. The appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed.
February 12, 2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Sarita JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No
Whether reportable? Yes/No
Uploaded on: February 12, 2026
Page 12 of 12
12 of 12
::: Downloaded on - 14-02-2026 11:23:45 :::