Karnataka High Court
Ramachandrappa vs Nagarathna Bai on 23 July, 1993
Equivalent citations: ILR1993KAR2511, 1993(3)KARLJ192, 1995 A I H C 1953, (1993) 3 KANT LJ 192, (1994) 2 RENCJ 210, (1994) 1 RENCR 148, (1993) 2 RENTLR 640
ORDER
N.D.V. Bhat, J
1. This Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 1-3-1993 passed by the XIII Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore under Section 29(4) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in H.R.C.No. 602/1988. By the said order the learned Additional Small Causes Judge directed the respondent (instant petitioner) to put the landlord in vacant possession of the schedule premises within two months from the date of the order.
2. I have heard the learned Counsels on either side.
3. The point for consideration is as to whether the order in question in this Revision Petition is just and proper.
4. It is seen that by an order dated 21-3-1992 the lower Court had directed the respondent to deposit Rs. 5800/-, the same being the arrears of rent from 7-5-1987 to 7-3-1992 at the rate of Rs. 100/- p.m. It appears that the tenant had deposited Rs. 6000/- on 2-6-1992 and the said sum covered the rent upto 7-5-1992. However, the respondent had failed to pay or deposit the rents from 7-5-1992. On these allegations, the tenant was called upon to show cause as to why further proceedings should not be stopped.
5. It appears that the Counsel for the tenant filed a memo on 2-11-1992 to the effect that the tenant had deposited Rs. 500/- being the rent for the period from 7-5-1992 to 7-10-1992, on 31-10-1992 and that therefore, there was no arrears of rent.
6. However, it appears that no cause as such was shown by the tenant as to why the proceedings should not be stopped. In the context of the aforesaid circumstances, the lower Court passed the impugned order directing the tenant to vacate the premises within the stipulated time.
7. Sri Shiraguppi, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the tenant has paid upto date rent and even the amount that was found due and deposited on 31-10-1992 was just a sum of Rs. 500/-, and the reason for the delay in depositing is adequately reflected in the Civil Revision Petition presented before this Court and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower Court, according to Sri Shiraguppi has committed a mistake in passing the order of eviction.
8. On the other hand, Sri Surana, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that it is not as if the instant petitioner had committed delay in paying the amount of Rs. 500/- as such. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the tenant was given time to pay the huge arrears of rent as found due by the lower Court for the period from 7-5-1987 to 7-3-1992. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the tenant has not complied with the order of the Court with reference to the time within which the amount was required to be paid. The learned Counsel in particular, pointed out that the tenant was required to deposit the amount of Rs. 5800/-found due for the period from 7-5-1987 to 7-3-1992 on or before 21 -4-1992, that is to say, within one month from the date of the order but the tenant has made a deposit of Rs. 6000/- on 2-6-1992 and further committed default of payment of rents accruing from month to month and had made the deposit of Rs. 500/- only on 31-10-1992. It is also pointed out by the learned Counsel that no cause muchless a sufficient cause has been shown by the tenant. On these grounds, in substance, the learned Counsel contended that there is absolutely no grounds whatsoever to give relief to the tenant from being evicted. It is in the context of the aforesaid submissions, this Court is required to see as to whether the Revision Petition deserves to be allowed or the same is liable to be dismissed,
9. At this juncture, it is necessary to consider the principles laid down by the Judicial Decisions with reference to the questions relevant for consideration, in the context of the provisions of Section 29(4) of the Act. it is pointed in the Decision in MRANALINI B. SHAH AND ANR. v. BAPALAL MOHANLAL SHAH, with reference to Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, that in case of monthly tenancy Court has no discretion to treat payments made at irregular intervals as sufficient compliance with Clause (b). It is also necessary to point out here that under Rule 9 of the Karnataka Rent Control Rules, the time prescribed for payment of rent is fifteen days from the last day of the month for which the rent has fallen due. In the Decision in SYED ABDUL WADOOD v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, a Division Bench of this Court has held that though primarily the Act is meant to protect against harassment of the tenants by the landlord the law has also to safeguard the interest of the landlord against the exploits of a recalcitrant tenant. Further, in the Decision in VENKATA-RAMANAPPA v. NARAYANACHAR, it is pointed out that the circumstances justifying sympathetic attitude towards innocent non-contumacious tenant will have to be considered. In the said, case, among other things, it is observed as under:
"Admittedly, in this case the tenant is a flower vendor. The rent is only Rs. 15/- per month. This explanation is that his wife was seriously ill and he could not deposit the amount of Rs. 15/-. Whatever may be the objections of the landlord, the fact remains that the petitioner-tenant is in a very difficult position. A sympathetic attitude will have to be shown while appreciating his explanation. In the circumstances, I set laside the order under revision. The deposit made shall be accepted and paid over to the landlord. The trial Court shall expedite the main matter and shall dispose of the main case before the end of January, 1991. It is also clarified that in case the petitioner commits any further default a very strict view shall be taken under Section 29(4). The C.R.P. is allowed accordingly."
10. In the Decision in TIPPANNA LAXMAN WAGHMODE v. GODAVARIBAI, this Court has held in para-5 as under:
"As per Section 29(1) of the Act a tenant cannot prefer or prosecute a revision petition without making a deposit of the arrears of rent or without making the payment of rents when the proceedings are pending. However, under Section 29(4) the Court cannot dismiss the revision petition in case the tenant shows sufficient cause against such dismissal. There was some argument before me that this provision was not at all applicable if the tenant fails to deposit the rent prior to the filing of the revision petition. The question of considering the sufficient cause against the dismissal of the proceedings could arise according to the learned Counsel for the respondents only when the tenants commit default when the proceedings were pending in the trial Court, the learned Counsel cited a few decisions for the respective propositions, but it is not necessary for me to refer to all these decisions in view of the authoritative pronouncement by a Division Bench of this Court on this question in SHIVA v. B. DEVANNA (ILR 1980 Kar. 706). At para-10 as well as in the subsequent para, the Division Bench clearly applied the provisions of Section 29(4) and observed that before dismissing the revision petition the Court will have to consider the sufficiency of the cause if any shown by the tenant:
"However, we should add that even in cases where the tenant has failed to comply with Section 29(1) of the Act a further safeguard is given to him under Sub-section (4) of Section 29. He can show sufficient cause against passing an ordex of eviction or dismissal of revision petition. Such reasons could be other than the one relating to non-payment or non-deposit of rent or delayed deposit as held by this Court in T. JANARDHANA v. R. KRISHNAPPA [1967(1) Mys.LJ.577] and IP. HUNSRAJ v. G.S.. PANNALAL [1972(1) Mys.L.J.565]. The Court has to pass appropriate orders depending on the facts of each case, as to whether the tenant has shown sufficient cause against the passing of an order adverse to him. Therefore, except to the extent of protection given in Section 29(4) of the Act and subject to the right to deposit only such arrears of rent as determined summarily by the Court under Sub-section (3) of Section 29, the consequence of non-compliance, of Section 29(1) by a tenant would be, he stands deprived of his right to contest an eviction petition or to prefer a revision petition against an order of eviction and he has to suffer an order of eviction."
Further in para-7 therein it is observed as under:
"If the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents is to be accepted, the question of considering the sufficiency of the cause does not arise. If the rent is not deposited prior to the filing of the revision petition, the resultant position will be quite arbitrary. There may be very genuine cause wherein a tenant could not make the deposit in spite of his best efforts for whatever reason and if such a tenant is to be non-suited by the dismissal of his revision petition as not maintainable, the forum created by the Legislature to consider the case on merits will be denied to such a tenant. That cannot be the intention of the Legislature at all. Language of Section 29(4) in no way negatives the applicability of the consideration of sufficiency of the cause even when the tenant is not able to deposit the rent or pay the same before or at the time of filing the revision petition. No doubt the burden will be entirely on the tenant to establish the sufficiency of the cause."
Further in the decision in SUDHAKAR v. LAKSHAMMA, this Court with reference to the various Decisions of the Supreme Court and the earlier Decisions of this Court, has held as under:
"Therefore, promptness in the payment of rent is implicit in Section 29(1) of the Act. It is only for the reasons beyond his control or for bona fide reasons, if the tenant was prevented from paying the rent promptly, the Statute comes to his rescue in case he makes out a case under Section 29(4) of the Act. The Act nowhere contemplated the tenant to take his own time and plead that he has discharged his obligation. The principle stated by the Supreme Court arising out of a case from the Bombay Act equally applied to a case under Section 29(1) and Section 29(4) of the Act."
A careful consideration of the various Decisions alluded to hereinabove, make it clear that in deciding as to what circumstances would constitute 'sufficient cause' to award relief to a tenant from an order of eviction under Section 29(4), the Court has to exercise its discretionary power, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the concerned case. As pointed out in Venkataramanappa's case no principle of universal application governing all situations can be stated in a rigid formula.
11. In the instant case, as can be gathered from the materials from the record particularly, the details given in the Caveat Petition that the order was passed by the Court below on 21-3-1992. It is further seen that by the said order an amount of Rs. 5800/- towards the arrears of rent from 7-5-1987 to 7-3-1992 was directed to be deposited within one month from the said date, that is to say, before 21-4-1992. It is further seen that the Revision Petition filed by the instant petitioner against the order dated 21-3-1992 is dismissed as can be seen from para-5 of the said petition. It is also seen that the tenant deposited the amount of Rs. 6000/- on 2-6-1992. The said amount comprised of the amount directed to be paid by the Court by its order dated 21-3-1992 together with the amount of rent from 7-3-1992 to 7-4-1992 and 7-4-1992 to 7-5-1992. Further it is seen that the tenant (revision petitioner) did not pay the rents for the period from 7-5-1992 to 7-6-1992, from 7-6-1992 to 7-7-1992, 7-7-1992 to 7-8-1992, 7-8-1992 to 7-9-1992 and 7-9-1992 to 7-10-1992. It is seen that he deposited the amount of Rs. 500/- (5 months' rent) only on 31-10-1992. The lower Court, in the course of its order, has, among other things, stated in para-4 therein as under:
"Though number of adjournments were granted to the respondent, he has not filed objections to I.A.II and as such, as per order dated 12-1-1993 the respondent was directed to show cause as to why further proceedings should not be stopped and as to why he should not be directed to put the petitioner in possession of the schedule premises. Though the case was adjourned to 25-1 -1993, 1 - 2-1993 and 10-2-1993 the respondent did not show cause as to why further proceedings should not be stopped. Office was directed to note whether any deposits were made by the respondent subsequent to 31-10-92 and the office has endorsed that except the payment of Rs. 500/- on 29-10-92 no deposits have been made by the respondent from 30-10-91 to 15-2-93."
It appears that the underlined portion in the above order of the Court below was meant as 30-10-1992.
12. It will have to be seen as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order passed by the Court below can be said to be wrong. As pointed out in Venkataramanappa's Case if the circumstances warrant sympathetic attitude towards a tenant, the same will have to be considered. However, it is for the tenant to place before the Court the circumstances under which he failed to deposit the arrears of rent in time, and the circumstances which warrant that he should not be evicted on that count. If, however, he does not place any such circumstances, the Court will have hardly any option but to direct an order of eviction. Further as pointed out by the Supreme court in Mranalini B. Shah's case, the Court has no discretion to treat payments made at irregular intervals as sufficient compliance. Further under Rule 9 of the Karnataka Rent Control Rules, the time prescribed for payment of rent is 15 days from the last day of the month for which the rent has fallen due. In the instant case, the rent has fallen due from 1987, that is to say, from 7- 5-1987. However, there was a dispute as to tenancy between the parties. But then, once when the Court resolves the dispute and holds that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant and further directs the tenant to deposit the arrears within a stipulated time and directs him to make further payments regularly it is his bounden legal duty to comply with the directions of the Court. There may be cases where for reasons beyond his control, the tenant may not be in a position to make the payments or to deposit the rent regularly; he may fail to do so under compelling and extra-ordinary circumstances. However, even here, he has to tell the Court under what circumstances he could not make the payment. If he fails to place such materials before the Court in order to enable the Court, if necessary, to take a sympathetic view, he has to blame himself. The Court cannot, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, treat the irregular payment as substantial compliance though, no reason is given for the tenant for the delay. As pointed out by this Court in Lakshamma's case, the Act nowhere contemplates that the tenant can take his own time and plead that he has discharged his obligation. Further promptness in the payment of rent is implicit in Section 29(1) of the Act. In the instant case, the tenant was required to deposit the arrears within one month from 21-3-1992. However, the same was not paid by that time. Further the same is shown to have been paid on 2-6-1992. As seen from para-5 of the Caveat Petition even the Revision Petition preferred before this Court was dismissed and even in the order of this Court, it is pointed out that if the tenant has sufficient reason for not depositing rent within the time prescribed by the Court that is a matter to be considered by the trial Court. Further there was also a delay in the payment of rent for the months of March and April. Then again, the rent for five months was not paid till 31 -10-1992. Further the order of the lower Court which is culled out hereinabove goes to show that from 30-10-1992 to 15-2-1993 no deposits were made. It is not as if the tenant can take the direction of the Court or the direction implicit in the statutory provision casually. The conduct of the instant petitioner reflects a sense of indifference which, in my opinion, is certainly fatal. It is not for the Court to imagine the circumstances and to reach a conclusion that the tenant had sufficient cause. The order passed by the Court below would go to show that by an order dated 12.1.1993, the tenant was directed to show cause and that he was given an opportunity to show cause by granting adjournments from time to time but the said opportunity does not appear to have beep availed of by the tenant. If the opportunity offered to show cause is not availed by the tenant the Court will not have any option but to carry out the mandate reflected in Section 29(4) of the Act.
13. Sri Shiraguppi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner had been to Coimbatore for business purpose and petitioner had specifically instructed Sri Ramesh, who was looking after the business in the absence of the petitioner to pay rents regularly as the petitioner had to be away from the month of November 1992 and he has not returned from Coimbatore upto 30.6.1993 and it is under these circumstances, the delay was occasioned. In my opinion, the submission made by Sri Shiraguppi apart from the fact that it is belated explanation, the same does not carry conviction also.
14. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any justifiable grounds to find fault with the order of the Court below. In that view of the matter, the Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed. At the same time, I am of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, reasonable time is required to be granted to the tenant to vacate the petition premises and subject to the condition. In my opinion, it would be just and reasonable to grant him time till 31.5.1994.
15. In the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed. The order passed by the lower Court is confirmed. However, the tenant (revision petitioner) is granted time to vacate the petition premises till 31.5.1994 (Thirty-first May Nineteen ninety four). The time granted for vacating as indicated hereinabove, is subject to the condition that he goes on paying the rents accruing from month to month within the time allowed by law. If the petitioner (tenant) fails to pay rent of any month in time, the time granted earlier for vacating the petition premises stands revoked and the landlord (instant respondent) would be at liberty to execute the order of the Court below as confirmed by this Court immediately thereafter.