Allahabad High Court
U.P. Public Service Commission vs Surendra Kumar Singh on 5 August, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003(4)AWC2819
Author: M. Katju
Bench: M. Katju
JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. This special appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court dated 12.4.2002 in Writ Petition No. 53701 of 2000. In that decision the learned single Judge has followed his own judgment in Writ Petition No. 55771 of 2000, Sushil Kumar Srivastava v. U. P. Public Service Commission, decided on 12.4.2002.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The facts of this case are that the U. P. Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) issued an advertisement in the newspaper 'Rashtriya Sahara' dated 3.7.1999 inviting applications for the post of Regional Inspector (Technical) and Assistant Regional Inspector (Technical). Copy of the advertisement is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The writ petitioner applied against that advertisement. His application was rejected on the ground that he was overage, and hence he filed Writ Petition No. 30063 of 1999 in this Court in which an interim order dated 26.7.1999 was passed permitting him to appear in the examination. Accordingly he appeared in the written examination and practical examination whose result was declared on 25.11.2000 in which he was not declared selected. Aggrieved this petition was filed before the learned single Judge who allowed the same, hence this special appeal.
4. It may be mentioned that Writ Petition No. 30063 of 1999 was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court on 15.3.2001, and it was held that the writ petitioner was overage.
5. We have carefully perused the judgment of the learned single Judge, and we respectfully disagree with the view he has taken. The learned singe Judge has observed that the main issue which arose for determination in the case, was as to whether for calling a candidate in the interview a candidate has to separately obtain 40% marks in both written and practical tests, or whether 40% marks have to be obtained after adding the aggregate marks of the written and practical examination together. The writ petitioner submitted that if the marks in the written and practical examination are added he would have secured 40% of the aggregate and he would be held to have qualified for the interview. However, the respondents in the writ petition alleged that 40% have to be obtained separately in both written as well as practical test.
6. The recruitment to the post of Regional Inspector (Technical) and Assistant Regional Inspector (Technical) is governed by the U. P. Transport (Subordinate) Technical Service Rules, 1980. Rules 14 and 15 have been quoted in the judgment of the learned single Judge and hence it is not necessary to repeat the same. However, we may refer to Rule 15 (3) of the Rules which states :
"After the results of the written examination have been received and regulated, the Commission shall, having regard to the need for securing due reservation of the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other categories under Rule 6, summon for interview such number of candidate as on the result of the written examination have come up to the standard fixed by the Commission in this respect. The marks awarded to each candidate at the interview shall be added to the marks obtained by him in the written examination."
7. A perusal of Rule 15 (3) shows that the Commission has to summon for interview such number of candidates who have come up to the standard fixed by the Commission in the written examination. The marks awarded in the interview will then be added to the marks in the written examination.
8. Thus, it is to be noted that Rule 15 (3) does not itself fix the requisite standard for the written examination but leaves that to the Commission.
9. The advertisement has mentioned that the two written papers have 50 and 100 marks respectively. The practical test has 100 marks and the personality test has 30 marks. The advertisement further states that the personality test will be held by the Commission after the written and practical examinations on dates to be communicated by the Commission and will be confined to such number of candidates only as have qualified in the written and practical test. In para 8 of the counter-affidavit to the writ petition it is stated that only 111 candidates appeared for the written and practical test and only 77 could score the minimum qualifying marks fixed by the Commission.
10. A supplementary counter-affidavit has also been filed by the Commission. In para 3 of the same it is stated that the Commission in its meeting on 22.11.2000 considered the report of the Examination Committee and Subject Committee and reiterated its decision fixing minimum qualifying marks in both written as well as practical examination vide Annexure-SCA 1 and SCA 2.
11. In our opinion, it is open to the Commission to adopt any method of fixing the standard under Rule 15 (3) as long as it is an objective standard applicable to all candidates. It is not for this Court to sit in appeal over the decision taken by the Commission in this regard. If the Commission feels that 40% marks should separately be obtained for the written as well as the practical test, it is not for this Court to sit in appeal over that decision of the Commission. The Court must observe judicial restraint in such administrative matters. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the Commission must necessarily add the marks in the written and practical test and only thereafter determine the required 40% in the aggregate for qualifying for the interview. In our opinion, it is in the discretion of the Commission either to require 40% after adding the result of both written and practical examinations, or to require 40% separately in each of the results of the written and practical examination for qualifying for the interview.
12. The administrative authorities must be left with the discretion to adopt different procedures in such selections, and it is not proper for this Court to interfere in this connection, as Judges do not have expertise in such matters.
13. Of course, if there had been a specific Rule that the marks of the written and practical test have to be added and only thereafter 40% of the aggregate shall be taken as the requisite qualifying marks for the interview, the position would have been different. However, Rule 15 (3) is silent as to what procedure should be adopted, and hence it is open to the Commission to adopt any procedure at its discretion provided the same is not wholly arbitrary or illegal. The administrative authorities must be left with wide latitude in such matters. It is singularly inappropriate for this Court to sit in appeal over administrative decisions, unless they are clearly illegal.
14. As observed by Chief Justice Neely :
"I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a Judge. I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, stockbroker or system management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a 5,000 pages record addressing the intricacies of public utility operation. It is not the function of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator."
15. Merely because in the past the Commission has been adding the marks of the written and practical test and then determining 40%, for the qualifying standard, it does not mean that the Commission cannot adopt a new practice. In such matters, the Court must give wide latitude to the administration to make experiments and to change the past practice if it so thinks fit, unless the new practice is wholly illegal. After all, starting a new practice is making an experiment, and this Court should not interfere in this.
16. In his dissenting judgment in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1932), Mr. Justice Brandeis, the celebrated Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Government must be left free to engage in social experiments. Progress in the social sciences, even as in the physical sciences, depends on "a process of trial and error" and Courts must not interfere with necessary experiments:
Justice Brandeis observed :
"To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation." (see also "The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis" by Samuel Konefsky)
17. As held by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11, judicial review of administrative decision is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision but the decision making process. Hence it is not for the Court to determine whether the particular decision is fair or not. The Court is only concerned with the manner in which the decision has been reached. The Supreme Court also observed that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The Court does not sit as a court of appeal over administrative decisions as it does not have the expertise to correct those decisions.
18. In Secretary (Health) v. Dr. Anita Puri, JT 1996 (8) SC 130, the Supreme Court observed (vide para 9) that where there is no statutory rule or guideline issued by the Government for the Commission for the purpose of evaluation of merit of the candidates, the sole authority and discretion vests with the Commission. In such matters "the Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by experts unless allegations of mala fide are made and established. It would be prudent and safe for the Courts to leave the decisions on such matters to the experts who are more familiar with the problems they face than the Courts."
19. In Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, 2003 (4) SCC 289, (vide para 12) the Supreme Court observed :
"On matters affecting policy and requiring technical expertise the Court would leave the matter for decision of those who are qualified to address the views. Unless the policy or action is inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or irrational or abuse of power, the Court will not interfere with such matters."
20. The learned single Judge has held that the decision dated 23.11.2000 (Annexure-SCA-1 to the supplementary counter-affidavit to the petition) is not a decision of the Commission, and hence the decision of the Commission dated 19.11.1997 still holds the field. The learned single Judge has observed that the decision dated 23.11.2000 is a decision of the Pariksha Samiti (Examination Committee) and not a decision of the Commission.
21. The Examination Committee is a body set up by the Commission. Its decision dated 23.11.2000, was never disapproved by the Commission, rather it seems that the Commission had tacitly or by implication endorsed the decision dated 23.11.2000 since the Commission has not specifically set aside that decision, rather it is proceeding on the basis of that decision.
22. It may be mentioned that under Section 5 of the U. P. State Public Service Commission (Regulation and Procedure) Act, 1985, the Commission can delegate its function to any Committee. At any event, since the Commission has not disapproved the decision of the Committee dated 23.11.2000, the said decision must be deemed to have been impliedly approved by the Commission, and has to be treated as the decision of the Commission.
23. We may further add that since the petitioner had been declared overage and Writ Petition No. 30063 of 1999 in this connection had been dismissed on 15.3.2001 by this Court which held that the petitioner was overage for the examination, it was not proper for the learned single Judge to have directed that the petitioner shall be treated as having qualified for the interview on the basis of aggregate marks secured in written and personality test. If the petitioner is not even eligible, that is the end of the matter.
24. It may be mentioned that another petitioner Sri S.K. Srivastava had filed Writ Petition No. 37358 of 2000 which had been dismissed by a learned single Judge on 14.8.2000. In that petition, the candidature of the petitioner Sri S.K. Srivastava had been rejected as he did not possess the essential qualification as the experience certificate produced by him was not valid. Against the judgment in Writ Petition No. 37358 of 2000, Sri S.K. Srivastava filed Special Appeal No. 516 of 2000 which is pending in this Court.
25. The learned single Judge in his impugned judgment in the petition filed by S.K. Srtvastava has observed at the end of his judgment that "the result of petitioner No. 1 shall be subject to the result of Special Appeal No. 516 of 2000 filed by petitioner No. 1 (S.K. Srivastava)."
26. The learned single Judge in his judgment in the case of the respondent in this appeal Sri Surendra Kumar Singh has merely followed the judgment in Writ Petition No. 55771 of 2000 filed by S.K. Srivastava. It may be mentioned that the candidature of Sri. S.K. Srivastava had been rejected on an altogether different ground than the candidature of Sri Surendra Kumar Singh. The candidature of Sri S.K. Srivastava was rejected on the ground that he did not possess the appropriate experience certificate, whereas the candidature of Sri S.K. Srivastava was rejected on the ground that he was overage. The writ petition filed by Sri Surendra Kumar Singh (in Writ Petition No, 30063 of 1999) by which he challenged the order rejecting his candidature on the ground that he was overage was dismissed by this Court and it was held that he was overage. When Sri Surendra Kumar Singh, the respondent in this appeal has been held by this Court to be overage, we fail to see how the learned single Judge could have allowed his writ petition following the judgment in the case of Sri S.K. Srivastava whose candidature had been rejected on an altogether different ground. If a person is overage obviously he cannot appear in the examination.
27. For this reason also, the judgment is not sustainable in law. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. No order as to cost.