Karnataka High Court
Sri G Munikrishnappa vs Smt Nalini on 16 December, 2025
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UMESH M ADIGA
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 2101 OF 2017 (FC)
BETWEEN:
SRI. G. MUNIKRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE GAILINARASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT : 47 YEARS,
OCCUPATION:GOVERNMENT SERVICE,
RESIDING AT: OBICHOODAHALLI VILLAGE,
UTTARAHALLI HOBLI,
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK,
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT -560 087.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. KANTHARAJU N.K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
SMT. NALINI
WIFE OF G.MUNIKRISHNAPPA,
DAUGHTER OF CHENNIGARAYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT : 39 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT
RESIDING AT CHANNASANDRA VILLAGE,
MADHUGIRI TALUK,
TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 101.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. B.J., ESHWARAPPA, ADVOCATE (ABSENT))
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 19(1) OF FAMILY
COURT ACT, 1984, AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT AND DECREE
DATED 23.09.2016 PASSED IN M.C.NO. 278/2009 ON THE FILE
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017
OF THE IV ADDITIONAL PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT,
BENGLAURU, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED UNDER
SECTION 13(1)(ia)(ib) OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, FOR
DISSOLLUTION OF MARRIAGE.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 15.09.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UMESH M ADIGA
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI) Heard the learned counsel for the appellant.
2. This appeal has been filed seeking to challenge the judgment and order dated 23.09.2016, the decree of which was signed on 07.10.2016. By means of the impugned decree, the petition filed by the appellant under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act was dismissed.
3. The case of the petitioner was that he got married to the respondent on 15.06.1997 as per Hindu rites and customs and the marriage was consummated. They led a happy married life for one year. Thereafter the respondent ill-treated the petitioner. Reconciliation efforts were made, but to no avail. -3- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 It is stated that on 15.06.1998, without informing the petitioner and his mother, the respondent left the matrimonial home and stayed at Obichoodahalli at her relatives house. On enquiries being made, it came to knowledge of the appellant that the respondent stayed at Obichoodahalli till 16.01.2008 and thereafter went to stay with her parents without any valid reason. Accordingly, desertion was alleged. Despite efforts, there was no cohabitation with the petitioner and she refused to join the matrimonial home. It is alleged that a son was born to the respondent who is not the son of the petitioner. During subsistence of the marriage, the respondent willfully deserted the petitioner and had extra marital relationship. She was living in adultery and continued as such and therefore the petition was filed.
4. Objections were filed by the respondent. The marriage was admitted. It is stated that after stay of 15 days in her matrimonial home, she went to her parental home for observing Ashadamasa and thereafter, she returned back to her matrimonial home. At the time of Ganesha festival, the villagers demolished the house, which was being constructed by the petitioner. The petitioner started ill-treating the respondent that the house was demolished by her father. She was not -4- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 allowed into the kitchen and was treated as a servant. He used to abuse and assault her and on 01.06.1998, the petitioner forced an abortion on her. At that time, the petitioner suffered ill health. It is stated that she tolerated the ill-treatment and continued to stay with the petitioner for two to three years and then she went to her parental home for delivery of her child. Thereafter, the petitioner never visited the child. She returned to the matrimonial home along with the child when the child was 5 months baby. But neither the petitioner nor his mother allowed her to enter the house. A panchayat was convened during which he declared that the child does not belong to him. Thereafter, the respondent was forced to take shelter in the house of her parents. It was contended by the respondent that in order to contract a second marriage, the petitioner had secured a girl related to him and he is keeping her in his house since the past three years. The respondent stated that she was even then ready to join the petitioner with the child. Four issues were framed by the Family Court which are as under:
(1) Whether the petitioner proves that he was subjected to cruelty in the hands of the respondent and he cannot be expected to lead life with the respondent?-5- MFA No. 2101 of 2017
(2) Whether the petitioner further proves that the respondent has voluntarily deserted him two years prior to presentation of the petition without justifiable reason?
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the relief as sought in the petition?
(4) What Order?
5. Point Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were decided in the negative. The petitioner got himself examined as PW-1 and got marked the documents Exs-P1 to P4 and closed his side. The respondent examined himself as RW-1, but no documents were marked.
6. PW-1 apart from reiterating his case made in the petition, stated that several attempts were made to bring back the respondent to the matrimonial home. Even panchayats were convened but were all in vain. It was noted by the Family Court that except for his oral testimony, the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence to show that the respondent left the matrimonial house on 15.06.1998 and that she stayed with one Hemanna at Obichoodahalli village. Moreover, the petitioner had not examined any of the witnesses who were present in the Panchayat, to prove that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 15.06.1998, without -6- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 informing the petitioner or his mother, and that she stayed in the house of one Hemanna in Obichoodahalli Village. It was therefore held that it cannot be stated that the respondent left the matrimonial house on 15.06.1998 and stayed with Hemanna at Obichoodahalli and that she went to her parental house on 16.06.1998.
7. The Family Court noticed that the pleadings and evidence of the petitioner are contradictory. The respondent No. 1 adduced evidence that she gave birth to a child on 14.07.1999. Till she went to her parents house for delivery, she stayed with the petitioner. The Family Court noted that the evidence given by the respondent was not challenged by the petitioner, as the respondent was not subjected to cross examination. No evidence had been brought out by the petitioner to establish that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 15.06.1998. Further, the Family Court noted, that no convincing and cogent evidence had been placed by the petitioner to establish that he was meted out with cruelty in the hands of the respondent. It was noted that no evidence has been placed by the petitioner that the respondent was living in adultery and that she continued to do so. As a matter of fact from the evidence on record, it was noticed that the fault was -7- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 of the petitioner himself. The conduct of the petitioner was held to show that he made allegations against the respondent only to get a divorce from her. The trial Court noted that the parties and the son of the respondent had submitted themselves to DNA test. The blood samples were sent to Truth Lab. After examination, the report was sent, which was on record and objections was filed by the petitioner to the same. After hearing both sides, the Court had rejected the objection filed by the petitioner. The said order was not challenged by the petitioner and it attained finality. As per the Truth Lab report, the child was stated to be the biological child of the petitioner and the respondent. After receipt of the DNA report, the petitioner had not taken interest in prosecuting the matter. On the basis of the said report, the issues were decided in the negative and the petition for divorce was dismissed.
8. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the Truth Lab report was wrongly accepted on record and relied upon by the trial Court. Inasmuch as the sample was directed to be collected by the Court and the report was to be submitted by another laboratory. This was not done. He contends that the matter be remanded to the Family Court to consider the twin applications filed by the petitioner for -8- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 rejecting the Truth Lab report and for sending the blood samples to an accredited laboratory for DNA report.
9. We have perused the record and we find that the judgment of the Family Court is grounded on the evidence on record. We have re-appreciated the evidence on record. In his cross-examination the PW-1 has admitted that he had taken his wife/respondent to the Gynecologist on 01.06.1998. He denied the suggestion that the respondent was in his house thereafter also before she left his house for delivery to her parents' house. He denied the suggestion that he was informed about the delivery of son on the same day of his birth. He denied the suggestion that the respondent with her parents and his son came to his house during the third month of his child. He denied that on seeing the arrival of his parents-in-law and the respondent, both he along with his mother locked his house and left the village. It was further denied that the respondent and her parents and his son stayed in front of his house for eight days with the help of the surrounding people. He stated that the allegation regarding adulterous life of the respondent is made because she stayed in the house of Hemanna of his village, with whom they are not in talking terms for more than -9- MFA No. 2101 of 2017 10 years. It was admitted that the respondent said that Hemanna happens to be her uncle from her father's side.
10. After the examination-in-chief of the RW-1 was submitted by way of affidavit, on 06.01.2012 the RW-1 accepted the affidavit as her examination-in-chief. On that day, the cross-examination was deferred. The RW-1 was recalled and duly sworn on 07.06.2016 but, the appellant and his counsel were absent. The Court noted that sufficient time was given. The matter being of the year 2009, cross-examination was taken as 'Nil'. In the examination-in-chief, the RW-1 stated that it was on 14.07.1999 that a child was born to her and that she lived with the appellant until she was sent to her parents' home for delivery. It was stated that the case set-up by the respondent against her, is false. It was stated that Hemanna is her father's relative and is her uncle and when she was young, she often went to his house. There was a quarrel with the villagers and the family of her husband. At that time Hemanna's family got angry and stopped talking to the appellant and to going to his house. The appellant saw her talking with Hemanna at a distance and accused her. She stated that when she came to pick up her three month old
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017child, the appellant did not let her in. The villagers witnessed this and when they asked that the respondent be taken in the house, the appellant said that, he did not want her and whoever wants her should keep her. Thus, she had to take shelter with her child in her parents' house without any reason. When things became very difficult, the RW-1 filed a case for maintenance.
11. Despite the clear stand taken by the RW-1 in her testimony, no attempt was made by the appellant to cross- examination her despite passage of a long period of time. Thus neither the allegation of cruelty nor of that of desertion have been proved by the appellant.
12. Thereafter, application was moved by the appellant for getting the DNA test of his minor child done as he disputed his paternity. The application came to be allowed by the Court and samples were taken which were sent to a laboratory. A DNA report dated 30.09.2015 signed by the Asst. Director, Truth Labs, Delhi, was filed which stated that after subjecting the blood samples to DNA profiling came to the conclusion that Master Supreeth is the biological child of Mr. Munikrishnappa
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017and Mrs. Nalini. That is to say the minor child is the son of the appellant and the respondent.
13. The Supreme Court, in the case of Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph1 considered Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the aspect of right to privacy. The judgments in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia2 and Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B.3 among other judgments, were referred. It was observed that the issue hinges on two primary prongs requiring detailed analysis: (i) the difference between legitimacy and paternity, and consequently, the circumstances under which the presumption of legitimacy is displaced to permit an enquiry into paternity; and (ii) the exercise of 'balancing of interests' and evaluating the eminent need for a DNA test. The aspects of access and non-access under Section 112 (Evidence Act) do not require a party to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had or did not have sexual intercourse at the time the child could have been begotten. 'Access' merely refers to the possibility of an opportunity for marital relations. Whether parties may be on non-speaking terms, engaging in extra-marital affairs, or 1 2025 SCCOnline SC 175 2 (2024) 7 SCC 773 3 (1993) 3 SCC 418
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017residing in different houses in the same village, it does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the spouses having an opportunity to engage in marital relations. It was observed that non-access means the impossibility, not merely inability, of the spouses to have marital relations with each other. For a person to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, they must first assert non-access which, in turn, must be substantiated by evidence. It was then held as follows:-
"It is only when such an assertion is made, that the court can consider the question of ordering a DNA test to establish paternity. In Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B. (supra), this Court laid down the following parameters to decide whether a court can order a DNA test for the purposes of Section 112:
"(1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course;
(2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained;
(3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act;
(4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman;
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017(5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis."
14. The Supreme Court then considered the right to privacy and the right to dignity as follows:-
"36. On one hand, courts must protect the parties' rights to privacy and dignity by evaluating whether the social stigma from one of them being declared 'illegitimate' would cause them disproportionate harm. On the other hand, courts must assess the child's legitimate interest in knowing his biological father and whether there is an eminent need for a DNA test.
Right to privacy and right to dignity
37. Having recognized the diverging pathways in the present analysis, it is pertinent to first address the aspect of the right to privacy. At the outset, a cursory reference to the decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India4, reveals that privacy is concomitant to the right of the individual to exercise control over his or her personality. Privacy includes, at its core, the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home, and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone, as a corollary to the safeguarding of individual autonomy and the ability of an individual to control vital aspects of his life. Elaborating further, this Court held that:
"325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including 4 (2017) 10 SCC 1
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the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them."
38. In this context, while permitting an enquiry into a person's paternity vide a DNA test, we must be mindful of the collateral infringement of privacy. For this, the court must satisfy itself that the threshold for the abovementioned three conditions is satisfied. If even one of these conditions fails, it is considered an unwarranted invasion of privacy and consequently, of life and personal liberty as embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution.
39. Similarly, when dealing with the right to dignity, this Court, in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi)5, held that the right to dignity encapsulates the right of every individual to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value. It means that every human being possesses dignity merely by being a human, and can make self-defining and self-determining choices. Further, this Court held that the right to dignity is intertwined with the right to privacy. This means that a person can exercise his right to privacy in order to protect his right to dignity and vice-versa. 5 (2023) 9 SCC 433
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017Together, these rights protect an individual's ability to make the most intimate decisions regarding his life, including sexual activity, whether inside or outside the confines of marriage.
40. Forcefully undergoing a DNA test would subject an individual's private life to scrutiny from the outside world. That scrutiny, particularly when concerning matters of infidelity, can be harsh and can eviscerate a person's reputation and standing in society. It can irreversibly affect a person's social and professional life, along with his mental health. On account of this, he has the right to undertake certain actions to protect his dignity and privacy, including refusing to undergo a DNA test.
41. Usually in cases concerning legitimacy, it is the child's dignity and privacy that have to be protected, as they primarily come under the line of fire. Though in this instance, the child is a major and is voluntarily submitting himself to this test, he is not the only stakeholder bearing personal interest in the results, whatever they may be. The effects of social stigma surrounding an illegitimate child make their way into the parents' lives as there may be undue scrutiny owing to the alleged infidelity. It is in this backdrop that the Appellant's right to privacy and dignity have to be considered.
42. Moreover, the Respondent is already declared to be the legitimate son of Mr. Raju Kurian. The fishing enquiry, which he wants through the judicial process is seemingly, not meant to bring 'certainty' to an uncertain event. Rather, it is predominantly targeted to harm the
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017Appellant's reputation. The Respondent knows well who is his 'father' as per the law.
43. That apart, the courts must also remain abreast with the effects such a probe would have on other relevant stakeholders, especially women. Casting aspersions on a married woman's fidelity would ruin her reputation, status, and dignity; such that she would be castigated in society. Though in this case, the Respondent's mother is actively associated in propagating this vexatious litigation, one can only imagine the repercussions in other cases where a child, in utter disregard to the sentiments and self-respect of their mother, initiates proceedings seeking a declaration of paternity? The conferment of such a right can lead to its potential misuse against vulnerable women. They would be put to trial in a court of law and the court of public opinion, causing them significant mental distress, among other issues. It is in this sphere that their right to dignity and privacy deserve special consideration.
44. It must be noted that the law permits only a preliminary enquiry into a person's private life by allowing the parties to bring evidence on record to prove non- access to dislodge the presumption of legitimacy. When the law provides for a mode to attain a particular object, that mode must be satisfied. When the evidence submitted does not rebut this presumption, the court cannot subvert the law to attain a particular object, by permitting a roving enquiry into a person's private life, such as through a DNA test."
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017
15. On the aspect of eminent need for a DNA test, the Supreme Court observed in Ivan Rathinam as follows:-
46. When dealing with the eminent need for a DNA test to prove paternity, this Court balances the interests of those involved and must consider whether it is possible to reach the truth without the use of such a test.
47. First and foremost, the courts must, therefore, consider the existing evidence to assess the presumption of legitimacy. If that evidence is insufficient to come to a finding, only then should the court consider ordering a DNA test. Once the insufficiency of evidence is established, the court must consider whether ordering a DNA test is in the best interests of the parties involved and must ensure that it does not cause undue harm to the parties. There are thus, two blockades to ordering a DNA test : (i) insufficiency of evidence; and (ii) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests.
48. The Respondent in this regard, has placed strong reliance on two decisions of this Court to buttress his claim for a DNA test : Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v.
Lata Nandlal Badwaik6 and Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy7. We are of the view that it is necessary to distinguish these cases from the facts of the case at hand to illustrate as to why they cannot come to the aid of the Respondent.
6 (2014) 2 SCC 576 7 (2015) 1 SCC 365
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017
49. In Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (supra), all the parties concerned consented to undergo a DNA test. It was solely on this basis that the High Court permitted such testing. The question before this Court was only whether the results of such a test could be admitted into evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. This Court held that since none of the parties contested the DNA test, the Court had to proceed with the assumption that the order for it was validly passed. Thus, the issue before this Court was solely concerning the admissibility of the results of the test, not whether a DNA test could be ordered in the first instance.
50. In Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (supra), this Court directed the child therein to undergo a DNA test. However, this direction was not given in furtherance of a declaration as to the legitimacy of the child. On the contrary, the proceedings therein were regarding a prayer for divorce based on adultery. The DNA test was to be conducted to prove that the wife was adulterous for the sake of obtaining a divorce. The appellant therein did not desire to prove the illegitimacy of the child; it was merely incidental. This Court explicitly stated that though the question of legitimacy was incidentally involved, the issue of infidelity alone would be determined by the DNA test, without expressly disturbing the presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
51. In the case at hand, we cannot say that there is insufficient evidence to come to a conclusion regarding the presumption of legitimacy. The Respondent and his mother placed on record certain letters, claimed to be
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017written by the Appellant, where he allegedly admitted his paternity. They were deemed unreliable as they could not be proved to be written by the Appellant. Even the Register of Birth in Cochin clearly recorded Mr. Raju Kurian's name as the father of the Respondent. Documentary evidence aside, it is uncontested that the Respondent's mother and Mr. Raju Kurian were residing together, in a valid, subsisting marriage when the Respondent was conceived. Thus, in our considered opinion, there seems to be ample evidence to presume legitimacy and there is absolutely no confusion as to whether the presumption would apply. Further, as analyzed in detail above, the balance of interest does not support mandating a DNA test, as it is likely to have a disproportionately adverse impact on the Appellant and the Respondent's mother. As a result, there is no 'eminent need' for a DNA test."
16. It is the own case of the appellant that he was married to the respondent on 15.06.1997. It is admitted by the appellant that he and the respondent had been living and led a happy married life as husband and wife for about one year after their marriage. The son was born to the respondent during subsistence of her marriage to the appellant. Therefore, the burden was on the appellant to prove that the appellant and the respondent had no access to each other at the time when the child could have been begotten. The appellant has totally failed to discharge his liability of leading any such evidence that
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MFA No. 2101 of 2017he and the respondent had no access to each other at the time when the child could have been begotten. Therefore, notwithstanding the DNA report which anyway affirms the paternity of the minor child, the Family Court was justified in holding that the minor child is the legitimate son of the appellant and the respondent.
17. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
(JAYANT BANERJI) JUDGE Sd/-
(UMESH M ADIGA) JUDGE KGR/AG List No.1 Sl.No.:19