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State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission

Pramod Kumar Gupta S/O. Jati Ram Gupta vs Ashiana Housing Limited on 23 December, 2025

      IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
                 COMMISSION AT NEW DELHI
                                        RESERVED ON: 31.10.2025
                                      PRONOUNCED ON: 23.12.2025

              CONSUMER COMPLAINT NO. 45 OF 2025
                          WITH
  NC/IA/5249/2025, NC/IA/8190/2025, NC/IA/8191/2025, NC/IA/10257/2025,
NC/IA/11070/2025 (PERMISSION TO FILE JOINT COMPLAINT, RECALLING OF
    ORDER, DIRECTIONS, CONDONATION OF DELAY, INTERIM RELIEF)
1.) MR. PRAMOD KUMAR GUPTA
    Villa No M 86A Ashiana Utsav Complex
    Village DASAVE (LAVASA) Taluka Mulshi
    PUNE 412 112
    E-mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 9892993015            ...Complainant/Applicant No. 1

2). MRS. KAWALJIT SINGH
    Villa No M 82A Ashiana Utsav Complex
    Village DASAVE (LAVASA) Taluka Mulshi
    PUNE 412 112
    E-mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 8805020040               ...Complainant/Applicant No. 2
3.) CDR. ASHUTOSH S BHALERAO (RETD)
    Flat No V 1134 (First Floor) Ashiana Utsav Complex
    Village DASAVE (LAVASA) Taluka Mulshi
    PUNE 412 112
    E-mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 9822193994               ...Complainant/Applicant No. 3
4.) MR. ANIL PRABHAKAR TAMBAY
    Villa No M 95 Ashiana Utsav Complex
    Village DASAVE (LAVASA) Talka Mulshi
    PUNE 412 112
    E-mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 9321645583            ...Complainant/Applicant No. 4
                           Versus
1.) ASHIANA HOUSING LIMITED
    HEAD OFFICE,
    304, SOUTHERN PARK,
    SAKET DISTRICT CENTER SAKET,
    NEW DELHI-110017
    E Mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 9810736565

IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025                                          1
 2.) ASHIANA MAINTENANCE SERVICES LLP
    HEAD OFFICE, 304, SOUTHERN PARK,
    SAKET DISTRICT CENTER SAKET,
    NEW DELHI-110017
    E Mail: [email protected]
    Mobile No: 9810736565       ... Opposite Parties/Respondents

BEFORE:
HON'BLE AVM JONNALAGADDA RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (Retd.)
PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA, MEMBER

For the Complainants      : Mr. Devinder Sharma, Advocate
                            Mr. Kapil Dua, Advocate
For the Opposite Parties. : Mr. Chandrachur Bhattacharyya, Advocate

                              JUDGMENT

AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (Retd.), MEMBER

1. The present consumer complaint has been filed by the Complainants/Applicants with the following prayer:

"(a) Direct the Opposite Parties that the control, management, and maintenance of the common areas, in Utsav Retirement Resort at Lavasa, shall be carried out with the express consent of the Executive Committee of Ashiana Utsav Residents Association, inter alia, in respect of:

(I) Use of common areas by the Lessees, Ashiana Housing Limited, maintenance agency, contractors, sub-contractors, business associates and their employees as the case may be;

(Il) Scope of Services, including security and alarm systems, to be provided by the Maintenance Agency and the basis of charging for such services;

III) Terms of the Maintenance Agreement with the maintenance agency including the amount to be charged for the services and its annual revision;

(IV) Contributions to the Capital Fund and its management (including investment), budgeting and control.

(b) Direct that the Opposite Party (OP)No. 2 cannot recover such maintenance charges and charges for all the services, based on the area of the Units, which have no direct correlation with such area;

(c) Direct OP-2 to recover maintenance charges in accordance with Tripartite Maintenance Agreement, inter alia, in respect of audit/scrutiny of the Fixed Maintenance charges (maintenance and provision of services) and their adjustment at the end of the financial year, apportionment/ allocation of common electricity expenses, total water consumption to Villas as well as the Apartments and the services of the nurse;

(d) Direct OP-2 to furnish an account of Capital Charges since 01/05/2013 to the Ashiana Utsav Residents Association and credit the accrued simple interest @9% p.a on the balances at the end of the each of Financial Year to the Capital Fund;

(e) Direct OP-2 that Reducible Interest Free Management Deposit/Fund (RIFMD) for a period of 10 years is to be discontinued forthwith and the balance of the RIFMD held by OP-2 as on 01/04/2025, shall be adjusted against the maintenance bills for the subsequent months; and

(f) Direct OP-1 to provide adequate power back up for all the common areas (including lifts in the Apartments/Flats of Phase I and Il) of the Retirement Resort at Lavasa and to acquire the means of transport in accordance with the communication dated 19/11/2012 at its cost within the timeframe that this Hon'ble Commission may specify; and

(g) Direct that unfair practice of charging 5% service charges on outsourced services and restrictive condition of availing all the services from OP-2 is to be discontinued; and

(h) Direct OP- 1 and 2 that the maintenance and service charges (including Capital Charges) paid under the TMA for Financial Year 2023-24, 2024-25 and during pendency of the Complaint shall be treated as a provisional payment and finalized and adjusted in accordance with the TMA and the principles decided by this Commission in the present complaint; and

(i) Direct the OPs that the TMA may be amended from time to time with the express consent of the Lessees representing not less than 51% of the area of the Utsav Retirement Resort at Lavasa; and

(j) Direct that the Complaint filed in the interest of senior citizens be listed and disposed of on priority in accordance with Sub Regulation (6) of Regulation 26 of this Commission's Regulations; and

(k) Grant cost of litigation to the Complainants; and

(l) Any other order, relief, or directions which this Hon'ble Commission may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."

2. Brief facts of the case that led to the complaint are that the Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra had granted in principle approval to Lavasa Corporation Limited ("Lavasa") for development of a Hill Station Township. Lavasa thereafter leased a land to Ashiana Housing Limited ("AHL") for 999 years under a registered Lease Deed dated 14.11.2008, for development of a retirement resort comprising villas and apartments in four phases. AHL commenced marketing of the residential units promising, inter alia, formation of a residents' council for management of common areas, transparency in levy of maintenance charges, generator backup for common areas, and various shared facilities at the Activity Centre. Complainant No.1 booked a two-bedroom villa on 30.06.2010 and executed an Agreement to Lease on 14.02.2013. Complainants 2, 3 and 4 also booked and executed Agreements to Lease between 2009-2012. The Agreements provided for execution of a final Lease Deed after possession. Possession of units in Phase-I commenced in February 2013. Vatika Marketing Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AHL (later renamed Ashiana Maintenance Services Ltd. and thereafter Ashiana Maintenance Services LLP), was appointed as the maintenance agency under a Tripartite Maintenance Agreement (TMA). After taking possession, the Complainants executed the TMA and paid one year's advance maintenance charges along with a Refundable Interest-Free Management Deposit (RIFMD). OP-2 thereafter began recovering monthly maintenance charges under three heads: Fixed Charges, Capital Charges and Floating Charges, on a cost-plus basis, along with a 5% service charge. Water charges for individual consumption and common areas were billed on an estimated basis. Later, from January 2017 a revised method whereby water consumption for the entire complex was divided per square foot and communicated to Lavasa for direct billing. The Residents were assured of formation of an IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 4 Association under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and a Core Advisory Committee was initially constituted. However, no Association was registered by OPs. The Complainants and other lessees thereafter formed and registered the "Ashiana Utsav Residents Association"

(AURA) on 03.10.2019. Despite repeated communications, the OPs did not recognise the Association. In March 2020, OPs informed the residents that due to the applicability of RERA, the Association contemplated under the Agreements could not be recognised and that a Cooperative Housing Society under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 would instead be formed. The process was initiated but no society was formed, even after further assurances in 2021 and 2022. From FY 2015-16 onwards, according to the Complainants, annual audited statements of expenditure were not provided, yearly adjustments were not carried out, and maintenance charges, including Fixed Charges, Capital Charges and Floating Charges, were revised periodically without consultation. Backup generator supply for common areas was also not provided for certain periods. The OPs continued to issue annual budgets and revise maintenance charges for FY 2021-22, FY 2023-24 and FY 2024-25 without recognising AURA or forming a statutory association. It is also the case of the Complainants that the Advisory Committee constituted in 2023 had no legal basis and did not have any role in enforcing the terms of the Agreement to Lease or the TMA. Maintenance charges continued to be levied on the same cost-

plus basis, along with charges for services such as transportation, activity centre facilities and caregiver/nursing services. The present complaint has therefore, been filed by the Complainants seeking redressal of their grievances arising from the conduct of OPs in relation to formation of the Association, Billing methodology, Maintenance charges and Management of their common facilities.

3. Upon notice, Respondents/OPs filed their written version wherein they raised preliminary objection that the complaint stands barred by limitation under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and that the Complainants have not even filed an application seeking condonation of delay. Thus, the complaint ought to be dismissed on that ground alone.

4. Subsequently, Complainants filed IA No. 10257/2025 seeking condonation of delay in CC No. 45 of 2025 contending the following:

a) Hold that there is no delay in filing the Complaint as Section 22 of the Limitation, 1963 is applicable to the facts of the case;

b) Condone the delay, if any, in filing the present Complaint and proceed with the Complaint on merits in the interest of the Justice;

c) Issue any other direction that this Commission may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case."

5. Heard learned Counsels for both the parties in detail on 31.10.2025 and orders were reserved with respect to IA No. 10257/2025 on preliminary objection of delay.

6. The learned counsel for the ComplainantsApplicants in IA/10257/ 2025 reiterated the factual background of the complaint and argued that any delay in filing stood justified as the cause of action is inherently continuing in nature and the grievances of the Complainants concerned persisting gross deficiencies and unfair contractual terms imposed by OPs in the management, control, and maintenance of common areas. The Complainants were promised completely integrated development and essential services. However, the OPs continued to retain exclusive control over common areas, imposed unilateral and inflated charges for maintenance unrelated to actual costs, and failed to provide contracted services such as generator backup, lift backup, and bus service to Pune. He asserted that OPs repeatedly violated Article 9 of the Tripartite Maintenance Agreement by failing to form and register the IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 6 mandated Residents' Association and further refused to recognise the democratically registered Ashiana Utsav Residents Association. He highlighted that the Complainants were compelled earlier to approach the Competition Commission of India, due to absence of any remedy for unfair contract terms under the then prevailing Consumer Protection Act of 1986. Thereafter, CC/50/2021 was filed by two lessees. But, during its pendency, several developments occurred over nearly 42 months, such as continued revision of charges, non-recognition of the residents' association, and failure to form a Cooperative Housing Society, thereby rendering the earlier complaint incomplete. As a sequel, CC/50/2021 was withdrawn on 31.01.2025 with liberty to file a fresh complaint incorporating subsequent events. The original Complainant being over 70 years of age and unable to pursue further proceedings, did not re- institute the matter, prompting the present Complainants to do so. He asserted that recurring maintenance bills, repeated cost escalations, and continuing denial of essential services constituted successive causes of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the complaint fell within the period of limitation. He argued that the Act of 2019, now, expressly empowered Consumer Commissions to strike down one-sided and unreasonable clauses as unfair contract terms and the OPs' conduct, failure to fulfil contractual obligations, and denial of participatory governance, constitutes "unfair contract" and "deficiency in service." He urged that in view of the continuing violations, the delay, if any, be condoned and appropriate directions be issued to declare the unfair terms void, rationalise maintenance charges, enforce committed services, and recognise AURA for participatory management. He relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brigade Enterprises Ltd. v. Anil Kumar Virmani, (2022) 4 SCC 138 and Samruddhi Co- Operative Housing Society v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 35.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel for OPs argued that the complaint is hopelessly barred by limitation. He asserted that an earlier class-action complaint with respect to the same matter by some members of same project against same OPs vide CC No.50 of 2021, was withdrawn on 31.01.2025 with liberty only to file a fresh complaint with better particulars, clearly recording that such liberty would remain strictly "subject to the law of limitation". The Complainants cannot seek to circumvent statutory limitation by relying on the pendency of the earlier matter for over three years, while the same was found wanting on multiple counts and as a sequel withdrawn on their own being untenable. He argued that the Complainants moved the present Application seeking condonation of delay only after OPs raised blatant violation of law and procedures in the preliminary objection, indicating substantial and protracted delay. He asserted that the present plea for condonation was merely an afterthought filed at a highly belated stage, that too on being specifically objected by the OPs. He asserted that the allegations in the complaint mainly pertained to unfair contractual terms in the said Tripartite Maintenance Agreement and lease deeds. Therefore, the cause of action arose on the respective dates of execution of the Agreements itself. He pointed that Complainant No. 1 executed the TMA on 17.09.2015 and the Lease Deed on 15.11.2016, while Complainants Nos. 2,3 & 4 executed their agreements between 2010 and 2012; thus, the two-year limitation period expired long ago and whereas, the present complaint was filed only in 2025. He emphasised that even if the date of possession is considered, the delay exceeds seven to ten years, which cannot be condoned in law. There is certainly no scope to term the failure of the Complainants as the continuing cause of action He relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on Lingeswaran Etc. v. Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal(C) Nos. 2054-2055/2022. He argued that the IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 8 Complainants failed to offer any credible explanation for the prolonged and unexplained delay in challenging contractual terms that were known to them since inception. He contended that limitation was not a mere procedural formality but a substantive bar on jurisdiction, and the application for condonation of delay was liable to be dismissed.

8. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties and carefully perused the material on record. The issue being considered at this stage is IA No. 10257/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the present complaint. Clearly, the cause of action pertains to the period during which the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was in vogue. In terms of Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a complaint must be filed within two years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Section 24 of the Act, 1986 provides as follows:

[24A. Limitation period.--(1) The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-

section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint as this such period:

Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay.

9. The statute is explicit in its terms, and this Commission is barred from entertaining a complaint filed beyond this period unless the complainant satisfies this Commission that there was "sufficient cause"

for not filing the complaint within the prescribed period. The Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 discussed the concept of "sufficient cause" as below:

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", in as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"

means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or „remained inactive‟. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory application is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."

10. In the present case, the Complainants executed their respective Agreements to Lease and Tripartite Maintenance Agreements between 2010 and 2015, and possession was taken between 2013 and 2015. The allegations in the complaint pertain to the contractual framework governing maintenance charges, governance structure, formation of association, and methodology of billing, that is, matters which were fully known to the lessees at the time of execution and possession. The present complaint, instituted only in 2025, is thus barred by limitation as per Section 24A of the Act. The Complainants sought to justify the delay by invoking the concept of a "continuing wrong" as per Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which states that a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment during which the breach continues. However, in our considered view the grievances and allegations, being a part of the contractual documents between the parties and the Complainants are IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 10 fully aware of the implications and adhering to the same. Further, while undisputedly there was no change to the said contractual terms between the parties, significant time has lapsed. Therefore, these do not constitute a continuing breach within the meaning of the said section. At this point we would like to rely on Samruddhi Co-Operative Housing Society v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 35 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:

"12. Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1963 provides for the computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. This Court in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Mahara Sansthan elaborated on when a continuous cause of action arises. Speaking for the three-judge Bench, Justice PB Gajendragadkar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that "31. [...] Does the conduct of the trustees amount to a continuing wrong under Section 23? That is the question which this contention raises for our decision. In other words, did the cause of action arise de die in diem as claimed by the appellants? In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked."

(emphasis supplied) IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 11

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision clarified that a "continuing wrong" arises only when the wrongful act itself continues, and not merely the effect or consequence of a completed act. When examined against this standard, the present dispute does not fall within the doctrine of continuing wrong. The acts complained of like the execution of the Tripartite Maintenance Agreement, the Lease Deeds, and the contractual framework governing charges, were completed transactions, which arose the moment the contracts were entered into. A completed contractual act does not become a continuing wrong merely because it has continuing consequences. Once the Complainants have accepted the possession and signed the Agreement in question with open eyes and with full knowledge of the terms of the Agreement, subsequent disputes disagreements regarding governance arrangements do not extend or revive limitation for challenging contractual terms agreed to long ago. These recurring events are merely the effects of an earlier settled contractual arrangement between the parties, and not capable of any fresh wrongs, thus initiating a new period of limitation. Thus, in view of the law laid down in Samruddhi Co- operative (supra) that distinguishes between a continuing injury and a mere continuing effect, it is evident that the Complainants failed to demonstrate that the cause of action qualifies as "continuing wrong." The Complainants further argued that the Act, 1986 did not specifically contain a provision addressing "unfair contract," unlike the Act, 2019, and therefore, they could not have agitated such grievances earlier. This contention is also untenable. Even though the Act, 1986 did not contain a standalone Section titled "unfair contract", that does not imply that disputes relating to one sided, unreasonable, or oppressive contractual terms could not be adjudicated. Consumer fora under the Act, 1986 consistently exercised jurisdiction to examine whether contractual stipulations amounted to unfair trade practice, deficiency in IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 12 service or arbitrary and excessive charges. Numerous judicial precedents under the Act, 1986 demonstrated regular scrutiny of contractual terms for unfairness or imbalance. Therefore, introduction of an express statutory label in the subsequent Act does not constitute "sufficient cause" for protracted delay in filing the complaint. In any case, the alleged unfair terms of contract could also have been adjudicated under the Act, 1986.

12. It is also seen form the record that an earlier complaint with respect to the same matter by Ms Savita Goswami & Anr of the same project against same OPs vide CC No.50 of 2021 was withdrawn on 31.01.2025 with liberty only to file a fresh complaint with better particulars. The said complaint was dismissed was withdrawn with liberty as sought subject to the law of limitation.

13. The law governing condonation is settled. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal and Ors. vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, has observed:

"It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

14. Hon'ble Apex Court in Lingeswaran Etc. Vs Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal(C) Nos. 2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022 has held that:

"5. ... At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane vs. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same."

15. After due consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case pertaining to the contention of delay in filing the present complaint, the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for both the parties, the law on limitation and the established precedents, we are of the considered view that the Complainants failed to make out any legally sustainable ground for condonation of such protracted delay. The grievances sought to be raised emanate from contractual arrangements between the parties which were fully known to the Complainants at the time of their execution and possession. Such completed acts cannot be revived by describing as recurring consequences and thus "continuing wrong." Applying the well-settled principles governing Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is evident that no "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated by the Complainants to explain such protracted delay.

16. In these circumstances and keeping in view the settled position that limitation cannot be enlarged merely on equitable considerations, we find that the delay was wholly unexplained and incapable of condonation.

17. Accordingly, IA No. 10257/2025 is rejected. Consequently, CC No. 45 of 2025 is dismissed.

18. All pending Applications, if any, are also disposed of accordingly.

......................................................... (AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM, VSM (RETD.) PRESIDING MEMBER ................................................ (ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA, J) MEMBER /Hitaishee IA/10257/2025 IN CC/45/2025 15