Gauhati High Court
Arup Kumar Sarma & Anr vs The State Of Assam on 18 July, 2013
Author: A.C. Upadhyay
Bench: A.C. Upadhyay
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND
ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.423 OF 2010.
1. Sri Arup Kumar Sarma
Son of Late Kamalendra Nath Sarma.
2. Smti. Sweety Bezboruah @ Sarma
Wife of Sri Arup Kumar Sarma
Both residents of Santipur, Guwahati
under Bharalumukh Police Station,
in the district of Kamrup, Assam.
... PETITIONERS
-Versus-
The State of Assam.
... RESPONDENT
CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.272 OF 2011. Miss Arpana Devi D/O Sri Amalendra Nath Sarma, R/O Santipur (D C Talukdar Path), P.S. Bharalumukh, Dist. - Kamrup, ... APPELLANT COMPLAINANT
-Versus-
1. Sri Arup Kumar Sarma Son of Late Kamalendra Nath Sarma
2. Smti. Sweety Bezboruah @ Sarma Wife of Sri Arup Kumar Sarma resident of Santipur (D C Talukdar Path) P.S. Bharalumukh, District Kamrup, (Assam) ... RESPONDENTS 2 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.C. UPADHYAY For the appellant :Mr. D. Das, Sr. Advocate (In Crl. Revn. P. No.423/2010) Mr. K.D. Chetri, Advocate (In Crl. Revn. P. No.272/2011) For the Respondent :Mr. P.C. Dey, Mr. K. Kalita,Advocates (In Crl. Revn. P. No.423/2010) Mr. D. Das, Advocate (In Crl. Revn. P. No.272/2011) Date of hearing : 4.6.2013 Date of Judgment : 18.7.2013 JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1. Both the afore noted revision petitions arise out of the same appellate judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup in Criminal Appeal No.70 of 2009, whereby the conviction of the appellants under Section 336/427/323/34 IPC was upheld, however, the sentences imposed was slightly modified. The complainant as well as the convicted accused persons preferred the aforenoted revision petitions against the appellate judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup. Since both the criminals revisions arise out of the same appellate order, 3 I propose to dispose of both the criminal revisions afore noted by the following common order.
2. The facts leading to the filing of these revision applications may be stated in brief as follows -
Accused petitioners are husband and wife. The petitioner No.1 is a civil servant working as Circle Officer, Chhaygaon. The petitioner No.2, is also Government servant, working as District Programmer Officer, Morigaon. Both of them are senior Govt. servants. On 16.1.2005 at around 10.30 A.M., while the informant, namely, Miss Arpana Devi was standing in her Varanda along with her elder sister Miss Utpala Devi and her father, the accused persons named above started a quarrel with them without any rhyme or reason and also started hurling stones on them.
3. The accused persons also assaulted the informant and her elder sister. Hence the FIR. Based on the FIR the police launched investigation and on completion of investigation submitted charge -sheet against both accused petitioners, alleging commission of offence under section 336/427/323/34 of I.P.C.
4. Trial ensued, in which the prosecution examined as many as five witnesses. On conclusion of the hearing, the learned trial Magistrate convicted the accused petitioners under Section 336/427/323/34 IPC and sentenced both of 4 them to suffer simple imprisonment for 1 (one) month and to pay fine of Rs.250/- and in default 7 days simple imprisonment under Section 336 IPC, further sentenced to pay fine of Rs.2000/- only in default simple imprisonment for 15 days, under Section 427 and further sentenced them to suffer simple imprisonment for 3 months and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- in default SI for 10 days, under Section 323 IPC. The accused petitioners preferred appeal against the decision of the trial Court in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup. Learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup vide the impugned order maintained the conviction of the accused petitioners under the afore-noted sections of law , however, modified the sentence by imposing fine of Rs.1000/- with default stipulation of 10 days simple imprisonment, however, refused to extend the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
5. PW-1, Arpana Devi, who is the informant of the instant case, had deposed that on 16.1.2005 at about 10.30 a.m., her elder sister and her father were sitting in their verandah. Suddenly, both the accused/petitioners Arup Sarma and her wife Sweety came to their house and stated beating them. Accused Arup Sarma hurt PW-1 on the chest and twisted her finger. Both the accused petitioners tried to push PW-1 and drive her out from the veranda. Both accused/petitioners beat her father. Thereafter, both of them went away and 5 started throwing stones at their house. As a result of which, one window glass of the house broke. Accused Arup Sarma threw a brick at their house and the brick pieces fell on their bed. The FIR was lodged and police was called by PW-1.
6. In cross-examination PW-1 stated that police came just before 12 'o' clock and that she went with the police and filed the ejahar. PW-1 stated that there is no boundary between the two houses and that both the accused/petitioners had come to their verandah and physically assaulted them. PW-1 also stated that she saw the accused/petitioners throwing stone and breaking the window.
7. PW-2, Amalendra Nath Sarma deposed that the complainant is his daughter and that the accused petitioner No.1, Arup Sarma, is his elder brother's son and accused petitioner Sweety Sarma is his daughter-in-law. P.W.2 deposed that on 16.1.2005, while his daughter Arpana and Utpala were talking to each other in the verandah, suddenly accused Arup Sarma and his wife started assaulting him. PW-2 was hit on the chest by accused Arup Sarma with his hand and when both his daughters tried to restrain him, they were assaulted by the accused. Accused then threw a brick and broke the window.
8. In cross-examination PW-2 stated that they did not have any dispute with the accused persons regarding land 6 and that he had stated before the police and accused petitioner Arup Sarma came and shouted and abused regarding the matter of dispossession of land. PW-2 however admitted that there was some confusion regarding land.
9. PW-3, Utpala Devi stated that the complainant was her sister and the accused petitioners her brother and sister-in- law. On 16.1.2005 about 10.30 a.m. when her father, her younger sister Arpana Devi and herself were standing in the verandah and talking to each other both the accused petitioners came to their house and hit her father and when both of them tried to restrain accused Arup Sarma, they were beaten by hands. Her younger sister got hurt. Accused Arup Sarma then threw a brick at them and they somehow managed to save themselves and ran to the house. Arup Sarma broke one window and threw a brick through the window. They rang up the police and they came to the place of occurrence, but did not take any action. The accused person threatened them and left the house. The police sent them to the doctor, where they were treated.
10. In cross-examination PW-3, stated that there is no boundary between the two houses and that she had stated before the police that there was fight over the boundary. (She denied the suggestion put forward by the defence.) 7
11. PW-4, Sri Pradip Das deposed that he was seizure witness. Ext-2(2) and Ext-3(2) is his signature on the seizure list. He did not see anything.
12. PW-5, Sri Dharani Barman, the Investigating Officer stated that on 16.1.2005 Bharalumukh P.S. Case No.13 of 2005 under Section 336/427/323/34 IPC was registered on the basis of the FIR lodged by the first informant. PW-5 had sent the two injured for medical examination, visited the place of occurrence, prepared the sketch map and seized the bricks and wooden pieces, which were part of the broken window. However, before injury report could not be collected PW-5 was transferred.
13. In the cross-examinationP.W.5 stated that he made the G.D. Entry on 16.1.2005 and seized articles at the place of occurrence. The Officer-in-Charge received the FIR from Aparna Devi and did not record the statement of any witnesses after the case was registered.
14. On careful evaluation of the evidence on record, it appears that both the parties, who were very close relations, have been living separately within the same compound. Undeniably, there was a dis-agreement between the parties regarding possession over land. From the evidence of the PW-1, it is obvious that in the morning hour on the date of 8 occurrence both the accused came to their veranda and assaulted PW-1, her father (PW-2) and her elder sister (PW-
3) with fist and blows. Immediately, thereafter, the accused Arup Sharma pelted stones and broken pieces of bricks at their house. As a consequence of which a glass window of the house of the complainant was broken. The manner in which the act was committed by both the accused persons clearly reflected that it was done by them in furtherance of their common intention, which implies existence of pre-arranged plan. Such pre-arranged plan is reflected on the conduct of the accused persons, who acted in unison to commit the crime. On careful evaluation of the entire gamut of facts as well as the evidence of the witnesses, I do not find any reason to upset the finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Court. Now question arises, whether the punishment imposed on the petitioner was on the lower side warranting interference by this Court or whether the accused petitioners ought to have been dealt as per the Probation of Offenders Act 1958, considering the gravity of offence and the involvement of close relatives in the imbroglio.
15. Mr. K.D. Chetri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant in Criminal Revision Petition No.272 of 2011 submitted that the learned appellate Court committed illegality by modifying the sentence of imprisonment to that of fine, and as such the impugned judgment is liable to be 9 set aside and the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court in G.R. Case No.263 of 2005 is liable to be upheld.
16. It may be pointed out that learned Sessions Judge, in his appellate order, while upholding the conviction of the accused petitioners reduced the sentence of imprisonment of 3 (three) months to a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default S.I. for 10 days, for the commission of offence under Section 323 IPC (Pick up from the Supreme Court judgment).
17. It has been submitted on behalf of the accused petitioners that both of them are government servants and have put in considerable length of service and their whole service career would be jeopardized, if the conviction of the accused petitioners under Section 336/427/323/34 IPC remain as it is. Learned counsel for the accused petitioners pray to grant them the privilege of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, (hereinafter referred as the Act) considering the facts and circumstances leading to the occurence.
18. Learned counsel for the accused petitioners submitted that learned Courts below erred in law by declining to give the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, despite the fact that the accused petitioner No.1, Arup Sarma, has been serving as Circle Officer to the Government of Assam and the accused petitioner N o.2 Sweety Sarma, has been serving as District Program Officer. 10 In support of his contention, Mr. D. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the accused petitioners further submitted that both the parties are very close relations and are residing separately in the same compound. More so, the petitioners are both senior officers in the Government Department, therefore, the benefit of either Section 360 CrPC or the provisions of the Probation Offenders Act 1958 could have been given to them. Learned counsel pointed out that this is a fit case where the learned Courts below ought to have resorted to the Probation of Offenders Act 1958, by taking into account the aforesaid aspect of the matter as well as the length of time the accused petitioners are facing the ordeal so far.
20. Now the point to be considered is whether this is a fit case to release the accused petitioners on probation of good conduct as submitted by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners or it's a case for enhancement of punishment as submitted by learned counsel for the complainant. The learned court below has declined to give the benefit of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, considering the fact that accused Arup Sarma has been serving as Circle Officer to the government of Assam and accused Sweety Sarma has been serving as District Program Officer and they are quite capable of understanding the implication of their misdeeds. 11
21. Under Section 360(1) of CrPC as well as in Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, it is laid down that when any person not under twenty one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less or when any person under twenty one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment of life and no previous conviction is proved against the offenders, if it appears to the court before which he is convicted, regard being had to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, that it is expedient that the offender should be released on probation of good conduct, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding 3 years) as the court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behavior.
22. In order to rely on the decision of the Apex Court reported in Mohd. Monir Alam v. State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 26, at page 28, Mr. Das, learned senior counsel drew the attention of the Court to the fact that parties are close relations and lived in the same compound and the 12 accused petitioners are Government servants holding responsible position in the Governemnt. Mohd. Monir Alam v. State of Bihar(supra) it has been observed as follows:
6. Mr R.S. Suri, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised several arguments during the course of hearing. He has pleaded that in the light of the fact that the trial court had given a positive finding that the incident was the outcome of a free fight and had taken place all of a sudden, it was not open to the High Court to have modified the conviction to one under Section 304(II) read with Section 149 IPC and that too without appeal or notice to the accused though in the end the High Court had, in fact, confirmed the judgment of the trial court.
7. Mr Suri has also submitted that the appellant, who had, in the meanwhile, secured a very prestigious employment, should be released on probation. He has pointed out that as both the parties were very closely related to each other and had admitted that the incident had happened all of a sudden with a cross-case registered against the opposite party, some consideration ought to be given to the appellant. He has also put on record several documents to show the present state of affairs.
8. We have considered Mr Suri's submissions very carefully. We see from the documents that the appellant has secured a Doctorate and is presently employed as a Senior Assistant Professor in the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu and that he had secured this appointment in the year 1997. His professional qualifications have also been provided to us which show his expertise in his speciality and also portray his association with prestigious organisations worldwide in the field of strategic studies. We are, therefore, of the opinion that his conduct and attainments 13 after his involvement in this matter justify his release on probation. We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal but direct that he shall be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 on terms to be settled by the trial court.
23. In Razab Ali Vs. State of Assam (1998) 2 GLR 23 a Single Bench of this Court observed that short term sentence as imposed by the trial Court do not serve any useful purpose. More so, absence of any criminal antecedents entitle him from the benefit of Probation of Offenders act.
24. This Section 360 Cr. P. C. or the provisions as provided under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is a beneficent provision which enables the Court under certain circumstances to release the accused, who has been convicted, on probation of good conduct. The object of this Section is to avoid sentencing the first offenders to prison and the learned Magistrate should have given a thought as while imposing sentence of fine only as to what purpose is was going to serve except stigmatizing the accused-
petitioners.
25. Mr. Chetri, learned counsel also relied on the observations of Orissa High Court reported in 1975 CRI.L.J. 1399 (State Vs. Narayan Bisoi) to submit that the case warrants higher sentence. The observations read as follows -
14On examination of the record of the case and upon hearing the learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and Mr. Ranjit Mohant for the accused opposite party, I am, however, satisfied that this case warrants a higher sentence. The learned Magistrate has not only been guilty of erroneously acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 354, I.P.C. as also the one under Section 451, I.P.C., but also in imposing a very inadequate sentence so far as conviction under Section 448, I.P.C. is concerned. The Code permitted imposition of a substantive imprisonment for one year. Where on the facts established by the prosecution which the learned Magistrate had accepted, there was no justification for him to impose a small fine of Rs.
100. Discretion has been vested in courts under the Code to impose suitable and adequate sentence within the limits set by law. Where the facts warranted a. deterrent sentence to be given, judicial discretion must be applied and such sentence as would be appropriate should be awarded. I was feeling inclined to impose a term of imprisonment. But Mr. Ranjit Mohanty rightly 15 brings to my notice that there has already been a lapse of some time and now to enhance the sentence to one of imprisonment may bring about hardship to the accused. I would accordingly enhance the fine of Rs. 100 to Rs. 300. If the fine be not paid, the accused opposite party shall suffer R.I. for one month in lieu thereof. If the fine be realised a sum of Rs. 150 shall be paid to P.W. 2 by way of compensation.
26. The present case cannot be correlated with the case of State Vs Narain Bosnoi (supra) since punishment is imposed in a case on consideration of several factors .There is no apparent reason to jump to a conclusion to impose similar punishment as in State Vs Narain Bosnoi (supra),without considering all relevant factors. As a matter of fact, the Apex Court has in number of decisions held that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides and not for what can be logically deduced from various observation in it and the decisions are not be read as statute laws and the factual context of a decision is decisive of its binding character.
27. In the case of Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, the Apex Court observed that sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. 16 One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances.
28. The principle of proportionality in sentencing a crime- doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of law, proportion between crime and punishment bears most relevant influence in determination of sentencing the crime- doer. The court has to take into consideration all aspects including social interest and consciousness of the society for award of appropriate sentence. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise.
29. Mr. Das, Sr. counsel has also submitted that the both the accused petitioners are senior Government servants and do not have any past criminal antecedents on record. 17 Further, in the meanwhile, they have secured responsible position in the Government Department. He has also pointed out that as both the parties are very closely related to each other and the incident had happened all of a sudden. Over and above, since both the families live in the same compound an element of compromise and settlement between in respect of the civil disputes concerning landed property between the parties in future cannot be ruled out . Mr. Das submits that learned Court below failed to consider this essential component for the release of the accused petitioners on probation of good conduct..
30. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, observed that Section 4 could be resorted to when the court considers the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the offence, and the court forms its opinion that it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a specified object that the offender can be released on the probation of good conduct.
31. In my opinion the object of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to avoid sentencing the first offenders to prison and the learned Court below ought to have given a thought while imposing a sentence of fine only. In fact no purpose is going to be served except stigmatizing the accused-petitioners by imposing fine. 18
32. On careful consideration of the submission made by Mr. Das, taking into account the conduct and attainments of the petitioners and absence of their past criminal record coupled with the fact that the complainant and the accused petitioners are residing in the same compound and are also close relation, do justify release of the accused petitioners on probation good conduct. In the end, for an accusation of the type proved against accused petitioners, in the attendant situation, looking into background facts of land dispute, upon sensible evaluation, do not call for a severe punishment to the accused petitioners . Taken together, society expects both accused petitioners and the complainant to live peacefully together as good neighbours, for all the time to come. However, looking into the facts and circumstances of the case and the damage caused to the dwelling house of the victims and for the pain and sufferings sustained by the victims , adequate compensation is required be awarded in terms of the provision of Section 357 of the CrPC.
33. Order for payment of compensation can be made in terms of the provision of Section 357 of the Cr.P.C or under Section 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, in addition to a direction for the execution of bond under Section 4 of the said Act. In terms of section 357(3) 19 Criminal Procedure Code, compensation would be payable under of the aforesaid Code, not as a punishment but could be streamed from the order of conviction. The compensatory process involves no penal consequences. Order for payment for compensation it is not a punishment and, whereas fine is a part of sentence.
34. In Manish Jalan v. State of Karnataka (2008) 8 SCC 225, the Apex Court felt that the provision regarding award of compensation to the victims of crimes had not been made use by the Courts as often as it ought to be. This power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system.
35. It is settled proposition of law that even after holding guilty for the alleged offence and extending him the benefit of the probation under the abovementioned Act, appellant could be directed to pay compensation to the victims under Sections 357 of Cr. PC. This Court , accordingly, direct that the accused petitioners shall be released on probation of 20 good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, on certain conditions and on payment of adequate compensation in terms of Section 357 of CrPC.
36. Consequently, on the above principles, while extending the benefit of probation, I direct the accused petitioners to pay the compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand) only to the victims. The aforesaid amount is to be deposited by the appellant with the Trial Court within three months from today. On depositing the same, the entire sum be given to each of the injured victims in equal proportion by calling them in the Trial Court through summons, on failure to their legal heirs.
37. The accused petitioners are directed to be released on probation of good conduct, subject to aforesaid compliance and also on furnishing the personal bond of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand) each to the satisfaction of the trial Court, as per prescribed procedure, under the aforesaid Act, within three months along with an undertaking that the accused petitioners will maintain peace and good behaviour for period of three years and shall not involve themselves in any criminal activities.
38. The Trial Court shall be at liberty to take appropriate steps against the accused petitioners in accordance with the prescribed procedure under the provisions of the 21 Probation of Offenders Act, on violating any of the aforesaid term by the accused petitioners.
39. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the conviction of the accused petitioners under 336/427/323/34 IPC is upheld and the revisions petitions are partially accepted, and disallowed to the extent indicated, by extending the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Subject to abovementioned terms and conditions, both the revision petitions noted above stand disposed of and the sentence imposed on the accused petitioners by the appellate court is hereby set aside. To the extent aforenoted the impugned judgment is modified, while the other findings of the same are hereby affirmed. The bail bond of the appellant is hereby discharged.
40. Send back the LCR.
JUDGE TDR 22 The petitioner No.1 is a member of civil service and is presently serving as Circle Officer, Chhaygoan. The petitioner No.2, is also Government servant, working as District Programmer Officer, Morigaon
94. Then the Court noticed another decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab26 in which it was observed that in awarding compensation, it was necessary for the court to decide if the case was a fit one in which compensation deserved to be granted.
95. Then the Court in Manish Jalan case13 considered another decision of this Court in Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd.27 wherein the Court held at p. 545 of the Report as under: (Dilip S. Dahanukar case27, SCC para 38) "38. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefor in mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The amount of compensation sought to be imposed, thus, must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, the capacity of the accused to pay the same must be judged. A fortiori, an enquiry in 23 this behalf even in a summary way, may be necessary. Some reasons, which may not be very elaborate, may also have to be assigned; the purpose being that whereas the power to impose fine is limited and direction to pay compensation can be made for one or the other factors enumerated out of the same; but sub-section (3) of Section 357 does not impose any such limitation and thus, power thereunder should be exercised only in appropriate cases. Such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised at the whims and caprice of a Judge."
Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the original in Supreme Court Cases.
This extract is taken from Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, at page 679 :
Having regard to the above legal position and the fact that the mother of the victim had no grievance against the appellant therein and she prayed for some compensation, this Court held that a lenient view could be taken in the matter and the sentence of imprisonment could be reduced and, accordingly, reduced the sentence to the period already undergone and directed the appellant to pay compensation of rupees one lakh to the mother of the victim.
96. The World Health Organisation in the Global Status Report on Road Safety has pointed out that speeding and drunk driving are the major contributing factors in road accidents. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), the total number of deaths due to road accidents in India every year is now over 1,35,000. NCRB report also states drunken driving as a major factor for road accidents.
Our country has a dubious distinction of registering maximum number of deaths in road accidents. It is high time that lawmakers revisit the sentencing policy reflected in Section 304-A IPC.
97. The facts and circumstances of the case which have been proved by the prosecution in bringing home the guilt of the accused under Section 304 Part II IPC undoubtedly show a despicable aggravated offence warranting punishment proportionate to the crime. Seven precious human lives were lost by the act of the accused. For an offence like this which has been proved against the appellant, sentence of three 24 years awarded by the High Court is too meager and not adequate but since no appeal has been preferred by the State, we refrain from considering the matter for enhancement. By letting the appellant away on the sentence already undergone i.e. two months in a case like this, in our view, would be travesty of justice and highly unjust, unfair, improper and disproportionate to the gravity of crime. It is true that the appellant has paid compensation of Rs 8,50,000 but no amount of compensation could relieve the families of victims from the constant agony. As a matter of fact, the High Court had been quite considerate and lenient in awarding to the appellant sentence of three years for an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC where seven persons were killed.
This extract is taken from Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, at page 679 :
: 2000 SCC (Cri) 755 11 (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1208 12 (2006) 2 SCC 359 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 499 13 (2008) 8 SCC 225 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 456 14 ILR (1881) 3 All 776 15 (2007) 14 SCC 269 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 873 16 AIR 1963 SC 612 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 495 17 (2008) 16 SCC 328 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 278 18 (2005) 5 SCC 554 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329 19 28 L Ed 2d 711 : 402 US 183 (1970) 20 (1994) 2 SCC 220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358 21 (1996) 2 SCC 175 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 225 22 (2003) 8 SCC 13 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1935 23 (2004) 6 SCC 513 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1801 24 (2005) 2 SCC 710 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 559 25 * Ed.: As observed in Dhananjoy Chatterjee case, (1994) 2 SCC 220, p. 239, para 15.
25 (1988) 4 SCC 551 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 984 26 (1978) 4 SCC 111 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 549 27 (2007) 6 SCC 528 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 209 Disclaimer: The text is computer generated. The user must verify the authenticity of the extracted portion with the original in Supreme Court Cases.