Orissa High Court
Shree Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije vs M/S Odisha Trust Of Technical .... ... on 16 May, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: S.K. Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET No.154 of 2023
Along with
CONTC No.3374 of 2023
Shree Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, .... Petitioner(s)
Puri
(In RVWPET No.154 of 2023)
M/S Odisha Trust of Technical
Education and Training,
Bhubaneswar
(In CONTC No.3374 of 2023)
-versus-
M/S Odisha Trust of Technical .... Opposite Party (s)
Education and Training,
Bhubaneswar
(In RVWPET No.154 of 2023)
Ranjan Kumar Das, IAS
(In CONTC No.3374 of 2023)
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Pitambar Acharya, Senior Advocate
along with
Mr.A.C. Swain, Adv.
(In RVWPET No.154 of 2023)
Mr. Milan Kanungo, Sr. Adv.
along with
Mr. S. R. Mohanty, Adv.
(IN CONTC No.3374 of 2023)
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Pitambar Acharya, Senior Advocate
along with
Mr.A.C. Swain, Adv.
(IN CONTC No.3374 of 2023)
Mr. Milan Kanungo, Adv.
along with
Mr. S. R. Mohanty, Adv.
(In RVWPET No.154 of 2023)
Page 1 of 53
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-22.04.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-16.05.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. Since both the cases are interlinked, both the cases are being heard and disposed of together. However, this court feels it appropriate to treat RVWPET No.154 of 2023 as the leading case for proper adjudication of these matters.
2. The Petitioner, in the instant Review Petition, seeks to assail the judgment rendered by this Court vide its order dated 27.03.2023 in W.P.(C) No. 8201 of 2022, whereby this Court was pleased to direct the Shree Jagannath Temple Administration, Puri, through its District Level Land Sub-Committee, to initiate steps for the sale of the land belonging to Lord Jagannath, as involved in the present matter. In compliance with the said order, the Sub-Committee was instructed to first obtain the Bench Mark Valuation for the year 2020-21 from the District Sub- Registrar, Khordha, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the order, and immediately thereafter to communicate the demand to the Petitioner for deposit of the differential amount. The Petitioner was directed to deposit such differential amount within a period of two weeks from the date of such communication. Upon receipt of the said amount, the Law Department was further directed to accord permission under Section 16(2) of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 (hereinafter Page 2 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 "SJTA"), whereupon the necessary land documents would be executed in favour of the Petitioner.
3. The present Contempt Petition stems from the non-compliance with the directions issued by this Court in its order dated 27.03.2023. The adjudication of the Contempt Petition is intrinsically linked to the outcome of the Review Petition, and its fate shall accordingly be determined upon the conclusion thereof.
4. The Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the directions contained in the impugned judgment are manifestly contrary to the Uniform Policy formulated by the Temple Managing Committee in consultation with the State Government, governing alienation of temple land. The implementation of the aforesaid order would not only amount to a deviation from established policy but would also create an undesirable precedent. This would result in substantial and irreparable financial loss to the Deity, who is recognized in law as a perpetual minor, and whose interests must be safeguarded with utmost vigilance. I. RELEVANT FACTUAL MATRIX
5. The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
a) The disputed land, forming part of the Ekarajat Mahal estate, has a unique and sacrosant origin. It was originally endowed by the British Government in 1858 and handed over to the then Raja Superintendent of the Shree Jagannath Temple for the specific purpose of meeting the temple's expenses.Page 3 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
b) On 14.11.1973, the then Administrator of the Shree Jagannath Temple is said to have issued a permanent lease (Kabuliyat) in favour of Smt. Rabibala Sinha in Lease Case No. 13/1971. However, this lease was granted without obtaining the necessary concurrence of the Temple Managing Committee or prior sanction of the State Government, as mandatorily required under Section 16(2) of the SJTA. Nevertheless, on 26.05.1981, Rabibala Sinha executed a registered sale deed in favour of Milan Kumar Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo. In May 1990, a mutation in their names was effected in Mutation Case No. 949/1989, allegedly without objection from the Temple Administration.
c) Later, on 31.05.2000, Milan Kumar Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo executed a registered sale deed in favour of OTTET (Orissa Trust of Technical Education and Training), the Opposite Party No.1. Subsequently, OTTET filed Mutation Case No. 1703/2011 seeking correction of the Record-of-Rights in its name.
d) However, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Shree Jagannath Temple Administration filed Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014 before the Sub-Collector, Bhubaneswar challenging the mutation effected in 1990. OTTET, in turn, challenged the maintainability of this delayed appeal by filing W.P.(C) No. 11871/2015. This Court disposed of the petition on 06.07.2015, directing the Tahasildar to dispose of Mutation Case No. 1703/2011 within three months.
e) In the course of this proceeding, the Tahasildar directed OTTET to obtain a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the Temple Page 4 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Administration. OTTET then approached this Court again by way of filing of W.P.(C) No. 596/2018, challenging the order dated 18.10.2017 passed in Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014. The Court, vide order dated 19.01.2018, stayed further proceedings in the said mutation appeal. While the matter was pending, the Temple Managing Committee, in its meeting dated 29.01.2019, resolved to grant NOC to OTTET subject to deposit of Rs.1,42,200/- per decimal, and also decided to withdraw Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014, provided OTTET withdrew its writ petition. Acting upon this, OTTET withdrew W.P.(C) No.596/2018. Thereafter, on 05.02.2020, the Sub-Collector allowed Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014 in favour of the Temple Administration.
f) Meanwhile, the State Level Land Committee, in its meeting held on 20.02.2020, deliberated on the question of alienating the land in question. It was observed that the land comprising Ac.15.00, situated in Mouza-Kantia, was part of a larger contiguous stretch of land i.e. Plot Nos. 4059 and 4285, measuring Ac. 59.950 and Ac. 16.575 respectively. The Committee reasoned that the sale of such land at outdated benchmark value would cause a substantial financial loss to Lord Jagannath, a perpetual minor. Accordingly, it was decided to revert the proposal to sell the land to OTTET, instructing them to re-submit their application along with a recommendation from the District Level Land Sub-Committee and obtain the current market value from the Sub- Registrar. It was further clarified that this resolution would override all Page 5 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 previous inconsistent communications, resolutions, and decisions by the Temple Administration, including those of the Managing Committee.
g) Upon closer examination, the Temple Administration discovered that the resolution dated 03.12.2019 was passed in deviation from the binding Uniform Policy and without taking into account the void nature of the lease deeds. The said policy explicitly prohibits regularisation or sale of land covered by forged or void lease deeds. Accordingly, on 17.11.2020, the Managing Committee passed a fresh resolution reversing its earlier decision and resolving not to alienate the land. Instead, it was resolved to refund the amount deposited by the Opp. Party No.1 as consideration.
h) Following this, a refund of Rs. 1.5 crores was initiated through UCO Bank Draft No. 532679 dated 25.03.2021 under SJTA Letter No. 3140 dated 26.03.2021, sent by special messenger on 08.04.2021. However, OTTET refused to accept the refund. Another cheque bearing No. 000942 dated 02.06.2021 for the same amount was then sent via registered post, which was also returned undelivered and received back by the SJTA on 02.07.2021.
i) In rebuttal, the Opposite Parties preferred W.P.(C) No. 3865 of 2021, praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus to the Temple Administration to execute a sale deed in their favour. In response, the Temple Administration filed a comprehensive counter-affidavit outlining the void nature of the lease deeds, the absence of statutory compliance under Section 16(2), and the fact that the earlier resolution Page 6 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 had been legally and properly rescinded. It was further submitted that the Uniform Policy, which forms part of the legal framework governing alienation of temple land, expressly bars such transactions and requires recommendation from the District Level Land Sub-Committee, which was conspicuously absent in this case, making this case a fit case for review.
j) The Temple Administration also placed on record the joint enquiry report, current benchmark valuation, multiple correspondences, and a detailed sequence of events showing due compliance with statutory and policy norms. However, the judgment dated 27.03.2023 is under review. This Court directed the Temple Administration to obtain the Benchmark Valuation for 2020-21, demand the differential amount from the Petitioners (Opp. party in this petition), and upon its receipt, process the file for permission under Section 16(2) of the Act and execute the sale deed. Hence, this Review Petition. II. SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER:
6. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. Pitambar Acharya earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i). The Single Judge, in issuing the impugned judgment, has clearly exceeded the limited scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which does not extend to the adjudication of disputed questions of fact or to grant relief to parties claiming under void, forged, or fraudulent documents. The order under review is vitiated by the suppression of material facts and documents by the writ Page 7 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 petitioner, particularly the non-disclosure of pending applications dated
21.06.2008 and 21.01.2014 submitted by the Opposite Party under the Uniform Policy for the purchase of the land in question. These applications remain undisposed of and constitute newly discovered and material evidence, which could not have been presented earlier despite due diligence. Such suppression on the part of the Opposite Party amounts to fraud on the Court, as recognized by the Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath,1 thereby rendering the impugned order void and warranting its review.
(ii). The land in question, being religious endowment property, falls within the purview of the SJTA. Section 16(2) of the Act categorically prohibits any lease, sale, or mortgage of temple property without prior sanction of the State Government; a condition never satisfied in this case. Consequently, all transactions, from the inception of the lease to subsequent transfers, including those involving OTTET and its assigns, are vitiated ab initio and are legally non-existent. The impugned judgment fails to consider the mandatory provisions of Sections 5, 16, and 33 of the Temple Act and disregards binding resolutions passed by statutory committees constituted under the Act.
(iii). The Supreme Court, in Shree Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math &Ors.,2 has upheld the overriding effect of Sections 5 and 33 and affirmed the statutory primacy of the Temple Committee in 1 AIR 1994 SC 853 2 [2015] 15 SCR 46 Page 8 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 all matters concerning temple properties. The judgment under review, by overlooking these statutory mandates, is unsustainable in law.
(iv). The original lease granted in Lease Case No. 13/1973 to Rabibala Sinha was issued without any approval from the Temple Managing Committee or the State Government and is therefore wholly illegal and void. All derivative or subsequent claims, including the alleged rights of OTTET from the year 2000, rest on this patchy foundation. The doctrine of nemodat quod non habet squarely applies, and no valid title can be conveyed when none existed in the first place. The assertion of any vested right by the Opposite Parties on the basis of the alleged deposit of Rs. 1.5 Crores is wholly misconceived. The said amount was not accepted as consideration for a concluded transaction but held in deposit, pending due diligence and fulfillment of mandatory statutory requirements. The State Level Land Committee, by resolution dated 20.02.2020, rejected OTTET's application for sale due to the absence of recommendation from the District Level Land Sub-Committee and the potential loss to the deity because of undervaluation. Subsequently, the Temple Administration resolved on 17.11.2020 to refund the amount and not to proceed with the sale. Despite repeated communications, the Opposite Parties failed to accept the refund, revealing their mala fide intent to enforce a transaction contrary to law.
(v). The Opposite Parties have further misled this Court by misrepresenting facts related to Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014. The withdrawal of W.P.(C) No. 596 of 2018 was not based on any commitment or undertaking by the Temple Administration to issue a No Objection Page 9 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Certificate (NOC), and no such assurance was given. The plea of legitimate expectation is therefore baseless and contrary to the record. The Opposite Parties have also attempted to misuse documents in OEA Case No. 88/1992 by falsely asserting that 4 acres of land under Khata No. 4059 had been restored to private persons by Memo No. 1211/IR dated 21.03.1998. The Board of Revenue's order contains no such direction, and this misrepresentation constitutes a fraudulent attempt to obtain favourable relief. Following the Temple Committee's resolution dated 17.11.2020, Misc. Case No. 14 of 2021, arising from W.P.(C) No. 3865/2021, was filed, wherein the request for NOC was lawfully and rightly rejected, particularly since the land is recorded in the name of Lord Jagannath in both the Sabik and Hal Records of Rights. The direction of the Single Judge to execute the sale deed in favour of the Petitioners directly violates this statutory protection. Hence, the thwarted aspiration of the Petitioner in the guise of legitimate expectations snow ball a legal folly.
(vi). Though there existed a prior resolution dated 21.05.2019 suggesting the issuance of NOC based on 2000 valuation rates, subsequent developments rendered it redundant. Market value had by then escalated to over Rs. 2 Crore per acre, and the Uniform Policy mandates sale at prevailing market rates to protect the interests of the deity. No NOC was ever issued pursuant to the 2019 resolution, and in view of the adverse decision of the State Level Land Committee and the Opposite Parties' failure to obtain necessary recommendations, no enforceable rights accrued. Moreover, Clause 7(d) of the Uniform Policy Page 10 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 limits the validity of a valuation to three years. The Court's direction to execute a sale deed based on the outdated 2020-21 valuation violates this provision and contravenes the policy framework governing alienation of temple lands. It also interferes with the fiduciary and discretionary domain of the Temple Managing Committee, whose autonomy and custodial authority are protected under the Act and affirmed by precedents.
(vii). The Opposite Parties have also failed to substantiate their claim of having invested in the land or of having come into possession lawfully. Their assertion remains unproven and is contradicted by their repeated attempts to obtain favourable relief through multiple writ petitions and by circumventing due process. These actions reflect an abuse of the Court's process and disqualify the Opposite Parties as bona fide litigants. The direction of the Single Judge to execute a sale deed in their favour, without addressing the legality of the original lease and despite the lack of jurisdiction under Article 226, mandates urgent review. The entire foundation of the Opposite Parties' claim is based on illegality and fraud, which this Court, exercising its equitable jurisdiction, must not endorse.
(viii). Finally, as per the Uniform Policy and prevailing statutory norms, all vacant lands under Kantia Mouza in the Sateishi Hazari Mahal category must be disposed of through public auction. The impugned order's direction to allow a private sale to the Opposite Parties has no basis in law or policy and stands contrary to the statutory framework and the interests of the deity. The same is therefore liable to be set aside. Page 11 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 III. SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED BY THE OPPOSITE PARTIES
7. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Opp. Party Mr. Milan Kanungo earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i). The Review Petition is devoid of merit as there is no error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated 27.03.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 8201 of 2022. This Court has already adjudicated the matter after full consideration of the pleadings and contentions of both sides, including those raised by the Review Petitioners.
(ii). As held by the Supreme Court in Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat,3 the scope of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is confined to discovery of new evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or other sufficient reason. The error must be self-evident and not one requiring elaborate argument. A review cannot serve as an appeal in disguise. The Review Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any such error.
(iii). The petition does not satisfy the limited grounds for review. The facts and findings recorded in the judgment reflect no error justifying interference. The contentions regarding OTTET's applications in 2008, 2011, and 2014, and the Land Committee proceedings dated 20.02.2020, are duly addressed. The land was leased to Smt. Rabibala Sinha in 1973 with prior government sanction (ALR Case No. 13/73). She sold the land to Milan and Srinath Sahoo via registered deed No. 1010/1981. Based on 3 Civil Appeal No. 3601 of 2020 Page 12 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 this, Mutation Case No. 949/89 was initiated and allowed, with the Temple's representative affirming the lease's validity.
(iv). The land was later sold to OTTET via deed No. 3017/2000. Meanwhile, the Temple filed OEA Case No. 88/92, disposed of by the Board of Revenue on 27.02.1998, restoring certain lands to the Temple, excluding the subject lands which remained in Milan Sahoo's name.
(v). In 2008, the Government declined to accept land revenue from OTTET, requiring an NOC from the Temple. Though OTTET paid Rs.10 and applied for NOC, no action followed. In 2011, OTTET filed Mutation Case No. 1703/11. After 41 years of lease and 25 years post-mutation, the Temple belatedly filed Mutation Appeal No. 120/2014, leading OTTET to approach this Court in W.P.(C) No. 11871/2015, seeking early disposal.
(vi). Upon condonation of the Temple's delay, OTTET challenged the same in W.P.(C) No. 596/2018. This Court stayed further proceedings. On 29.01.2019 and 15.03.2019, the Managing Committee resolved to withdraw the appeal and issue NOC upon payment of year 2000 benchmark value. A spot inspection confirmed valuation at Rs.10 lakhs per acre. OTTET deposited Rs.1.5 crores for 15 acres.
(vii). On 20.06.2019, OTTET was directed to deposit the amount and withdraw the writ petition. Upon compliance, the Temple sought government approval under Section 16 of the SJTA Act, which was conditionally granted on 08.06.2020. The Revenue Department's 2008 clarification supports the continuity of private rights over recorded Sthitiban lands.
Page 13 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
(viii). The Temple initially decided to withdraw the mutation appeal, prompting OTTET to not appear. Later, it reversed its stand, compelling OTTET to file W.P.(C) No. 8201/2022. As recorded in the judgment, the petitioner deposited Rs.1.5 crores, and the Temple Administration pursued government approval. These facts, already considered, do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the record to warrant review. IV. AN EXAMINATION OF THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT
8. Before addressing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side, it is necessary to revisit the settled legal position regarding the scope of review as envisaged under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read in conjunction with, Order XLVII Rule 1.
9. The authority of the Supreme Court to revisit and reconsider its own judgments is grounded in Article 137 of the Constitution of India. In civil cases, the criteria for seeking review are drawn from Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates specific grounds for such relief. In contrast, in criminal proceedings, review is available only where a manifest error is evident on the face of the record.
10. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer (1),4 elucidated the fundamental principles governing the exercise of review jurisdiction, outlining both the conditions warranting and those precluding such exercise. In this regard, the Court relied on the observations of Justice Krishna Iyer, who emphasized that a request for 4 2023 SCC OnLine SC 140 Page 14 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 review, absent a manifest error in the original decision, is tantamount to seeking the impossible:
"In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as His Lordship then was) "a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result......... A review in the Counsel's mentation cannot repair the verdict once given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace."
11. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by the High Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
12. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others,5 the Supreme Court made very succinct observations. A review is permissible only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record, or discovery of new and important evidence. The relevant paragraph is produced hereinbelow:
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be 2 (1980) 2 SCC 167, M/s. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi 3 AIR 1965 SC 845, Sajjan Singh and Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 4 (1997) 8 SCC 715 said to be an error apparent on the face of the 5 (1997) 8 SCC 715 Page 15 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."
13. In Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited & Another,6 the Apex Court reiterated the law and held that: -
"15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions."
14. In the case of Perry Kansagra v. Smriti Madan Kansagra,7 the Supreme Court has observed that, while exercising review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the CPC, the court does not function as an appellate forum to re-examine its own order. It is well- established that a rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law, and review proceedings cannot be used as a disguised appeal. The power of review is confined to rectifying errors apparent on the face of the record and does not extend to substituting one judicial view for another. Such power must be exercised strictly within the statutory limits prescribed for review. It is impermissible and unjustified to attempt to rewrite or reframe a judgment that has conclusively decided the controversy. After 6 2023 INSC 610 7 (2019) 20 SCC 753 Page 16 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 a thorough examination of judicial precedents and principles governing review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, this Court has summarized the legal position as follows::
"(i) Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions.
(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.
(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate.
(v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit."
15. Nonetheless, in the case of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab,8 wherein the Supreme Court took the view that there is nothing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which precludes High Court from exercising the power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. It was held that every Court including High Court inheres plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. 8 AIR 1963 SC 1909 Page 17 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
16. In similar vein, in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale,9 the Supreme Court made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record :-
"An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ."
17. In Smt. Meera Bhanja v. St. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary,10 the Supreme Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The relevant portion is produced hereinbelow:
"12. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has over-stepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. by merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the review Bench has re-appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as Court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench. Even if the earlier Division Bench findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 9 AIR 1960 SC 137 10 (1995) 1 SCC 170 Page 18 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate court. learned Counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It would not have been reviewed by re-considering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed."
18. The Supreme Court, in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India,11 after considering the dictionary meaning of word "review" has taken the view that power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute, dealing with exercise of power; the review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, and mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground of review.
19. Further, in Subhash v. State of Maharastra & Another,12 the Supreme Court of India emphasized that Court should not be misguided and should not lightly entertain the review application unless there are circumstances falling within the prescribed limits for that as the Courts and Tribunal should not proceed to re-examine the matter as if it was an original application before it for the reason that it cannot be a scope of review. In State Haryana v. Mohinder Singh,13 the Supreme Court 11 AIR 2000 SC 1650 12 AIR 2002 SC 2573 13 JT 2002 (1) 197 Page 19 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 disapproved the judgment of High Court, wherein earlier writ petition was disposed of by High Court being infructuous and giving some directions, and subsequent to the same, review was sought, which was allowed, same was clearly termed to be overstepping of jurisdiction, and amounting to giving of one more chance of hearing.
20. In the case of Bhagwant Singh Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & another,14 the Allahabad High Court rejected the review application filed on a ground which had not been argued earlier because the counsel, at initial stage, had committed mistake in not relying on and arguing those points, and held as under:-
"It is not possible to review a judgment only to give the petitioner a fresh inning. It is not for the litigant to judge of counsel's wisdom after the case has been decided. It is for the counsel to argue the case in the manner he thinks it should be argued. Once the case has been finally argued on merit and decided on merit, no application for review lies on the ground that the case should have been differently argued."
21. The Supreme Court, in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal (supra) laid down the limits of the Review Jurisdiction, as under: -
"16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:--
(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error 14 ILR (1976) 2 ALL 699 Page 20 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected.
(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise."
(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review."
In fact, by embellishing the wisdom narrated above, this Court shall attempt to justify invoking the review jurisdiction in the instant case. V. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS
22. I have heard the representations of the counsels appearing for the respective parties at length.
23. From the legal examination presented in the above section, it is clear that the High Court's power to review its own judgments or orders, though limited and exceptional, plays a vital role in ensuring that justice is not compromised by oversight or error. This power may be exercised upon the satisfaction of specific grounds. These include, first, the presence of an error apparent on the face of the record; encompassing legal or factual mistakes that are self-evident and do not require extensive reasoning. Second, the discovery of new and important Page 21 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 evidence or material facts which, despite due diligence, were not within the petitioner's knowledge or could not be produced at the time of the original decision; and Third, the application of the equitable doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit, which allows the Court to correct its own procedural or judicial errors so that no party suffers prejudice from the Court's act. While the scope of review is not intended to provide an avenue for rehearing or rearguing a case, it functions as a crucial safeguard to prevent manifest injustice and uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings.
24. The present case is indeed a peculiar one, as this Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the impugned judgment meet all three established grounds warranting the exercise of its review jurisdiction. Each of these conditions, forming the legal foundation for invoking review powers, will be examined in turn to assess whether the interference sought is justified in law and equity. It is not at all a horrific attempt by this Court to invoke its review jurisdiction, considering the eminently convincing grounds inherent in the judgment under review. A. Error Apparent on the Face of the Record: Self-Evident Legal or Factual Mistakes
25. Against the first condition of apparent error, the counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the land in question, being religious endowment property, falls within the purview of the SJTA. Section 16(2) of the Act categorically prohibits any lease, sale, or mortgage of temple property without prior sanction of the State Government; a Page 22 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 condition never satisfied in this case which was mistaken to be true in the impugned judgment dated 27.03.2023.
26. A careful analysis of the impugned order discloses that it unequivocally recorded two determinative findings: first, that the Shree Jagannath Temple Managing Committee had duly sanctioned the transfer of interest in the disputed land through lease proceedings in ALR Case No. 13/71; and second, that the lease in question was of a perpetual nature. However, these findings are vitiated by both an error apparent on the face of the record and a fundamental misconception of law; the former constituting a manifest error of fact, and the latter amounting to a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the legal principles governing the nature and validity of such leases. The relevant paragraph from the impugned order is produced hereinbelow:
"3. Present litigation has a checkered career. Factual narration as reveals depicts, on 14.11.1973, Shree Jagannath Temple Management Committee passed order in grant of permanent lease of the disputed property in favour of one Smt.Rabibala Sinha, D/o Jagannath Sinha, vide ALR Case No.13/71. As a consequence, a Patta was also signed on 14.11.1973...."
27. The error in the impugned judgment pertains to the interpretation and application of Section 16(2) of the SJTA in relation to the lease granted in favour of Rabibala Sinha. In impugned judgement dated 27.03.2023, this court was erroneously led to believe that the lease executed in 1973 had received the requisite approval from the State Government, as mandated under Section 16(2). This assumption is fundamentally Page 23 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 flawed. The opposite parties have relied solely on the Kabuliyat (lease deed) to assert that such approval was obtained. However, the Kabuliyat, executed at the instance of the Shree Jagannath Temple Authority, cannot be equated with the "previous sanction of the State Government" as required by the statute. Hence, this is the most alluring point to curate a reviewable point.
28. First it is important to present the concerned provision for better understanding of the situation:
"16. Alienation of the Temple properties :-
(1) No movable property of a non-perishable nature of which the Committee is in possession and the value of which is more than [fifty thousand rupees] and no Jewelleries shall be sold, pledged or otherwise alienated without the previous approval of the State Government.
(2) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act no immovable property taken possession of by the Committee shall be leased out for more than five years or mortgaged, sold or otherwise alienated except with the previous sanction of the State Government."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Section 16(2) draws a clear and categorical distinction between the role of the Shree Jagannath Temple Authority and that of the State Government. While the Shree Jagannath Temple Authority may facilitate the lease, the statutory mandate is that any lease of immovable property exceeding five years, or any form of alienation, must receive prior approval from the State Government. This solitary point itself proves to be mollycoddling issue in the entire episode. Page 24 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
30. At this juncture, for the sake of comprehensive judicial discussion, this court finds it apposite to examine the applicable principles of statutory interpretation in the context of Section 16(2) of the SJTA. The statutory provision highlighted above is both explicit and prohibitory in nature. A holistic interpretation of this clause, guided by settled principles of statutory construction, leads to the inescapable conclusion that any alienation undertaken without the prior approval of the State Government is invalid and void.
31. The use of negative words "no immovable property...shall be... except with the previous sanction of the State Government" admits of no ambiguity. The prohibition is absolute unless an express exception is provided elsewhere in the Act. In addition to that, the use of the word "shall" denotes a mandatory obligation, leaving no room for discretion or implied deviation.
32. A perusal of the aforesaid provision reveals that it is framed in negative language. It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that provisions couched in negative terms are ordinarily construed as mandatory and imperative in nature, admitting of no discretion in their application.15 As stated by Crawford "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience."16
33. In Vijay Narayan Thatte & Ors v. State of Maharashtra,17 the Supreme Court while determining the interpretation of the negative injunctions 15 See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 11th Edition, 2008 pages 390 to 392 16 See Crawford Statutory Construction P. 523 17 (2009) 9 SCC 92 Page 25 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 in Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, placed their reliance on the Mimansa School of Interpretation. The Court highlighted that negative injunctions in statutes, such as those expressed through prohibitory language, are to be construed as unequivocally mandatory. When a statutory provision uses clear negative phrasing, such as "shall not...except with prior sanction," it must be interpreted as creating an absolute and non-negotiable restriction. The Court applied this principle to conclude that such prohibitions, especially when general in scope and addressed to all, invalidate any act done in contravention of them, rendering it void ab initio. The relevant portion is produced hereinbelow:
"15. Thus we see that in the Mimansa system as regards negative injunctions (such as the one contained in the proviso to Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act) there is a much deeper discussion on the subject than that done by Western Jurists. The Western writers on the subject of interpretation (like Maxwell, Craies, etc.) only say that ordinarily negative words are mandatory, but there is no deeper discussion on the subject, no classification of the kinds of negative injunctions and their effects.
16. In the Mimansa system illustrations of many principles of interpretation are given in the form of maxims (nyayas). The negative injunction is illustrated by the Kalanjanyaya or Kalanja maxim. The Kalanja maxim (nakalanjambhakshayet) states that `a general condemnatory text is to be understood not only as prohibiting an act, but also the tendency, including the intention and attempt to do it.' It is thus mandatory.Page 26 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
17. A plain reading of the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act shows that it is a general prohibition against the whole world and not against a particular person. Hence the Kalanja maxim of the Mimansa system will in our opinion apply to the proviso to Section 6.
18. Laughakshi Bhaskara, one of the great Mimansa writers, taking the prohibitory text 'one is not to eat Kalanja or fermented/stale food' (nakalanjambhakshayet), explains the idiomatic force of the phrase (nabhakshayet). He explains that the suffix 'yat' means 'shall', and that the negative particle 'not' is to be taken as attached to the suffix 'yat' (shall), and not to the idea of Kalanja eating. For if it be taken as attached to the latter idea, then the sentence might mean 'you shall eat but not Kalanja'. In this case strictly there would be no prohibition. So he labours to demonstrate that the gist of the sentence is 'shall not' and therefore the object of it is to turn off from eating Kalanja (fermented/stale food). This may appear to be making a hair splitting distinction, but it is of great importance from the Mimansa point of view because it indicates the mandatory nature of the negative injunction (nishedha).
19. The explanation of a Nishedha Vidhi appears more clearly from Jaimini's Sutras on the Kalanja maxim.
The objector says:
"In a case of prohibition, mentally you entertain the idea of the action prohibited; for you have to discriminate between the prohibited act and the negation of that act."
The objector means to say:
"what is the good of a prohibition when it invites the imagination to gloat on the action prohibited."
The author answers:
Page 27 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 "When an act is enjoined by the Shastra, it is for the purpose of the good of a person; if the good object be divorced from the meaning of the Shastra, then it becomes a case of transgressing it.' The meaning of this is:
"In a case of prohibition you must take it that not only is the particular external act prohibited, but the very intention of it is also prohibited."
20. Roughly speaking, the principle laid down is this :
In a case of prohibition one should abstain from the very idea of the act prohibited, and there ought to be no evasion of the Vidhi in any way. Thus, this class of Nishedha Vidhis is to be interpreted most comprehensively and as mandatory."
21. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is totally mandatory and bears no exceptions."
34. Furthermore, the application of the Mischief Rule, also known as Heydon's Rule, reinforces the mandatory character of Section 16(2) of the SJTA. This interpretive rule requires the Court to construe statutes in a manner that suppresses the mischief the law was designed to prevent and advances the remedy intended by the legislature. The mischief clearly sought to be addressed by this provision is the risk of unauthorized, arbitrary, or self-serving alienation of temple property, which could result in the dissipation of assets held in trust for the deity and the public. The statutory requirement of prior approval by the State Government introduces an essential layer of oversight and accountability. To construe this condition as merely directory would Page 28 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 defeat the legislative purpose and revive the very mischief the statute was enacted to prevent.
35. Ergo, when examined through the lens of established principles of statutory interpretation, it becomes abundantly clear that the requirement of prior sanction by the State Government under Section 16(2) is a binding and indispensable condition precedent. Any alienation of immovable property by the Shree Jagannath Temple Committee undertaken in contravention of this statutory mandate is legally void, unenforceable, and non-est in law.
36. Now, turning to the purported "perpetual" character of the lease in question, it is essential to underscore that Indian land jurisprudence does not recognize the concept of a perpetual lease as a valid and independent estate in immovable property. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the principal legislation governing leases, envisages leases for a definite term or renewable upon fulfillment of specified conditions, but does not contemplate the creation of leases in perpetuity unless such an arrangement is expressly sanctioned by statute.
37. The impugned judgment dated 27.03.2023 appears to have inadvertently disregarded this well-settled principle of law by accepting the lease in question as being perpetual in nature, despite there being no statutory sanction or legal foundation to sustain such a characterization. This oversight is particularly significant given that the property in question is held in trust by a public religious institution, where heightened fiduciary standards and statutory restrictions govern its Page 29 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 alienation. The conclusion drawn in the impugned judgement, thus, constitutes a error of law, rendering the finding legally unsustainable.
38. The notion of a perpetual lease, to the extent it has been discussed in Indian jurisprudence, arises not as a substantive right but as a judicially carved exception in highly specific circumstances; often where long- term leases contain a clause for continuous renewal or where equity demands recognition of long-standing possession. Even then, courts have been cautious and have repeatedly emphasized that a lease in perpetuity must be supported by an unequivocal intention of the lessor, evident from clear language in the lease deed, and must not contravene any statutory bar.
39. In the context of temple or trust property, such leases are subject to even stricter scrutiny, as alienation of such property is governed by fiduciary principles and statutory restrictions. Therefore, any assertion that the lease herein is perpetual in nature is not only legally untenable but also contrary to settled principles of property law and public trust doctrine.
40. In the context of the discussion of "Perpetual leases," the observations made by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Syed Jaleel Zone v. P. Venkata Murlidhar,18 are particularly very apposite. The relevant observations are produced hereinbelow:
"(i) In India, the law does not prohibit a perpetual lease; clear and unambiguous language would be required to infer such a lease. If the language is ambiguous the court would opt for an interpretation negating the plea of the perpetual lease;18
AIR 1981 AP 328 Page 30 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
(ii) To find an answer to the question whether a covenant for renewal contained in the lease deed construed properly and in its real context, entitles the tenant to continue as long as he chooses by exercising the option of renewal at the end of each successive period of 5 years subject to the same terms and condition depends on the deed of lease being read as a whole and an effort made to ascertain the intention of the parties while entering into the contract. No single clause or tem should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document;
(iii) The court always leans against a perpetual renewal and hence where there is a clause for renewal subject to the same terms and conditions, it would be construed as giving a right to renewal for the same period as the period of the original lease, but not a right to second or third renewal and so on unless, of course, the language is clear and unambiguous."
(Emphasis supplied)
41. From the above observation, it is clear that under Indian law, while a perpetual lease is not outrightly prohibited, it must be founded on clear, express, and unequivocal terms within the lease deed. In the absence of such language, courts are bound to interpret the lease strictly and against the claim of perpetuity. Ambiguity in the terms will weigh against the lessee, especially where public or trust property is involved, given the heightened fiduciary obligations and statutory safeguards applicable in such contexts.
42. In the present case, neither the SJTA, nor any allied statutory provision confers the power upon the Committee to grant leases in perpetuity. In Page 31 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 the absence of statutory support or express terms to that effect, the claim of the lease being perpetual cannot be sustained.
43. Accordingly, this Court finds that the purported perpetual nature of the lease is legally untenable and stands vitiated for want of both statutory sanction and the requisite clarity in the contractual language.
44. The Court shall now proceed to consider the next aspect of the matter.
In the next sequence of events that transpired, on 26.05.1981, Rabibala Sinha sold the land to Milan Kumar Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo, vide Registered Sale Deed No.1010 dated 26.05.1981. Record of Right was corrected bearing new Khata No.1036/14 in purchaser's favour in May, 1990 in the disposal of Mutation Case No.949/89.
45. Now, assuming arguendo that the lease granted in favour of Rabibala Sinha was valid, though the contrary has already been thoroughly demonstrated; the subsequent transfer or sale of the said leasehold interest by her is ex facie without any legal efficacy. In law, a lessee derives only a limited interest in the demised property and cannot convey a title greater than what she herself holds. It is a settled principle that a lease, irrespective of its duration, even one extending to 99 years or styled as "perpetual," does not confer ownership rights upon the lessee, nor does it entitle the lessee to alienate the property as though she were the absolute owner.
46. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the Collector of Bombay v. Khatizabai Dharsi Somji Dossa,19 has categorically held that whether the term of the lease be 5 years, 50 years, 99 years or even 999 19 (1962) 64 Bom LR 311 Page 32 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 years, the transaction is only a lease and there is always a reversion which continues to vest in the owner in the entire term of the lease and the lessee even if for 999 years does not become the owner.
"27. A man who being owner of land grants a lease in perpetuity carves a subordinate interest out of his own and does not annihilate his own interest. This result is to be inferred by the use of the word 'lease,' which implies an interest still remaining in the lessor. Before the lease the owner had the right to enjoy the possession of the land, and by the lease he excludes himself during its currency from that right, but the determination of the lease is a removal of that barrier, and there is nothing to prevent the enjoyment from which he had been excluded by the lease."
47. In this context, the judgment of the Privy Council in Subramanya Chettiar v. Subramanya Mudaliyar20 has held the length of the lease to be not indicative of even permanency of the lease much less of transfer of ownership. The Calcutta High Court also in Kamal Kumar Datta v. Nandalal Dubey21 expressly held the lease for 99 years to be not qualifying as a permanent lease.
48. The High Court of Delhi in Hotel Queen Road P. Ltd. v. Union of India &Ors.,22 has held that the right of ownership over a property in cases of lease is not determined on the basis of the duration of the lease and a lease, even if for 99 years, does not confer Ownership Rights on the Lessee. The relevant portion of the Judgment is reproduced hereunder:
"13. A lease in ordinary legal sense contemplates demise or a transfer of a right to enjoy land for a term or in perpetuity 20 AIR 1929 PC 156 21 AIR 1929 Cal 37 22 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9807 Page 33 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 for a consideration of a price paid or promised or services or other things of value to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor. There is a marked difference between lease and ownership. While the former is only a transfer of a right to enjoyment to a property, latter denotes a complete and total control over the property and not merely a right to enjoyment. The lessee of a property is a tenant. He may be entitled to transfer his interest in the land, but right to transfer ownership vests with the owner of the said land. Tenancy cannot be considered to be a permanent ownership, even when the tenant has made permanent structures at his own cost on the land. Though heritability and transfer may incidents common to both ownership and lease, however, that by in itself are not sufficient to cloth a person with absolute ownership...
14. The right of ownership over a property in cases of lease is not determined on the basis of the duration for which the lease is granted to the lessee. Thus, a lease even if for 99 years, does not confer ownership rights on the lessee, unless they are specifically transferred to him in which case it stops being a lease. Even in the cases of lease for long durations, the residuary rights of a leased land belong to the owner of the land and not the lessor. It is a settled law that the length of the lease is not indicative of even permanency of lease much less of ownership...."
49. The Supreme Court, speaking to the same effect, elucidated that ownership, in its true legal sense, implies absolute dominion and the unfettered right to transfer such dominion. A lessee, despite possessing transferable and heritable rights, does not become the owner, as such rights amount only to an interest in the property, not its ownership. Page 34 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Thus, the ability to transfer interest does not equate to the authority to transfer title. In Mohd. Noor v. Mohd. Ibrahim,23 observed as under:-
"5. ...The theoretical concept of 'ownership', therefore, appears to be that a person can be considered to be owner if he has absolute dominion over it in all respects and is capable of transferring such ownership. Heritability and transferability are not doubt some of the many and may be most important ingredients of ownership. But they by themselves cannot be considered as sufficient for clothing a person with absolute ownership. Their absence may establish lack of ownership but their presence by itself is not sufficient to establish it. The ownership concept does not accord with the status of a person who is paying the rent. A tenant under various legislations either urban or rural property, agricultural or otherwise, enjoys right of heritability and transferability. At the same time, he does not become owner of the property. Transfer of ownership is distinct and different from transfer of interest in the property. A licensee or even a tenant may be entitled by law to transfer his interest in the property but that is not a transfer of ownership. For instance, a lessee from a corporation or a local body or even Stage Government to raise building may have heritable and transferable right but such a person is not an owner and the transfer in such a case of his interest in the property and not the ownership......"
50. Notwithstanding the patent illegality and procedural infirmities vitiating the lease originally granted to Rabibala Sinha, particularly its non-compliance with mandatory provisions of the SJTA, she nonetheless purported to transfer the said property by way of a registered sale deed dated 26.05.1981 to Milan Kumar Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo. This transaction was inherently invalid, as Rabibala 23 (1994) 5 SCC 562 Page 35 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Sinha had no lawful ownership or title to the property; the lease under which she claimed rights itself was void and incapable of creating any transferable interest. Despite this, the transferees succeeded in getting the property mutated in their names against the disputed land. This sequence of events starkly illustrates how a void and non-est transaction, rooted in an invalid lease, was ultimately regularized on record, raising serious questions as to the due process of land records management and the unchecked alienation of public trust property. This speaks volume of an engineered vested interest is in operation in the entire transaction.
51. The impugned order dated 27.03.2023 erroneously failed to scrutinize the legal validity of the mutation entry, thereby acquiescing in a manifest error of fact and law. This omission assumes further significance in light of the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the Opposite Party on the said mutation as purported evidence of the validity and official cognizance of the impugned transaction. However, such reliance is misplaced, as mutation is merely an administrative act for fiscal purposes and does not, by itself, confer title or legal legitimacy to a transaction otherwise rendered void by operation of law.
52. It is a well-settled principle that mutation in revenue records is a ministerial and administrative act, intended solely for the purpose of revenue collection, and does not confer ownership, cure defects in title, or validate an otherwise illegal or void transaction.24 The existence of a 24 SeeJitendra Singh v. State of M.P., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802; SumanVerma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Page 36 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 mutation entry, ipso facto, cannot be construed as conferring legal sanctity upon a lease or sale that is vitiated by non-compliance with statutory requirements, particularly those governing the alienation of public or trust property. Therefore, the argument that the mutation reflects legal validity or governmental cognizance of the transaction stands on infirm legal footing and is liable to be rejected.
53. In light of the above discussion, it is manifest that the title claimed over the land in question is fundamentally flawed and devoid of legal sanctity. The initial lease executed in favour of Rabibala Sinha in 1973 stands vitiated on two independent but equally compelling grounds:
first, it was executed without obtaining the prior sanction of the State Government as mandatorily required under Section 16(2) of the SJTA;
and second, it was erroneously treated as a perpetual lease despite the settled position in law that Indian jurisprudence does not recognise the concept of perpetual lease sans explicit statutory authority.
Consequently, the purported sale deed executed by Rabibala Sinha in favour of Milan Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo was invalid, as no lawful or transferable interest had ever vested in her. The subsequent mutation effected in the names of the purchasers does not cure this illegality, as mutation is merely a ministerial act for revenue purposes and does not confer or validate title. The whole exercise is merely a reflection of administrative oversight, not lawful recognition. Therefore, the interest subsequently claimed by OTTET, being rooted in a chain of void and ChinnaNarasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; BhimabaiMahadeoKambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. SonuKumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70.Page 37 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 non-est transactions, is itself void ab initio and incapable of sustaining any proprietary or legal claim over the land.
B. Newly Discovered Material Evidence
54. I shall now address the second ground for review, namely, newly discovered evidence i.e. such material facts which were unavailable despite due diligence at the time of the original decision.
55. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that, although a prior resolution dated 21.05.2019 contemplated the issuance of a NOC based on the year 2000 benchmark valuation rates, subsequent developments have rendered the said resolution redundant and inoperative. The Petitioner has argued that the Opposite Party had suppressed material facts, specifically, its applications for the purchase of the subject land under the Uniform Policy, which were submitted on 21.06.2008 and 21.01.2014. These applications are still pending consideration before the competent authority.
56. By that time, the prevailing market value had appreciated significantly, exceeding ₹2 Crore per acre, and in terms of the Uniform Policy, alienation of temple lands must be effected strictly at current market rates to safeguard the proprietary and fiduciary interests of the deity. Moreover, reliance is placed on Clause 7(d) of the Uniform Policy, which prescribes a three-year validity period for any valuation. The direction issued by this Court to execute a sale deed based on the outdated 2020-21 valuation is argued to be contrary to the said clause Page 38 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 and in derogation of the prevailing policy framework regulating the alienation of temple property.
57. It is pertinent to note that on 12.03.2003, the State Government introduced a 'Uniform Policy' (referred to as "ସମାନନୀତି") for the sale of lands belonging to the Shree Jagannath Temple in Puri. Under this policy, lands were to be sold to persons in long-standing possession, in accordance with the provisions of the SJTA. The policy aimed to ensure that such sales were conducted at rates fixed under the Act, in a transparent and equitable manner, benefiting both the temple administration and the possessors.
58. The pendency of these applications is of critical significance, as it gives rise to two key inferences: First, the applications were never acted upon, indicating that ownership or title in respect of the land in question was never lawfully conferred upon the Opposite Party. Second, despite the Opposite Party's strenuous efforts to assert the legitimacy of the sale transaction purportedly executed in its favour via Sale Deed bearing R.S.D. No. 3017, the act of reapplying for the same land suggests a lack of confidence in the validity of its own title. This contradiction casts serious doubt on the Opposite Party's asserted interest in the land.
59. Since it has already been established that, owing to the fact that the original lease in favour of Rabibala Sinha was itself invalid, the land interest purportedly transferred to the Opposite Party vide R.S.D. No. 3017 dated 26.05.1981 was void ab initio; it becomes necessary to examine the additional claims raised by the Opposite Party regarding Page 39 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 their asserted rights over the subject land, as upheld by the impugned judgment dated 27.03.2023.
60. In support of the claim, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party argued that the Jagannath Temple Administration had initiated proceedings under Section 1A of the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act, seeking settlement of temple land in various Mouzas of Khurda District, including Kantia. It was submitted that in OEA Case No. 88/92, disposed of on 27.02.1998, the Temple sought restoration of 16.575 acres in Khata No. 4285 and 59.950 acres in Khata No. 4059, out of which 12.575 acres and 39.950 acres, respectively, were restored in favour of the Temple. The counsel submitted that the land claimed by the Opp. Party falls under these Khatas and continued to stand recorded in the name of Milan Sahoo following finalisation of the said proceedings.
61. However, this claim is unsustainable in law. It has already been conclusively established that the land shown in the name of Milan Sahoo is the result of an erroneous and unlawful transaction, as no valid title or interest was ever conveyed to him owing to the foundational illegality of the initial lease to Rabibala Sinha. Any subsequent recording of land in his name is merely reflective of an administrative lapse and does not confer legitimacy upon a transaction that was void from inception.
62. Moreover, the fragility of the Opposite Party's interest in the disputed land was further evidenced in 2008, when the Revenue Authorities declined to accept land revenue from the Petitioner and directed him to first obtain a 'No Objection Certificate' from the Temple Administration Page 40 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 and to seek correction of the Record of Rights to reflect the proper ownership. In response, the Petitioner applied in the prescribed manner using the format provided by the Zonal Temple Office. However, despite compliance on the part of the Petitioner, the NOC process was never completed nor acted upon, rendering the effort ineffectual. This episode further underscores the fact that the claim of the Opposite Party has always been mired in legal infirmity and administrative doubt, never receiving clear affirmation from the authorities, either in title or in revenue records.
63. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the impugned judgment dated 27.03.2023 makes reference to Communication No. 5174 dated 08.06.2020, wherein the Law Department purportedly conveyed its approval of the proposal under Section 16(2) subject to the fulfillment of specific conditions as enumerated therein:
"1. Sale of Temple Land measuring an area of Ac.5.515 to Shree Jagannath College, Kaipadar, Khordha with total consideration money of Rs.25.14,840/-
2. Sale of Temple Land measuring an area Ac.0.620 to Basudevpur Municipality for construction of permanent Bus Stand @ Rs.99,000/- per decimal BMV of plot no.563, 564, 565, 567 (Gharabarikissam) and @ Rs.60,500/- per decimal BMV of plot no.566 (Patita)
3. Sale of 85 land sale cases of Puri measuring an area of Ac.3.090.5 kadi to 85 applicants of Puri town area with total consideration amount of Rs.75,60,409/-.
4. The Land Committee (State Level) feels it proper to revert the proposal for sale of Ac.15.00 land in Mouza- Kantia to OTTET with advice to re-submit the same with recommendation of the district Level Land Sub-Page 41 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Committee and to obtain present market value of land from District Sub-Registrar."
(Emphasis supplied)
64. The Court, in its impugned judgement, appeared to treat the communication dated 08.06.2020 as adequate compliance with the statutory requirement under Section 16(2) of the SJTA. It was observed that the communication amounted to a form of approval by the State Government for the alienation of the temple land, albeit subject to certain conditions. The impugned judgement further accepted the submission of the then petitioner ("OTTET") that they were ready and willing to fulfill the condition specified in Clause 4 of the communication. It also took note of the undertaking made on behalf of the petitioner that it was even willing to provide the land value at the benchmark rate of 2021, despite the fact that the Law Department's condition was communicated in 2020. Based on this subsequent willingness, the Court inferred that the procedural requirement under Section 16(2) was effectively fulfilled or, at the very least, regularized.
65. However, this reasoning is slightly flawed in terms of prevalent law. The communication dated 08.06.2020 does not contain any express or implied approval of the proposal. On the contrary, it categorically states that the matter is being reverted with advice to resubmit the same along with the requisite recommendation and valuation. Such language clearly signifies deferral, not approval. Section 16(2) requires that the sanction must be definitive, unequivocal, and formally conveyed after Page 42 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 due compliance with the prescribed procedure. A conditional advisory communication directing further action does not satisfy this statutory mandate. Furthermore, the petitioner's ex post facto willingness to comply with the stipulated conditions does not cure the legal infirmity.
66. Additionally, the Court's acceptance of a deferred and conditional communication as a completed sanction conflates administrative advice with legal approval. The mere fact that the Law Department expressed a conditional inclination or procedural advice cannot be elevated to the status of statutory sanction. Until and unless the conditions mentioned in the communication are fulfilled and a fresh, express approval is issued thereafter, there can be no compliance with Section 16(2). C. Doctrine of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit: Court's power to correct its errors
67. The Latin maxim actus curiae neminemgravabit, meaning "an act of the court shall prejudice no one," is a well-established equitable doctrine rooted in the principles of fairness and justice. It empowers courts to correct their own procedural or judicial errors to ensure that no party suffers prejudice due to the court's act or omission. This doctrine reflects the fundamental idea that justice should not be thwarted by inadvertent mistakes made by the judiciary.
68. When the court commits an error in procedure or makes a slip that causes detriment, this principle permits the court to rectify such errors to prevent injustice to the parties involved. Jurisprudentially, courts have invoked this maxim to exercise inherent or supervisory jurisdiction to correct procedural irregularities or clerical mistakes. The Page 43 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that procedural lapses attributable to the court must not result in the loss of substantive rights or unfair prejudice. The doctrine supports the court's power to review, correct, or reopen proceedings to uphold fairness and the proper administration of justice.
69. Its application, however, is limited to errors caused by the court's own acts or omissions and does not extend to mistakes or negligence by litigants. It enables correction of errors apparent on the record, such as wrongful acceptance or rejection of documents, misplacement of files, or erroneous orders, but cannot be used to reopen settled questions of law or final decisions arbitrarily. Practically, by applying actus curiae neminem gravabit, courts protect litigants from undue prejudice resulting from judicial errors, thereby reinforcing the integrity and credibility of the judicial process. In essence, this maxim serves as a crucial judicial tool to ensure that justice is administered fairly and equitably, free from avoidable procedural errors attributable to the court itself.
70. In State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh,25 the Supreme Court examined the scope of actus curiae neminem gravabit which allows correction of unintentional judicial mistakes that may prejudice a party. Such errors include clerical mistakes, calculation errors, or accidental omissions by the court, which can be rectified without re-arguing the case. The important portion is produced hereinunder:
"13. The basis of the provision under Section 152 of the Code is founded on the maxim 'actus curiae 25 (2004) 1 SCC 328 Page 44 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 neminemgravabit' i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no man. The maxim "is founded upon justice and good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law", said Cresswell J. in Freeman v. Tranah (12 C.B.
406). An unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must and alone could be rectified. In Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa (AIR 1966 SC 1047) it was observed that the arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing whereas an error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is an error due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable to be corrected. To illustrate this point it was said that in a case where the order contains something which is not mentioned in the decree, it would be a case of unintentional omission or mistake as the mistake or omission is attributable to the Court which may say something or omit to say something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of mistakes. The provision cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original order or decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective judicial order after the judgment in the case."
71. In the sacred legal conception of Hindu law, the deity Lord Jagannath is regarded as a perpetual minor, incapable of managing His own property and, therefore, under the perpetual protection of the law. It is a deeply unsettling irony that in "Ghor Kaliyug", an age defined by moral decay and ethical collapse, the very devotees who seek divine blessings and protection from the Lord are, in many cases, complicit in systematically divesting Him of His rightful properties. These acts, often veiled under the garb of legality, are nothing short of sacrilege when scrutinized under constitutional and statutory mandates. Page 45 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56
72. In the instant case, the proprietary interests of Lord Jagannath have been gravely compromised by a series of illegal acts that cannot be dismissed as mere procedural lapses or judicial oversight. The lease deed allegedly executed in 1973, without prior approval under Section 16(2) of the SJTA, is void ab initio. The subsequent transfer of title to Rabibala Sinha, followed by alienation in favour of Milan Sahoo and Srinath Sahoo, along with the corresponding mutation entries, collectively constitutes a flagrant breach of statutory safeguards, fiduciary obligations, and administrative discipline, each of which exists precisely to protect the interest of the deity.
73. What renders the present situation particularly grave is the evident institutional failure underlying the impugned transactions. These unlawful alienations have not transpired in a vacuum; rather, they appear to have been enabled, and in certain instances, actively abetted by systemic administrative apathy, procedural irregularities, and a discernible breakdown in interdepartmental coordination. Public functionaries, who are statutorily mandated to safeguard the interests of the deity and protect temple property, have either willfully abdicated their legal responsibilities or have become complicit in the dilution of the deity's proprietary rights. The governmental apparatus, which ought to serve as the vigilant custodian of the temple's estate, has instead assumed the role of a compromised spectator, thereby undermining the sanctity of public trust reposed in such institutions.
74. These irregularities were further compounded by certain inadvertent judicial oversights in the prior proceedings, wherein the impugned Page 46 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 transactions were not subjected to the degree of scrutiny that the law mandates. The failure to examine the invalidity of the mutation entries, the inadvertent disregard of the statutory requirement for prior sanction under Section 16(2) of the SJTA, and the mistaken acceptance of the lease as perpetual in nature were not the result of any intentional lapse, but rather stem from omissions and misapprehensions. These were not issues of substantive judicial determination but errors arising from inadvertence and oversights that, unfortunately, permitted illegitimate transactions to assume a semblance of legality, thereby jeopardizing the lawful interests of the deity.
75. In this context, the invocation of the legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is not only apposite but imperative. This Court cannot permit its own orders to operate as inadvertent instruments of injustice. It is incumbent upon the Court, as a matter of constitutional duty, to rectify any such error or oversight, particularly where the resultant prejudice affects the interests of the deitywhose estate is held in sacred public trust and whose rights the law mandates to be zealously protected.
76. The Court itself is duty bound to protect the interest of the temple over the property by exercising parens patriae jurisdiction. The said mandate is on the basic concept that idol is not a juristic person. Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of A.A.Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board,26 held as follows:
"The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their 26 AIR 2007 SC 3162 Page 47 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 trustees/archakas/shebaits/ employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the passive or active collusion of the authorities concerned. Such acts of "fences eating the crops" should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of boards/trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation."
77. The Madras High Court in K. Senthilkumar v. The Principal Secretary to Government, held that that "Deity" in the temple is a "minor" and the Court should be astute to protect the interests of an idol in any litigation. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:
"26. In the present case, the 99 years Lease Deed executed by one Dharmakartha Govinda Reddiyar itself is null and void. There are further Settlement Deeds or the Sale Deeds also cannot be held as valid. The temple property, which is meant for the benefit of the temple, can never be allowed to be encumbered in a different manner and in such circumstances, the Courts are bound to step in and deal with the issues properly.
27. The "Deity" in the temple is a "minor" and the Court should be astute to protect the interests of an idol in any litigation. Therefore, when the trustee or the Executive Officer or the custodian of the idol, temple and its properties, leave the same in lurch, any person interested in respect of such temple or worshiping the 'Deity' can certainly be clothed with an adhoc power of representation to protect its Page 48 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 interest. Where the persons in management of a temple failed to protect the interest of the temple https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ diligently, the Court is empowered to take notice of such facts and deal with the issues in an appropriate manner. The Court is bound to take notice of the fact that the Executive Officers appointed in the temples are being changed periodically and in many a case, they do not get fully acquainted with the history or affairs of the temple. If there is lapses, slackness or negligence on the part of the Executive Officer and the trustees of the temple, "it is the duty of the Court to ensure that the 'Deity' does not suffer thereby. The Courts should be astute to protect the interests of an idol in any litigation."
28. Fraudulent and illegal encroachments of temple properties is a crime against the society at large. Misappropriation of the funds of the temple is undoubtedly an offence and all such offences are to be registered and the offenders are liable to be prosecuted by the State as the State is the controller of these temples and the offences are also committed against the State. Temple properties are allowed to be looted by few greedy men and by few professional criminals and land grabbers. Active or passive contribution and collusion by the officials of the HR & CE Department cannot be overruled. These lapses, negligence, dereliction of duty on the part of such public officials are also to be viewed seriously and all appropriate actions in this regard are highly warranted.
29. The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards, require to be protected and safeguarded by their Trustees/Archaks/ Sebaits/employees. Instances are many where persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false claims of ownership or tenancy, or adverse possession. This is possible only with the Page 49 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 passive or active collusion of the concerned authorities. Such acts of 'fences eating the crops' should be dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of Boards/Trusts, and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and charitable institutions from wrongful claims or misappropriation."
78. The erosion of the Lord's property is not merely a legal infraction; it is a spiritual affront and a cultural injury. The judiciary must therefore act as the final sentinel against such desecration. It is imperative that this Court ensures its jurisdiction is not misused to cloak fraudulent transactions with a veneer of legitimacy. Any judicial endorsement of such transactions would amount to a ratification of sacrilege.
79. Let not the sanctity of the temple fall victim to legal technicalities or administrative complicity. This Court must respond with clarity, vigilance, and resolve; restoring not only the property to its rightful custodian but reaffirming the rule of law in matters where law and faith converge.
VI. CONCLUSION:
80. Large swathes of land endowed in the name of Lord Jagannath, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas, have already slipped from the effective control of the temple administration due to the execution of such erroneousalienation of such immovable property.
81. Such alienation of the temple properties have rendered the estate economically unviable, as the returns are grossly disproportionate to Page 50 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 the market value of the land and insufficient even to meet the administrative costs associated with their management.
82. In practice, such arrangements result in a de facto alienation of temple property, stripping the deity of meaningful ownership while vesting long-term enjoyment in private hands. Upon the expiry of these lease terms, any effort by the authorities to resume the lands for the benefit of the temple is likely to face severe public resistance, especially where the land has changed hands multiple times or been developed. The political ramifications of reclaiming such property are so fraught that successive governments may be deterred from undertaking any corrective action, thereby entrenching the loss.
83. The prevailing approach does little to protect the long-term proprietary interests of the deity. While it may momentarily augment revenue and reduce administrative burdens, it has the unintended consequence of legitimizing what is, in effect, the permanent transfer of sacred trust property into private dominion. Such a scheme runs counter to the principles underlying the SJTA, which enjoins the State and its agencies to act as vigilant custodians of the deity's estate, not facilitators of its erosion.
84. Having considered the entirety of the submissions, the relevant legal principles, and the evident lapses in the handling of the subject property, the Court issues the following directions:
(i). The concerned revenue and land records authorities are instructed to take immediate steps to correct the entries with respect to properties in the name of Lord Jagannathin their records to reflect Page 51 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 the true legal position, consistent with the statutory provisions under the SJTA and applicable law. Any mutation or record that is contrary to law and the principles upheld in this judgment shall be expunged forthwith.
(ii). The State Government is directed to review the existing provisions and procedural mechanisms under the SJTA, especially Section 16(2), to address the glaring lacunae that have allowed unauthorized alienation and mutation of temple properties. The current framework has demonstrated ineffectiveness in safeguarding the proprietary rights of the Temple and its deity, Lord Jagannath, and must therefore be strengthened, clarified, and made more stringent to prevent recurrence of such irregularities.
(iii). The Law Department and the Temple Administration shall ensure proper coordination and timely communication in all matters concerning alienation, lease, or mutation of temple lands. No sanction or approval shall be considered valid unless it strictly complies with the statutory requirements, including prior recommendation by competent land committees and valuation by the District Sub-Registrar, as mandated by law.
(iv). The administrative machinery, including revenue officials and subordinate authorities, shall be sensitized to the unique status of the temple properties and the fact that Lord Jagannath, being a perpetual minor, requires special protection of his interests. Any negligence, corruption, or administrative lethargy resulting in Page 52 of 53 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 17-May-2025 18:34:56 illegal transfer or mutation of temple lands must be identified and acted upon with due diligence.
(v). Finally, the State Government shall take appropriate steps to streamline and improve the efficiency of the processes related to temple land administration to prevent future disputes and ensure that the rights of the Temple remain inviolable. This shall include digitalization of records, clear guidelines on mutation and transfer, and robust monitoring mechanisms.
85. With the above observation, the Review Petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 27.03.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 8201 of 2022 is set aside.
86. Accordingly, CONTC No.3374 of 2023 is rendered futile and is quashed.
87. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
88. Accordingly, both the Writ Petition and the CONTC are disposed of.
89. Interim order, if any, passed earlier in any of the Petitions stands vacated.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 16th May, 2025/ Page 53 of 53