Delhi District Court
Smt. Sharda Ahuja vs Sh. Suresh Kumar on 12 September, 2019
IN THE COURT OF SH. AJAY NAGAR
ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER (WEST), TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI.
ARC No.- 25865/2016
Smt. Sharda Ahuja
W/o Sh. Baldev Raj Ahuja,
R/o W-21, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110027. ...... Petitioner
VERSUS
Sh. Suresh Kumar
S/o Late Sh. Raunak Ram,
Shop No. 4/2947-D, Shiv Chowk,
Ranjeet Nagar, New Delhi-110008. ..... Respondent
Date of Filing : 16.03.2012
Date of Judgment : 12.09.2019
JUDGMENT
1. Present case is a petition U/Sec. 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'DRC Act') for eviction of the respondent in respect of Shop No. 4/2947-D, Shiv Chowk, Ranjeet Nagar, New Delhi-110008 more conspicuously shown within red lines in the attached site plan (hereinafter referred to as 'tenanted premises').
2. In the present petition, it is inter-alia averred by the petitioner that the property bearing No. 2947-D was constructed on the piece of land measuring 87 square yards in the area Village Shadipur, now known as Shiv Chowk, Ranjeet Nagar, New Delhi which was owned and possessed by late Smt. Janki Devi Wd./o Late Sh. Charan Dass, mother of the petitioner, who ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 1 of 47 inducted the respondent as tenant in the tenanted premises. That Late Smt. Janki Rani @ Janki Devi unfortunately expired on 22.10.2009 leaving behind the petitioner, her daughter Smt. Satnam Manchanda and one son Sh. Manjot Singh Batra and both of them i.e. Smt. Satnam Manchanda and one son Sh. Manjot Singh Batra relinquished their shares in favour of the petitioner vide Relinquishment Deed dated 23.12.2009 and thus, the petitioner became the exclusive and sole owner of the said property. That the petitioner being the owner and landlady of the tenanted premises requires the tenanted premises bonafidely for using the same for commercial purposes for herself as well as for her dependent family members as the petitioner has no other alternative accommodation available for her.
It is further averred that the elder daughter of Ms. Shefali is well versed with boutique business. That petitioner and her daughter want to run a boutique in the shop No. 4 & 5 and for running the boutique, sufficient space is required i.e. for fabricating clothes, handwork embroidery, for entertaining the customers, displaying the garments and also for a Trial Room. Thus, it is claimed by the petitioner that the need of the petitioner is bonafide and urgent in nature.
Lastly, it is prayed by the petitioner that an eviction order may be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent.
3. Notice of the eviction petition was sent to the respondent. In response to which, the respondent filed detailed leave to defend application which was allowed and the respondent was given an opportunity to file Written Statement.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 2 of 474. In the Written Statement, the respondent has inter-alia contended that the petition of the petitioner is not maintainable as the need of the petitioner is not bonafide but malafide. That the petitioner has deliberated concealed the fact that he has alternative accomodation available at her disposal. That the suit building consists of ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor. That the entire building is commercial in nature and was let out to different tenants from time to time. That husband of the petitioner Sh. Baldev Ahuja got the portions of property vacated recently and has kept the said portions vacant and is not using the same with ulterior motives only to show paucity of accommodation. That the site plan filed along with the petition is not in accordance with the site. That there is no relationship between the petitioner and the respondent of landlord and tenant. That the intention of the petitioner is just to get the tenanted premises vacated from the respondent.
That the daughter of the petitioner Ms. Shefali is married and is happily living with her husband. That the husband of Ms. Shefali is multi-millionaire person having well established business under the name and style of Tip Top Fashion. That the husband of Ms. Shefali owns several immovable properties from which he is getting huge rental income. That the husband of Ms. Shefali also owns two building in Tank Road at 16/57, Gali No. 5, Tank Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. That the husband of Ms. Shefali is having flourishing wholesale business of garments in Tank Road Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. That Ms. Shefali also owns commercial building in Tank Road from which she is getting huge rental income. That Ms. Shefali also owns a property bering No. 12/19, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 3 of 47 and the said property is a big property and the said property can be used for the alleged need of Ms. Shefali for setting up the business of boutique.
It is further contented by the respondent that even before filing the present petition, husband of the petitioner approached the respondent and made an offer either to vacate the tenanted premises or to purchase the same for a consideration of Rs. 20 Lakh, which was/is not at all acceptable to the respondent. That the intention of the petitioner is just to get the tenanted premises vacated from the respondent and to sell the property to enter into a collaboration with a builder so as to construct a complete commercial property and let out the same on huge rentals. That neither the petitioner nor the previous landlord of the respondent had ever disclosed the factum of alleged Relinquishment Deed dated 23.12.2009. That he has not been supplied the copy thereof. That the respondent has never attorned the petitioner as her landlord.
It is further contended that initially Smt. Janak Rani was receiving the rent from the respondent and after her death Smt. Satnam started receiving rent from the respondent from July, 2009. However, Smt. Satnam also stopped receiving rent from the respondent from Jan. 2012 as she disclosed that dispute has arisen in respect of the said property as Smt. Janak Rani during her lifetime had entered into an Agreement to Sell and the dispute has arisen with regard to the same. That thereafter no one came to collect the rent from the respondent. That correct site plan has already been filed by the respondent. That it is admitted that monthly rent of the tenanted premises is Rs. 644/- only.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 4 of 47It is further contended by the respondent that the petitioner is not the landlord of the respondent. That the respondent is an old tenant in the tenanted premises. That the petitioner is not the landlord of the respondent. That Smt. Janki Devi was not the owner of the tenanted premises and she was merely collecting rent from the respondent and after her death, her daughter Smt. Satnam started collecting rent from the petitioner. That Smt. Janki Devi was having one daughter Smt. Satnam and one son Sh. Manjot Singh Batra only and the petitioner is not the daughter of Smt. Janki Devi. That petitioner is the daughter of Sh. Mehar Singh. Smt. Janak Rani was paternal aunt of the petitioner and was never a daughter of Smt. Janak Rani.
It is also contended by the respondent that even otherwise the petition is not maintainable before the expiry of five years from the date of transfer of the property in favour of the petitioner in view of Section 14(6) of D.R.C. Act. That the petitoner is not in blood relation of the deceased landlady so, she is not entitled to claim the eviction or file petition before expiry of five years of the death of Smt. Janak Rani and/or the alleged Relinquishment Deed in her favour. That the tenanted premises is a commercial building which comprises of ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor. That the entire third floor of the suit building is lying vacant at present and the entire building is commercial in nature and is let out to different tenants from time to time. That the husband of the petitioner Sh. Baldev Singh Ahuja got the property vacated recently and has kept the said building vacant and is not using the same with ulterior motives only to show paucity of accommodation. That the petitioner has intentionally not filed the site plan of the ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 5 of 47 building which would clearly show that there is ample accommodation available in the said building itself where the petitioner's son has been doing the said business and the same is on the main Patel Road, which is more prestigious and commercially viable shop. It is further alleged that in addition to shop no. 3 and store on the ground floor, which is lying locked in the said building, there are three storeys above the tenanted premises where there are three halls on each floor, which were being used as shops for commercial purpose by the previous tenants. That the first floor also had been let out by Smt. Janak Rani earlier to Sh. Baldev Singh Ahuja, who had been using it for residence-cum-office. Thereafter, the said portion was re-let by Smt. Janak Rani for tailoring shop and then to some whole sale dealer of buttons in the last 3-4 years. That the petitioner got vacated half of the second floor from the tenant who was running a factory of manufacturing transistors in the name and style of Hollywood Electronics on the second floor, which was run by one Sh. Satinder Kumar Mahajan. That petitioner's husband about eight months back, got the said porperty vacated from the said tenant by paying a premium of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the said tenant and the entire market knows about it. That the second floor of the said property was also let out to a Bio-Lab which remained in occupation for about 15 years. That Sh. Baldev Raj, husband of the petitioner got the said portion on the second floor vacated from the said tenant about one year back by paying a premium of Rs. 5,00,000/-. That the said tenant also vacated the second floor which was being for commercial purpose. That on the third floor, there was an office of a Chartered Accountant, who vacated the said two rooms about one year back and thereafter the said rooms were again ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 6 of 47 let to one Sh. Aggrwal, who was also running an office of some publisher for about two months and thereafter vacated the said two rooms.
It is further alleged that the son of the petitioner Sh. Punit Ahuja has been working with his father for the last about more than 12-15 years and has been running the shop in the building owned by the petitioner herself i.e. property No. 2632/16, Opposite Metro Pillar No. 213, Main Patel Rorad, Shadipur, New Delhi-110008. That the Bank accounts of the petitioner as well as the son would disclose that petitioner's son is not unemployed and is having substantial income which he earns out of the business run by him in the above stated shop which although in the name of the husband of the petitioner, but it is in fact the petitoner's son, who is running the business for the last more than 12 years. That petitioner's son alone is sitting in the said shop and doing the business by opening and closing the shop. That the petitioner is seeking an eviction on the ground of additional accommodation and there is neither an urgency in the need nor the need of the petitioner is bonafide. That the husband of the petitioner does not remain well and is medically unfit to do business and it is the petitioner's son, who has been handling the business in the shop at Shadipur, which is less than half kilometer away from the tenanted premises.
It is also contended by the respondent that the married daughter is not dependent upon the petitioner for her need for commercial employment and is not covered under the definition of family of petitioner once she got married and she is very well settled with her husband in her matrimonial home. That she is neither a divorcee nor is dependent family member of the petitioner. That the petitioner is a house wife and has never ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 7 of 47 done any business. That petitioner is living at W-21, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. That the petitioner has vacant possession of 09 big rooms in the property which are lying locked and are not being used or occupied by the petitioner for her alleged need.
Lastly, it is prayed by the respondent that present petition may be dismissed.
5. Replication was filed by the petitioner to the Written Statement of the respnodent wherein the petitioner has refuted the stand of the respondent and reaffirmed her original stand as well as the petitioner has clarified the stand taken by her. In her replication, the petitioner has reasserted her bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises.
6. Thereafter, after completion of pleadings, matter was fixed for Petitioner's Evidence/P.E. Sh. Baldev Raj Ahuja was examined as PW-1. Petitioner also examined Ms. Shefali Oberoi as PW-2. Both the witnesses were cross examined at length and thereafter petitioner's evidence was closed.
Evidence was also led by the respondent who examined Sh. Praveen Bansal as RW-1, Sh. Raj Singh as RW-2, Sh. Ghanshyam Goyal as RW-3 and Sh. Deepak Jain as RW-4. All the witnesses were also cross examined at length by Ld. Counsel for petitioner.
Thereafter, Respondent's Evidence was closed and the matter was fixed for final arguments.
7. It is pertinent to mention that a Civil Misc. Main petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 8 of 47 order dated 10.04.2019 passed by this court was preferred by the respondent before the Hon'ble High Court and an opportunity was given to the petitoner for re-examination of the RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh. Thereafter, in compliance of the order dated 24.07.2019 of the Hon'ble High Court, RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh was examined and cross examined as per the specific directions of Hon'ble High Court. Furthermore, both the parties were given an opportunity to file the additional written arguments.
8. I have carefully gone through the written arguments filed by Ld. Counsels for both the parties and case law relied upon. I have also carefully gone through the testimonies, documents and material on record.
In his written arguments, the respondent has inter-alia submitted that Smt. Shefali is happily married daughter of the petitioner, who is married to a multi millionaire and owns several immovable properties, rental income from them, two building in tank road i.e. 16/57, Gali No. 5, Tank Road, Delhi. That Shefali is the owner of 12/19, East Patel, Nagar, Delhi of two and a half storey property on 200 sq. yards worth Rs. 11 crores. That entire building where tenancy premises is situated is commercial having ground, first, second and third floor. That the site plan filed by the petitioner is not correct. That husband of the petitioner approached the respondent to vacate or to purchase the shop for Rs. 20 Lakhs. That the petitioner did not disclose about the release deed. That Smt. Janak Rani received rent, after her death, Sh. Satnam received rent till January, 2012. That no one came to collect rent from the respondent. That petitioner is not the daughter of Smt. Janak Rani and she ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 9 of 47 has no blood relation nor she adopted her. That Release Deed is a sham document. That Smt. Janak Rani informed that she had sold to petitioner's husband by way of agreement to sell. That Smt. Janak Rani lost senses few months prior to death and was in coma since August 2009 and died on 22.10.2009. That soon after two months, relinquishment deed was procured, saving the stamp duty. That as per Section 14(6) of D.R.C. Act, petition cannot be filed.
It is further stated in the written arguments that the eviction decree on similar ground has been also against one Sh. Sandeep Puri in respect of Shop No. 5 on 13.09.2018 and the Hon'ble High Court has stayed the operation of eviction orders. That the alleged bonafide need is for her daughter, Ms. Shefali Oberoi. That she is not a dependent memeber of the petitioner's family. That her husband is very affluent person and they reside at East Patel Nagar which is a very posh colony. That further petitoner had concealed the fact that in 2001, her husband had purchased a big house that is property bearing H. No. 12/19, East Patel nagar in the name of Ms. Shefali worth Rs. 9 crores. That after marriage, husband of the daughter purchased a big shop at Tank Road, near Karol Bagh, Delhi by spending a sum of Rs. 6-7 crores. That the petitioner filed four connected eviction petitions on the ground of alleged bonafide requirement wherein out of four, three petitions have already been allowed and the possession of two shops namely shop no. 1 & 2 of the suit property has already been taken over by the petitioner during the pendency of the present eviction petition but there are not being used for the purpose for which the petitioner got them evicted. That the two shops were taken for the alleged created frivolous need of his son.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 10 of 47It is further stated in the written arguments that the son of the petitioner is still running his business from the other shop at Patel Road, where he had been running the business with his father. That the petitioner and her daughter has no knowledge and qualification for starting and running a business of Boutique. That Mrs. Shefali has two children and that they are school going and for this reason, she has never done a job or any business for the welfare and proper care of her children. That three shops on the ground floor, entire first floor, second floor, and third floor of the suit property are lying vacant. That the second floor of the suit property was occupied by one "Unison Pharma" and another to "Hollywood Electronics" and the same have been vacated in the later half of the year 2011.
It is also stated that the respondent has also concealed about the alternative space in the form of a shop, on the ground floor of the suit property, which faces the main road of the colony which is 25-30 feet wide. That the said shops have not been numbered in the site plan and is situated between the shop no. 3 & 4 of the suit premises. That the same is lying locked and is covered with the iron shutter. That the petitioner has also concealed about the two other commercial properties. That one commercial property which is available at property bearing No. 2632/16, opposite Metro Pillar No. 213, Main Patel Road, Shadipur, New Delhi-110008. That the said property comprises of five floors and is approximately 100 square yards. That the other property number 2740, Street No. 23, Beadon Pura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi admeasuring about 200 suqare yards is also available with the petitioner. That the petitioner has concealed the material facts regarding the strained relations between the petitioner and her daughter Ms. Shefali Oberoi.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 11 of 47That it is apparently clear from the various photographs and videos taken on different dates from the period starting from 30th October, 2018 till 9th November, 2018 that the son of the petitioner is regularly sitting and running the business with his father in the shop which is a property bearing No. 2632/16, Opposite Metro Pillar No. 213, Main Patel Road, Shadipur, New Delhi.
Additional Written Submissions on behalf of the respondent were also filed inter-alia submitting that as per the order dated 24.07.2019 of the Hon'ble High Court, the examination in chief of RW-2 (Sh. Raj Singh) recorded on 08.08.2019.
It is further submitted by the respondent that from the statement of RW-2, it is very clear that petitioner is in possession of four shops in the suit premises out of which one is used for store purposes and other shop is lying locked by the petitioner. And the other two shops which one servant of Sh. Baldev Singh Ahuja occasionlly opens and closes the shop, Sh. Baldev Ahuja visits the said shops occasionally, and Sh. Puneet Ahuja never sits in the said shops which were got vacated by the petitioner for her son Sh. Punit Ahuja on the ground of bonafide requirement to run the business.
In her additional written arguments, the petitioner has inter-alia submitted that the respondent has sub-let the tenanted premises to Sh. Praveen Kumar Bansal, who is also having the shop adjoining the suit property. That it is important in the light of the fact that RW-2 has stated that he knows both the tenants of these shops then if Sh. Puneet Ahuja is not carrying on the ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 12 of 47 business, as alleged by them then why those two tenants have not taken any action. That secondly, the knowledge of RW-2 is based on hear say and nothing else. Furthermore, he has not given answer to those questions which have been specifically asked from him, for testing his knowledge about the suit property. All this shows that he is a tutored witness and has come to depose at the instance of the attorney of the respondent- Sh. Praveen Kumar Bansal. That RW-1, who is a sub-lettee is having no knowledge and others RW-2 and RW-3 are the procured witnsses. That with regard to RW-4, it is submitted that again, this witness was not able to identify the shop Nos. 1 & 2 or the shop in question. That the petitioner has been able to prove her bonafide requirements and she is not having any other alternative accommodation, therefore, she is entitled for the eviction order.
9. It is pertinent to mention here that the present petition was filed on 16.03.2012 and this court was inclined to dispose it of as early as possible being one of the old matters pending in this court and giving priority to these cases in view of the mandate of Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Apex Court.
It is also important to mention that the present matter was fixed for orders/judgment on 07.05.2019. Furthermore, vide order dated 04.05.2019, a transfer petition preferred by the respondent was dismissed by Ld. Senior Civil Judge/ Rent Controller (West), subject to costs of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited with the D.L.S.A. Thereafter, with intention to delay the proceedings/ judgment in the present matter, the respondent approached the Ld. District & Sessions Judge, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi by filing an appeal against the order dated ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 13 of 47 04.05.2019 passed by Ld. Senior Civil Judge/ Rent Controller, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, which was ultimately dismissed with the costs of Rs. 10,000/- and the interim order dated 14.05.2019 granted to the respondent, was vacated.
It is also important to mention that thereafter, the respondent approached the Hon'ble High Court to challenge the order dated 10.04.2019 passed by this court alleging that this court has declined the request of the petitioner (respondent herein) to re-examine RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh and vide order dated 24.07.2019 passed by the Hon'ble High Court, the respondent was granted opportunity to re-examine the witness/RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh. Accordingly, in compliance of the said order of the Hon'ble High Court, witness/RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh was again examined and cross examined.
It is also important to mention that the respondent left no stone unturned to delay the judgment in the present matter. The present matter was fixed for order/judgment on 07.05.2019 but the judgment could not be passed for almost four months due to dilatory tactics adopted by the respondent. Several opportunities have already been granted to the respondent in this case but the respondent tried to delay the present case on one pretext or the other. However, this court is inclined to dispose of the present matter as early as possible in view of mandate of Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court, as this is one of the old matters pending this court.
10. It is expedient to reproduce the Section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act which is as under:
"Section-14. Protection of tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 14 of 47 order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by court or any controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-
"That the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation."
As such, followings are the ingredients of Section 14 (1)
(e) of D.R.C. Act:-
(i) There should be relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent.
(ii) Landlord should be the owner of the tenanted premises.
(iii) That the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for himself/herself or for any member of his/her family dependent upon him/her.
(iv) Landlord should not have other reasonable suitable accommodation.
11. Let us discuss the ingredients of Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act:-
(i) & (ii). Landlordship/Ownership:-
12. Perusal of record shows that in the present case, the petitioner has claimed to be landlady and owner of the tenanted ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 15 of 47 premises on the ground of Relinquishment Deed dated 23.12.2009 executed by Smt. Satnam Manchanda and Sh. Manjot Singh Batra. It is claimed by the petitioner that mother of the petitioner Smt. Janak Rani @ Janki Devi wd./o late Sh. Charan Dass inducted the respondent as tenant in the tenanted premises and after her death on 20.10.2009, left behind petitioner, her daughter Smt. Satnam Manchanda and one son Sh. Manjot Singh Batra. It is further claimed that both of them Smt. Satnam Manchanda and Sh. Manjot Singh Batra relinquished their respective shares in favour of petitioner vide relinquishment deed dated 23.12.2009.
On the other hand, the respondent has claimed that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and neither the petitioner nor the previous landlord of the respondent had ever disclosed the factum of alleged relinquishment deed dated 23.12.2009. Moreover, respondent has also claimed that Sh. Janak Devi is not the owner of the tenanted premises and she was merely collecting the rent from the respondent and after her death, her daughter Smt. Satnam Started collecting rent. It is also alleged by the respondent that the petitioner is not the daughter of Smt. Janak Devi. Instead, she is the daughter of Sh. Mehar Singh. And Smt. Janak Rani was paternal Aunt of the petitioner.
13. It is expedient to reproduce the relevant portion of the case law which is as under:-
In case titled as Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. 1995 RLR 162 a Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while dealing with the concept of ownership in a pending eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act had noted as follows:ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 16 of 47
"There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny ownership in cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the substance of such a plea on the part of the tenants the Courts have insisted that they should state who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In the present case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases involving disputes of title to the property. Ownership is not to be proved in absolute terms. The respondent does not claim the owner of the premises."
Further, in the case titled as Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs Smt Ved Prabha & ors 1987 AIR 2028, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: -
"That the meaning of term 'owner' is vis a vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant."
It is well settled proposition of law that the petitioner need not prove his/her ownership in absolute term. It is sufficient that if he/she has proved that he/she is something more than the tenant.
It is well settled position of the law that for the purposes of Sec. 14(1)(e) of the D.R.C. Act, the petitioner is required to prove his/her ownership also. But it is also well settled that petitioner need not to prove his/her ownership in absolute terms. It is sufficient for the petitioner to prove that he/she is something more than the tenant.
Moreover, 116 of the Indian Evidence Act is relevant to reproduce here which is as under:-
"116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.--No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given."ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 17 of 47
14. As such, the tenant has no right to challenge the ownership of the landlord while continuing in the tenanted premises and if he/she wants to challenge it, he/she can do so only after his/her discontinues in the tenanted premises. But record clearly shows that the respondent is still in the possession of the tenanted premises.
As such, in view of mandate of Sec. 116 of Indian Evidence Act, respondent cannot challenge the ownership of the landlord, who let out to him the tenanted premises.
In the present case, the petitioner has claimed the landlordship as well as ownership on the basis of relinquishment deed dated 23.12.2009. On the other hand, respondent has claimed that no one disclosed the factum of alleged relinquishment deed dated 23.12.2009 and copy thereof was not supplied to him.
In the case titled as Sri Ram Pasricha Vs. Jagan Nath & Ors 1976 AIR 2335, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed :-
"the relationship between the parties being that of landlord and tenant,only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord Under section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. The tenant can not deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant question of title to the leased property is irrelevant."
Furthermore, in the case titled as Subhash Jain vs. Ravi Sehgal in RC Rev. No. 292/2013, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi observed as under :-
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 18 of 47"The other objection of the petitioner is also without any force that the sale deed dated 29th March, 1993 is a sham document. The petitioner cannot object the history of ownership of the suit property in view of the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the tenant has no right to challenge the ownership of the landlord as he is not a contender to the suit property."
In the case of Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450 and Shanti Sharma vs. Ved Prabha, 1987 RLR 526 SC, it was held that it is not the concern of the tenant as to how the landlord acquired the property.
In the case of Bharat Bhushan Vij vs. Arti Techchandani, 2008 (153) DLT 247 in paras 4 and 5 it was held as under :
"4. The concept of ownership in a landlord- tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after death of the original owner without demur and without raising an objection against the person, who claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that there is a ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 19 of 47 testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner."
15. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the respondent has no right to dispute the title or ownership of the landlord. Even otherwise, the respondent has not disclosed the name of the person, who is the landlord/landlady qua tenanted premises, if not the petitioner. Moreover, in the paragraph no. 3 on merits, the respondent has inter-alia admitted that initially Smt. Janak Rani was receiving the rent from the respondent and after her death Smt. Satnam started receiving the rent from him. As such, respondent himself has admitted the landlordship of Smt. Janak Rani but in the paragraph no. 18(a), it is inter-alia contended by the respondent that Smt. Janak Rani was not the owner of the property and she was merely collecting the rent.
In view of Sec. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the respondent/tenant has no right to challenge the ownership of Smt. Janak Devi, as he himself has admitted her as landlady.
16. One of the contention of the respondent is that initially Smt. Janak Rani was receiving the rent from the respondent and after her death, smt. Satnam started receiving rent since July 2009 and she stopped receiving rent from the respondent w.e.f. January, 2012 and thereafter no one came to collect the rent from the respondent. On the other hand, petitioner has ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 20 of 47 denied these allegations.
Perusal of record shows that no rent receipt or any document has been placed on record by the respondent showing that Smt. Janak Rani or after her death Smt. Satnam received rent from the respondent from July 2009 upto January 2012 and he has merely made the bald allegations.
The respondent has further claimed that no one came thereafter i.e. January 2012 to collect the rent from the respondent.
But in my considered view, he could have deposited the rent U/Sec. 27 of the D.R.C. Act but no such action has been taken by the respondent for the reasons best known to him. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that rent receipts were not issued by Smt. Satnam for the rent paid to her, he could have approached the Rent Controller U/Sec. 26 of the D.R.C. Act but he has not gone for such kind of remedy also. Interestingly, the respondent has not claimed in his W.S. that Smt. Satnam is the landlady of the tenanted premises. He has merely stated in the paragraph No. 3 on merits that he paid rent to Smt. Satnam from July 2009 upto January 2012.
As such, the respondent has not disclosed the name of the landlady or landlord if the petitioner is not landlady.
In the written statement, the respondent has also claimed that Smt. Janak Devi is not the owner of the property in question and she was merely collecting rent from the respondent and after her death, her daughter Smt. Satnam was collecting rent.
In my considered view, this contention does not have any substance as the respondent has not disclosed the reasons for paying the rent to Smt. Janak Rani or Smt. Satnam if they were ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 21 of 47 not the owner or landlady of the tenanted premises. Moreover, they have not disclosed the name of actual owner of the tenanted premises if the petitioner is not the owner.
17. One of the pleas taken by the respondent is that the petitioner is not the daughter of Smt. Janak Rani. This allegation is denied by the petitioner.
In my considered view, the respondent/ tenant has no right to challenge such kind of relationship and it is the prerogative of the legal heirs of Smt. Janak Rani and the tenant has no right to raise such kind of issues.
Keeping in view the material on record and documents specifically document Ex. PW-1/4 (Colly), the petitioner has been able to prove that she is something more than the tenant/ respondent and she need not prove her ownership in absolute terms.
As such, ingredients in respect of landlordship and ownership are satisfied by the petitioner.
(iii) & (iv). Bonafide requirement and alternative accommodation:-
18. It is expedient to discuss some case law on these ingredients which are as under:-
In the case titled as Sarla Ahuja Vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 100, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-
"The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 22 of 47 not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."
In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 SC 2507, at pg-2512 in para 14 & 15, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:-
"14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 which speaks of non- availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant fact Ors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come."ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 23 of 47
In the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under:-
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC
353. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
The moral duty of a father/mother to help establish his/her son/daughter was also recognized by the Hon'ble Apex Court in "Joginder Pal Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Behal" [AIR 2002 SC 2256] in the following words:
"24........Keeping in view the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord. To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord. If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire : (i) whether the requirement of such person can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identify nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the overlaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent."
19. Perusal of record shows that in the present case, petitioner has filed the present petition for using the same for commercial purposes for herself and her dependent family members. The claim of the petitioner is that her elder daughter Ms. Shefali is well versed with the boutique business. And the ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 24 of 47 petitioner and her daughter want to run a boutique in the shop no. 4 & 5 for which sufficient space is required for fabricating the cloths, handwork embroidery, entertaining the customers, displaying the garments and also for a Trial Room.
On the other hand, the respondent has claimed that there is no bonafide need of the petitioner and the petitioner has withheld the material facts from this court. The claim of the respondent is that daughter of the petitioner Ms. Shefali is married and is well settled with her multi-millionaire husband. And Ms. Shefali as well as her husband is having several properties having good income.
It is also the contention of the respondent that intention of the petitioner is to get it vacated and to sell the property and to construct a complete commercial property and let out the same on huge rentals. It is also claimed that the petitioner is seeking eviction on the ground of additional accommodation and there is no urgency. Moreover, husband of petitioner is not medically fit to do business and it is the petitioner's son, who is handling the business in the shop at Shadipur. It is also contended by the respondent that married daughter is not dependent upon the petitioner for her need for commercial employment and is not covered within the definition of petitioner.
20. It is also contended by the respondent that petitioner is house wife and has never done any business.
In case titled as "Labhu Lal Vs. Sandhya Gupta"
[2011(1) RCR,(Rent) 231 (Delhi)], it has been held that the children are very much dependent on the landlord for the purpose of setting up their business and such a requirement is a bonafide one.ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 25 of 47
In the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as Raghunath G. Panhale (dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Chagan Lal Sundarji & Co. (1999) 8 SCC 1 wherein it was held that:-
"It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of "need or requirement" to be equivalent to "dire or absolute or compelling necessity". According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business. The manner in which the courts have gone into the meaning of "lockout" in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 appears to us to be nothing but a perverse approach to the problem. One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service should first resign his job and wait for the unknown and uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty. Joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get back one's premises. For that matter assuming the landlord was in a job and had not resigned it or assuming that pending the long-drawn litigation he started some other temporary water business to sustain himself, that would not be an indication that the need for establishing a grocery shop was not a bona fide or a reasonable requirement or that it was motivated or was a mere design to evict the tenant".
In the case titled as Ram Babu Agarwal vs. Jay Kishan Das 2009(2) RCR 455, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-
"However, as regards the question of bonafide need, we find that the main ground for rejecting the landlord's petition for eviction was that in the petition the landlord had ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 26 of 47 alleged that he required the premises for his son Giriraj who wanted to do footwear business in the premises in question. The High Court has held that since Giriraj has no experience in the footwear business and was only helping his father in the cloth business, hence there was no bonafide need. We are of the opinion that a person can start a new business even if he has no experience in the new business. That does not mean that his claim for starting the new business must be rejected on the ground that it is a false claim.
Many people start new businesses even if they do not have experience in the new business, and sometimes they are successful in the new business also."
In the case titled as Lajpat Rai Vs Raman Jain 2012 Law suit (Del) 1439, it was observed by Hon'ble High Court as under:-
"The facts have been disclosed by the petitioners himself in the eviction petition; the petitioners also being a commerce graduate from the Shri Ram College of Commerce seeks an independent business of his own; thus this need to set up a business of his own cannot be in any manner be said to be imaginative or a need which is moonshine; it is a genuine need; the present petitioners having inherited this shop from his grandmother by virtue of the aforenoted Will wishes to set up his own business of rubber and latex which he was earlier carrying on with his father and in which he has gained expertise and knowledge. Thus in no manner can it be said that this need of the landlord is not a bonafide need. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement; it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to him; neither the Court tell him the manner he wishes to set up his business."
21. Perusal of record shows that the respondent has claimed that the petitioner is having alternative accommodation in her possession.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 27 of 47On the other hand, the petitioner has refuted the allegation stating that she is not having alternative reasonably suitable commercial accommodation with her possession.
In my considered view, everyone has a right, as well as duty to work for himself/herself and for the family members dependent on them. It is well settled proposition of law as held in catena of judgments of Hon'ble superior courts that bonafide requirement of a person does not become malafide merely because he/she not having experience. As far as dependency of the daughter of the petitioner is concerned, the children of a person are always dependent upon their parents. Moreover, in my view everyone has a right to excel in his/her life. A person is not supposed to be stagnated in the same position and status in the entire life, otherwise there will be monotony in the life. It is also on record that the daughter of the petitioner is residing near the tenanted premises. As such, it is not the case of the respondent that she will not be able to commute easily to tenanted premises to run the business at tenanted premises.
As such, in view of the settled proposition of law, all these contentions of the respondent do not have any merits that the petitioner is a house wife and is not having any experience of any business.
22. Another contention of the respondent is that married daughter is not dependent upon the petitioner for the commercial requirement and married daughter is not covered under the definition of family of petitioner and she is not divorcee.
The next contention of the respondent is that Smt. Shefali is happily married daughter and residing with her ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 28 of 47 husband and her husband as well as herself having a number of residential as well as commercial properties in their name.
It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Anil Kumar Gupta Vs Deepika Verma passed in RC Revision No. 138/2015 passed on 14.10.2015 that dependency is not restricted to financial or physical but it will also include emotional reliance on another person.
It is a matter of common knowledge that daughters are always dependent upon their parents even after marriage and are always emotionally attached with her parents and a relation of a mother/father and a daughter becomes even stronger after marriage. Moreover, in the present case, the petitioner is having only daughter and there is very likelihood of extreme attachment between petitioner and her daughter. It is well settled that daughter in law may be dependent on father in law or mother in law and father in law/mother in law can file the eviction petition U/S 14(1)(e) of DRC Act for the bonafide requirement of daughter in law.
In my considered view, when mother in law/father in law is entitled to file eviction petition for her or his daughter in law, an eviction petition can also be filed for bonafide requirement of daughter attached to their mother/father. I have gone through the written arguments filed by the respondent wherein it is alleged by the respondent that there is strained relationship between the petitioner and her daughter. Perusal of record shows that no such plea was taken by the respondent in his written statement and it is only an afterthought. Moreover, no cogent and convincing evidence has been produced to prove this fact.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 29 of 4723. In the case titled as Anil Kumar Gupta Vs Deepika Verma passed in RC Revision No. 138/2015 on 14.10.2015 the Hon'ble High Court held that 'family' word should be interpreted liberally and common blanket approach can not be followed and the court must look at each case in the light of its own peculiar circumstances.
In Anil Kumar Gupta Vs Deepika Verma (supra) it is further observed as under:-
"12. Customarily or in common parlance a dependent would be defined as any person who is reliant on another either for financial or physical support for sustenance of life. It is pertinent to note that the word dependent or as to what constitutes a family has nowhere been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act. Rather, the legislators consciously and deliberately have used the words "any member of family dependent on the landlord" instead of defining a clear degree of relations so as to construe a wider meaning to the aforesaid words as man is a social creature and part of a complex societal system involving myriad of relations from which he cannot be isolated. It is significant to understand that the dependency is not restricted to financial or physical but will also include emotional reliance on another person. Reliance in this regard is placed on the findings of this court." Further in M/S. Jhalani Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs B.K. Soni; AIR 1994 Delhi 167, wherein the court observed "the social set up of our society is such where a married daughter continues to enjoy a place of pride in her maternal home and therefore while considering the requirement of the landlord her married daughter and her expected visits cannot be lost sight of. Similarly in Sain Dass v. Madan Lal; 1972 Ren CJ (SN) 8 (Delhi), this Court has acknowledged "the word "himself" has to be construed to mean "himself" as cohabiting with his family members with whom he is normally accustomed to live. Therefore, contrary to the submissions of the learned counsel for the ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 30 of 47 petitioner financial or physical incapacitation cannot be the sole premises for determining dependency on another." The Hon'ble Delhi High Court Further observed "14. As it crystallizes from the aforesaid the word dependent cannot be constructed in a narrow and literal manner. The same have to be interpreted judiciously keeping in mind the intent of the legislators. As discussed above the words used under S.14 (1)
(e), are "any member of family dependent on him" which would include the daughter in law who in the instant matter is dependent on her mother in law/landlady (respondent herein) and on account of sharing of residence both the daughter in law and the respondent are physically, emotionally and financially inter-
dependent." The Hon'ble Delhi High Court Further observed "it is settled principle that no blanket approach can be followed and the court must look at each case in the light of its own peculiar circumstances."
In the case titled as Sunder Singh Talwar Vs Kamal Chand Dugar MANU Vs DE/1400/2018 decided on 11.04.2018 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi inter-alia observed as under:-
"It is settled legal position in this regard that a landlord while filing an eviction petition for bona fide need, need not specify the exact business which is proposed to be carried out from the tenanted premises for which the eviction has been sought. In fact, even if in the eviction petition a particular purpose is stated, the landlord is not bound by the said purpose and after an eviction order, can change his mind and use the premises for a different kind of business. It is settled by a catena of judgments that the landlord has not to give an elaborate description of the business or the nature of business that he seeks to carry out in the premises. In this context reference may be had to the judgment of this court in Puran Chand Aggarwal v. Lekh Raj, 210 (2014) DLT 131, wherein the court held as follows: "26. As far as business is concerned, it is not necessary that ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 31 of 47 the landlord must show some evidence that he has experience of said business. That is not the requirement of law in order to file the eviction petition on the grounds of bonafide requirement."
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed as under:-
"23. It has next been pleaded by the petitioner that a daughter once married cannot be considered dependent upon the father for the purpose of seeking eviction of a dependent family members under the DRC Act. The contention is misplaced."
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed that:
"24. The Supreme Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, AIR 2002 SC 2256/ (MANU/SC/0453/2002), held as follows:
"24. We are of the opinion that the expression "for his own use" as occurring in Section 13(3)
(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed.
The expressions must be assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use."
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court Further observed that:-
"If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a person other than the landlord himself the Court shall with circumspection inquire:
(i) whether the requirement of such person can ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 32 of 47 be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and
(ii) whether there is a close inter-relation or identify nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query........."
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed that:-
"Hence, it is not a universal rule that married daughter cannot be dependent upon her father. Even otherwise in my opinion, in the present day and age it would be futile to argue that once the daughter is married she ceases to be responsibility of her father. A daughter has equal rights in the estate of the parents in case of intestate death. There can be no reason as to why the father would not like to settle his daughter in business or profession in the same way as he would like to settle his son. The plea to the contrary in the present facts is completely misplaced. It may also be noted that in the present case there is a clear and categorical averment that the daughter does not own any other property in Delhi and is dependent on the father to be settled."
The Hon'ble Delhi High Court further observed that:-
"10. The second question which arises is that even if she is a member of the family of the petitioner, the next question would arises whether she could be treated as a dependent on the petitioner for the purpose of her accommodation. Certainly, to this question also the answer prima facie should be in negative. The reason being that once the daughter of the petitioner has got married for purposes of any accommodation, she would be dependent on her husband rather on her father."
As such, all the contentions of the respondent as stated earlier do not have any substance.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 33 of 4724. Next contention of the respondent is that the site plan filed by the petitioner is incorrect.
Perusal of the record shows that in the present case, the respondent has himself stated that he has filed the correct site plan. As such, this contention of the respondent is now without any merit.
25. The next contention of the respondent is that before filing the present petition, husband of the petitioner approached the respondent and made an offer either to vacate or purchase the tenanted premises for Rs. 2,00,000/- and the intention of the petitioner is to get the tenanted premises vacated and sell it to a property dealer to construct a complete commercial property and let it out on huge rent.
On the other hand, the petitioner has denied these allegations and reiterated the bonafide need of herself and her daughter.
It is expedient to reproduce Sec. 19 of the D.R.C. Act, which is as under:-
"19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry.
(1) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 [or under sections 14A, 14B, 14C, 148 and 21], the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller, obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and the premises are not ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 34 of 47 occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub-section (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made on him in this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit."
26. As such, statute clearly lays down that the petitioner/ landlord has to occupy the vacated tenanted premises within two months and the landlord cannot re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant within three years from the date of obtaining possession and in case he does so, the evicted tenant may approach the Rent Controller seeking direction to the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises. As such, the fear of the respondent is without any substance.
27. One of the contentions of the respondent is that the present petition is not maintainable before the expiry of five years from the date of transfer of property in favour of petitioner in view of Sec. 14(6) of the D.R.C. Act. On the other hand, it is denied by the petitioner.
It is expedient to reproduce the Section 14(6) of the D.R.C Act, which is as under:-
"(6). Where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under sub section (1), on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso thereto, unless period of five years have elapsed from ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 35 of 47 the date of acquision."
In the case titled as "Smt. Nand Kaur Vs. Taleshwar Ji", 1972 R.C.R., 924, the Hon'ble High Court held that Section 14 (6) of DRC Act does not apply in the cases of relinquishment by a co-owner in favour of other co-owner. In view of the aforesaid judgment, the nature of transfer which has taken place in the present case cannot be said as contemplated u/s 14 (6) of DRC Act. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:
"The transfer referred to in subsection (6) of Section 14 of the Act cannot be considered to include the case of relinquishment by a co-owner in favour of the other co- owners. The appellants were co-owners of the said property along with the said three married daughters of Balwant Singh. The property had not been partitioned between them by metes and bounds. They were, therefore, owners of the entire property in proportion to their shares. With the relinquishment executed by the aforesaid three married daughters of Balwant Singh, the appellants became full owners of the entire property. This cannot be said to be a transfer of the nature contemplated by subsection (6) of section 14 of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is without any substance".
28. As such, in view of the settled proposition, the contention of respondent raising the objections U/Sec. 14(6) of the D.R.C. Act is devoid of merit.
29. The next contention of the respondent is that the petitioner is seeking eviction on the ground of additional accommodation.
In the case titled as "Mittar Sain Vs Rajesh Kumar"
passed in RC Revision 196/2013 and CM 8431/2013 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, the relevant portion is as ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 36 of 47 under:-
"14. On the issue of alternate accommodation, this court is of the view that the reliance by the tenant on the cases of S.M. Mehra, Santosh Devi Soni and Liaq Ahmad (Supra) are misplaced. This court is of the view that decision in the said cases were given in the peculiar set of facts and such decisions would not be applicable to the present case as the facts are entirely different. Moreover, as has been relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the landlord, in the case of Madan Lal Gupta (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that neither Santosh Devi Soni (Supra) nor Liaq Ahmad (Supra) laid down any principle of law, it was further observed in these cases, certain orders were passed on the facts arising in them."
In the case titled as Madan Lal Gupta Vs Ravinder Kumar passed in SLP (Civil) 10729/2000 passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court inter-alia observed as under:-
"However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners sought to rely upon two decisions of this court in Santosh Devi Soni Vs Chand Kiran, J.T 2000 (3) SC 397, and Liaq Ahmad ORS Vs Shri Habeeb Ur Rehman, JT 2000 (5) SC 611. Neither of these two decisions set down any principle of law so as to call for interference by us. In these two cases on the facts arising in the case certain orders have been passed by this court."
30. The respondent has claimed that the petitioner is having a number of properties which can be used by her for satisfying the bonafide commercial requirement of her daughter Smt. Shefali as stated in the eviction petition.
On the other hand, the petitioner has denied to have ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 37 of 47 alternative reasonable suitable commercial accommodation to satisfy the bonafide commercial requirement of her daughter for opening a boutique.
Perusal of record shows that the respondent has claimed that the petitioner is having ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor in the suit property in which the tenanted premises is situated. Perusal of record shows that the petitioner has not disputed that the suit property is multi-storey building as stated by the respondent and sought the tenanted premises to satisfy the bonafide need of her daughter, as she is not having alternative accommodation for her.
It is well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property. If the petitioner/landlord has filed the eviction petition for commercial bonafide requirement but the property available with the petitioner is residential one, it cannot be said that the petitioner is having the alternative reasonably suitable commercial accommodation.
It is well settled that the property available with the petitioner is convenient and suitable or not is to be determined from the point of view of the petitioner/landlord and not from the point of view of the tenant/respondent. The respondent/tenant cannot dictate the terms to the petitioner to use the property in the particular manner. The petitioner/landlord is the best judge of his/her requirement.
31. One of the contentions of the respondent is that entire third floor of the said property is lying vacant at present and ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 38 of 47 entire building is commercial in nature and is let out to different tenants from time to time. The husband of petitioner has got property vacated recently but has kept the said building vacant and is not using the same to show paucity of accommodation.
That the first floor was let out by Smt. Janak Rani to Sh. Baldev Ahuja and the said portion was re-let by Smt. Janak Rani to some other person in the last 3-4 years.
It is also contended that petitioner got vacated half of the second floor from a tenant and eight months back got that property vacated and the entire market know about it.
In nut-shell, the claim of the respondent is that the petitioner is having first, second and third floor in the same building where the tenanted premises is situated and the same can be used for satisfying the bonafide need of herself and her daughter for opening a boutique.
On the other hand, the petitioner has denied the allegations levelled by the respondent.
Perusal of the record shows that the tenanted premises in possession of the respondent is situated on the ground floor in the same building and the other premises is situated on the upper floors i.e. first, second and third floor. Moreover, the requirement of the petitioner is to open a boutique in the tenanted premises.
Record shows that the petitioner has claimed in her petition that elder daughter Smt. Shefali and herself want to run a boutique in the shop no. 4 & 5 for which sufficient space is required for fabrication of clothes, handwork embroidery and for entertaining the customers, displaying the garments and also for a Trial Room.
Perusal of record clearly shows that the petitioner has ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 39 of 47 sought shop no. 4 & 5 in the suit property for satisfying the bonafide need of Ms. Shefali by opening a boutique business and another eviction petition filed for getting the shop no. 5 vacated has already been filed and disposed of for the bonafide need of Ms. Shefali in the another case in favour of petitioner and this fact is not disputed by the respondent about the filing and disposal of aforementioned another eviction petition and eviction order against the another tenant qua shop no. 5. As such, it will never be suitable and convenient for a boutique owner as well as for customers and also for employees to have a separate place for the purposes such as fabrication of clothes, handwork embroidery and for entertaining the customers, displaying the garments and also for a Trial Room. It is well settled proposition of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the tenant cannot dictate the terms to use the premises in a particular manner.
In my considered view, the most reasonably suitable accommodation would be the property adjoining shop no. 4 and not on the first floor, second floor and third floor. As far as, shop no. 3 is concerned, it is already in possession of husband of the petitioner, who is using it regularly for the purposes as godown. Moreover, record shows that it is already occupied by the husband of the petitioner and is not vacant and even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that it is vacant, it would not be suitable as it is smaller in size in comparison to the tenanted premises. Moreover, it is away from the tenanted premises as well as from shop no. 5 in view of the site plan filed by the petitioner. Moreover, footfall of the customers on the ground floor is always on the higher side in comparison to the upper floors and the Landlord of the suit property is not supposed to ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 40 of 47 face the financial loss merely to save the tenancy of a tenant.
32. One of the contentions of the respondent is that the son of the petitioner is not using the shop no. 1 & 2 which were got vacated by the petitioner by filing the eviction petition U/Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act for the bonafide requirement of her son.
I have perused the material on record and testimonies of all the witnesses including RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh.
In my considered view, this contention also does not have any merit as the petitioner has categorically claimed that the son of the petitioner is using the shop no. 1 & 2 regularly.
The respondent has categorically relied upon the testimonies on record and specifically the testimony of RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh. It is submitted by the respondent that there is contradiction and admission in the testimony of PW-1 and PW-2 and further stated that RW-1 Sh. Praveen Kumar Bansal as an attorney has proved the documents on record and his testimony has gone unrebutted and subsequent events would demolish the bonafide need of the petitioner.
I have carefully gone through entire written arguments filed by the respondent as well as testimonies of all the witnesses on record.
In my considered view, none of the arguments as stated by the respondent has substance in view of the exhaustive discussion as earlier and well settled proposition of law as stated earlier. Perusal of record shows that the respondent has claimed that RW-2 Sh. Raj Singh has been able to prove the malafide on the part of petitioner.
I have gone through the testimony of RW-2 which shows that the contention of respondent is without any substance. As ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 41 of 47 per the submission and deposition of the RW-2, the son of the petitioner Sh. Puneet Ahuja is not using the shop no. 1 & 2 in the same building where the tenanted premises is situated. But, perusal of record shows that in his testimony RW-2 himself has inter-alia deposed that no one is sitting in the aforementioned two vacated shops and only Sh. Baldev Singh Ahuja occasionally comes to those two vacated shops and one servant of Sh. Baldev Ahuja comes to two vacated shops who opens and closes the two vacated shops and I have never seen Sh. Puneet Ahuja in the vacated shops.
As such, perusal of testimony of RW-2 clearly shows that the aforementioned two vacated shops are being used by Sh. Puneet Ahuja through his servant and his father Sh. Baldev Ahuja.
In my considered view, it is not mandatory for an owner to sit in all the shops owned by him and the same may be run by his servant or employee or any relative and there is no bar at all and it cannot be said in such circumstances that the vacated shops are not being used. An owner can have many shops and it may not be possible for the owner of many shops to sit in all the shops owned by him.
As such, this contention of the respondent does not have any substance. Moreover, even if the son of the petitioner is using the shop at Main Patel Road, Shadipur helping his father, it does not show the malafide on the part of the petitioner as it is the duty of each and every son to help their parents in their old age. Moreover, it has been brought into the notice of the court by the respondent himself that the shop no. 1 & 2 were got vacated by the petitioner citing the bonafide need of her son. But, the contention of the respondent is that these are not being ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 42 of 47 used by the son of the petitioner.
In my considered view, in view of Sec. 19 of the D.R.C. Act, the tenant concerned always has the remedy against such grievance and may opt for it. But, the record shows that the respondent has not claimed that the tenants of aforesaid shop no. 1 & 2 have filed any application U/Sec. 19 of the D.R.C. Act. Even, the testimonies of other witnesses produced by the respondent do not prove the malafide on the part of petitioner.
33. Next contention of the respondent is that Ms. Shefali owns a property bearing No. 12/19, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi and said property can be used for her alleged need for setting up a boutique. On the other hand, the petitioner has denied.
Perusal of record shows that although the respondent has mentioned the number of the property i.e. 12/19,East Patel Nagar, New Delhi but he has not placed on record any document which shows that the property is owned by Smt. Shefali. Even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that it is owned by Smt. Shefali, it does not exclude the benefit of 14(1)
(e) D.R.C. Act as the bonafide requirement of Ms. Shefali is a commercial requirement and in W.S. in paragraph no. 5, the respondent has not claimed that property No. 12/19, East Patel Nagar, New Delhi is a commercial property and reasonably suitable shop is available on the ground floor itself and it is also suitable for the purposes of opening a business of boutique as it is well settled that any kind of accommodation is not enough to exclude the benefit of Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act, it should be alternative reasonably suitable accommodation. Moreover, it is not enough that alternative reasonably suitable accommodation ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 43 of 47 is available, it should also be commercial accommodation and if the accommodation available is residential but the bonafide need is of commercial accommodation, it cannot be said that the petitioner is having alternative reasonably suitable commercial accommodation.
34. Respondent has also claimed that the husband of Smt. Shefali owns two buildings in Tank Road i.e. 16/57, Gali No. 5,Tank Road, New Delhi. On the contrary, the petitioner denied the same.
In my considered view, the property of the husband of Ms. Shefali is not to be considered while dealing with the petition U/Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act as it is not the property of the petitioner, it is the separate property of her son in law.
35. Perusal of record shows that the respondent as well as petitioner has relied upon a number of judgments of Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court.
I have gone through the entire case law relied upon by ld. Counsels for the parties.
The case titled as "Amarjit Singh Vs. Smt. Quamaraim 1987 AIR 741" relied upon by the respondent is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of the discussion earlier as the exhaustive reasons have been given by the petitioner and by this court also stating that alternative reasonably suitable commercial accommodation is not available with the petitioner for the purposes of opening a boutique. Moreover, subsequent events have also been considered as put forth by the respondent.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 44 of 4736. One of the contentions of the respondent is that the relevant witnesses were not produced by the petitioner to prove her case.
In my considered view, the court cannot force the petitioner or the respondent to produce the specific witnesses to prove her/his case. It is the prerogative of the parties to produce the witness to support his/her case.
37. The next contention of the respondent is that bonafide need cannot be proved by alleged attorney.
In my considered view, an attorney can always appear on behalf of the parties and can depose and there is no restriction of law. Interestingly, the respondent himself has relied upon the judgment of "Man Kaur Vs. Hartar Singh Sanga 2010 (10) SCC 512", wherein it is held that bonafide need can be proved even by the attorney and the examples have also been given by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this case also comes within the ambit of the examples. Interestingly and surprisingly, the respondent himself has produced the attorney in the present case as RW-1 Sh. Praveen Kumar Bansal and respondent Sh. Suresh Kumar has not come to the witness box. As such, the respondent himself is taking the contradictory stand.
38. The case titled as Manohar Lal Vs. Pushpa Wati Jain 49 (1993) DLT 653 relied upon by the respondent is also not applicable to the facts of the present case as the petitioner herein is residing in Delhi along with members of her family and not in Chandigarh.
ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 45 of 4739. The next case relied upon by the respondent i.e. Chet Ram Gupta Vs. Motian Devi Lamba 148 (2008) DLT 473 (DB) is also not relevant in view of the peculiar facts of the present case and the discussion as earlier. Similarly, in Rajappa Hanumantha Ranoji Vs. Mahadev 2000 (6) SCC 120; also becomes applicable only when the litigants are completely indisciplined and adopting the dubious methods. Whereas in the present case the respondent has failed to prove the parameters as mentioned in the present judgment relied upon by him. Likewise, Kizhakkayil-Suhara Vs. Manhant Avida 2001 Supp. (3) SCR 349; is also not applicable to the present case in view of peculiar facts of the case and the discussions as earlier.
As far as Bhim Singh Vs. Priti Gupta 223 (2015) DLT 303 is concerned, it is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case as the aforementioned judgment was decided while dealing with the leave to defend and the present case in hand is a contested case after leading the evidence.
40. Keeping in view the material on record and discussions as earlier, I am of the view that the contentions raised by the respondent has no merit.
CONCLUSION:-
41. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the present case, material on record, settled proposition of law and the reasons as discussed earlier, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has proved all the ingredients of Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. As such, the present eviction petition is allowed and an eviction order is passed in favour of petitioner and against the respondent in respect of the tenanted premises i.e. ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 46 of 47 Shop No. 4/2947-D, Shiv Chowk, Ranjeet Nagar, New Delhi- 110008 more conspicuously shown within red lines in the attached site plan Ex. PW-1/5.
42. However, this judgment shall not be operative before the expiry of six months from today keeping in view Sec. 14(7) of D.R.C. Act.
43. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Digitally signedAJAY by AJAY NAGAR Date: Announced in the open Court NAGAR 2019.09.12 17:08:12 +0530 on 12th September, 2019 (This judgment contains 47 pages) (Ajay Nagar) Additional Rent Controller, West District, THC, Delhi. ARC No. 25865/16 Sharda Ahuja Vs. Suresh Kumar Page 47 of 47