Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
New India Assurance Co., Ltd., ... vs Thanichintala Venkaiah And Another on 20 March, 2001
Equivalent citations: II(2001)ACC152, I(2002)ACC485, 2002ACJ485, 2001(3)ALD389, 2001(4)ALT178, AIR 2001 ANDHRA PRADESH 371, (2002) 1 ACJ 485, (2001) 2 TAC 486, (2001) 3 ANDHLD 389, (2001) 1 ANDHWR 257, (2001) 4 ANDH LT 178, (2001) 2 ACC 152
Author: N.V. Ramana
Bench: N.V. Ramana
JUDGMENT
1. The only question which falls for determination in both these CMAs, is whether the insurer is liable under the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called the 'New Act'), as it stood prior to the amendment by Amending Act 54 of 1994, to pay compensation for the death or bodily injury caused to the 'owner of the goods' travelling in a goods vehicle.
2. Insurance company is the appellant in these two appeals. It filed CMA No.235 of 1998 questioning the award passed in OP No.267 of 1992, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Guntur. In this case, Thanichintala Venkaiah, while travelling in a lorry bearing Registration No.l6T-1832 along with his fish baskets by paying an amount of Rs.50/- as fare from Macherla to Dachepalli, received grievous injuries when the lorry turned turtle in the outskirts of the Macherla. The said accident occurred on 9-12-1991. He, therefore, file the OP under Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.90,000/-. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, after conducting enquiry in accordance with law, held that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry and having regard to the nature of injuries sustained by the petitioner and also the income of the injured, determined a sum of Rs.35,000/- as compensation which was accordingly awarded.
3. CMA No.760 of 1999 was filed questioning the award passed in OP No.979 of 1993 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nalgonda. In this case, one Kunareddy Saidamma, who was a vegetable vendor, while travelling in a lorry bearing Registration No.AAQ 2453 from Nagarjuna Sagar to Ramannagudem village along with her kirana goods, due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said lorry, the lorry turned turtle and the said Saidamma received grievous injuries and later succumbed to the said injuries. The accident in this case took place on 1-7-1993. The legal representatives of deceased Saidamma, therefore, filed the OP under the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation of a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. The Tribunal, after conducting elaborate enquiry in accordance with law, held that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry and insofar as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the Tribunal below having regard to the age of the deceased and her monthly earnings and also taking into account the dependency factor, determined the compensation at Rs.75,000/-, which was accordingly awarded.
4. The sole contention which is advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants-insurance company in both these appeals is that the accidents in these cases took place on 9-12-1991 and 1-7-1993 respectively and the relevant provision that is applicable is Section 147 of the new Act as it stood prior to the amendment by way of Amending Act 54 of 1994; that under the said provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the New Act, the Insurance Company is liable only in respect of death or bodily injury to any person who is travelling in a public service vehicle as fair-paid passenger. It is further contended that the word 'any person' occurring in Section 147(1)(b)(i), does not include any person other than the passengers carried for hire or reward and, therefore, 'owner of the goods' travelling in a goods vehicle does not fall within the meaning of the 'any person'.
5. Learned Counsel further contends that the language used in Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the new Act prior to the amendment and Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, 'old Act') is identical and there is absolutely no change in the language used in the two provisions. In other words, the pre-amended provision of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the New Act is the verbatim reproduction of Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the old Act and so, the said pre-amended provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the new Act must be interpreted in the same manner in which Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the old Act was interpreted.
6. Learned Counsel in this connection drew my attention to the pre-amended and post-amended provisions of Section 147 and contended that in the absence of the words 'including owner of the goods* in the pre-amending provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the new Act, it cannot be inferred that the words 'any person' used in the said provision also includes 'owner of the goods' and that such an interpretation would virtually lead to a disastrous consequence, as, according to the learned Counsel, it would amount to giving retrospectively to the post-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act. It is, therefore, contended that the word 'any, person' occurring in the pre-amended provisions of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the new Act are to be construed only in its literal meaning, in which event, the insurer does not become liable to cover the risk of the owner of the goods. Therefore, it is contended that the appellants-insurance company is not liable to pay compensation in these cases.
7. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents/ claimants that the scheme of the new Act is, inter alia, to provide enhanced compensation to the victims of the road accidents and to enlarge the limit of liability of the insurer and having regard to the scheme of the new Act, the words 'any person', if interpreted harmoniously in tune with the true intent and object of the Legislature, 'owner of the goods' shall be brought within the ambit of the expression 'any person'. It is also contended that the said provision being intended to benefit the victims of the road accidents, the same shall have to be read so to fulfil the object and intention of the Legislature. It is further contended that having regard to the said scheme of the Act, even in the absence of the expression 'owner of the goods', the expression 'any person' shall be understood to include 'owner of the goods' also. According to the learned Counsel, the amendment was made only with an abundant caution and in order to avoid possible ambiguity white interpreting the provisions of Section 147 and to make it more explicit and clear by clarifying the intention of the framers of the Act as originally enacted. In view of the language used in Section 147 as it stood even prior to the amendment, it is contended that question of obtaining any specific 'policy' by the insured for the goods being carried along with the owner of the goods in the goods vehicle, does not arise and that the said policy, therefore, covers the risk of owner of the goods also.
8. It is one of the cardinal rules of interpretation that in order to derive the intention of the Legislature, in course of interpretation of the relevant provision, there can scarcely be a better test than that of probing into the motive and philosophy of the relevant provisions keeping in mind the goals to be achieved while enacting the Act and while so construed, if two interpretations are possible, the one which subserves the purpose and object of the Act must be adopted. Further, the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment (see Towerfield (Owners) v. Workington Harbour and Dock Board, (1969) 2 WLR 390). The general rule of interpretation is that words are to be construed in accordance with the intention of the legislation. However, wide ,in the abstract, general words and phrases are more or less elastic, and admit of restriction or extention to suit the legislation in question. The object or policy of the legislation often affords the answer to problems arising from ambiguities which it contains. For it is a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter, that is, to be construed as particular if the intention be particular, [see Bacon, Maxims, JO; Wandsworth Boards of Works v. United Telephone Company, (1894) 13 QBD 904 and Straddling v. Morgan, (1560) 1 Plowd. 199]. The sum and substance of all the aforementioned well established principles of interpretation is that in the event of any ambiguity in the construction of any word or words occurring in the section of any particular enactment, the said word or words, shall be interpreted with reference to the object and intent of the Legislature while framing that particular enactment. Having due regard to the aforementioned principles of interpretation, I propose to examine the question that is raised in these two appeals with reference to the relevant provisions.
9. The law relating to the motor vehicles in our country was initially governed by the Motor vehicles Act, 1939, which was enacted consolidating and amending the law on the subject. Insofar as our present purpose is concerned, Section 95 of the old Act, which is analogous to Section 147 of the new Act, is relevant which prescribed the requirements of the policy and limits of the liability of the insurance company, it is useful to extract hereunder Section 95 of the old Act. It reads as follows:
"95. Requirement of policies and limits of liability :--(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer or by a co-operative society allowed under Section 108 to transact the business of an insurer; and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in subsection (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place :
Provided that a policy shall not except as may be otherwise provided under subsection (3) be required-
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee-
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle; or
(b) if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle; or
(c) if it is a goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle; or
(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises; or
(iii) to cover any contractual liability.
Explanation :--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by, or to have arising out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act of omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.
(2).....
(3) Omitted by Act 100 of 1956.
(4).....
(4-A).....
(5).....
10. It is settled law that a policy issued under Section 95 of the old Act covers the risk of only certain class of persons falling under 'third party' and that the insurer is liable to indemnify only those persons who are being carried in vehicles other than those which carry passengers for hire or reward. Thus, the provisions of the old Act limited the liability of the insurer only in respect of certain class persons from among the category of 'third parties' excluding all other classes of persons travelling in the goods vehicle. Therefore, there was a widespread feeling among the general public that this provision should be suitably amended so as to make it more beneficial to the persons travelling. This opinion gained more strength in the light of the repaid changes that have taken place in the road transport technology, pattern of passenger and freight movements, development of road network in the country and particularly improved techniques in the motor vehicles management. Therefore, people belonging to several walks of life, including the members of the Parliament urged for comprehensive review of the old Act, to make it relevant to the modern-day requirements. Therefore, a Working Group was constituted to review all the provisions of the old Act and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive legislation to replace the old Act. The Working Group, having taken into account the suggestions and recommendations made by various bodies and institutions like Central Institute of Road Transport, Automotive Research Association of India and other transport organisations including the manufacturers and the general public, submitted a report to the Central Government making certain important modifications in the old Act. Some of the more important modifications so suggested related for taking care of-
(a) the fact increasing number of both commercial vehicles and personal vehicles in the country;
(b) the need for encouraging adoption of higher technology in automotive sector;
(c) the greater flow of passenger and freight with the least impediments so that island of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances;
(d) concern for road safety standards, and pollution-control measures, standards for transportation of hazardous and explosive materials;
(e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalisations for private sector operations in the road transport field; and
(f) need for effective ways of tracking down traffic offenders.
11. Further, in M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty, AIR 1987 SC 2188, certain suggestions were made by the Apex Court to raise the limit of compensation payable as a result of motor accidents in respect of death and permanent disablement in the event of there being no proof of fault on the part of the person involved in the accident and also in hit and run motor accidents and to remove certain disparities in the liability of the insurer to pay compensation depending upon the class or type of vehicles involved in the accidents. All the suggestions received in this regard, including the suggestions made by the Supreme Court have been incorporated in the Bill and a comprehensive legislation called, "The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988" (Act 59 of 1988) was enacted. Some of the important provisions of the proposed legislation, as seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, provide for following matters, namely :--
(a) rationalisation of certain definitions with additions of certain new definitions of new types of vehicles;
(b) stricter procedures relating to grant of driving licences and the period of validity thereof;
(c) laying down of standards for the components and parts of motor vehicles;
(d) standards for anti-pollution control devices;
(e) provision for issuing fitness certificates of vehicle also by the authorized testing stations;
(f) enabling provision for updating the system of registration marks;
(g) liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non-nationalised routes all-India Tourist permits and also national permits for goods carriages;
(h) administration of the Solatium Scheme by the General Insurance Corporation;
(i) provision for enhanced compensation in cases of 'no fault liability' and in hit and run motor accidents;
(j) provision for payment of compensation by the insurer to the extent of actual liability to the victims of motor accidents irrespective of the class of vehicles;
(k) maintenance of State registers for driving licences and vehicle registration;
(l) constitution of Road Safety Councils."
12. The object of the Act, as can be culled out from the aforementioned Statement of Objects and Reasons, which is, inter alia, to provide relief to the victims of road accidents by including a provision for payment of compensation by the insurer to the extent of actual liability to the victims of motor accidents irrespective of the class ofvehicles. It is in furtherance of this object, Chapters X, XI and XII in the new Act have been rationalised to safeguard the interests of the victims of the road accidents; the limitations prescribed in the old Act have been removed while enacting the new Act and the burden of proof to prove the rash and negligent part of the accident, which was placed on the victim in the old Act, was shifted to the respondents as per the provisions of Section 163-A of the new Act. Insofar as the liability of the insurer in concerned, Section 95 of the old Act was replaced by enacting Section 147 and while doing so, proviso (ii) to Section 95 of the old Act was omitted, thereby making the insurer's liability unlimited. In other words, the Parliament, by enacting Section 147, extended the liability of the insurer to 'every person' who is a third party to the policy [except the first party i.e., insurer and. the second party i.e., insured]. For the purpose of ready reference, the pre-amending provisions of Section 147, are extracted hereunder:
"147. Requirement of policies and limits of liability :--(1) In order to comply with Ihe requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
Provided that a policy shall not be required-
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee,--
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle; or
(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle; or
(c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle; or
(ii) to cover any contractual liability.
Explanation :--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.
(2) Subject to the proviso to subsection (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, upto the following limits, namely:--
(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred;
(b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand :
Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier.
(3) A policy shall be of no effect for the purposes of this Chapter unless and until there is issued by the insurer in favour of the person by whom the policy is effected a certificate of insurance in the prescribed form and containing the prescribed particulars of any condition subject to which the policy is issued and of any other prescribed matters; and different forms, particulars and matters may be prescribed in different cases.
(4) Where a cover note issued by the insurer under the provisions of this Chapter or the rules made thereunder is not followed by a policy of insurance within the prescribed time, the insurer shall, within seven days of the expiry of the period of the validity of the cover note, notify the fact to the registering authority in whose records the vehicle to which the cover note relates has been registered or to such other authority as the State Government may prescribe.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons."
13. As already stated, the aforementioned Section 147 underwent an amendment in the year 1994. By way of amending Act 54 of 1994 which came into force with effect from 14-11-1994, the provisions in Section 147(1)(b)(i) was amended. Even though we are not concerned with the said amended provision, the relevant portion of the said provision is quoted hereunder for the purpose of ready reference. It reads as follows:
"147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability :--(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter a policy of insurance must be a policy which-
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
14. The sum and substance of the pre-ametided provision, as has been interpreted by various High Courts including the Apex Court, is that it requires the insurer to cover in its policy of insurance the risk of liability of the insured in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to person or damage to property of a 'third party' and that a fare-paid passenger in a vehicle is also a third party qua the insurer. Be that as it may, on a comparison of the pre-amended provision of Section 147 with its correspondents provision in the old Act. (i.e., Section 95), one can clearly notice the ostensible change in the tenor of the language used in the two provisions and by reading the same, one can easily gather the intention of the Legislature in regard to the liability of the insurer qua the 'third party'. The first change which was effected while enacting the provision in the new Act is the replacement of sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the old Act with a new provision, which is couched in different language, in Section 147 of the new Act thereby making a total departure from the language used in the old Act. Another notable change which had taken place while construing the provision of Section 147 .is the omission of proviso (ii) of the old Act. By virtue of the said proviso (ii), the Parliament restricted the coverage of policy and the insurer was liable only in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to gassengers who are carried in a vehicle which is plied for hire or reward, thereby limiting the coverage of policy in respect of only a particular class of persons travelling in the goods vehicle. Thus, the insurer's liability under Section 95 of the old Act was very much limited and having regard to the object of making a "provision for payment of compensation by the insurer to the extent of actual liability to the victims of motor accidents irrespective of the class of vehicles", the Parliament omitted the said proviso (ii) while enacting Section 147 of the new Act. Thus, by virtue of the omission of proviso (ii) in the new Act, the pre-amended provision of the new Act removed all the restrictions which were put in Section 95 of the old Act in respect of third parties. The said omission, in my opinion, is deliberate and intentional, which was evidently made by the Parliament in furtherance of its avowed object of bringing all types of persons who travel in the goods vehicle within the scope and ambit of the expression 'third party', irrespective of their class or category while travelling in a motor vehicle. It is in this context, the pre-amended provision of Section 147, especially the words "any person" occurring in the said provision, must be construed and if so construed, the said words "any person" shall be given wider connotation. Further, if the Parliament had no intention of making any change in the scheme of the old Act, it ought to have imported Section 95 of the old Act in extenso into the new Act without making any omissions/alterations/additions. Therefore, by omission of the above-said proviso while enacting Section 147(1) of the new Act, the Legislature can be inferred to have intentionally and knowingly changed the tenor of the language. The said omission would clearly show that the Legislature intends to provide something different and modify the very scheme of Section 95 of the old. Act. If the Legislature changes the tenor of the language and omits a certain provision while replacing the old Act, the Legislature's intention emerging therefrom has to be given effect to while interpreting the provisions of the later enactment. For the aforesaid reasons, it must be held that the expression, "any person" used in the pre-amended provision of Section 147, having regard to the scheme of the new Act, shall be construed harmoniously to mean and include "owner of the goods" also. In view of the above interpretation, the substitution of the expression "injury to any person " by the expression "injury to any person including the owner of the goods" is nothing but mere amplification to what was already contained in the provision so as to make the intent and purport of the provision more explicit and that the amending Act was not at all intended to bring in any change in the existing law. The said amendment made by way of Act 54 of 1994 was mainly intended to remove any possible ambiguity in deriving the meaning of Section 147. In this context, the observations of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company v. Satpal Singh, , which arose under the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act, are relevant to be quoted here. They read as follows:
"Under Section 147 of the new Act, the policy must be a policy which insures the person or classes of person specified in the policy to-the extent specified in sub-section (2):
'(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in 'public place.' The said proviso to the said sub-section is not relevant here as it pertains to death or bodily injury to the employee mentioned therein. Sub-section (2) provides that policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, upto the following limits, namely:--
'(a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred;
in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand :
Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement of till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier."
Hence, under sub-section (2) there is no upper limitation for the insurer regarding the amount of compensation awarded in respect of death or bodily injury of a victim of the accident. It is, therefore, apparent that the limit contained in the old Act has been removed and the policy should insure the liability incurred and cover injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle....."
15. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Rama Devi, 2000 ACJ 1016, a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, while dealing with the expression, "persons travelling along with the goods" under the provisions of the new Act prior to the amending Act 54 of 1994, after elaborate consideration of Section 95 of the Act, held that insurance company is liable to pay compensation in respect of the persons who are travelling along with the goods. The observations made in the said judgment are quite pertinent to be mentioned here. They are as follows:
"Though as indicated earlier, Section 147(1) of 1988 Act is almost similar with Section 95 of the 1939 Act as it stood at the time of the repeal of the 1939 Act and introduction of the 1988 Act, there is a specific and conspicuous change in 1988 Act, in that, no such provision is contained in the form of Section 95(l)(b), by proviso (ii) was engrafted in Section 147(1) of the 1988 Act. The said omission cannot be considered to be either of any significance or importance being a conscious omission and not an act of mere 'casus omissus"
"In our view, therefore, even in the-absence of the amendments introduced by Central Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14-11-1994, the provisions contained in Section 147(1) of the Act are by themselves sufficient to oblige the coverage of risk to passengers who are not carried for hire or reward even in a goods vehicle and, consequently will take within it the liability in respect of the owner of the goods also found travelling with his goods at the time of accident, culminating in the claim for compensation in a given case. The insurance should cover risks to such third parties also."
16. The aforementioned observations of the Himachal Pradesh High Court quoted supra lends support to the view taken by me in this case.
17. Further, in Jayanti Sahu v, Rama Chandra Behera, 2000 (2) ACC 389, in which the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act fell for consideration before the Orissa High Court, wherein the accident took place on 18-6-1990 while the deceased was travelling with his goods, the Orissa High Court considering Section 147 and referring the decision of the Supreme Court in Mallawwa and others v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and others, , held that the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation as the deceased is travelling along with the goods.
18. Similar is the view taken by the Madras High Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. A. Govindan, 11 (2000) ACC 363, in which again the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act fell for consideration. In that case, the accident occurred on 8-12-1989 when the deceased was travelling in a lorry along with the goods. After considering Satpal Singh's case (surpa), the Madras High Court held that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation to the persons who were travelling along with goods.
19. While considering the similar issue, the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Oriental Insurance Company, Limited, v. Ajayakumar, I (2000) ACC 507, which also arose under the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act, it was held that even a gratuitous passenger in a- private vehicle is also covered by the Act Policy under Section 147. It was further held that Proviso (ii), which excluded the passengers in private vehicles from the purview of Section 95(1)(b) of 1939 Act, is not available in Section 147 of New Act and, therefore, the general provision in clause (i) of the new Act has to be taken as applicable to passengers carried in private vehicles not for hire or reward.
20. Lastly, in S. Lolakshi v. N. Tatiah, , in which similar question arose for consideration, a learned single Judge of this Court, took similar view holding that the policy issued under the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act, covers the risk of a traveller in a goods vehicle along with his goods.
21. Learned Counsel for the appellant-insurer contends, that where a word has been construed judicially in a certain legal area, it is imperative to give it the same meaning if it occurs in a statute dealing with the same general matter at a subsequent point of time and that, therefore, the words 'any person' occurring in the pre-amended provision of Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the new Act and those in Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the old Act must be interpreted to mean in an identical manner. There shall not be any quarrel with regard to the aforementioned principle of interpretation, which was put forward by the learned Counsel with regard to the construction of identical words occurring in two enactments. But, in my opinion, such an interpretation is possible only if such a word is used in an exactly identical situation and in the same context and especially, if the scheme of the later enactment remains unaltered. Same word or phrase sometimes receives similar meaning and sometimes receives two different constructions, depending on the object and intent under which the said enactment was framed. Therefore, I am of the view that the word or words occurring in any particular enactment, even though they are identical to the ones which are used in the old enactment, must always be^ construed having regard to the context in which those words are used in that particular provision, and particularly having regard to the scheme of the later enactment. As already stated, the scheme of the new Act is entirely different from that of the old Act. Chapters X, XI and XII of the 1988 Act were introduced with a view to benefit more number of victims of the road accidents by suitably extending the liability of the insurer in that regard and the words 'any person' occurring in the pre-amended provisions of Section 147 of the new Act, even though appear to be identical to those which were used in the old Act, must be construed liberally and, especially in the light of the scheme of the new Act and if so construed, the said words shall be understood to mean "owner of the goods" also and merely because identical set of expressions are used in the new enactment, it is not necessary to interpret the words or word used in the new enactment in the same way in which the word in the old enactment was interpreted.
22. In view of the aforementioned discussion and the observations of the Supreme Court, I hold that the words 'any person' used in the pre-amending provisions of Section 147 of the new Act shall be interpreted to mean and include 'owner of the goods' and that under Section 147 of the pre-amending provisions of the new Act, the insurer is liable to pay compensation in the event of death or bodily injury to the owner of the goods also. The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants-insurer are rejected" and the point is answered accordingly.
23. In view of the aforementioned discussion, the CMA filed by the appellant-insurance company are 'liable to be dismissed.
24. In the result, both the CMAs are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.