Supreme Court of India
Union Of India And Ors vs Mohd. Ramzan Khan on 20 November, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991 AIR 471, 1990 SCR SUPL. (3) 248, AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 471, 1991 LAB IC 308, 1991 (1) SCC 588, (1991) 78 FJR 207, (1990) 61 FACLR 736, (1991) IJR 295 (SC), (1991) 1 LAB LN 380, 1991 SCD 336, (1991) 1 SERVLR 159, (1991) 1 UPLBEC 456, (1991) 1 LABLJ 29, 1991 SCC (L&S) 612, 1991 UJ(SC) 1 163, (1991) 1 SERVLJ 196, 1991 BRLJ 75 104, (1991) 1 CURLR 61, 1991 ALL CJ 1 351, (1991) 16 ATC 505, (1991) 1 CIVLJ 764, (1990) 4 JT 456 (SC)
PETITIONER:
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOHD. RAMZAN KHAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/11/1990
BENCH:
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
BENCH:
MISRA, RANGNATH (CJ)
SAWANT, P.B.
RAMASWAMY, K.
CITATION:
1991 AIR 471 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 248
1991 SCC (1) 588 JT 1990 (4) 456
1990 SCALE (2)1094
CITATOR INFO :
R 1992 SC2219 (139)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950--Article 311(2)--Deletion of
second notice proposing punishments mentioned in Article
311(2), by the FortySecond Amendment--Whether delinquent
entitled to copy of inquiry report before imposing punish-
ment--Non-supply of report--Whether violates rules of natu-
ral justice.
Constitution of India, 1950--Articles 14, 311--Supply of
inquiry report in the case of the inquiry officer not being
the disciplinary authority and non-supply of the report in
the case of the inquiry officer being the disciplinary
authority---Whether Article 14 attracted.
HEADNOTE:
In the civil appeals by special leave, the short point
for determination was whether with the alteration of the
provisions of Article 311(2) under the Forty-Second Amend-
ment of the Constitution doing away with the opportunity of
showing cause against the proposed punishment, the delin-
quent has no right to be entitled to a copy of the report of
inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings.
Dismissing the appeals, this Court,
HELD: 1. The Forty-Second Amendment has deleted the
second stage of the inquiry which would commence with the
service of a notice proposing one of the three punishments
mentioned in Art. 311(1) and the delinquent officer would
represent against the same and on the basis of such repre-
sentation and/or oral hearing granted, the disciplinary
authority decides about the punishment. Deletion of this
part from the concept of reasonable opportunity in Art.
311(2) does not bring about any material change in regard to
requiring the copy of the report to be provided to the
delinquent. [255H-256C]
2. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of
Art. 311(2) has nothing to do with providing of a copy of
the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his ï7
3
in Art. 311(2) has been abolished by amend-
249
ment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against
the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the
charges or some of the charges are established and holding
the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with
the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommenda-
tions of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of
punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes neces-
sary and to have the proceeding completed by using some
material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not
countenanced by fair procedure. [257C-F]
3. While by law application of natural justice could be
totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here
which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the
proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court
making rules of natural justice applicable to such an in-
quiry are not affected by the 42nd Amendment. Supply of a
copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if
any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted
would be within the rules of natural justice and the delin-
quent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy
thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about
any change in this position. [257E-H]
4. Where the disciplinary authority is the Inquiry
Officer there is no report. He becomes the first assessing
authority to consider the evidence directly for finding out
whether the delinquent in guilty and liable to be punished.
Even otherwise, the inquiries which are directly handled by
the disciplinary authority and those which are allowed to be
handled by the Inquiry Officer can easily be classified into
two separate groups one, where there is no inquiry report
on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority is
the Inquiry Officer and inquiries where there is a report on
account of the fact that an officer other than the discipli-
nary authority has been constituted as the Inquiry Officer.
[258A-C]
5. Wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has
furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the
conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of
all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular
punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of
such report and will also be entitled to make a representa-
tion against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the
report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice
and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter.
[258E-G]
ï73
80; R.
Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India, 64 IA 55; High
Commis-
250
sionerror India v. LM. Lall, 75 IA 225; Secretary of State
for India v. I.M. Lall, [1945] FCR 103; State of Maharashtra
v. Paishankar Avalram Joshi & Anr., [1969] 3 SCR 917; Avtar
Singh v. Inspector General, SLR (1968) SC 131; Union of
India v. H.C. Goel, [1964] 4 SCR 718; State of Gujarat
v.R.G. Teredesai & Anr., [1970] 1 SCR 251; Uttar Pradesh
Government v. Sabir Hussain, [1975] Suppl. SCR 354; Mazharul
Islam Hashmi v. State of U.P. & Anr., [1979] 4 SCC 537,
referred to.
Prof. Wade on Administrative Law, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
