Gauhati High Court
National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Mrs. Utpala Saikia And 6 Ors on 31 January, 2017
Author: Kalyan Rai Surana
Bench: Kalyan Rai Surana
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(THE HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
M.A.C. APPEAL NO. 105/2009
National Insurance Company Limited,
.....Appellant
-Vs-
Mrs. Utpala Saikia & others
....Respondents
BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA For the appellant : Mr. BC Das, Sr. Adv., Mrs. S. Roy, Mr. RC Paul, Advs.
For the respondents : Mr. R. Goswami, Adv. For resp.No.7,
Mr. BJ Mukherjee, Adv. For resp. No. 2 to 5
Date of hearing : 24.01.2017
Date of order : 31.01.2017.
JUDGMENT & ORDER
1. Heard Ms. S. Roy, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. B.J. Mukherjee, and Mr. R. Goswami, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents No. 2 to 5 and respondent No. 7 respectively.
2. This appeal is filed by National Insurance Co. Ltd., who was the insurer of truck bearing Reg. No. AS-25-A-5352. The appeal has been filed under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act" for brevity) is directed MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 1 of 12 against the judgment and award dated 10.07.2009 passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaon (hereinafter referred to as the "learned Tribunal" for brevity), awarding a sum of Rs.12,20,000/- in favour of the claimants.
3. At the very outset is must be mentioned that there were five claimants before the learned Tribunal. The claimant No.1 was the wife of Late Mahendra Saikia, the deceased, and the other 4 (four) claimants were the minor daughters and sons of the said deceased and claimant No.1. At the time of filing the claim petition, Ms. Anindita Saikia (daughter), the claimant No.2 was aged about 15 years - 6 months, Ms. Niminita Saikia (daughter) was aged about 9 years - 6 months, Ms. Jashashree Sikha Saikia (daughter) was aged about 6 years, and Master Kingshuk Saikia (son) was aged about 2 years - 6 months. Going by the age of the claimants No. 2 to 5 as mentioned above, all of them have attained the age of majority by now. The claimant No.1, namely, Smt. Utpala Saikia, the wife of the deceased had also expired during the pendency of the claim case, and Ms. Utpala Saikia, the eldest daughter of the deceased had in the meanwhile attained majority and filed petition No. 1255/07 to allow her to conduct the claim petition for herself and her other minor sisters and brother, which was allowed and the name of the claimant No.1 was deleted. However, in this appeal, the claimant No.1, whose name was struck off, was arrayed as respondent No.1. Therefore, by order dated 01.02.2010, passed by this court in M.C. No. 3560/2009, the name of respondent No.1 was struck off from the list of respondents and the cause title was amended accordingly. However, it appears that in the cause title of this appeal, the seriatim of the Opp. Parties in the claim petition were not altered and rest of the respondents continue to be numbered as Respondents No. 2 to 8 as before. Out of the rest of the Opp. Parties, while the Opp. Parties No.2 to 5 were the claimants, the Opp. Party No.6 is the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident. The Opp. Party No.7 i.e. National Insurance Co. Ltd., was the insurer of vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352 and the Opp. Party No. 8 was United India Insurance Co. Ltd., the insurer of vehicle No. AS-02-A- 4225. As stated herein before, the present appeal has been preferred by the Opp. Party No.7 before the learned Tribunal.
4. The case of the claimants before the learned Tribunal was that on the fateful day of 08.08.2001 at about 12.45 a.m., while the predecessor-in- interest of the claimants were coming to Nagaon from Guwahati by driving his own vehicle (Maruti Car bearing Reg. No. AS-02-A-4225) with one Mohan Joshi, met with an accident at Village- Namgaon near Raha. The car was badly damaged and the deceased sustained severe injuries. He was MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 2 of 12 brought to Nagaon for treatment, and was immediately shifted to Guwahati for better treatment. The deceased succumbed to his injuries on 11.08.2001. At the time of his death, the deceased was aged about 42 years and working as an Assistant Manager in State Bank of India. He had left behind his widow, 4 minor children, ailing mother and two unmarried sisters, who were all dependent on him.
5. The claimants filed a claim petition before the learned Tribunal at Nagaon, claiming a compensation of Rs.25.00 lakh. The cause of accident was attributed on the driver of truck bearing Reg. no. AS-25-A-5352, which was stated to be parked in the middle of the road without any parking lights on.
6. The respondent No.6 herein (Opp. Party No.6), who was the owner of vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352 did not contest the claim and the appellant herein (Opp. Party No.7) and Respondent No.7 herein (Opp. Party No.8) contested the claim petition by filing their written statement. Amongst other defence, the appellant herein denied the involvement of the vehicle insured by them in the accident, it denied that the said vehicle was driven by a valid licence holder and also denied injury sustained by the deceased as well as the death of the deceased in GNRC Hospital. The respondent No. 7 herein (Opp. Party No. 8) also took a plea, amongst others, that the vehicle insured by them was not driven by a valid licence holder.
7. On examination of the records it is seen that the claimants had examined 4 PWs, viz., Utpala Saikia, claimant No.1 (since deceased) had examined herself as PW-1, Biren Patar, who was the Secretary of the local V.D.P. of Saragaon, who was also the eye witness to the accident was examined as PW-2. Sri Sibananda Kakoti, the Deputy Manager of State Bank of India, Nagaon Branch was examined as PW-3. Sri Mohan Joshi, who was in the car with the deceased at the time of accident was examined as PW-4. The PWs proved Salary Certificate (Ext.1), Post mortem Report (Ext.2), Medical certificate of cause of death (Ext.3), Medical Certificate of Death (Ext.4), Medicine List for Neuro Surgery of GNRC (Ext.5), Accident Information report (Ext.6), FIR (Ext.7). The learned Tribunal held that the insurer of both vehicles took the plea that the persons driving both the vehicles did not have a valid licence, but did not prove the said plea. Accordingly, finding no merit in the defence, the compensation was quantified at Rs.24,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty four lakh forty thousand only), directing the appellant herein to pay its share of the payment of compensation amounting to Rs.12,20,000/- (Rupees Twelve lakh twenty thousand only) within a period of MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 3 of 12 two months from the date of award, failing which the said amount would carry interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of passing of the award till realization. Cost of the claim proceeding was quantified at Rs.1,000/-. The learned tribunal finding the deceased to be contributory negligent towards the accident, for which the Respondent No.7 herein (i.e. the insurer of Maruti Car No. AS-02-A-4225) was not found liable to pay any compensation.
8. The learned Tribunal framed the following 3 (three) issues for deciding the claim:
1. Whether the claim petition is maintainable?
2. Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352 and whether the claimants' father died in the accident?
3. Whether the claimant is entitled to receive compensation and if so to what extent and who is liable to pay the same?
9. The learned Tribunal had held that the claim petition was maintainable and the non-impleading of the driver of vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352 would not result in the failure of the claim case. It is seen from the claim petition that the above referred vehicle was duly insured by the appellant under insurance policy No. 2000/6701313, which was valid upto 26.03.2002. therefore, the non- impleading of driver of the offending vehicle did not vitiate the claim as the said vehicle was duly insured. The owner of the vehicle would be vicariously liable for the act or omission by the driver and as he stands duly indemnified, by holding a valid insurance, the appellant cannot escape its liability.
10. In respect of issue No.2, the learned Tribunal, by referring to the provisions of section 107, 109, 122, 126, 147(b)(i) and 165 of the said Act, has held that the parking of truck on road, a public place, without parking lights by vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352 amounted to rash and negligent driving. It is seen that by the evidence of PW-4, it has been successfully proved by the claimant that the truck was not visible in the dead of the night in the absence of parking lights. Moreover, as per the deposition of PW-4, he had categorically stated in his evidence that Maruti Car's lights give visibility of upto 25 metres, the said evidence remained unrebutted. It was further held that the use of vehicle can be inferred even if it was stationery and not in motion. The PW-2 and PW-4, who were the eye witness to the accident, by their unshaken deposition, attributed fault on the improperly parked truck (vehicle No. AS-25-A-5352) by stating that (1) the accident occurred in the darkness of the MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 4 of 12 night, (2) the truck was parked in the middle of the road, (3) the truck had no top light, back light, parking light nor road danger red light was kept burning in the stationery truck, (4) there was no other indication that the truck was parked on the road, and (5) the truck was abandoned and unattended in a dangerous position on the road. As per PW-2, the truck was parked almost in the middle of the road. PW-4, who was also travelling with the deceased in the ill fated car had stated that the parked truck was first noticed at a distance of about 10 feet and at that time another vehicle was also coming from the other side, as such, there was no scope to avoid the accident. These two witnesses were unrelated witnesses. The reliance of the learned Tribunal on the case of Samir Chanda V. Managing Director, Assam State Transport Corporation, reported in (1998) 6 SCC 605, where the word "use" in respect of a motor vehicle was held to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary further holding that the use of the vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. Thus, this court does not find any infirmity in the decision of the learned Tribunal on the said issues No.1 and 2, as framed by it.
11. The learned Tribunal, on the basis of Post Mortem Report (Ext.2), Medical Certificate (Ext.3) and First Information Report (Ext.7), accepted the plea of contributory negligence on part of the deceased. The records reveal that in the FIR (Ext.7) dated 09.08.2001 registered in Raha P.S. as GR Case No. 1139/2001, the name of accused in column 2 was mentioned as Mahendra Kalita (the decased) and in column 3 thereof, the brief description of offence is entered as "Rash and negligent driving and causing grievous injury and damage."The claimant's side could not rebut the said evidence. Hence, this court does not find any infirmity with the findings in existence of contributory negligence on part of the deceased.
12. In respect of issue No.3, relying on the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 and on the salary certificate (Ext.1), the learned Tribunal accepted the plea that at the time of his death, the deceased was working as Assistant Manager of State Bank of India, Mokokchung Branch and drawing a salary of Rs.19,353/- and after deduction, he was drawing net amount of Rs.17,049/-. PW-3, who was working as Deputy Manager of State Bank of India, deposed to the effect that there was every likelihood of the deceased being promoted and ultimately his salary would have been Rs.34,000/-. Considering the future prospect, the income of the deceased was assessed at Rs.20,000/-. The multiplier of 15 was taken as the deceased was MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 5 of 12 42 years old. One-third of income if the deceased was deducted towards his own expenses. The compensation was calculated as under:-
a. Rs.20,000/- X 12 X 15 = Rs. 24,00,000/-.
b. Funeral expenses: Rs. 2,500/-.
c. Loss of estate: Rs. 5,000/-.
d. Loss of consortium: Rs. 5,000/-.
e. Loss of love and affection: Rs. 10,000/-.
f. Cost of treatment: Rs. 20,000/-.
g. Total compensation: Rs. 24,40,000/-.
(Rupees Twenty four lakh forty thousand only).
13. The direction of the learned Tribunal to the appellant herein to pay its 50% share of the payment of compensation is liable to be sustained. The appellant herein shall now be liable to pay 50% of Rs.22,82,444/- amounting to Rs.11,41,222/- to the claimants i.e. Respondents No.2 to 5 herein by way of 4 separate cheques. The said sum shall carry interest @ 6% from the date of the award as ordered by the learned Tribunal, till its realization. The appellant shall continue to be liable for the cost of the claim proceeding, which was quantified at Rs.1,000/- by the learned Tribunal.
14. Consequently, as the deceased is found to be contributory negligent towards the accident, for which the Respondent No.7 herein (i.e. the insurer of Maruti Car No. AS-02- A-4225) is not found liable to pay any compensation.
15. The learned counsel for the respondents No.2 to 5 have cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of (i) Rajesh & others V. Rajbir Singh & others, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 54 (para 10 to 16), and (ii) Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi & ors V. Kasam Daud Kumbhar & ors., reported in (2015) 4 SCC 237 (para 16 and 17) and urged that the learned Tribunal had calculated the compensation in a lower side. It failed to take into account 30% addition of income on account of future prospect and other factors like loss of dependency, loss of consortium, loss of care and guidance, funeral expenses, etc. were not in accordance with the various case laws cited by him. He has submitted that his claim for enhancement is liable to be considered and granted as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the above referred two cases.
In paragraphs 10 to 16 of the case of Rajbir Singh (supra), it has been stated as follows:-
MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 6 of 12"10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case, it was held as follows: (SCC p.
280) "10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to 'make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just'. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation."
The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim.
12. There is another reason why the court should award proper compensation irrespective of the claim and, if required, even in excess of the claim. After the amendment of the Act by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14-11-1994, the report on motor vehicle accident prepared by the police officer and forwarded to the Claims Tribunal under sub- section (6) of Section 158 has to be treated as an application for compensation.
13. Section 158(6) of the Act reads as follows:
"158. Production of certain certificates, licence and perm it in certain cases.--(1)-(5) * * * (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the insurer concerned, and, where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer."
14. Section 166(4) of the Act reads as follows:
"166. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act."
15. Prior to the amendment in 1994, it was left to the discretion of the Tribunal as to whether the report be treated as an application or not. The pre-amended position under sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act, reads as under:
MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 7 of 12"166. (4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if it thinks it necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for compensation under this Act."
16. In a report on accident, there is no question of any reference to any claim for damages, different heads of damages or such other details. It is the duty of the Tribunal to build on that report and award just, equitable, fair and reasonable compensation with reference to the settled principles on assessment of damages. Thus, on that ground also we hold that the Tribunal/court has a duty, irrespective of the claims made in the application, if any, to properly award a just, equitable, fair and reasonable compensation, if necessary, ignoring the claim made in the application for compensation."
In paragraphs 16 and 17 of the case of Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi (supra), it has been stated as follows:-
"16. In Deddappa v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.10, it was observed as under: (SCC p. 602, para 26) "26. However, as the appellant hails from the lowest strata of society, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, we should, in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, direct Respondent 1 to pay the amount of claim to the appellants herein and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle viz. Respondent 2, particularly in view of the fact that no appeal was preferred by him. We direct accordingly."
17. The next question falling for our consideration is the rate of interest to be awarded. The Tribunal has awarded interest @ 15% which was reduced to 12% by the High Court. The rate of interest awarded by both the courts is on higher side. In Amresh Kumari v. Niranjan Lal Jagdish Parshad Jain11 and Mohinder Kaur v. Hira Nand Sindhi12, this Court has awarded the compensation amount payable to the claimants with interest @ 9%."
16. By relying on the herein before quoted paragraphs, the learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 5 claims for a re-assessment of the compensation as follows:-
a. Monthly Salary @ Rs.17,049/-, so yearly salary would be Rs.2,04,588/- b. 30% addition on account of future prospect as per the case of Rajbir Singh (supra): 2,04,588/- + Rs.61,376/- = Rs.2,65,964/-
c. Less: 1/4th deduction as the deceased had 5 defendants at the time of his death as per case of Sarla Verma (supra): Rs.66,491/-.
d. Total yearly income (a+b-c) = Rs.1,99,473/-
MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 8 of 12e. Applicable multiplier as per case of Sarla Verma (supra): 14. f. Loss of dependency: Rs.1,99,473/- X 14 = Rs.27,92,622/-.
g. Add: On account of loss of consortium as per Rajbir Singh (supra):
Rs.1,00,000/-.
h. Add: On account of loss of care and guidance as per Jiju Kuruvilla & others V. Kunjujamma Mohan, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 166: Rs.2,00,000/-. i. Add: For funeral expenses as per case of Rajbir Singh (supra): Rs.25,000/-. j. Add: For Medical expenses as per award by the learned Tribunal: Rs.25,000/- k. Total of (f) to (j) above: Rs.31,37,622/-.
l. Thus, 50% share of the appellant would be Rs.15,68,811/-. m. Cost awarded by the learned Tribunal: Rs.1000/-. n. Interest @ 6% from date of filing claim petition i.e. 26.02.2002 till realization.
17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the appellant, by referring to the case of Ranjana Prakash & others V. Divisional Manager & ors, reported in (2001) 14 SCC 639, refers to paragraph 6 to 8 thereof and submits that there is no cross appeal by the respondents No.2 to 5 and, as such, the oral prayer for enhancement of the award should not be entertained at this first appellate stage. For the sake of convenience, paragraphs 6,7 & 8 of the said judgment is quoted below:
"6. We are of the view that the High Court committed an error in ignoring the contention of the claimants. It is true that the claimants had not challenged the award of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had failed to take note of the future prospects and add 30% to the annual income of the deceased. But the claimants were not aggrieved by Rs 23,134 being taken as the monthly income. There was therefore no need for them to challenge the award of the Tribunal. But where in an appeal filed by the owner/insurer, if the High Court proposes to reduce the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimants can certainly defend the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, by pointing out other errors or omissions in the award, which if taken note of, would show that there was no need to reduce the amount awarded as compensation. Therefore, in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the appellant can certainly put forth a contention that if 30% is to be deducted from the income for whatsoever reason, 30% should also be added towards future prospects, so that the compensation awarded is not reduced. The fact that the claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross- objections.MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 9 of 12
7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may.
8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation."
18. In light of the herein before quoted paragraphs from the above mentioned two cases, this Court is, therefore, confronted with the question as to which citation would constitute a binding precedent. It is seen that while the case of Rajbir Singh (supra) has been decided by a Full Court of 3 Judges Bench. The other two cases have been decided by a Division Bench having strength of 2 Hon'ble Judges. It appears that in the case of Rajbir Singh (supra), the issue which the Hon'ble Apex Court was deciding is reflect in the opening words of paragraph 10, which is "Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed..." and, as such, this court is not persuaded to accept the argument that the said judgment can be said to be a binding precedent on the power of the appellate court to enhance the award without a cross appeal. The answer directly on the point is found in the judgment in the case of Ranjana Prakash (supra), because in para 6 thereof, it has been held as follows - "... The fact that the claimants did not independently challenge the award will not therefore come in the way of their defending the compensation MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 10 of 12 awarded, on other grounds. It would only mean that in an appeal by the owner/ insurer, the claimants will not be entitled to seek enhancement of the compensation by urging any new ground, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objection." In para 8 thereof, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has further directly clarified and held on the very point by stating as follows - ".... The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/ insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation." On the well accepted legal principle that "a judgment is an authority on what it decides" and that "a judgment is not to be read as a statute, it has to be read in the context of the facts discussed in it." On reading paragraph 10 of the case of Rajbir Singh (supra), it is apparent that the question formulated by the Hon'ble Apex Court was "Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case." Therefore, the Apex Court in Rajbir SIngh's case (supra) was referring to the power of the Tribunal while exercising original jurisdiction, while in the case of Ranjana Prakash (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was explaining the limitations of the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, in view of the above discussions, the prayer for enhancement of the compensation as made by the learned counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 5 is rejected. There is one more reason for refusing 30% increase of future prospect, for which the answer lies in reading paragraph 9 of the case of Ranjana Prakash (supra), which reads as follows:-
"9. In Sarla Verma, this Court held that where the deceased had a permanent job with regular salary with provisions for periodic increases, 30% of the current income could be added towards future prospects if the deceased was aged between 40 to 50 years. In Sarla Verma, this Court also stated that income tax paid should be deducted from the annual income to arrive at the "income" which will form the basis for calculating the compensation. The Tribunal did neither of these two things. If both are done, the result would be that there would be no change in the income arrived at by the Tribunal for calculating the compensation. The 30% increase on account of future prospects and the 30% deduction on account of income tax would cancel each other, resulting in "income" remaining unchanged. As a result, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal also would remain unaltered."
19. As regards the quantum of compensation, which the appellant shall be liable to pay, this court finds that as per the ratio of the case of Sarla Verma (Smt.) & others V. Delhi Transport Corporation, as reported in (2009) 3 Supreme 487: (2013) 9 SCC 54, as the deceased was 42 years old when he expired, the applicable multiplier (as per column 4 of MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 11 of 12 the chart therein) is 14 and not 15. Hence, the compensation is required to be re-calculated as follows:-
a. Monthly income- Rs.20,000 Less: 1/3rd deduction on account of personal expenses: Rs.6,667/- Income taken for calculating compensation: Rs.13,333/-
b. Rs.13,333/- X 12 X 14 = Rs. 22,39,944/-.
c. Funeral expenses: Rs. 2,500/-.
d. Loss of estate: Rs. 5,000/-.
e. Loss of consortium: Rs. 5,000/-.
f. Loss of love and affection: Rs. 10,000/-.
g. Cost of treatment: Rs. 20,000/-.
h. Total compensation: Rs. 22,82,444/-.
(Rupees Twenty two lakh eighty two thousand four hundred forty four only)
20. As no liability for paying any compensation is imposed upon the Respondent No.7 as stated herein before, the appellant shall deposit 50% of its share of compensation amounting to Rs.11,41,222/- plus cost of Rs.1,000/- as imposed by the learned Tribunal within a period of 6 (six) weeks from today before the Registry of this Court. Needless to say that on such deposit being made, the Registry shall permit the claimants (i.e. Respondents No.2 to 5 herein) to withdraw the same by way of 4 separate cheques in equal proportion in the names of the said Respondents No.2 to 5 on proper identification by Sri B.J. Mukherjee, their learned counsel.
21. Thus, the appeal stands partially allowed with no order as to costs of this appeal.
22. Before parting with the records, this Court puts on record its appreciation of the erudite arguments advanced by Mrs. S. Roy, Sri B.J. Mukherjee, and Mr. R. Goswami, the learned counsels for the parties.
JUDGE MKS/ MAC Appeal No.105/09 Page 12 of 12