National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Chola Ms General Insurance Company Ltd vs M Rajesh on 16 January, 2026
t.
IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
AT NEW DELHI
NC/SA/751/2025
(Against the order dated 29.11.2024 in First Appeal No. 502/2023 of the
Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijayawada)
WITH
NC/IA/13434/2025
NC/IA/14187/2025
(STAY AND CONDONATION OF DELAY)
Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. Appellant
Versus
M. Rajesh Respondent
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.P. SAHI, PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. BHARATKUMAR PANDYA, MEMBER
For Appellant Ms. Niyati Jadaun, Advocate
Dated: 16.01.2026
ORDER
1. The Insurance Company resisted the complaint of the respondent - CC No. 153/2020 filed before the DCDRC, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh, whereas the complainant alleged that he was entitled to the entire loss of the claim of his lorry bearing registration no. AP21TE1729 that was insured with the Appellant under a policy under a declared value of Rs. 30 lakhs for the period from 15.06.2019 to 14.06.2020.
2. The contention is that the vehicle caught fire at about 2.30am in the night of 7th / 8th of September, 2019 while the lorry was proceeding at a place which fell within the jurisdiction of Tripuranthakam Police Station. The NC/SA/751/2025 Page | 1 complainant alleged that it was due to some electric short circuit resulting in burning of flames.
3. A police complaint was lodged giving rise to crime no. 130/2019 registered at the same police station. The spot surveyor came to visit the site on 09.09.2019 and after a final survey was conducted a suspicion arose about the nature of the accident. Consequently the appellant approached M/s. Satyadev Labs Pvt. Ltd. engaging the services of one Dr. P.S.N. Reddy for carrying out a forensic investigation of the vehicle. A report was submitted on 23.10.2019 and the copy of the forensic report has been brought on record of this appeal vide a document compilation through Diary No. 929 dated 13.01.2026. The report is in detail with 19 photographs and a rough sketch of the vehicle. On a physical evidence and analysis, the said report suggested absence of a short-circuit failure and observed that there were some abnormal or unnatural burn patterns on the basis whereof it was presumed that the fire could have been caused by the pouring of ignitable fire accelerant diesel on the cable of the vehicle. In fact the suggestion appears to be that it was not an accidental fire.
4. On the basis of the said report, the Insurance Company repudiated the claim on 29.01.2020.
5. Accordingly, the complaint was filed before the DCDRC on 12.10.2020 after the enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The District Commission came to the conclusion that the evidence with regard to the accident, the lodging of the police report and the availing of the fire services NC/SA/751/2025 Page|2 indicate that by the time attempts could be made to extinguish the fire, the entire vehicle had been gutted. The fire accident certificates indicated that the fire was medium and the photographs with regard to the burnt lorry indicated that it had completely burnt. The District Commission also relied on a newspaper that indicated the cause of fire as short-circuit and accordingly the complaint was allowed assessing the loss at 75% of the IDV on non-standard basis with a direction to pay Rs. 22,50,000/- together with 6% interest per annum from the date of accident to the date of realisation. Rs. 10,000/- was also awarded as cost of compensation and Rs. 5,000/- as costs.
6. The Insurance Company filed F.A. No. 502/2023 and the State Commission vide an order dated 29.11.2024 dismissed the appeal accordingly. All the grounds taken in the appeal from ground no. 5(a) to (m), all relate to the merits explaining the delay as the State Commission dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a delay of 172 days in preferring the appeal.
7. The present appeal under Section 51(2) was preferred treating the delay in the filing of this appeal of 257 days as incorrectly calculated by the office praying that a limitation of 90 days should be made available and the delay should be accordingly condoned. This issue was decided vide a order dated 17.11.2025 which is extracted hereinunder:
Mr. Nandwani has urged that the limitation of 30 days for filing an appeal under Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would not apply, in as much as, there is no specific provision for the same under Section 51 (2). He then refers to the limitation provided under Section 14 of the Consumer Protection (Consumer Commission Procedure) Regulations, 2020 to urge that NC/SA/751/2025 °~ge |3 the limitation as indicated therein nowhere recites about the limitation with regard to the appeals under Section 51 (2) and therefore the same should be construed to be a limitation of 90 days for appeals under Section 51 (2), more so, keeping in view the fact that the appeal lies before the National Commission. He hinted at the time period required for approaching the National Commission and urged this being a practically difficulty, the limitation of 90 days be allowed for appeals under Section 51 (2) before this Commission.
We have considered the submissions raised and we find it difficult to accept the said proposition, in as much as, Section 51 of the Act provides for appeals against the orders of the State Commission. It is 30 days for an appeal against an order on an original complaint which is a First Appeal before this Commission. Where the State Commission exercises appellate powers and passes an order in an appeal filed against the order of the District Commission a further appeal under Section 51 (2) is provided before the National Commission. The legislature cannot be presumed to have intended a different limitation for an appeal under Section 51 (2) and we have to treat the proviso under Section 51 (1) on the principle of ejusdem generis to apply in respect of appeals under Section 51 (2) also. Even practically an appeal against an order of the State Commission in an original complaint can be filed on all issues of fact and law as a first appeal and therefore would require a more exhaustive preparation as against an appeal under Section 51(2) against an appellate order of the State Commission, which only lies on substantial questions of law. It would therefore be illogical and irrational to presume that the legislature had intended to make available a larger span of time for a second appeal under Section 51 (2) and a lesser time of 30 days only for a first appeal.
The argument of Mr. Nandwani that 90 days should be made available for filing appeals under Section 51 (2) is rejected keeping in view the Regulation 14 of the 2020 Regulations which also opens with a phrase "subject to the provisions of Section 51". Consequently, having interpreted the provisions as aforesaid, the appellant if has come beyond 30 days, will have to file an application for delay condonation or else the appeal would not be maintainable.
Mr. Nandwani says that he may now be permitted to file an application to that effect. Two weeks' time is granted for the same. If the application is filed within the said period, the same shall be listed for directions on 06.01.2026.
The Registry may also take notice of this order and shall compute the limitation of 30 days for entertaining an appeal under Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
NC/SA/751/2025 age | 4
8. Accordingly, a fresh application has been filed for condoning the delay of 257 days in filing of this appeal. The explanation given for explaining the delay are contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 are as follows:
3. That the Appellant is a body corporate having its registered office at Chennai, Tamil Nadu and branch offices all over India. The working of the Appellant is just like a government department wherein several formalities and steps are undertaken before deciding to file the Appeal, for that purpose the file moves from one desk to another, and in this way sufficient time is consumed.
4. That the documents necessary for filing the second appeal had to be procured from various distant locations across India. Furthermore, the concerned Legal Officer at Chennai was on leave during the relevant period, which caused unavoidable delay in collating the requisite documents; thereby resulting in delay in filing the accompanying appeal.
5. That since the certified copy of the Ld. State Commission order dated 29.11.2024 was misplaced, a fresh certified copy was applied for and received on 21.10.2025; whereas the copy of original certified copy had been received earlier on 03.12.2024, therefore there is a delay of 257 days in filing the present second appeal.
8. That it is a settled law that keeping in view the working of such companies like a government department, the law of limitation should be interpreted liberally as no personal interest of any official of such companies are involved.
9. That delay in the filing of the accompanying appeal is due to reasons beyond the control of the appellant and for the reasons mentioned above.
9. We are not at all satisfied with the explanation given with regard to the delay as indicated above, in as much as, the appellant company cannot claim itself to be working like a government department. This explanation by the appellant does not appear to be genuine or bonafide nor is it a valid explanation giving rise to sufficient cause. The plea that documents to be NC/SA/751/2025 Page |5 procured from across the country is a weird assertion not worth comprehending without any material to support the same.
10. We have called upon the learned counsel to advance the submissions and Advocate Ms. Niyati Jadaun has urged that there is no deliberate delay on the part of the appellant and that the delay had been caused due to reasons beyond control in the circumstances indicated above. This is unacceptable as there is nothing to believe that the certified copy was misplaced. There is no plea explaining as to why almost one year was consumed thereafter in obtaining another certified copy of the order on 21.10.2025.
11. What we find is that the State Commission had also dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay of 172 days and in the present appeal, the delay of 257 days in filing of this appeal was sought to be explained in the manner as quoted above which we have found to be neither reasonable nor plausible.
12. The Company is backed-up by administrators and legal advisors, who are well aware of their responsibilities and the legal provisions under which appeals are to be preferred, and if with delay, should be provided with sufficient cause. As already indicated above in the five paragraphs of the delay condonation application, we find no sufficient cause in terms of the legal position as explained by the Apex Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 10 SCO 531 has held as under:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions NC/SA/751/2025 Page |6 notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse".
Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
13. A perusal of the said ratio would indicate that the distinction between an excuse and an explanation has been explained, and in the instant case, the explanation given are excuses without any substantive documents to prove the said alleged lapses and movement of the files and consequently, we do not find any good reason to condone the delay. The delay condonation h'C/SA/751/2025 Page | 7 application 14187/2025 is dismissed and consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed.
Sd/-
( A.P. SAHI, J.)
PRESIDENT '
Sd/- > •;?
( BHARATKUMAR PANDYA)
MEMBER
Pramod/Vandana/Court- 1/02
NC/SA/751/2025 Page |8