Telangana High Court
Adduri Rajendar vs The State Of Telangana on 7 April, 2026
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
1
wp_34738_2024
NBK, J
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 34738 of 2024
07th April, 2026
Between:
1. Adduri Rajender S/o Veeranna, and others
... Petitioners
AND
1. The State of Telangana, and others
... Respondents
ORDER:
The case of the petitioners, precisely as per the writ affidavit, is that they are small and marginal farmers dependent on their lands for livelihood, and they first became aware of the proposed acquisition only in March 2023, when a public award enquiry notice was placed in the Gram Panchayat office. Following this notice, survey teams began marking their lands, and despite approaching authorities for clarification, no copies of earlier notifications were furnished. As survey activities intensified during April and May 2023, allegedly damaging standing crops, some petitioners approached this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023. At that stage, they were informed that mandatory environmental clearance had not been obtained. Taking this into account, the Court granted an interim stay on dispossession in May 2023. Subsequently, during the pendency of that case, the authorities secured environmental clearance in July 2023 and moved an application to vacate the stay. It was only through counter 2 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J affidavits filed in that proceeding that the petitioners discovered the existence of multiple 3A and 3D notifications, allegedly published in newspapers such as "Mana Telangana" and "The Hindu," which, according to the petitioners, had negligible circulation in their locality and were never displayed in the Gram Panchayat.
1.1. It is contended that the earlier writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the authorities not to interfere with the possession without initiating proper acquisition proceedings and paying compensation. The petitioners believed that fresh proceedings would be initiated in compliance with this direction, however, the authorities proceeded to pass awards under Section 3G(1) on 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024 without issuing fresh notices or granting an opportunity for objections or personal hearing. Notices regarding these awards were served only in April 2024, and even then, copies of the award proceedings were not supplied. The petitioners state that copies were obtained with great difficulty only in October 2024, after which time was required to gather documents and seek legal advice before approaching the Court again. Throughout this period, the petitioners and others submitted representations raising concerns about the project and the acquisition process, but no responses were received. Meanwhile, authorities allegedly continued efforts to take possession and pressured landowners to accept compensation.
1.2. The petitioners assert that multiple 3A notifications dated 10.03.2021 and 21.04.2022 were issued for the same stretch without adequate land descriptions or owner details, violating Section 3A(2). He further alleges that publication in newspapers with little or no local circulation defeated the purpose of Section 3A(3), and that no Grama 3 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J Sabha or local notification was conducted, undermining transparency and natural justice. The petitioners claim that 3D notifications dated 22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022 were issued without affording any opportunity to file objections, and that even after this Court's earlier order, no fresh opportunity or hearing was provided.He argues that the authorities acted unfairly in publishing notices.While a Section 3G notice was displayed in the Gram Panchayat office, the earlier 3A notifications were not published locally. It is also stated that only one Section 3G(3) notice for the first set of notifications was published locally, whereas the second notification was not made available and was discovered only later through an RTI request.
1.3. The petitioners mainly argue that the authorities failed to properly decide compensation and rehabilitation (R&R) benefits as required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties Order dated 28.08.2015. It is stated that compensation under Sections 3G and 3H includes not only the land value but also rehabilitation benefits. However, no R&R award was passed, making the awards incomplete and legally invalid. They further argue that the authorities cannot take possession of the land until both compensation and R&R benefits are fully decided and given to the petitioners.
1.4. The petitioners contend that the notifications were not properly published, they were not given real opportunity to file objections or opportunity of being heard, and the awards themselves are defective. They also claim that authorities are now pressuring them to accept compensation and give up their land, while contractors are already entering their fields and disturbing standing crops.
1.5. The petitioners therefore seek a writ of mandamus to declare the entire acquisition process as void, including the 3A notifications dated 4 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J 02.03.2021 and 19.04.2022, the 3D notifications dated 22.02.2022 and 07.10.2022, the awards passed under Section 3G(1) on 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, and the consequential award notices issued on 16.04.2024, by contending that these actions violate statutory provisions under the National Highways Act, 1956 read with the RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties) Order dated 28.08.2015, as well as constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 300A.
2. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.3-Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally, on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 2, and 4. It is contended that the entire land acquisition process for the Mancherial- Warangal Greenfield National Highway NH-163G was conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
2.1. It is contended that the acquisition process originated with the issuance of a Gazette notification bearing No. 3099 dated 27.08.2019, by which the Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally, was designated as the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition for the stretch from Km. 63.779 to Km. 88.418. Thereafter, a Section 3A notification was published, including in newspapers on 25.03.2021, triggering the statutory period of 21 days for filing objections, which lasted until 14.04.2021. The respondent emphasizes that several interested persons did file objections within this stipulated period, which were duly considered under Section 3C; however, the petitioners failed to submit any objections within this legally prescribed timeframe. Consequently, the authorities proceeded to issue the Section 3D declaration, which was published on 22.02.2022, 5 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J thereby vesting the land absolutely in the Central Government as per Section 3D(2).
2.2. It is contended that during the preparation of sub-division records following the first Section 3D notification, it was discovered that certain extents of land had been inadvertently omitted from the initial Section 3A notification. To rectify this omission, additional Section 3A notifications were issued only with respect to the missing extents and without any overlap with previously notified land. These additional notifications led to corresponding Section 3D and Section 3G processes, all of which, were carried out in full compliance with statutory requirements. The respondent also details that final declarations under Section 3D were published in the Gazette of India on 28.02.2023 and again on 23.08.2023 for additional extents, and were simultaneously published in newspapers such as "Mana Telangana" and "The Hindu," in accordance with Section 3A(3) of the Act.
2.3. It is stated that environmental clearance was duly granted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, on 05.07.2023, and that this clearance was published in "Mana Telangana" on 25.08.2023. Following completion of all statutory steps, awards were passed under Section 3G(1) through proceedings dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, with compensation determined in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The respondent asserts that compensation amounts, including 100% solatium, 12% additional market value from the date of 3A notification to the date of award, and a multiplication factor of 1.5 for rural lands, were duly calculated and deposited in the CALA account for disbursement. Notices 6 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J under Section 3E were issued to the petitioners to receive compensation, but the petitioners allegedly failed to appear and collect the same.
2.4. It is stated thatpublication requests for notifications under Sections 3A, 3D, and 3G were made at the instance of the Project Director, NHAI, Project Implementation Unit, Warangal, and that all such notifications were consistently published in the same two newspapers, as required by law. It is stated that any discrepancies in names or ownership details identified in Section 3D notifications are corrected at the stage of award determination through speaking orders after verification of original documents, ensuring that rightful claimants receive compensation under Section 3G.
2.5. In response to the allegation of lack of notice and opportunity, the respondent asserts that the statutory mechanism under Section 3A and 3C was fully complied with, and that the petitioners' failure to file objections within the 21-day period cannot invalidate the proceedings. Further, the claim of inadequate publication is refuted by emphasizing that the law only requires publication in two newspapers, including one vernacular, and does not mandate publication in local panchayat offices. Further, the allegation of multiple / overlapping notifications is denied by contending that additional 3A notifications were issued solely to cover previously omitted extents.
2.6. In response to the allegation of no opportunity for hearing, it is contended by the respondentsthat hearings were available under Section 3C and were availed by other landowners,therebythere is no procedural unfairness. It is contended that the awards were passed in accordance with Section 3G and the compensation framework of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
7wp_34738_2024 NBK, J 2.7. With regard to the claim of Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits, it is contended that the Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act apply only in cases involving large-scale displacement, such as hydroelectric or industrial township projects, and are not applicable to linear infrastructure projects like national highways. Therefore, he contends that the petitioners' demand for R&R benefits is legally untenable.
2.8. In response to the allegation of interference with possession and cultivation, it is contended that under Section 3B of the Act, authorized personnel are legally entitled to enter land for survey and related purposes after issuance of a Section 3A notification, and that there is no damage to crops or unlawful interference. He further emphasizes that once a Section 3D declaration is published, the land vests absolutely in the Central Government free from encumbrances.
2.9. It is contended that the out of 615 affected landowners, only a few have raised objections, and the petitioners approached the Court with an intention to stall the acquisition process rather than to seek the statutory grievance redressal mechanism through arbitration.
3. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent No.7-Project Director of NHAI on behalf of respondents No. 6 and 7, essentially contending that the entire land acquisition process for the four-lane Greenfield National Highway NH-163G is lawful, procedurally sound, and fully compliant with the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is contended that the NHAI initiated the Greenfield highway project from Mancherial to Warangal covering the stretch from Km. 63.779 to Km. 88.418 across 14 villages in Jayashankar 8 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J Bhupalapally District, including Mogullapally. A formal requisition for land acquisition was submitted under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956, following which the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA), namely the Revenue Divisional Officer, Bhupalpally, was duly empowered to carry out acquisition proceedings. The first Section 3A notification was issued vide S.O. No. 1016(E) dated 02.03.2021, and its substance was published in "Mana Telangana" (Telugu) and "The Hindu" (English) on 25.03.2021, granting a statutory period of 21 days for filing objections. It is stated that no objections were received from the petitioners within this period as mandated under Section 3C, leading to the issuance of the Section 3D declaration vide S.O. No. 814(E) dated 22.02.2022, which legally vested the land in the Central Government.
3.1. Subsequently, an additional Section 3A notification was issued vide S.O. No. 1869(E) dated 19.04.2022 to cover certain additional extents of land, and its substance was published on 08.05.2022 in the same newspapers, again allowing 21 days for objections. Once again, no objections were received, and a corresponding Section 3D notification was issued vide S.O. No. 4780(E) dated 07.10.2022. It is stated that upon publication of these Section 3D notifications, the acquired lands vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. In parallel, environmental clearance for the project was granted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change on 05.07.2023, thereby satisfying all statutory environmental requirements.
3.2. It is stated that a public notice under Section 3G(3) was issued in "Mana Telangana" and "The Hindu" on 28.02.2023, calling upon all interested persons to appear before the Competent Authority on 28.03.2023 9 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J during office hours and submit their claims along with documentary proof of title. Following this process, and after conducting due enquiry, the Competent Authority passed awards on 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024. These awards, according to the respondents, were passed after considering all objections received, granting opportunity of hearing, and determining compensation strictly in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The compensation included statutory benefits such as 100% solatium, 12% additional market value from the date of 3A notification to the date of award, and a multiplication factor of 1.5 for rural lands. The determined compensation amounts were deposited with the competent authority as required under law.
3.3. With regard to the documentary and procedural evidence, the respondents rely on the sequence of statutory notifications (S.O. No. 1016(E) dated 02.03.2021, S.O. No. 814(E) dated 22.02.2022, S.O. No. 1869(E) dated 19.04.2022, and S.O. No. 4780(E) dated 07.10.2022), the newspaper publications dated 25.03.2021 and 08.05.2022, the Section 3G(3) public notice dated 28.02.2023 calling landowners to appear on 28.03.2023, the environmental clearance dated 05.07.2023 issued by the competent Ministry, and the award proceedings dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024. Each of these, they argue, demonstrates strict adherence to statutory requirements and procedural fairness.
3.4. The respondents categorically deny that there was any lack of notice or opportunity to submit objections. It is contended that the statutory framework under Sections 3A and 3C was fully complied with and that the petitioners' failure to submit objections within the 21-day window cannot invalidate the acquisition process. They refute the claim of inadequate publication by emphasizing that publication in two newspapers, including 10 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J one vernacular, satisfies the legal requirement, and deny that there is any obligation to publish notifications in local panchayat offices. It is stated that the second 3A notification dated 19.04.2022 was issued solely to include missing extents and did not overlap with earlier notifications.
3.5. The respondents contend that the awards dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024 were passed only after due enquiry under Section 3G and after providing opportunity to all stakeholders. It is contended that the order in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023 did not stipulate fresh acquisition proceedings,instead the order directs to follow due process and pay compensation, which has been fully complied with.
3.6. In response to the claim of Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, it is contended that such benefits apply only to "displaced families" as defined under Section 3(k), meaning those who are relocated and resettled. It is contended that in the present case, only small extents of land have been acquired, and the petitioners have neither been relocated nor displaced, and no certification of displacement has been issued by the Competent Authority, and therefore it is contended that the petitionersare not entitled to R&R benefits. They further clarify that while certain compensation provisions under Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act apply, the broader R&R framework does not extend to linear infrastructure projects like highways unless actual displacement occurs. They also emphasize that the Third Schedule is intended for large-scale projects such as hydel or industrial townships and is wholly inapplicable to national highways, and therefore the petitioners are not entitled to R&R benefits. It is contended that the petitioners have failed to substantiate their claim of being affected families or suffering displacement, and that such factual 11 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J determinations cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction without concrete proof. It is contended that the petitioners have an alternative statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956 and a writ petition is not maintainable.
4. A reply affidavit is filed by the petitioners, in response to the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent. It is contended in the reply affidavit that although the petitioners had submitted objections and representations, the respondents failed to produce any record to show that their objections were considered. It is stated that no personal hearing was ever conducted and no proceedings regarding adjudication of objections were communicated, thereby violating statutory requirements and principles of natural justice.
4.1. It is contended that declarations under Section 3D were issued in 2022 and even in 2023 also, but the environmental clearance was obtained only on 05.07.2023, thereby rendering the entire acquisition process invalid, as prior environmental clearance has not been obtained.
4.2. The petitionerscontend that even as per the respondents, certain extents were "inadvertently missed" not once but twice, which itself demonstrates lack of due diligence in planning, survey, and notification. It is contended that this resulted in inaccurate disclosure of land details, depriving landowners of a meaningful opportunity to understand the acquisition and submit their objections.
4.3. On the issue of compensation and Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R), it is contended that respondent authorities themselves admitted that compensation isto be determined under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, but they simultaneously deny applicability of R&R provisions. It is 12 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J contended that under the Removal of Difficulties Order dated 28.08.2015, both compensation and R&R provisions--including those under the Second Schedule--are applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act.
4.4. The petitioners also rebut the respondent's claim that errors in names or details in notifications can be corrected at the award stage. It is contended that such errors in Section 3A and 3D notifications themselves deprive actual landowners of their statutory right to make objections and seek hearing, making the entire process fundamentally flawed. Similarly, he challenges the legality of issuing a second Section 3A notification on 19.04.2022 after a Section 3D declaration dated 22.02.2022.
4.5. Further, the petitionerscontend that the respondent authorities have taken contradictory stand with regard to objections. It is stated that, on the one hand, the respondent claims that some landowners filed objections within the 21-day period from 25.03.2021 to 14.04.2021and, on the other hand, the respondent makes a contrary claim that no objections were received before issuing the Section 3D declaration.It is stated that common objections were filed within time, however, no orders were passed on them.
4.6. The petitioners highlights that the respondent chose to offer "no comments" on certain serious allegations, particularly regarding procedural lapses in publication and award enquiry, and argues that such silence amounts to admission. He further disputes the claim that compensation was properly determined under Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, asserting that there was no revision of market value prior to the Section 3A notification, no adherence to procedures under Sections 16 to 18 and 23, and no valuation of structures before passing the awards.
13wp_34738_2024 NBK, J He also alleges that notices under Section 3E for taking possession were issued prematurely, without completing the mandatory steps of lawful determination.
4.7. In response to the respondents' contention that R&R provisions are not applicable, the petitionerscontend that their claim is specifically limited to the Second Schedule and not the Third Schedule, and that the respondents have failed to properly address this distinction.It is contended that the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015 extends compensation and R&R provisions of the 2013 Act to acquisitions under the National Highways Act.
5. Heard Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners; learned Standing Counsel for NHAI, learned Standing Counsel for CALA,and Mr. B. Narasimha Sarma, learned Additional Solicitor General of India. Perused the record.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners had earlier approached this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023 on the ground that no environmental clearance had been obtained for the project, and though certain petitioners, particularly petitioners Nos. 5, 6, and 9, were included in the additional notifications issued under Sections 3A and 3D, they were deprived of a meaningful opportunity to file objections. The said writ petition was disposed of with a clear direction that the respondents shall not interfere with the petitioners' lands without initiating proper land acquisition proceedings.
6.1. It is contended that the petitioners believed that fresh acquisition proceedings would be initiated in compliance with the order of this Court in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023, however, the Competent Authority 14 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J for Land Acquisition proceeded to pass awards under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956. Learned counsel contends that no effective opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit their objections to the Section 3A notifications, thereby violating principles of natural justice. It is further contended that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D were issued in respect of the same lands without clarity, and that the notifications lacked essential particulars such as survey number-wise and landowner-wise details.
6.2. Learned counsel also submits that despite the pendency of disputes, the respondents have been interfering with the petitioners' possession and cultivation activities, even though standing crops exist on the subject lands. It is contended that compensation as well as Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits ought to have been determined strictly in accordance with Sections 21 to 30 and Sections 16 to 18, 23, and 31 of the 2013 Act, and not under Section 3G of the NH Act.
6.3. It is contended that the expressions "amount" and "compensation" under Sections 3G and 3H of the NH Act must be interpreted to include not only the value of land and structures but also the rehabilitation entitlements of affected families. While conceding that the petitioners may not be displaced so as to require resettlement, learned counsel asserts that they nevertheless qualify as "affected families" and are entitled to rehabilitation benefits. It is argued that possession of land cannot be taken unless complete compensation, including valuation of trees and structures, and determination of rehabilitation entitlements are finalized and paid, which has not been done in the present case.
6.4. Learned counsel challenges the validity of the award proceedings on the ground that compensation for structures and trees has 15 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J not been determined, thereby rendering both the awards and consequential notices under Section 3E unsustainable in law. It is submitted that the Competent Authority ought to have followed the procedure prescribed under the RFCTLARR Act by issuing notice under Section 21, conducting enquiry under Section 23, and following the process under Sections 16 to 18 for identification of beneficiaries and preparation of a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme, instead of mechanically invoking Section 3G of the NH Act.
6.5. It is contended that the petitioners had made several representations expressing their unwillingness to part with their lands and pointing out the illegality in the acquisition process, including improper determination of compensation. Despite this, the authorities, in the months of June and July 2025, allegedly entered the petitioners' lands with police force, marked the lands, and threatened them not to continue cultivation, even though standing crops existed.
7. Learned counsel for the petitionersrelies on:
1) Akkala Chandrakala v. The State of Telangana 1;
2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah 2;
3) B.K. Ravichandra v. Union of India3;
4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 4;
5) K. Ramachandram v. State of Telangana5;
6) Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana6;
7) Manorama Devi v. National Highways Authority of India7;1
W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court) 2 (2024) 10 SCC 533 3 (2021) 14 SCC 703 4 (2005) 7 SCC 627 5 W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court) 6 W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court) 16 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J
8) Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 8;
9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah 9;
10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;
11) Union of India v. Shiv Raj 11;
12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12 7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway 765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated 12.11.2024, rejected the authorities' prayer to vacate an earlier stay order and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R compensation.
7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights--including 7 Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 - DB (Allahabad High Court) 8 (1973) 1 SCC 500 9 (2022) 15 SCC 1 10 2023 SCC OnLine All 5276 11 (2014) 6 SCC 564 12 1963 SCC OnLine SC 23 17 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a reasoned decision--along with requirements for an efficient process and fair rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is invalid.
7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300- A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected any notion that the State can act with "royal prerogative" and insisted that all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result, the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the rightful owners.
7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the landowner's objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under Section 5-A is a significant safeguard--comparable in importance to a fundamental right--and must involve a real and careful consideration by the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that 18 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed. Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter- affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to prevent arbitrary state action.
7.5. In K. Ramachandram(supra), this Courtexamined whether the government had followed the required statutory procedures while attempting to acquire the petitioner's land; and held that although the preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities' failure to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner's rights, the declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land exchange or fair monetary compensation.
7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother's solatium and 13 W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court) 19 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.
7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing, employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act, and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.
7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws. The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.
20wp_34738_2024 NBK, J 7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for compensation constitutes a ground of "patent illegality," justifying judicial intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the property's market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.
7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly assessed, rejecting the authorities' contention that linear road projects cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part of their compensation.
7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Courtconsidered the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also 21 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide compensation for over five years.
7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant's confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate's failure to follow procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
8. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) submits that the acquisition proceedings and the determination of compensation have been carried out strictly in accordance with law, and that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in the present writ petition. At the outset, it is contended that adequate and lawful compensation has been awarded to all affected landowners. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) passed awards dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, granting compensation in accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956 read with the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is stated that these awards were passed after conducting due enquiry, considering objections, and providing opportunity to all concerned parties.
8.1. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that the compensation amounts determined under the said awards have already been deposited with the competent authority as required under the NH Act, 1956. It is stated that in certain cases, some landowners did not attend the enjoyment survey or award enquiry and failed to produce title documents, due to which the CALA proceeded to determine compensation based on available records such as the enjoyment statements. Subsequently, some 22 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J landowners came forward with title documents and claims. It is also pointed out that while some of the petitioners have accepted and received the compensation, others have chosen not to receive the same, and therefore cannot now turn around and challenge the process itself.
8.2. Referring to the earlier proceedings in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023 and W.P. No. 13383 of 2023, learned Standing Counsel submits that this Court had only directed the authorities not to interfere with possession without following due process and payment of compensation; and the respondents have fully complied with this direction by following the statutory procedure and determining compensation. The contention of the petitioners that fresh acquisition proceedings ought to have been initiated is a misinterpretation of the Court's order.
8.3. It is submitted that the petitionershave an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956, whereby any aggrieved party may approach the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector for redressal of grievances relating to compensation. Further, under Section 3G(6), the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 apply, and any challenge to the arbitral award lies before the District Court under Section 34 of the said Act. In view of this statutory mechanism, it is argued that the present writ petition is not maintainable.
8.4. Learned Standing Counsel contends that the petitioners do not fall within the definition of a "displaced family" under Section 3(k) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, as they have neither been relocated nor resettled. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish loss of livelihood, loss of residence, or displacement so as to qualify as "affected families" under Section 3(c) of 23 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J the Act. In fact, only a portion of the petitioners' lands has been acquired, thereby negating any claim of deprivation of livelihood.
8.5. Learned Standing Counsel further contends that, even otherwise, the claims for R&R benefits require cogent evidence demonstrating that the compensation awarded is grossly inadequate to enable rehabilitation, and in the instant case the petitioners have failed to establish that the compensation awarded is grossly inadequate to enable rehabilitation. It is contended that where substantial compensation has been awarded, landowners are capable of acquiring alternative land or assets, thereby mitigating any alleged hardship. It is further submitted that if the petitioners intended to claim such benefits, they ought to have specifically raised these claims before the competent authority during the objection stage, which they failed to do. It is contended that entitlement to R&R benefits requires a certification by the competent authority that the family has been displaced or dislocated, which is absent in the present case. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are not automatically applicable to acquisitions under the NH Act, 1956 unless specifically extended by notification under Section 105 of the 2013 Act. In the absence of such extension covering social impact assessment and R&R provisions, there was no requirement for the NHAI to undertake such exercises in the present acquisition. Further, as only a part of the petitioners' land has been acquired and they have not been dislocated, the claim of the petitionersfor rehabilitation and resettlement benefits is misconceived.
8.6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the present project is a public infrastructure project of national importance, and if the petitioners are aggrieved by the quantum of compensation or any alleged deficiency 24 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J therein, they have a statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, 1956, and such grievances cannot form the basis to challenge the acquisition proceedings themselves. It is therefore contended that the acquisition has been carried out strictly in accordance with due process of law, and adequate compensation has been determined and made available, and that `no case for R&R benefits is made out, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed both on merits and on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) submits that the acquisition proceedings have been conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
9.1. It is contended that during the preparation of sub-division records with reference to the first declaration under Section 3D, it was noticed that certain extents of land had been inadvertently omitted from the earlier Section 3A notification. In order to rectify this omission, an additional Section 3A notification was issued, strictly limited to the missing extents and without any overlap with the previously notified lands. It is submitted that such action was undertaken only to ensure completeness and accuracy in the acquisition process and does not vitiate the proceedings.
9.2. Learned counsel further submits that in W.P. No. 13384 of 2023, this Court had directed the respondents not to interfere with the possession of the petitioners' lands without following due process and payment of compensation. In compliance with the said directions, the 25 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J CALA proceeded to determine compensation and passed awards dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024, thereby fulfilling the requirement of law before taking further steps in the acquisition.
9.3. It is also contended that the petitioners failed to avail the statutory opportunity to file objections to the Section 3A notifications. Despite publication of the notifications and availability of the objection mechanism under the Act, no objections were submitted by the petitioners within the prescribed time, and therefore, they cannot now challenge the acquisition on the ground of lack of opportunity.
9.4. Learned counsel submits that all statutory notifications were duly published in accordance with Section 3A(3) of the National Highways Act, 1956, namely in two local newspapers, one of which was in the vernacular language. Thus, the requirement of publication and notice stands fully complied with.
9.5. With regard to compensation, it is submitted that the awards dated 20.01.2024 and 14.03.2024 were passed after due enquiry, determining compensation in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, which govern the principles for assessment of market value and related benefits. Therefore, the contention that compensation has not been properly determined is untenable.
9.6. Learned counsel finally submits that out of a total of 615 land losers affected by the acquisition, only the present petitioners have approached this Court, raising objections with an intention to stall the acquisition process, and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
26wp_34738_2024 NBK, J
10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the instant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-à-vis the private interest while exercising the power and there are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.
10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of India 15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.
10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and nothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of the NH Act.
141997 (1) SCC 134 15 2017 SCC Online Hyd 250 16 2022 (6) SCC 127 17 2011 SCC OnLine AP 267 18 (2020) 15 SCC 161 27 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J 10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties can approach the arbitrator.
10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli19, and contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and therefore similar dispensation may be shown in the present writ petition as well in view of similarity of facts.
11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National Highways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G, and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications 19 Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023 28 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015. They also allegedenial of statutory entitlements, and attempts by the authorities to forcibly take possession of their lands without paying lawful compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and marginal farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be confined only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an agricultural extent, and that compensation should also be granted for the structures existing on the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits should be extended to the petitioners.
11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents (NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners' land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and that all statutory steps--issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and 3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and passing of compensation awards under Section 3G--were duly followed. According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and compensation has been determined and deposited as per law.It is also their contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired, requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under 29 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not "displaced families". It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the petitioners' allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a project of national importance and public interest.
12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature, connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.
12.1 Further, the petitioners' grievance with regard to entitlement to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.
30wp_34738_2024 NBK, J 12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose, unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set aside, nor can the opinion of experts--either with regard to the alignment of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable--be substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.
13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty 20, wherein it was held as follows:
"24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of National Highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides."20
(2011) 12 SCC 69 31 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J
14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated 07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a national highway. The Hon'ble Division Bench, by referring to various precedent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, more particularly Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:
"12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of existing highways are vital for development of infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the project relating to development and maintenance after thorough study by experts.
13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification issued under the Act, award has already been passed on 10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021 have even received the compensation. The project is virtually complete except for a small stretch."
15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section 3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government--ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself 32 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes relating to compensation.
16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent Civil Court.
17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances, warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or 21 1998 (8) SCC 1 33 wp_34738_2024 NBK, J where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged."
18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities; nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 615 affected persons, only the present petitioners are challenging the acquisition with the claim of compensation for structures, trees, etc., and also rehabilitation and resettlement benefits. Further, despite there being certain delay in obtaining environmental clearance, the very acquisition notifications cannot be set aside, as the issuance of notifications and their publication in Mana Telangana (Telugu) and The Hindu (English) newspapers, and considering of objections are prima facie not in dispute. The contention of the petitioners that the newspapers have little circulation and the petitioners were not aware cannot be countenanced, as primarily they submitted their objections.
19. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved, the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and therefore the petitioners are not remediless.
34wp_34738_2024 NBK, J
20. In light of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kushala Shetty (supra), and Whirlpool Corporation (supra), and also the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench in W.A. No.774 of 2024, dated 07.08.2024, this Court does not find any exceptional circumstances to entertain the writ petitionbypassing the statutory mechanism provided under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
21. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of, relegating the petitioners to avail the statutory remedy under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 and thereafter, if necessary, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. No costs. Interim order dated 10.12.2024 stands vacated. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________________ JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA 07th April, 2026 ksm